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This project is the product of a grant provided by the Ford 
Foundation, West Africa office, and warehoused and administered 
by the Diamond Awards for Media Excellence Trust Fund. The ed-
itor and contributors to the book are grateful especially to Mr. 
Innocent Chukwuma, Resident Representative in the Lagos office 
and Dr. Paul Nwulu, Head of the Media Desk at the office. The 
book, consisting of thirteen chapters on various aspects of the 
media in the Fourth Republic, has its origins in the approval of the 
Foundation following a proposal sent to it by me to do an extend-
ed paper, entitled Watchdogs or Captured Media? A Study of the 
Role of the Media in Nigeria’s Emergent Democracy 1999-2015. 
Funded by the Ford Foundation, the paper, published as a 
monograph, was submitted in November 2016, thereby providing 
the basis for a full length edited book on the subject. To bring 
out comparative perspectives from other African countries, it was 
decided to include the experiences of Ghana, Kenya and South Af-
rica, so that Nigerian readers can both compare and contrast how 
our experiences since 1999 resemble, as well as differ from the 
trajectory of State-media relations in these other countries. One 
of the highlights of the project was the hosting of an international 
seminar in Lagos on September 5 and 6, 2017 in which all the con-
tributors presented their prospective chapters to a panel of schol-
ars, serving as peer reviewers for the purpose of refinement and 
cross-fertilization of ideas. The conference was rewarding in that it 
helped to syncronize, as well as clarify ideas, providing a common 
ground, from which the contributors could proceed to finalize the 
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outcome of their researches.
What is contained in these pages, therefore, is the updated 
version of the contributions, following the criticisms and valuable 
suggestions at the Lagos conference. The contributors sought to 
answer the question to varying extents of the degree to which the 
Nigerian media in its print, electronic and digital forms had kept 
the traditions of a watchdog media alive or whether it had been 
captured by the political class through the familiar spoil-sharing 
arrangement, which characterize much of Nigerian politics. It is my 
hope that we have done justice, reasonably, to the enterprise of 
illuminating the role, changing profile, record and orientation of 
the media in the context of Nigeria’s wobbling semi-democracy.
Those who have contributed to shaping the ideas and perspec-
tives set down in this book are too numerous to mention. It is 
important, however, to mention the coordinating role of Mr. Lanre 
Idowu, supervising Trustee of DAME for providing the stimulating 
atmosphere under which the work was begun and completed. Of 
course, the editor and panel of contributors bear responsibility for 
the weaknesses and shortcomings of the book.
Professor Ayo Olukotun
Oba (Dr) Sikiru Kayode Adetona Professorial Chair in Governance
Department of Political Science
Olabisi Onabanjo University, Ago Iwoye.




Gentle Giants in a Wild Jungle
This is a project of extensive institutional and intellectual col-
laboration at various levels: between the grant giver (the Ford 
Foundation) and, on the other hand, the “middle man” (Diamond 
Awards for Media Excellence), as well as the recipient (who is also 
the distinguished editor (Professor Ayo Olukotun) of this import-
ant volume, and his eleven indefatigable collaborators. This is a 
commendable project, attesting to what respectful collaborative 
efforts can accomplish. 
Watchdog or Captured Media? A Study of the Role of the Media in 
Nigeria’s Emergent Democracy, 1999-2016 is an extraordinarily im-
pressive book, pitched to enliven the horizon of an African reader-
ship. It draws on the vast experiences of scholars and practitioners, 
thus giving the book its breadth and depth, and foregrounds the 
agency of the Nigerian state along with the excesses of its lead-
ership. In its capacious scope, the book offers us an opportunity 
to understand Africa’s giant nation, provoking our wonder and 
admiration for dedicated journalists, as well as empathy for state 
protagonists. Professor Ayo Olukotun, as a very able editor, has a 
tremendous capacity to bring people together, to distil their dif-
ferent insights into a coherent whole, and to provide a new light 
on the great issues of the moment. No doubt, he has assembled 
essays, which constitute these golden chapters to whet the intel-
lectual appetite of media experts and the general reader.
The contributors have been very carefully chosen, as they com-
prise luminary mainstream journalists, writers, human rights activ-
ists, teachers and professors of journalism, scholars, and editors. 
As distinguished writers, their diversity is very much reflected in 
the rich opinions and analyses on such broad and thematic topic 
as the media and the state, with chapters that cover various issues. 
For example, there are comparative discussions of Ghana by Pro-
fessor Kwame Karikari, former head of Ghana’s broadcasting house 
and a seasoned journalism professor; Kenya by Peter Kimani, an-
other seasoned media expert; South Africa by Professor Abiodun 
Salawu; digital media co-authored by Professor Lai Oso and Dr. 
Tunde Akanni; two chapters on the coverage of religious conflicts, 
one by Dr. Nathaniel Danjibo, the other by Professor Olukotun 
and Margaret Ayansola Jesuminure; state media relations by Pro-
fessor Chris Ogbondah; technology and ownership by Olukotun; 
the Freedom of Information Act by Edaetan Ojo; Corruption in the 
media by Lanre Idowu; television and democracy by Dr Oluyinka 
Esan; and talk radio by Funke-Treasure Durodola.
The guiding central narrative of the book is one of power and 
responsibility: if, as it is assumed, that the media is tasked with 
shaping society and curbing the excesses of those in leadership 
positions, how successful has it been? This is an important que-
ry as it relates to the conceptual balance of power in society, an 
informed citizenry, and critical opinions. And as to the specific 
years in focus—1999 to 2016, the Nigerian Fourth Republic, the 
period following long interlude of military rule—the connection 
of the media to which democracy was both critical and crucial. In-
deed, the selection of an era brings the essays into focus, whereby 
the book engagingly informs us of the place of the media in the 
Fourth Republic, covering its contributions, constraints, and chal-
lenges. The competent introduction by the editor, Ayo Olukotun, 
the scholar-cum-practitioner, places the book in its proper context 
and, in the final analysis, supplies a useful overview for its readers.
As to the value of the watchdog credentials of the media, there 
can be no doubt. That, indeed, is why older democracies have 
treated the media as the Fourth Estate (or Realm), following the 




three organs of government. Also, with the media as a watchdog, 
shocking scandals have to be exposed, while corruption has to be 
reported in the process, the false claims of politicians have to be 
ridiculed and, as a result, authoritarian governments do not want 
these activities in the public domain. Instead, they endeavour to 
force the media merely to report and praise, falsely pretending 
that both the media and the government are mutual collaborators 
in nation-building projects. 
The contributions of this book are manifold, but I plan to focus 
on six aspects that interest me. The first one is that the core query 
it raises is not ambiguous: Did Nigeria produce a captive media or 
that of watchdogs in the formative years of its post-military de-
mocracy? The answers are more than clarified in all the chapters. 
In this clarity, the book moves us beyond the narrow conceptual-
izations of the media around communication tools and policies as 
well as news gathering. Highlighted are the more critical issues of 
the forces that shape the media, and what the media itself is trying 
to shape. 
In this symbiotic conception, the second major contribution, 
the book creates a dialogue among and between media profes-
sionals and theorists. The role of the media as a watchdog derives 
from the expectation of the public that it should hold government 
accountable: the objectives of setting up private media in relation 
to the government, as stated in Section 22 of the 1999 Constitu-
tion, enjoining the media to “monitor governance.”
To be commended is the comparative dimension that the book 
supplies, the third main contribution. State-media relations are 
not peculiar to Nigeria, which may have informed the decision to 
undertake comparative work, including South Africa, Kenya, and 
Ghana. Can an African model emerge? Is one country better than 
the other? Evidence is provided on Ghana, Kenya and South Africa 
to show some similarities with and differences from Nigeria.
Tensions in state-media relations fill the pages of the book; as 
well as the challenges in reforming various spaces and institu-
tions. This, to me, constitutes the book’s fourth contribution. It is 
right to seek and fight for freedom of information as Ojo argues 
in chapter three.While it is a fact that media scholars and profes-
sionals criticize themselves, the profession, and content delivery 
is one of the most significant aspects of the book. For example, 
Lanre Idowu devotes an entire chapter to corruption. Internal cri-
ses within some media organisations and conflicts with the state 
have brought about some power decline of the media, as we no-
tice in chapter ten on Kenya. The linkages between the media and 
democracy are acutely represented in chapter 6. Major aspects of 
governance, especially the core ones of peace and conflicts, are 
illuminated in notable manners, as in the case of chapters 7 and 8. 
The media is visible in reporting all major national issues, includ-
ing the various perspectives of leading figures on a wide range of 
issues, as well as criticism of state underperformance.
A fifth contribution is the cogent analysis of the problems that 
beset the media: a combined newspaper circulation that is less 
than half a million a day; the challenges of living in a failing state 
where the citizens are denied access to basic human needs; and 
the media split into competing identities—ethnic, religious, re-
gional—with divisive results. If the nation itself is sliced into iden-
tity components, so too do separate media outlets serve Muslims 
and Christians, Yoruba and Igbo. In spite of these problems, the 
book argues that the media is taken seriously by those in power, 
and by the public who respect journalists who are pro-democra-
cy and pro-development. The state exercises forms of control via 
its ability to grant licenses, and uses its dominance in advertise-
ment to punish newspapers that criticize it. The era was predict-
ably marked by tension as the retired military general who came 
to power in 1999 not only won an election that did not generate 
trust, but his mindset was still that of an autocrat. As noted in the 
book, there were cases of journalists who were arrested, closure of 
newspaper houses, the shutdown of Freedom Radio in 2006, and 
one television station had its license suspended. 
Following that is the sixth contribution that speaks to improve-
ment, significantly regarding using technology more effectively, 
and how to deliver news in a media age.
As the very first book on the media during this era, it is a pi-




oneer work that will be referenced in all subsequent books. The 
future is too hard to predict, but I would like to assume that the 
media will continue to assert itself, fight for freedom, and speak 
for the poor and the marginalized. The public will expect both the 
state and the media to show accountability. The means of dissem-
inating information will become more expansive and digitized. 
The heterogeneous citizens living in a plural society will equally 
be served by a heterogeneous media fully connected to various 
groups. The respected media will not support corruption and en-
able authoritarianism. State control of the media will give way to 
privatized ownership with a voice. To draw from the United States 
especially, the left has shown the pervasive failures of corporate 
media (in terms of what is called the media monopoly) and even 
so-called public media (NPR and PBS), and has looked instead to 
independent media, including community radio, none of which 
would be considered privatized.
In essence, readers of this impressive book and I have a lot of 
work to do, which is to empower the media to reform the state. 
There is a question we need to address: how are we, as margin-
alized citizens, empowered to empower the media? Issues of ac-
countability and good governance involve not just the media but 
all of us as citizens. As we live in a mismanaged Nigerian state 
which, like a jungle, requires being tamed, we have to turn the 
media into wild dogs that can not only bark but bite. We have to 
invest the media with positive political influence. We must know 
the main source from which our people get the news the most, 
and in the process, to penetrate those to offer critical interpre-
tations of the news they provide. Where the possibility of good 
leadership exists, the media must be non-corrupt in its internal 
workings to support accountability. In a plural society, the media 
must reflect that plurality so that minority and marginalized voices 
are not suppressed.
In the end, watchful citizens should be able to harness the pow-
er they have in the age of social media. Platforms, websites and 
apps are legion, with university students and teenagers possess-
ing more experience than their parents’ generation. Social media 
will continue to become part of Nigeria’s culture, hence it should 
reform Nigerian politics and its space. Indeed, social media should 
force the traditional media to reform itself, and it should provide 
ideas to reform the country and create the network to offer a more 
youthful leadership that will revolutionize the state.
Toyin Falola, 
The Jacob and Frances Sanger Mossiker Chair in the Humanities
& University Distinguished Professor, 




Chris Wolumati Ogbondah is a professor of journalism, and 
former coordinator of the mass communication program in the 
Department of Communication Studies, University of Northern 
Iowa. He has also taught in Nigeria and the United Arab Emirates. 
He holds B.A. (Hons.) degree in journalism from the University of 
Nigeria, Nsukka; MA in journalism from the University of Nebraska 
at Omaha and Ph.D in journalism from Southern Illinois University 
at Carbondale, Illinois.
Chris Ogbondah is the author of The press in Nigeria: An anno-
tated bibliography; Military regimes and the press in Nigeria, 1966-
1993, and State-press relations in Nigeria, 1993-1998: Human 
rights and democratic development. Among the scholarly journals 
where his articles have appeared are: Public Relations Quarterly, 
Gazette: International Journal of Communication, Political Com-
munication and Persuasion, Afrika Spectrum, African Issues, Africa 
Media Review as well as book chapters on media in Africa.
Professor Ogbondah was a member of the survey team of Free-
dom House, New York that ranks the countries of the world on 
the scale of press freedom. He was a news reporter and program 
producer at then WNTV/WNBS, Ibadan, and Director of News and 
Current Affairs at the Rivers State Television (RSTV), and Nigerian 
Television Authority (NTA), Port Harcourt. Ogbondah was Group 
Sports Editor and Assistant Editor at The Tide in Port Harcourt, 
and a reporter at six newspapers in the United States of America, 
including The Grand Rapids Press, Michigan and Lexington News, 
Missouri.
Professor Ogbondah is a four-time recipient of the American 
Press Institute Fellowship, and the American Society of Newspa-
per Editors (ASNE) Excellence in Journalism Fellowship. He is a re-
cipient of the State of Iowa Board of Regents Award for Faculty 
Excellence. 
Edetaen Ojo is Executive Director of Media Rights Agenda in 
Lagos, which works to promote and defend freedom of expres-
sion in Nigeria.  Mr. Ojo has worked on Freedom of Information, 
media freedom and freedom of expression, media development, 
Internet freedom, human rights and democracy issues in Nige-
ria, regionally and internationally for over 20 years. He is Co-chair 
and a member of the National Steering Committee (NSC) of the 
Open Government Partnership (OGP) in Nigeria. He also currently 
chairs the Steering Committee of the African Freedom of Expres-
sion Exchange (AFEX), a network of freedom of expression organi-
zations in Africa; and Chair of the Board of Directors of the Media 
Foundation for West Africa (MFWA), based in Accra, Ghana.  He is 
also a member of the Governing Council of the Africa Freedom of 
Information Centre (AFIC) in Kampala, Uganda; and a member of 
the Board of Directors of International Media Support (IMS), an 
international media development organization based in Copenha-
gen, Denmark; in addition to many other roles he plays in Nigeria, 
across Africa and globally.
Abiodun Salawu is Professor of Journalism, Communication 
and Media Studies and Director of the research entity, Indigenous 
Language Media in Africa (ILMA) at the North-West University, 
South Africa. He has taught and researched journalism for over 
two decades in Nigeria and South Africa.
Prior to his academic career, he practiced journalism in a num-
ber of print media organisations in Nigeria. He has to his credit, 
scores of scholarly publications in academic journals and books. 
He has also edited three books and authored one. He is a regular 
presenter of papers at local and international conferences. He is a 
co-vice chair of the journalism section of IAMCR and a member of 
editorial/advisory boards of a number of journals. He is rated by 
the NRF as an established researcher and he is a member of the 
Codesria’s College of Senior Academic Mentors.




Lanre Idowu is a writer, editor, trainer and author with a rich 
experience and deep interest in the workings of the Nigerian me-
dia. He received BA, History, University of Lagos, Akoka, 1979; MA, 
Public Communication, Fordham University, New York, 1982. A 
former High School Teacher  in Lagos, he was a Staff Writer at Dai-
ly Times, 1982; Reporter, The Guardian, 1983; Assistant Editor, The 
Democrat Weekly, 1984-85; Information Analyst, USIS, 1985-86; 
Associate Editor, Deputy Editor, Editor and Deputy Editor-in-Chief, 
ThisWeek, 1986-89; Copywriter/Executive Director, Richard Munds 
Ltd., 1989-91; and Editor-in-Chief, Media Review and CEO, Di-
amond Publications since 1991. For a decade, he has been the 
spokesperson for the Diocese of Lagos Mainland (Church of Nige-
ria, Anglican Communion).
He is the Author of The Popular is Seldom Correct: Selected Es-
says on Governance, Media and Democracy (2009), Bridges of Mem-
ory: Poems of Lanre Idowu (2009) and Editor of various books such 
as Voices from Within: Essays on Nigerian Journalism in honour of 
Sam Amuka (2005; 2015), Nigerian Columnists and their Art (2009; 
2011), Master of His Age: The Story of Anthony Enahoro (2011), 
Watching the Watchdogs: Media Review at 20 (2011), and The Ed-
itor and the State: Perspectives on Media and Governance (2013). 
His latest works, Uneven Steps: The Story of the Nigerian Guild of 
Editors (1961-2016), Media on my Mind and Songs of Childhood: 
Poems of Lanre Idowu will be released in 2018. 
In appreciation of his training prowess, editing skills and con-
tributions to the development to the Nigerian media, he received 
respectively the Distinguished Trainer’s Award of the Sierra Leone 
Association of Journalists (2002), the Fellowship of the Nigerian 
Guild of Editors (2003), and the Lifetime Achievement Award of 
the Wole Soyinka Centre for Investigative Reporting (2011).  He is 
the supervising trustee of the Diamond Awards for Media Excel-
lence (DAME) Trust Fund, an annual initiative to reward outstand-
ing persons and their works in the media since 1992.
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partment of Political Science, Olabisi Onabanjo University, where 
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Akanni has served as a resource person for training, editing 
tasks, stakeholder mapping as well as for long and short term 
consultancies for local and international organizations including 





This section introduces the subject matter of this book, under-
lines its point of departure, as well as embeds it within historical 
and theoretical perspectives. As the title of the book suggests, it 
deals in 13 chapters with the role, changing profile, record and 
contexts of activities of the Nigerian media in the period between 
1999, when the Fourth Republic commenced, until 2016, a year 
after the historic election of 2015. As known, in 2015, for the first 
time, an opposition party, the All Progressives Congress, won 
elections against the ruling People’s Democratic Party, which for 
fifteen years had held power at the centre. It may be of interest 
to remark that no substantial published work has been written 
up till this book, with respect to the role of the Nigerian media 
in their print, electronic and digital forms regarding Nigerian de-
mocracy. Hence, the chapters in this book, which had been written 
by experts and practitioners in the field of communication and 
cognate disciplines, seek to fill a gap in the literature. The writings 
also amplify the subject of discourse, which is essentially woven 
around the extent to which the media have maintained their roles 
as watchdogs in the Fourth Republic, by comparative case studies 
from Ghana, Kenya and South Africa, given that these countries 
have in African terms, substantial media presence.
AN OVERVIEW OF THE BOOK
The Nigerian media, in term of size, are the biggest in Africa, 
followed by Kenya and South Africa, and are regarded as the epi-
centre of Nigeria’s magnificent civil society. They have emerged as 
the arbiters of national conversation, partly because of their an-
tecedents in the seminal anti-colonial and anti-military struggles. 
2
Watchdogs or Captured Media? . . . 
Most recently, they played heroic oppositional roles with respect 
to the brutal dictatorships of the 1990s and are regarded as the 
vanguard of the crusade to return Nigeria to civilian rule after 16 
years of unbroken military rule. Nobel Laureate, Wole Soyinka, ob-
served in the twilight of military rule that:
The press, and let me seize this very opportunity to stress this, has 
been magnificent, heroic and one of these days, when there is more 
pleasure, we are going to erect a statute; I am going to see personally 
to this, that a statue for heroism of the press is erected at a prominent 
place in this country, we must never forget (The Guardian, October 17, 
1998, p. 5).
As I have argued elsewhere, (Olukotun, 2017a), it is possible 
to speculate that Soyinka has not yet erected this monument be-
cause there is not enough pleasure in Nigeria or in the media, 
which are increasingly, despite their expansion and increasing 
digitization, accused by their critics of having been captured by 
the political class, and consequently, have lost the bite they once 
had. Illustrative of these critical voices is an article entitled “More 
freedom, more problems” (Agbaje and Adebanwi, 2003). In oth-
er words, even though the media have enjoyed more freedom in 
the period since 1999, freedom which was deepened by the pass-
ing of the Freedom of Information Act in 2011, there are critical 
doubts whether they have lived up to the billings predicted by 
their crusading role under the military, when they invented rebel-
lious communication outlets, such as alternative newspapers and 
a pirate radio to enhance the struggle for democracy. These are 
some of the main issues that the various contributors to this book 
have grappled with. 
In the next two sections of this chapter, I sketch out topography 
of the media, as well as conceptualize the political and account-
ability terrains, including the role of the state in what is often de-
scribed as a low quality democracy or a semi-democracy.
Topography of the Nigerian Media 1999-2017
Following the Oxford Dictionary of Media and Communication, 
the mass media are conceptualised to include the “various tech-
nological means of producing and disseminating messages and 
cultural forms... to large, widely dispersed, heterogenous audienc-
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es” (Chandler and Murdy, 2011:257).
Ordinarily, this would include electronic and digital avenues of 
communication, as well as books, films, theatre and popular cul-
ture outlets. For convenience and conciseness, however, we zero 
in on newspapers and magazines, as well as television, radio and 
online news sites.
The media in Nigeria and much of Africa are best understood 
in the context of their pre-colonial origins in oral narratives and 
festivals, as well as their colonial and postcolonial identities as en-
ablers of authoritarian rule, at least until the democratic transitions 
of the 1990s. Bourgault (1995) alludes to the authoritarian legacy 
in broadcasting, whereby Nigerian journalists conduct interviews 
for politicians without interrogating or critically appraising what 
they have to say. On one occasion, as Bourgault narrated it, a tele-
vision journalist actually slept off while the politician was narrating 
in a monotone the so-called achievement of government. Broad-
casting, despite liberalisation and the growth of a fragile private 
sector, is largely state-owned. The fact that coup-makers in the 
years of military rule employed predawn broadcast to announce 
change of governments meant that a certain apprehension and 
circumspection continue to trail state regulation of the broadcast-
ing sector. Hence, state radio and television tend to have national 
reach as opposed to most private broadcasters who have limited 
reach, although this is offset by their capacity to connect to satel-
lite broadcaster through DSTV; even as at 2016, and in spite of the 
approval, after a long struggle, of community radios, broadcasting 
is still tightly regulated while “the decision to grant a broadcasting 
license remains a subjective presidential privilege”. 
Other constraints include: High licensing fees, which restrict 
ownership to the wealthy, as well as restrictive clauses in the 
broadcasting code, which limit editorial content and program-
ming. Broadcast managers, who test the limit of regulation, have 
done so to their own regret as the shutdown of the Kano-based 
Freedom Radio in 2016, and the detention, for 78 hours of the 
editors of Channels Television in 2008 illustrate.
In the print media, the newspapers especially, there is a tradi-
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tion of lively outspokenness, partly because it is private sector-led, 
partly because of the history of civil agitation dating back to co-
lonial rule and also because Nigeria’s ethnic and religious diver-
sities make it difficult for dictatorship to operate since ethnicity 
and religion can become rallying point of civil agitation by the ex-
cluded. Even at that, there are official constraints and persecution 
to independent newspapers, as I show in a subsequent chapter, 
advertisers—and government is the largest advertisers--tend to 
blacklist critical publications, sentencing, in effect, to a short lifes-
pan. Considering that newspapers operate a shoe-string budget 
and do not print many copies, the subtle denial of advertising be-
comes important. Of course, when subtle hints do not avail, direct 
methods are employed. Examples abound in the Fourth Republic 
of the shutdown of publications such as Weekly Insider in 2004, 
as well as arrest of editors and the seizure of copies of indepen-
dent newspapers, such as occurred in June 2014 when the Nigeri-
an Army carried out searches, leading to confiscation of copies of 
Leadership, The Nation, Daily Trust and the Punch. The ejection of 
the State House Correspondent of the Punch, Olalekan Adetayo, 
in 2017 over a story connected to the ill-health of President Mu-
hammadu Buhari followed the same trend.
It should be noted as well, that Nigeria’s ethnic and religious 
diversities are reflected in the media and become obvious in times 
of ethno-religious conflicts involving opposed ethnic and reli-
gious groups. For example, Mahmud Jega, former editor of the 
Kaduna-based New Nigerian, and currently, the Executive Director 
of the Abuja-based newspaper, Daily Trust, argued that: 
As far as I can see, among the biggest national newspapers, such as 
The Guardian, Punch and Vanguard (all Lagos-based) regional slant is 
most consigned to letters, columns and editorials. However, in troubled 
times it bursts out to the front pages and is easily seen in news selec-
tion and drowning out of other news (Jega, 2003:18).
The issues arising from dichotomous perceptions of national is-
sues and ethno-religious conflicts are discussed in two chapters in 
the book. Worthy of note is the fragility of the media despite their 
visibility and loquaciousness. Newspaper titles appear, disappear 
and reappear with frequency, a trend also replicated in other Afri-
5
can countries such as Kenya. Similarly, it is doubtful if any newspa-
per prints up to a hundred thousand per day, while the combined 
circulation of newspapers is believed to be less than five hundred 
thousand per day. Nonetheless, the print media command an in-
fluence and prestige, for historical reasons, more than circulation 
figures would indicate. They are taken fairly seriously by policy 
makers and appear to have an influence depending on the con-
juncture on policy making (Olukotun, 2004a, 2004b; Omotoso, 
2018). Nonetheless, the rapid demise of newspapers in the con-
text of the poor working conditions of journalists has accentuated 
a moral and ethical crises discussed in a separate chapter in the 
book.
Finally, the Nigerian media, as several observers have noted op-
erate within the free market, capitalist system and do not harbour 
left leaning varieties as you find in some European countries. In 
this sense, and as Oyovbaire (2001) noted, it is a status quo media. 
According to him:
The radicalism of the media as an anti-colonial and pro-independence 
vehicle, as an anti-bad governance vehicle, as an anti-military rule and 
pro democracy institution is really no more than being only radicalism 
of the right or centre ideology. It is indeed a capitalist press. There is yet 
to exist in the Nigerian media scene any left wing or socialistically ideo-
logical newspaper or magazine of stature or long duration. For obvious 
reasons, the same goes for the broadcast media – in a real sense Nige-
ria has only an establishment or status quo media (Oyovbaire, 2001:16).
This is unsurprising given that socialist ideology did not take 
root in Nigeria, while in the Fourth Republic, ideological debates 
have been noticeably absent from political discourse. It is inter-
esting that the posture and leaning, largely centrist, of the me-
dia have not changed and is unlikely to in the foreseeable future, 
despite increased internet penetration and the popularity of the 
social media in a country where youths constitute a preponderant 
proportion of the population.
Media as Watchdog in a Semi-Democracy
The idea of the media as watchdog of democratic liberties is 
entrenched in liberal, social and socialist democracies. It speaks to 
such other ideas and concepts as muckraking, investigative jour-
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nalism, exposures of scandals and corruption in high places, as 
well as being vigilant generally over the conduct of public officials. 
It is regarded as the bedrock of democracies established or devel-
oping. In practical terms, it spans a variety of practices, such as the 
fact-checking of claims made by public figures, journalists acting 
as undercover agents in order to collect information that they will 
otherwise not have had access to, as well as generally, speaking 
truth to power. This view of the cardinal functions of the media is 
quite different from those purveyed by concepts such as develop-
mental journalism or journalism of nation-building, which privi-
lege the role of the media as nation-builders or as sacrificing some 
of their liberties to mainstream national integration and economic 
development (Coronel, 2010). Of course, there are less glamorous 
sides to watchdog reporting, such as their alleged tendencies to 
play the politics of scandals or get the public so inundated with 
stories of corruption that they are no longer shocked by revelation 
upon revelation. 
Obviously, the role of the media as watchdog is a function of 
their historical antecedents in any particular country, the media 
ownership structure, constitutional protection for civil liberties, an 
attentive public which provides a ready audience and feedback for 
that role, as well as previous successes or failures of such advo-
cacies. It should be pointed out that in Nigeria, as in most African 
countries, we are dealing with an authoritarian state carrying a 
large residue of military autocracy in electoral forms. Regarding 
Nigeria’s transition from military to semi-democracy, Adekanye 
(1999:10) informed pertinently that “the authoritarian regime from 
which this country has just transited was not just a military backed 
one but specifically military in character long entrenched in gov-
ernment and with a surfeit of corrupt interest in hanging on to 
power”. 
Nothing illustrates this viewpoint better than the fact that first 
eight years of the Fourth Republic featured presidency of a retired 
military General elected to power in elections widely criticised for 
their imperfections. That apart, retired generals, as well as secu-
rity forces, have been quite visible in what can be described as 
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a civilian-autocracy. This situation described by Zakaria (1997) as 
democratic illiberalizm is replicated in most African countries and 
often, as Ogbondah argues in his contribution to this book that 
the watchdog role of the media can only be perpetuated at a cost. 
Unsurprisingly, therefore, in the period under study, Nigerian jour-
nalists suffered peremptory arrests, persecution of critical media, 
forcible closure of newspapers, such as occurred in September 
2004 of Weekly Insider, shut down of Freedom Radio in 2006, the 
suspension from broadcasting of Channels Television in 2008 and 
detention of its editors, as well as the arrest in January 2017 of the 
publisher of Premium Times over a report critical of the Chief of 
Army Staff, General Tukur Buratai. As Berger (2012:140) noted:
Control and repression of mass communications via the media has 
played its part in preventing the industry from reaching its wider po-
tential. Corresponding to top-down and despotic rule, media is widely 
treated as a tool by the powerful who (that)  have little interest in di-
alogue with subject populations. While state power in much of Africa 
is successfully abused by rulers to stay in power- and this includes de-
ployment of state-owned media (often the largest component within 
the media sector), in other respects dysfunctionality is the order of the 
day. This latter feature impacts on the infrastructure for media (such as 
electricity).
In other words, and as I have argued elsewhere (Olukotun, 
2013), the Nigerian media are caught between a failing state and 
a deformed public sphere, to the extent that a predatory state is 
unable to guarantee the minimal conditions for its medium term 
survival, and harbour several infrastructural deficits such as epi-
leptic power supply and ineffective protection of citizens includ-
ing journalists. Another dimension of the problem which imping-
es on media capacity to effectively play the role of a watchdog 
concerns the bifurcation of the Nigerian public sphere into eth-
nic, religious, regional and primordial divisions. Indeed, Adebanwi 
(2002) has argued that there is no national media in Nigeria but 
an Arewa media, Nkenga and Ngbati media, corresponding to Ni-
geria’s major ethnic groups. In the same connection, conversation 
on the internet is characterized according to Sieptulnik (2002) “by 
frequent postings in in-group linguistic codes, for example, Ni-
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gerian English and Pidgin and the formation of splinter listerves 
and netgroups such as Ananet, the Yorubanet, corresponding to 
the divided nature of the Nigerian public sphere as it often cleav-
ages along gender, ethnic, regional and political lines” (Spittlenick, 
2000:189). Obviously, a divided public sphere suggests that the 
watchdog role of the media is a differentially perceived across the 
nation’s ethnic and religious fault lines. To put it differently, one 
man’s social crusader is another man’s ethnic irredentist. 
Equally important, as I show in my chapter on the economic 
and technological profile of the media, is the fragility of media 
institutions, many of which appear, capsize sometimes, reappear 
only to go off the media scene terminally. Although this is not pe-
culiar to Nigeria, and in part reflects a global trend of media vola-
tility and high mortality rate, its Nigerian dimension is remarkable. 
Taken along with the poor working conditions of journalists and 
their survival through the prevalent Brown Envelope syndrome, 
which Lanre Idowu discusses in his contribution, the context of 
watchdog journalism is far from auspicious.
In spite of these limitations, the idea of the Nigerian media as 
watchdog of the public space is deeply embedded in Nigeria’s 
media history and ideology. In fact, it finds expression and consti-
tutional recognition in Section 22 of the 1999 Constitution, which 
enjoins the media to “monitor governance and to uphold the re-
sponsibility and accountability of the government to the people”. 
Buttressing this entrenched tradition is a senior Nigerian journalist 
who argued that “the media are charged with the role of holding 
government accountable and to guard against the abuse of pow-
er. Hence, the need to raise countervailing structures of, surveil-
lances to monitor government’s activities and stem an inherent 
disposition towards excess (Oseni, 1995:3).
We find throughout the period under discussion that this role 
has been exercised by the media on such occasions as the reso-
lute opposition of the media to Obasanjo’s ‘third term agenda’ 
which would have illegally extended his tenure, to reports of cor-
ruption in the Jonathan administration which led to the easing 
out of a former Minister of Aviation, Ms. Stella Oduah, and to the 
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exposure of the rot in the Nigerian Police College by Channels 
Television triggering thereby a national outcry and official redress. 
So, criticisms of the media as captured and incorporated into the 
spoils-sharing arrangement of the political elite have some bite, 
but does not state the whole truth. The watchdog may no longer 
be as active as it once was; it may even manifest signs of ill health 
as in the increasing cases of corruption in the media, but it still 
barks and has proved frequently that it is capable of scaring away 
intruders and predators. In the concluding section of this chapter, 
I give a summary of the contributions made by different scholars 
to the voyage of understanding the Nigerian media in the Fourth 
Republic.
Section Three: Summary of the Chapters
The chapter by Prof. Karikari narrates the issues through a de-
tailed focus on the Ghanaian media. He throws up the contradic-
tion that, while the 1992 First Republican Constitution grants wide 
ranging freedom to the media, the performance of the watchdog 
role is encumbered by a salad of factors such as the influence 
of proprietors, political and economic patronage, corruption of 
journalists as well as weak professional norms. Hence, while the 
media, including the usually tepid state-owned segments, have 
gone out of their ways to serve as watchdogs to officialdom, there 
is general feeling that the media could have more effectively per-
formed this role than they have done.
Employing buttressing data from interviews conducted with 
journalists, Karikari maintained that out of five journalists inter-
viewed, four of them described media performanceof their watch-
dog role as below average. The overwhelming position that arises 
from the scholar’s empirical data is aptly summarized by one of his 
respondents who said in answer to a question that: 
“I don’t think they (the media) have done well. May be some pockets 
do a good job. With the coming into being of the Constitution of the 
Fourth Republic and the liberalization of the media, you would think 
that when quantity improved quality would follow... But what you find 
is that most of our journalists are following the ministers, the district 
chief executives. Our newspapers are filled with a lot of ‘he said’ stories. 
Our newspapers are filled with a lot of PR stories. Even business, when 
Introduction
10
Watchdogs or Captured Media? . . . 
business is doing something it is the PR side of the business story that 
is followed. Who is asking the businesses the critical questions?”
If journalists feel this way about their own colleagues, it is un-
likely that the general public will feel any better about the perfor-
mance of the watchdog role of the Ghanaian media. Nonetheless, 
all hope is not lost given that there are signs here and there of 
the re-awakening of the media to their core functions as well as 
redemptive and emancipatory roles.
The chapter by Prof. Lai Oso and Dr. Tunde Akanni on the Dig-
ital Public Sphere narrates developments in electronic journalism 
and the growth of online platforms within the context of the the-
oretical postulations of the German scholar Jugen Habermas on 
the Public Sphere. Oso and Akanni argue that social media cam-
paigns on digital platforms such as the one involved in sensitis-
ing the public to violence against persons, the increasing political 
use by public officials of Twitter and Facebook, the widening of 
the discursive space by online publications and citizen journalism, 
more than compensate for abuses of digital platforms through 
the spread of fake news, hate speeches and impersonation. They 
make a distinction between institutionalised Citizen Journalism, as 
practised by Premium Times and Cable and non-institutionalized 
Citizen Journalism evidenced by such outlets as Linda Ikeji’s Blog, 
Nairaland and the Nigerian Village Square. Although some of these 
outlets are filled with scandals and sensational news about celeb-
rities, there is a critical mass of outlets that focus on politics and 
widen the democratic space. That is not all. Oso and Akanni go on 
to argue that not only has Citizen Journalism deepened democra-
cy, the online media have revived investigative journalism, citing 
as an example the cases of Sahara Reporters, Premium Times and 
Cable. They conclude that “Citizen Journalism has deepened and 
widened the journalism net to embrace more actors and voices. It 
has further liberalised access to the public sphere.”
Two chapters, one by Dr. Danjibo and the other by Prof. Oluko-
tun and Mrs. Jesuminure deal with media coverage of ethno-re-
ligious conflicts in Nigeria. Danjibo looks at several outbreaks of 
ethno-religious conflicts such as the Sharia Law Crisis, the Miss 
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World Beauty Pageant Crisis as well as the Kidnap of the Chibok 
Girls and the clash between the Nigerian Army and the Shittes in 
2015. He makes the point that the Southern newspapers during 
the Sharia law crisis cast aspersions and demonized Sharia, giving 
the example of the Punch Newspaper (February 17, 2000, p.17) 
which had a bold caption titled “Sharia: Advent of a Millennium 
Monster”.
Danjibo also alludes to gaps in the training of journalists as well 
as their poor investigative skills, Citing the example of the Chi-
bok girls’ saga in which Nigerian newspapers came up with figures 
lower than the ones reported by CNN and Aljazeera. In his words 
“ while the CNN and Aljazeera gave the figure of the kidnapped 
girls as over 270, the Nigerian media, which most of the times are 
not on the combat field, reported far lower figures.” The paper 
by Olukotun and Jesuminure discusses the way in which the me-
dia preponderantly located in Southern Nigeria report and frame 
ethno-religious conflicts. They employ a case study approach to 
investigate the extent to which journalists adopt enemy frames to 
report crises that often break out pitting Christians against Mus-
lims as well as Hausas against Igbos. They take the view that while 
journalists do not precipitate ethno-religious conflicts, once crises 
break out; they tend to define the issues in antagonistic terms. 
Citing the specific example of the Miss World Beauty Peageant 
and the crisis that broke out over ThisDay reportage, they make 
the point that in times of crisis, there comes into play a reinforce-
ment of generic cleavages such as North versus South, and the 
consequent demonization of intra-cleavage differences. On this 
score, they refer to a statement by a former editor of a southern 
newspaper, the Nigerian Tribune, which suffered collateral damage 
in the course of the Miss World Beauty Pageant crisis. According 
to the editor, “Every southern newspaper was taken to be ThisDay 
in the North. Our vehicles could not move freely and our members 
of staff were afraid for their lives, we lost millions of naira”. In oth-
er words, the context of play mobilises the existing cleavages in 
confrontational terms without discrimination about the fine differ-
ences. The chapter closes by recommending instructional strategy 
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through which journalists can embrace conflict sensitive reporting 
in order not to stoke the fires of ethno-religious crisis.
The paper on changing economic, technological and owner-
ship landscapes by Prof. Olukotun locates the discourse on the 
watchdog role of the media within the context of factors such as 
the high mortality of media, protracted defaults on the salaries of 
journalists, the emergence of a partisan journalistic sphere with 
the establishment of media institutions by high profile politicians, 
the emergence of a Netocracy allied to the global public sphere 
among other issues. The paper maintains that the debate on the 
watchdog role of the media must be brought down to the capac-
ity profile of the media, shifting technology and demographics as 
well as the vulnerability of, especially, independent newspapers 
where mortality rate tends to be high. The paper argues that in 
the period under study, the watchdog role of journalists tended 
to assume an irregular character because of the limitations of ca-
pacity and the harsh constraints of an economic milieu hostile to 
business. Hence, while critical and investigative journalism contin-
ued to occur, they certainly did not do so in a sustained agenda 
building manner.
The paper on Corruption in the Nigerian Media by Mr. Lanre 
Idowu situates the discussion on the brown envelope syndrome 
within the context of the extant socio-political conditions of the 
society, the harsh economic milieu and the difficulties of practic-
ing ethical journalism in such a context. He also locates the wide-
spread syndrome at individual, organisational and inter-organisa-
tional levels. Hence, despite what he called “occasional flashes of 
brilliance” on the part of the media, there continues to be man-
ifestations of corruption partly reflecting the decay in the larger 
society. For example, such practices as pack journalism by beat 
associations of journalists which operate like cartels, the payment 
of protection fees by reputation managers of institutions, the 
granting of awards of dubious credibility to non deserving indi-
viduals and organisations are some of the ways in which corrup-
tion manifests in the media. Considering the corrosive effects of 
media corruption, Idowu recommends a clutch of measures which 
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will include the proper funding of media organisations, upgrading 
of skills in media management, naming and shaming mechanisms 
as ways of discouraging ethical infractions as well as a renewed 
attention to the enforcement of journalistic codes. The vicissitudes 
of the anti-corruption struggle in the larger society mounted by 
President Muhamadu Buhari, warn us that combating media cor-
ruption requires a sustained systemic, multi-pronged long term 
struggle, rather than flashes in the pan or insubstantial gestures.
The chapter by Edaetan Ojo on the Road to The Freedom of In-
formation Act and beyond, chronicles in elaborate detail the over 
a decade struggle by journalists and other civil society actors to 
ensure the passing into law of the Bill. Ojo, whose organization, 
Media Rights Agenda, was in the forefront of the crusade, docu-
ments the long drawn struggle which began in 1999 for the pass-
ing of the Bill. He traverses a diverse and complex terrain, which 
includes the advocacy strategies of civil society activists, countless 
meetings with legislators, as well as media campaigns on radio, 
television and print media sustained through the vicissitudes of 
struggle. Apart from these, there were letter writing campaigns, 
short message service or texts directed at the mobile phones of 
legislators, signature campaigns in which MRA assembled several 
hundreds of signed petitions to galvanize support for the Bill, as 
well as the dissemination of educational and enlightenment liter-
ature. In the end, the advocacy paid off with the signing of the Bill, 
thus opening another chapter, as Ojo narrates, in the chequered 
efforts by journalists and civil society to use the Bill as a tool of 
good governance.
Peter Kimani takes a look at the rise, fall and rise of the inde-
pendent media in Kenya. He does this by doing case studies of the 
2007 and 2013 General Elections when the media, the print media 
is his focus, in his words, “capitulated under pressure from inside 
and outside”. The study traces in detail, the ethnic and political 
battles fought by the media, as a section of them enlisted in the 
political fray, which the elections represented. For example, during 
the 2007 election, the Nation was faced with a crisis occasioned 
by political division. As Kimani saw it, there were two camps in 
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the newsroom, one supporting President Kibaki an ethnic Kikuyu, 
while the other supported opposition Chief, Raila Odinga, an eth-
nic Luo. The case study illustrates the emasculation of the watch-
dog role of the media because of partisanship and the penetration 
of the media by ethnic and political struggles. Interestingly, three 
newspapers: the Nation, the Standard and the Star became, for 
a season, the site of these political and ethnic battles. Broadly, 
the same picture prevailed during the 2013 election, when ma-
jor newspapers tended to fracture along ethnic lines. Overall, he 
scores the media a pass mark in terms of their watchdog role.
In his chapter, entitled Elections and The Media, Comparing the 
Experiences of South Africa and Nigeria in 2014 and 2015, Pro-
fessor Abiodun Salawu analyses the watchdog role of the media 
of both countries through the prism of their roles in facilitating 
electoral participation, as well as civic discourse and engagement. 
Based on an empirical survey, he reaches the conclusion that in 
both countries that the media, including the new media, were in 
the forefront, increasing political participation among citizens. Of 
course, there was a higher level of media-led participation and dis-
course in South Africa than Nigeria, because of what he calls, the 
lower use of the media in Nigeria because of electricity shortage 
and other deficits. Hence, there was higher reliance on the new 
media in South Africa for political information during the elections 
than Nigeria, where there is a lower level internet penetration. In 
both countries, the study established that the media, new and old, 
performed vibrant watchdog roles and, therefore, increased polit-
ical participation during the period of the election.
In her contribution entitled, Television and Nigeria’s Democrat-
ic Aspiration, Dr Oluyinka Esan discusses through a selection of 
media text, the role of television in stimulating participation and 
civic engagement in the years under study. She analyses issues 
dealing with contents, changing technology and globalization, as 
they affect the role of television. Of interest is the role of private 
television such as Channels TV with 90 minutes “Sunrise Daily” 
programme. According to her, the programme is “anchored by a 
panel of three hard-nosed interviewers noted for their adversarial” 
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style. In other words, the reach and focus of television, is increas-
ingly broadening attention outside of government officials to take 
on issues that affect the everyday man and woman. She also men-
tioned in the same connection, greater audience reach because 
of the use of indigenous languages, as well as programs targeted 
at youths and lovers of sports. Hence, it is now possible for the 
media through television to build, what she called, “the informed 
citizenry required to make informed decision.”
To complement Esan’s discourse focused on television, Funke 
Treasure-Durodola looks in detail at such features as “Talk Radio”, 
“Phone-in Programmes”, “The President Explains”, all of which 
mainstream the participatory and civic engagement dimensions 
of radio. Treasure, a senior radio journalist, argues that such inter-
ventions as radio magazines like “Kubanji Direct” on Radio Con-
tinental, Raypower’s “Political Platform” and “Fact File”, as well as 
“Wake Up Naija with Funke-Treasure underline the democratic and 
informative potential of radio as an instrument of engagement.
In his chapter on state media relations, Professor Chris Og-
bondah shows that in spite of the formal structures of democratic 
rule in the period since 1999, there are continuities between the 
military years when the Nigerian media struggled against a tight 
leash and the period of formal democracy. True, some of the re-
pressive laws by which the military persecuted the media have 
been removed and journalists are no longer under the jackboots 
of the generals. Better still, there is a Freedom of Information Act 
to empower journalists and civil societies in their struggles for ac-
countability. Nonetheless, as Ogbondah demonstrates, there still 
remain many more miles to be covered in the search for a free 
press. In this connection, the author draws attention to such vio-
lations as media closure and confiscation of publications, threats, 
physical assaults and killings, the use of strategic criminal libel and 
seditious suits, as well as the political control of the media through 
financial constrains, such as the manipulation and high cost of 
broadcasting licenses. Overall, however, there is a better climate 
for journalists to carry out their legitimate functions, but now and 
then there is a reversion to the years of impunity and outright 
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persecution.
CONCLUDING NOTE
 As the preceding narration suggests the scholars have looked 
in fairly considerable detail at various aspects of the role, orien-
tation, performance and constrains of the media in the context of 
Nigeria’s emerging democracy. Obviously, no one book can do 
complete justice to such a complex and variegated topic, but what 
is available here adds up to a substantial examination of the topic. 
For example, we do not deal with dimensions and genres of me-
dia, such as films, theatre, video and indigenous orature, but it is 
our hope that we have sought as a monitor of media performance 
in the context of the question posed at the outset, namely, to what 
extent have the media acted as watchdogs, and to what extent can 
they be described as captive media? I return to this question in the 
concluding chapter of the book. But, it is a delight to have con-
tributed in some meaningful way to filling some of the lacuna in 
the literature on media studies in Africa. As is well known, most of 
the books and publications on media in Africa have been preoc-
cupied with such concerns as newsgathering, the status and role 
conception of media workers, as well as changing communication 
policies in various countries. We jettison these rather narrow per-
spectives in order to capture, as Jakobowicz (1995:129) suggest 
“a series of processes and institutions, such as economic forces, 
international relations, the state and political movement”. It is our 
view that this is a more productive approach to the evolving con-
versation on the impact of the media in a transitional democracy, 
bearing in mind that there has not been enough cross-fertiliza-
tion of ideas between democratic theorists, comparative politics 
scholars and students of communication in Africa. We hope that 
these chapters have gone some way in bridging this gap as well as 
opening up possibilities of further and deeper enquiries into the 
abiding issues and challenges.
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STATE-MEDIA RELATIONS: 
Constraints on Freedom of the Media
By Christian Ogbondah
“In 13 years of democratic rule, the culture of democracy is still 
far from taking firm root in Nigeria. Its tenets are breached with 
sickening regularity….” (The Guardian, January 15, 2013).
 “Since the return of democratic rule in 1999, the Nigeria 
police have scarcely shown that it is willing to play by the rules 
of democratic norms. It still applies bare-knuckle tactics where 
it is not called for.” (ThisDay, January 30, 2007).
Introduction
The above passages from the editorial commentaries of The 
Guardian and ThisDay respectively, epitomize what many Nigeri-
ans believe to be the state of the democratic order in the country 
since May 29, 1999 when Nigeria transitioned from military au-
tocracy to civil democracy. Following the transition, many Nigeri-
ans hoped that arbitrary detention of journalists, closure of media 
houses and confiscation of media products that characterized the 
era of military dictatorship would be committed to the dustbin of 
history. They hoped that the new democratic state would be the 
prime mover of democratic values especially media freedom i.e. 
1
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the right to disseminate diverse views and news without govern-
mental interference. The Daily Champion reflected this hope in its 
editorial of October 11, 2004 when it said, “For a nation that has 
just come out of…years of military dictatorship – bruised, broken 
and battered – the event ushered in much hope for the people.” 
The Guardian reiterated this view in its editorial on May 29, 2013: 
“With the return to civil rule, expectations of Nigerians were high. 
Against the background of the impunity of the past, they expect-
ed the rule of law….Against massive human rights violations; they 
expected the veneration of rights.” 
The Guardian underscored this view in another editorial titled, 
“Citizens and torture,” on October 20, 2014: “Human rights viola-
tion which was once a routine under military rule in Nigeria was 
expected to have come to an end with the inauguration of civilian 
democratic rule in 1999.” 
Nigerians anchored these hopes on the belief that the worst 
form of democracy is better than the most benevolent dictator-
ship. Ironically enough, however, human rights violations espe-
cially restriction of media freedom seems to endure under the 
[new] democratic formation. Notably, the state utilizes the same 
repressive institutions – Nigeria’s brutal police force, the dreaded 
State Security Service (SSS) etc. – used by past military regimes to 
restrict media freedom. This is why in its editorial of May 29, 2013, 
The Guardian said: “The return to democracy after many years of 
military rule…has not brought much of the desired change. If any-
thing, the system has changed, but not the attitude. The personnel 
have changed, but the vices continue.”
The objective of this chapter is to make a critical analysis of the 
obstacles on media freedom in Nigeria within the context of state-
press relations from May 29, 1999 to 2017. To achieve its objective, 
this chapter will first make a brief description of state-press rela-
tions during the era of military rule. This will help provide the con-
text for understanding state-press relations since 1999. After that, 
it will make a detailed examination of legislative and constitutional 
reforms aimed to create the enabling environment for media free-
dom in the post-junta era. Next, the chapter will highlight the ma-
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jor obstacles on media freedom -- problems that seem to persist 
for the media in Nigeria, and therefore ought to be solved as part 
of the on-going [re]democratization in the country. The chapter 
concludes with recommendations on how to mitigate these ob-
stacles in order to catapult Nigeria to a vibrant democracy. 
Overview of State-Press Relations Under Military Rule 
Nigerian press did not enjoy a sweetheart relationship with the 
state during the periods of military rule that lasted for nearly thir-
ty years. State-press relations during those periods was tenuous 
as noted by several scholars, including Adekanye (1997), Ibelema 
(2003), Pate (2011; 2002), Adeyemi (1995), Agbaje (1993), Ajibade 
(2003, 1999), Aboaba (1979), Oreh (1976) and Onyedike (1984). 
Others who made this point are Utomi (1981), Dare (1972), Og-
bondah (1994; 2003), Youm and Ogbondah (1990-1991), Seng and 
Hunt (1986) and Hunt and Seng (1988). However, Jose (1975) and 
Ekwelie (1979) claimed that the press was [relatively] free during 
the Yakubu Gowon regime. But Ogbondah (1991; 1989), Ona-
goruwa (1977) and Olorunsola (1977) have fiercely challenged this 
claim with analyses of the Amakiri case of 1973. The Amakiri case 
arose when at the instruction of a state military governor’s Aide 
de Camp (ADC), a reporter of the Nigerian Observer, Minere Ama-
kiri, was dealt 24 strokes of a “horse whip across his bare back, his 
head and beards shaved with a pocketknife and detained for 27 
hours in an unused toilet.
During the periods of military rule, the state annulled the na-
tion’s constitutions. It promulgated numerous press decrees, in-
stitutional measures and arbitrary actions to minimize the ability 
of the press to disseminate pluralistic views and news. The more 
obnoxious of those decrees as well as institutional measures and 
arbitrary actions are described here to provide the background for 
understanding the nature of state-press relations since 1999. The 
measures included: 1) The State of Emergency Decree of 1966; 2) 
The Constitution (Suspension and Modification) Decrees No. 1 of 
1966 and 1967; Decrees No. 1 of 1984 and No. 17 of 1993;3) State 
Security (Detention of Persons) Decrees No. 3 of 1966 and 1967; 
Decree No. 2 of 1984 and Decree No. 11 of 1994; 4)The Morning 
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Post and Sunday Post (Prohibition) Edict of 1967; 5) Newspapers 
(Prohibition of Circulation) Decree No. 17 of 1967and Decree No. 
12 of 1978; 6) Armed Forces and Police (Special Powers) Decree 
No. 24 of 1967; 7) Police Act Decree No. 41 of 1967, and 8) Public 
Officers (Protection Against False Accusation) Decrees No.11 of 
1976 and No. 4 of 1984. Others were: 9) Newswatch Decree of 
1987; 10) Offensive Publications (Proscription) Decree 35 of 1993; 
11) Newspapers Decree 43 of 1993; 12) Newspapers Etc. (Pro-
scription and Prohibition From Circulation) Decree No. 48 of 1993; 
13) The Concord Newspapers and African Concord Weekly Mag-
azine (Proscription and Prohibition from Circulation) Decree No. 6 
of 1994; 14) The Punch Newspapers (Proscription and Prohibition 
from Circulation) Decree No. 7, of 1994, and 15) The Guardian 
Newspapers and African Guardian Weekly Magazine (Proscription 
and Prohibition from Circulation) Decree No. 8 of 1994. Momoh 
(May 1985), and some of the writers mentioned have described 
detailed provisions of these press decrees.
The enforcement of those decrees resulted in the detention of 
many journalists as described by Aboaba (1979), Adeyemi (1995), 
Agbaje (1992), Ajibade (2003; 1999), Akinkuotu (1999), Anyanwu 
(2002), Ekwelie, (1979), Jakande (1979), Ogbondah (1994), Oluko-
tun (2004a; 2004b; 2002a; 2002b; 2000), Olorunsola (1977), Onye-
dike (1984), Oreh, (1976) and others. Security agents also arrested 
and detained scores of political critics without trials documented 
by Onanuga (1999), Charles-Obi (1999), Ofeimun (1999), Olorun-
yomi (1998) and others. The enforcement of the decrees further 
resulted in the closure of media houses – just as junta officials 
arbitrarily confiscated newspaper and magazine copies at news-
stands Agbese (1989), Ogbondah (1994; 2003). Some journalists 
were murdered, including Dele Giwa, editor-in-chief of News-
watch. Others were physically tortured (Abati, 1999; Ekpu, 1999; 
Ajibade, 2003; Ogbondah, 2002; Orji, 2003). Kudirat Abiola, wife of 
Moshood Abiola, presumed winner of the June 23, 1993, presiden-
tial election, was among the political critics who were murdered. 
All these actions as well as the absence of due process created 
tenuous state-press relations throughout the periods of military 
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rule. With the transition to civil rule in 1999, Nigerians hoped that 
these extra-legal actions against the media would be relegated to 
the past.
State-Media Relations, 1999-2016
Since 1999, the National Assembly has enacted noteworthy le-
gal reforms for the media. It has abrogated at least one anachro-
nistic press law. Unlike the military era when soldiers governed, 
using decrees and edicts, the country is today governed through 
constitutional rule. Due process and rule of law have replaced ar-
bitrariness, impunity and extra-judicial actions. All these reforms 
described below are intended to create the enabling environment 
for media freedom.
1. The 1999 Constitution
The 1999 Constitution provides for freedom of expression. Sec-
tion 39(1) provides that, “Every person shall be entitled to freedom 
of expression, including freedom to hold opinions and to receive 
and impart ideas and information without interference.” Section 
39(2) provides that, “…every person shall be entitled to own, es-
tablish and operate any medium for the dissemination of infor-
mation, ideas and opinions.” Section 22 empowers the media to 
hold the government accountable: “The press, radio, television 
and…the mass media shall at all times be free to uphold the…
accountability of the Government to the people.” According to 
Section 15(5), one of the responsibilities and objectives of the 
state is to “abolish all corrupt practices and abuse of power.” The 
media, therefore, have a constitutional obligation to criticize, and 
hold the government accountable for abolishing corruption.  It is 
important to underscore this obligation because attempts by the 
media to carry out this constitutional duty, and the government’s 
reactions to attempts by the media to do so underpin the [tenu-
ous] nature of state-press relations. In one word, the effort by the 
media to fulfill the constitutional obligation of holding the gov-
ernment accountable is the key source of tension in state-media 
relations in Nigeria.
2. Freedom of Information Act
Another legal reform enactment is the Freedom of Informa-
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tion Act (FOIA). Enacted on May 28, 2011, the FOIA affirmative-
ly guarantees members of the press and public access to gov-
ernment-held information, upon request. Section 1(1) of the Act 
states: “…the right of any person to access or request informa-
tion, whether or not contained in any written form, which is in the 
custody or possession of any public official, agency or institution 
howsoever described, is established.” Section 1(3) guarantees re-
questing entities the right to institute proceedings in the court to 
compel public institutions to comply with the provisions of the 
law. Section 2 of the law mandates public institutions to ensure 
that information and records of their activities are kept, and in a 
manner that facilitates access to a requesting entity. Section 10 
criminalizes willful destruction or altering of information before 
it is made available to a requesting entity. Section 12 enumerates 
categories of information that may not be disclosed.
3. African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights
In addition to the above-mentioned legal provisions, is the Af-
rican Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (also known as the 
Banjul Charter), an international human rights instrument intend-
ed to promote and protect human rights and basic freedoms in 
the African continent. Article 9 of the Charter, which Nigeria is 
signatory to, provides for the right of media freedom. 
4. Human Rights Commission
The establishment of a Human Rights Commission charged 
with the duty to promote and protect human rights, including 
media freedom, is another recent legal reform. It came into being 
by the National Human Rights Commission (NHRC) Act, 1995, as 
amended by the NHRC Act, 2010. It serves as mechanism for the 
enhancement and enjoyment of human rights, including media 
freedom. The NHRC was established in 1995, following the enact-
ment of Decree No. 22 of 1995 by Sani Abacha’s military dictator-
ship. Few Nigerians knew it even existed because it did not make 
any substantial impact on human rights. It was set up as part of 
the late dictator’s white-wash effort to counter international criti-
cisms of the regime’s woeful human rights record.
5. Abrogation of Newspaper Amendment Act of 1964
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A notable reform for the media was the abrogation of the ob-
noxious Newspaper Amendment Act of 1964 on February 4, 2003. 
The law impeded journalistic practice for forty years as it made 
libel, a civil crime, punishable by a one-year imprisonment or a 
fine of two hundred pounds (Elias, 1969). Its full provisions are 
contained in the Federal Republic of Nigeria Official Gazette of 
September 5, 1964.
Obstacles on Media Freedom
Despite the enactment of these legal policies, there are still 
enigmatic problems (obstacles) to media freedom. There are two 
categories of these obstacles: i) external, and ii) internal. External 
obstacles include legal constraints, arbitrary actions, extra-judicial 
and institutional measures exerted on the media by the state and 
anti-media entities. Some of these constraints have been docu-
mented by Akinsiku (July 15, 2014), Ogbondah (2011; April 29, 
2013; 2004; 1997), Olukotun (2002b; 2004a), Joseph (1997), Oso 
(2011), Tete (2001), Harry (2015), Udeze (2012) and Pate (2011). 
Unethical behavior by media professionals constitutes internal 
threats to media freedom.
External Obstacles
The weaknesses in certain sections of the constitution and oth-
er legal policies are part of the external obstacles to media free-
dom. They include the following:
(i)  Derogable Measures and Claw back Clauses
Section 39(1&2) of the Constitution provides for the right of 
freedom of expression. But that right is derogable as Subsection 
3 states that:“Nothing in this section shall invalidate any law that 
is reasonably justifiable in a democratic society -(a) for the pur-
pose of preventing the disclosure of information received in con-
fidence, maintaining the authority and independence of courts or 
regulating telephony, wireless broadcasting, television or the ex-
hibition of cinematograph films….” Further, Section 45(1a) states: 
“Nothing in sections 37, 38, 39, 40 and 41 of this Constitution shall 
invalidate any law that is reasonably justifiable in a democratic 
society – a) in the interest of defense, public safety, public order, 
public morality or public health….” This means that media free-
Christian Ogbondah
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dom is subject to certain conditions as noted by Mapuva (2016) 
and Nyamnjoh, (2005). Hansungule (1995) observed that majori-
ty of African countries have adopted the practice by which press 
freedom is enshrined in the Bill of Rights while at the same time 
allowing, in the same clause, for the lessening of that right by 
state action. Hansungule (1995) further notes that even “in those 
constitutional frameworks in which it may not be derogable, it is 
still, nonetheless, subject to claw back measures which, if put in 
practice, could end tearing up the protection and, therefore, ren-
dering the right vulnerable” (p. 14). What this means is that a claw 
back measure reverses or limits the rights provided in the Consti-
tution. Ogbondah (2002; 1997) argued that derogable and claw 
back provisions take with the left hand what the Constitution has 
given with the right hand. The exercise of the right of expression 
is therefore, limited ab initio by such clauses as “provided that 
individuals abide by the law,” “within the law,” “in the interest of 
public safety” etc. Michaelsen (2012) highlighted the problematic 
nature of claw back clauses in the current era of international ter-
rorism. The problem with claw back clauses and degrogable 
measures in Nigeria can be seen from how the Court of Appeal 
upheld the obnoxious Public Order Act on March 10, 2016, citing 
Section 45 of the Constitution.
(ii)  FOIA Controversies
There have been contradictory court rulings (in Ibadan, Enugu, 
Abuja and Lagos) on the question of whether the FOIA is binding 
on the 36 states of the federation. Justice S.A. Akinteye, presiding 
over an Oyo State High Court in Ibadan in 2013, held that the FOIA 
applies to the entire federation, and therefore does not need to 
be “domesticated by any state before taking effect in all the states 
across the federation.” Justice D.V. Agishi, presiding over a Federal 
High Court in Enugu in 2014 made a similar ruling. But the Federal 
High Court in Lagos presided over by Justice Okon Abang, ruled 
on October 31, 2014 that the FOIA is only binding on the Federal 
Government and its agencies and not on the [36] states because it 
was enacted by the National Assembly. The question is yet to be 
resolved. It seems the question will make its way to the Supreme 
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Court for final adjudication. The controversial rulings collectively 
constitute an obstacle in the ability of the media to access gov-
ernment-held information at the state level. As the Daily Indepen-
dent said in its editorial on Nov. 13, 2014, “Any impediment in en-
forcing FOI Act nationwide would negate the essence of the law.”
(iii)  Antiquated Laws
Another problem is that the FOIA [silently] co-exists with the 
anachronistic Official Secrets Act of 1962, a child of the colonial 
era. With the 1962 Act, all government-held information is clas-
sified as “top secret,” creating an impenetrable veil of secrecy 
that makes it difficult for journalists to obtain information from 
state officials. Elias (1969), Osinbajo and Fogam (1991), Aihe and 
Oluyede (1979) and Okoro and Okolie (2004) have described the 
provisions of the law. Although some government officials have 
said that the FOIA supersedes the Official Secrets Act, those ver-
bal pronouncements are not enough. There ought to be a written 
legal policy that speaks to supremacy of the FOIA over the Official 
Secrets Act. 
(iv)  Extra-Legal Actions
The chronic use of arbitrary actions and extra-legal measures 
by the state in its relationship with journalists constitutes another 
category of obstacles on media freedom. They include the follow-
ing:
(a)  Arbitrary Arrests and Detentions
Since 1999, state security agents have arrested and detained 
scores of journalists and media personnel without any court or-
ders. Three editors of the Insider Weekly magazine - Osa Director, 
Chucks Onwudinjo and Janet Mba-Afolabi - were arrested on 
November 24, 2003. A report in the Newswatch of December 1, 
2003, noted that security officers arrested the editors for alleged-
ly publishing a false report titled, “Aso Rock Oil Bunkering Scan-
dal.”They were subsequently charged with sedition even though 
the Federal Court of Appeal had declared sedition unconstitution-
al in Chief Arthur Nwankwo v. The State, a 1983 case that has be-
come a locus classicus in sedition cases in Nigeria. On September 
4, 2004, security officers went back to the Insider Weekly maga-
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zine, and arrested its production editor, Raphael Olatoye. Others 
arrested between 2002 and 2005 included the editor of Global 
Star, Isaac Umunna, and Ben Adaji of The News magazine. 
In June 2006, security officers arrested Mike Aruleba of the Afri-
can Independent Television (AIT), and Rotimi Durojaiye of the Dai-
ly Independent in connection with a story that questioned the 
age and cost of a presidential jet that the Obasanjo government 
purchased. The state brought a charge of sedition against them. 
The then general manager of Leadership, Abraham Nda Isaiah, 
was arrested in January 2007 in connection with the paper’s re-
port about the health of former President Umaru Yar’Adua, an is-
sue the government wanted to keep secret (Henry, January 10, 
2007). The publisher of Abuja Inquirer, Dan Akpovwa and its ed-
itor, Sonde Abbah, were also arrested and charged with sedition 
in 2007 for the publication of an article, “Obasanjo-Atiku Face-
Off: Coup Fear Grips Nigeria.” The government abruptly dropped 
each of the sedition cases brought against the media. Ogbondah 
(April 29, 2013) has described some details of these cases. Four 
editorial staff members of the Nation – Yusuf Ali, Yomi Odunuga, 
Lawal Ogianegbon and Dapo Olufade – were arrested and de-
tained on October 11, 2011 in connection with a front-page sto-
ry, “Obasanjo’s Secret Letter to Jonathan Stirs Anger: Ex-President 
Seeks Sack of PTDF Chief, Four Others.” In February 2013, police 
officers arrested and charged three journalists at the Wazobia FM 
radio station in Kano with defamation for airing a show that said 
polio immunizations in the predominantly Muslim city were an 
anti-Islamic Western conspiracy. Dapo Olorunyomi, publisher of 
Premium Times, was among the prominent journalists arrested in 
2017 (Ibemere, January 19, 2017). One citizen, Isiaka Yusuf, was 
arrested and detained for posting on the Twitter, pictures of a jail-
break by suspected members of Boko Haram jihadist sect.
(b) Media Closure and Confiscation
Since May 29, 1999 several media houses have been shut down 
by the state. Broadcast stations have been shut down more than 
the print media. This is in sharp contrast with the era of military 
rule when the print media bore most of the brunt of media clo-
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sure. During the period of military rule, there were only a handful 
of private broadcasters. The NBC closed down AIT and RayPower 
100.5 FM stations for about 12 hours on October 24, 2005, and 
Freedom Radio 99.5 FM, Kano, on March 28, 2006 (Madu-West 
and Ajakaye, March 30, 2006). Then, on May 14, 2006, SSS offi-
cials ordered the stoppage of an AIT live broadcast in the National 
Assembly and confiscated the tape of the program titled, “A doc-
umentary on tenure elongation” (Akunna, May 15, 2006). The state 
closed down Channel Television in September 2008, following its 
broadcast of a hoax attributed to the News Agency of Nigeria. On 
May 10, 2009, the NBC shut down Adaba 88.9 FM Radio Station in 
Akure, Ondo State (Alake, May 18, 2009; Sowole, May 18, 2009). 
On April 27, 2015, the government barred the AIT from covering 
the activities of the then President-elect Buhari because of “secu-
rity issues,” in the same manner it expelled the Punch  State House 
reporter, Olalekan Adetayo, from covering the Presidential Villa 
in Abuja in 2017. Then on November 7, 2017, a number of media 
houses, including the Premium Times, were barred from entering 
the National Assembly to cover President Buhari’s presentation of 
the 2018 budget. Earlier in 2015, the NBC barred at least 18 songs 
from being broadcast by television stations in the country. The 
NBC said that the songs contained vulgar lyrics, obscene scenes 
and violence, and promoted ostentatious lifestyle, drug trafficking 
and indecent exposure. Ironically, those songs are played on web 
sites and in nightclubs in the country. For example, when the Kano 
State government banned Hausa rapper, Ziriums’ satirical song, 
‘Girgiza Kai,’ (“Shake Your Head”), he began to use online sites to 
distribute his songs. 
(c) Threats, Physical Assaults and Killings:
Threats and physical attacks on media houses as well as assaults 
and killings of journalists seem to persist in Nigeria. On October 
14, 2003, for example, angry members of the National Assembly 
threatened to sanction journalists who graphically reported alle-
gations of a N54-million bribe against two senators. On August 
30, 2003, [the then] Vice President, Atiku Abubakar’s security of-
ficers assaulted a photojournalist of the Daily Independent, Akin-
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tunde Akinleye, while covering a public event in Lagos. Since 1999, 
at least a dozen journalists have been murdered in Nigeria. But it 
was the killing of Godwin Agbroko, head of the editorial board 
of This Day, on December 22, 2006 that many remember. Another 
victim was Ogunbayo Ohu, assistant news editor of the Guardian. 
He was murdered on September 21, 2009 (Agha, September 22, 
2009). The April 26, 2012 simultaneous bomb attacks on This-
day newspapers in Abuja and Kaduna, and the offices of the 
Sun and the Moment by suspected members of Boko Haram in 
what is now known as the “Black Thursday for the Nigerian Press,” 
are among the attacks against the press that will be remembered 
for a long time to come.
(d) Strategic Criminal Libel and Seditious Suits (SCLSS)
The state utilizes charges of criminal libel and sedition stra-
tegically to intimidate, harass, and discourage journalists from 
criticizing the avalanche of corruption in the government. For ex-
ample, in November 2003, the government filed a charge of se-
dition and criminal libel against three editors of the Insider Week-
ly magazine mentioned earlier. In June 2006, the police brought 
charges of sedition against Mike Aruleba of the AIT station and 
Rotimi Durojaiye of the Daily Independent. The same charge was 
filed against Imo Eze, the director of the Ebonyi Voice newspa-
per, and one of his journalists, Oluwole Elenyinmi. Then in October 
2007, the Akwa Ibom State Government brought a charge of se-
dition against Jerome Imeime, a newspaper publisher in the state 
for an article that accused the then governor, Godswill Akpabio 
of corruption. Another case of sedition was brought against the 
editor of Leadership, Abraham Nda Isaiah, in 2007 for reporting on 
the health of the then President Umaru Yar’Adua which the gov-
ernment was keeping secret (Henry, January 10, 2007). In 2014, a 
journalist with the Sun, Ebere Wabara, was charged with seditious 
publication against the then governor of Abia State, Theodore Orji. 
Charges of sedition were also preferred against political crit-
ics. For example, sedition was preferred against the former Sen-
ate president, Iyorchia Ayu, Paul Ofana and Timi Frank during 
the presidential electioneering campaign in 2007. In all these, 
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the state abruptly dropped the charges or it showed little inter-
est to prosecute them conclusively. For example, Ayu, Ofana and 
Timi appeared in the court sixteen times in their trial, while the 
prosecution appeared only three times (Muraina, May 21, 2009). 
They eventually won their case. The Federal Government similar-
ly “abandoned” a libel case that President Muhammadu Buhari 
brought against DAAR Communications. The court disposed the 
case on December 6, 2016 because according to Justice John 
Tsoho “no representations from the parties have been entered 
since the matter was assigned to the court.” The state knows it 
will hardly win a sedition case. However, it continues to bring the 
charge against journalists in order to harass, intimidate and dis-
courage them from holding the government accountable for the 
mammoth level of corruption among state officials. These may be 
compared to the Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation 
(SLAPP) cases in America that big corporations use to discourage 
whistle blowers.
(e) Financial Constraints
Many Nigerian media houses are in the doldrums, financially. 
Some broadcasters cannot take off in the air due to financial con-
straints. Ogundimu (1996) noted that the NBC issued 114 licenses 
in the first four years of the liberalization of the sector. By 2017, the 
NBC had issued 402 licenses. As Onwumechili (1996; 2006), Dok-
pesi (1997), Ajia (1994) observed, many are yet to go on air due 
to financial difficulties. Some are unable to renew their licenses. 
For this reason, by March 2017, the licenses of 54 broadcast com-
panies were revoked for failure to pay the license fees within the 
stipulated 60-day period. The financial health of the print media 
industry is also down. No newspaper today has matched the circu-
lation figure of 500, 000 copies of the Sunday Times in the 1970s. 
Today, the daily circulation of all Nigerian newspapers combined, 
including evening titles, is not close to that highest-ever figure 
mentioned earlier. With the abysmally low circulation figures, and 
given the high cost of major raw materials – newsprint, ink and 
plates, computers, cameras, press maintenance, circulation costs 
and newsgathering expenses, most newspapers and magazines 
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struggle to break even on sales. It is due to financial difficulties 
that many newspapers are unable to pay the salaries of their work-
ers for several months, leading to intervention of the government 
in state-owned newspapers. For example, the Triumph, Kano State 
government-owned newspaper, was shut down in October 2012 
due to financial difficulties. It resumed publication when the state 
government intervened with a N50 million subsidy (ANON, Octo-
ber 4, 2002). This type of state intervention interferes with media 
freedom because as the old adage says, “He who pays the piper 
dictates the tune.”It is also as a result of financial difficulties expe-
rienced by many media houses that their reporters accept “brown 
envelopes,” payola, transportation fees, “family support” etc. from 
news sources to make ends meet. In turn, accepting brown en-
velopes potentially leads to conflict of interests. These constitute 
internal threats to media freedom.
Internal Obstacles
Unethical practices among many Nigerian journalists constitute 
internal threat to media freedom. Agbaje and Adebanwi (2003), 
Ogundimu (2003) and Sonaike (2000) highlighted this problem in 
their analyses of the problems created for, and by the press in 
the post-military era in Nigeria. Kukah (1996) noted that unethical 
practices can erode public confidence in the press. Unethical be-
havior on the part of journalists can constitute the greatest threat 
to media freedom under the current political formation. This is 
because unethical behavior on the part of journalists can provide 
the excuse for the state to enact press censorship laws. For exam-
ple, in 2006, SSS officers invaded Rhythm 93.7 FM radio station in 
Port Harcourt, and arrested its news editor for broadcasting un-
true news report that a bridge in Choba had collapsed.
Some journalists are guided by ethical considerations on their 
jobs. Many are not. This has created a moral crisis today in Ni-
geria’s media industry. What the former Speaker of the National 
Assembly, Ghali Na’aba, said about the press epitomizes the di-
lemma of the [moral] crisis facing many journalists and the media. 
During the Nigeria Union of Journalists Press Week in Abuja in 
2000, Na’aba told media professionals that the Nigerian press is 
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willing to let ethnic and tribal sentiments supplant its commitment 
to professional values. The former Attorney-General of the federa-
tion, Kanu Agabi, even accused the press of being balkanized and 
pushed into “championing ethnic tendencies.” Some Nigerians 
have attempted to illustrate the media’s tendency to champion-
ing ethnic sentiments with the coverage of the allegations of forg-
ery and perjury involving four prominent politicians from different 
ethnic groups. They were Chuba Okadigb, the first Senate Presi-
dent of the Fourth Republic; his successor, Evan(s) Enwerem; Sal-
isu Buhari, former Speaker of the House of Representatives, and 
Bola Tinubu, former governor of Lagos State. Olukotun (2004a), 
Ogundimu (2003) and Sonaike (2000) have analyzed media cov-
erage of the scandals. In the aftermath of the media coverage of 
the Enwerem, Buhari and Tinubu scandals, many Nigerians said 
they developed low opinions about the media. In a commentary 
titled, “The limits of investigative journalism,” in the October 1, 
1999 issue of the Guardian, Levi Obijiofor, a journalism instructor 
in Queensland, Australia, argued that the Nigerian press, with its 
most influential papers located in the southwestern part of the 
country, relentlessly investigated allegations of forgery and perjury 
against Buhari and Enwerem. Paradoxically, argued Obijiofor, the 
press did not investigate similar allegations against Tinubu who 
comes from Southwestern Nigeria, a conclusion that Ogbondah 
(2000) also made. One Nick Dazang, writing in the October 5, 1999 
issue of e Vanguard, said:
Consider: the South-West press was the most shrill and clarion in the 
Salisu Buhari and Evan(s) Enwerem scandals even though they did not 
entirely unearth the two scandals in the first instance. Incidentally in the 
Bola Tinubu scandal, which bears hues and colorations as the Buhari 
one, the South-West press was eloquent and deafening only by its si-
lence. The upshot of this strident silence is that suddenly there are two 
standards for measuring villains – one reserved for those who hail from 
the privileged South-West zone and the other for the lesser citizens 
who hail outside it. Arising from this rather unhappy and topsy-turvy 
situation, there is this impression that the media in Nigeria can no lon-
ger be trusted to be responsible to discharge their constitutional duty 
of holding public officers accountable to the people.
Dazang concluded that, “There are people, who in the after-
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math of the obvious bias in the reportage of the Tinubu scandal, 
who no longer consider the Nigerian media credible.” Another Ni-
gerian, one AbdulkareemYakubu, from Maiduguri, reiterated this 
perception about the Nigerian media in a September 1999 issue 
of the e Vanguard titled, “Selectivity of the media.” Yakubu said:
It is really ironical that the same media that helped to bring 
down Buhari is silent over this Tinubu affair. And there seems to be 
some kind of conspiracy among the southwest media to cover up 
the Tinubu affair instead of investigating further on the case. They 
seem to be mute on the issue….Anyone that has been following 
Tinubu’s case will know that the southwest media do not want to 
write about it. This goes to show that some of the media houses 
in the country are under the control of some individuals. This be-
comes glaringly clear when you read Salvator Amadi’s account of 
his encounter with Tinubu and his men in the National magazine 
of September 13, 1999 (Ogbondah, 2000). 
The perceived partisan press coverage of the three scandals 
raised the fear among some Nigerians that the press is out to 
protect certain individuals on the basis of political clout, ethnicity 
or patronage. Yet, the code of conduct of the Nigerian press re-
quires the media to present truthful, accurate, fair and balanced 
news reports, a requirement that is strongly articulated by The 
Commission on Freedom of the Press (1947), Merrill (1997; 1989), 
Black, Steele and Barney (1997), Gordon and Kittross (1999) and 
Momoh (2004).
Another form of unethical practice among many journalists is 
the acceptance of financial favors from news sources. Stephen 
Farris highlighted this problem in an article in the European edi-
tion of Time magazine of April 15, 2002. He said, “Bribery is just 
one of the challenges Nigeria’s press faces as the country makes 
the difficult transition from dictatorship to democracy.” Adebanwi 
(2003) underscored this point when he said, “the incidence of cor-
ruption in today’s Nigerian press has become alarming” (p. 95).
All these have contributed significantly to the low opinions that 
some Nigerians have about the media in their country. This is in 
sharp contrast with the recent past when Nigerians held the jour-
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nalism profession and journalists in high esteem. They respected 
journalists for their ethical standards. This was reflected in the top 
national leadership positions held by writers and newspapermen 
such as Herbert Macaulay, Ernest Ikoli, Nnamdi Azikiwe, Obafemi 
Awolowo, Anthony Enahoro, Peter Enahoro, Lateef Jakande, Tony 
Momoh etc.
Inability of journalists to uphold ethical standards in news re-
ports can provoke lawmakers to draft repressive press laws to en-
force moral probity on the part of journalists. The enactment of 
such laws can incapacitate the ability of the press to carry out its 
constitutional obligation to hold the government accountable. At 
the same time, the failure of journalists to uphold ethical princi-
ples can erode public trust and support for the press. During the 
periods of colonial rule and military dictatorship, the press carried 
the public along in its crusade for the introduction of democrat-
ic norms. But lack of ethical applications in news coverage can 
constitute a serious threat to public support for the press. This is 
because the public can always rally around the press when obnox-
ious laws are enacted, and when journalists are attacked by the 
state. But, the public will not rally around the press when it fails to 
be ethical i.e. when it fails to be fair, impartial, balanced, objective, 
honest, truthful and balanced in its news reports. Unethical behav-
ior on the part of journalists can lead to loss of confidence, trust 
and respect for the press by the public and government officials 
and loss of public interest in media products can affect the indus-
try’s financial stability and existence.
It is mostly because of these obstacles that the Nigerian press 
has never been ranked as free by either the New York-based Free-
dom House or the Paris-based Reporters Without Borders (RSF), 
the two organizations that rank freedom of the press in the world. 
Rationales for Attacks on the Press
Although the government explained that security officers took 
the actions described against the media in this chapter to maintain 
public safety and security, the pragmatic rationale for the state’s 
actions against the press was to incapacitate its ability to inves-
tigate and unearth the avalanche of corruption, embezzlement, 
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illegal private capital accumulation, avarice and stealing of pub-
lic funds by state officials. For example, the state arrested Duro-
jaye of the Independent and Aruleba of AIT after the publication 
of the report titled, “Controversy over age, cost of presidential 
jet.” The report exposed the inflated cost of a used presidential 
jet (“Tokunbo” in local parlance) that the government said it 
purchased. The government of Nigeria is weak, and it thrives on 
corruption. Adebanwi (2012) has made a scholarly analysis of 
corruption in Nigeria. Below is an infinitesimal description of the 
colossal level of corruption in the country.
When Nuhu Ribadu headed the EFCC he revealed to the BBC 
of London that since 1960 when Nigeria became an independent 
country, successive governments have stolen or wasted more than 
$380b (Madunagu, October 21, 2006). The chairman of the Presi-
dential Advisory Committee Against Corruption (PACAC), Profes-
sor Itse Sagay, revealed to Nigerians on June 5, 2017 that 55 top 
government officials and businessmen corruptly enriched them-
selves with public funds to the tune of over N1.35 trillion between 
2006 and 2013. Details of the illicit public money enrichment can 
be accessed at: https://www.vanguardngr.com/2017/06/55-top-
govt-officials-businessmen-stole-n1-4-trn-obj-yaradua-jona-
than/. A huge part of Nigeria’s crude oil is stolen in partnership 
with government officials: about 680,000 barrels daily, or about 
$7 billion annually. Civil servants defraud the country of N700b 
annually. In February 2015, the former Minister of Finance, Ngozi 
Okonjo-Iweala, revealed that the government discovered 62,893 
ghost workers in the federal pay roll, saving the nation N208.7b. At 
the National Identity Management Commission alone 4,800 of its 
10,300 staff were discovered in 2013 to be ghost workers. Accord-
ing to a report in the February 4, 2016 issue of  Vanguard, the 
House of Representatives Ad Hoc Committee on Failed Rail Con-
tracts, found 169 ghost companies that registered as contractors 
with the Nigeria Railway Corporation for projects valued at N1 
trillion. Top state officials are frequently owners of the ghost com-
panies.
Top government officials at the state level also use ghost work-
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ers to embezzle public funds. For example, in June 2015, Ekiti State 
Governor, Ayo Fayose, revealed that 809 ghost workers were un-
masked in a staff verification exercise conducted that year in the 
state, according to a news report in the Nation of June 26, 2015. In 
May 2016, the Governor of Sokoto State, Aminu Tambuwal, an-
nounced that the state government recovered over N300 million 
from the payrolls of the 23 local government councils in the state 
in one month only, following the discovery of thousands of ghost 
workers. In one local government council alone in the state, top 
government officials sold 200 appointment letters to a contrac-
tor in Zamfara, another state. Lagos State discovered N82 million 
ghost-workers fraud at different levels of the Local Government in 
2012. According to a report in the Daily Times of November 23, 
2011, the names of two infants -- a one-month-old and a five-
month-old) -- were discovered on the payment voucher of a local 
government council during an exercise to fish out ghost workers in 
Zamfara State in 2011. Their payroll documents indicated that the 
one-month-old had an Ordinary Level Diploma (OND) certificate, 
an equivalent of high school certificate. According to a report in 
the November 24, 2011 issue of the Nigerian Tribune, 725 ghost 
workers were discovered in Bauchi State that year. The story is 
the same in other states. For example, Plateau State government 
discovered a fake commissioner among 5,000 ghost workers. A 
news story in Vanguard of February 18, 2013 titled, “A country 
of ghosts,” reported the figures of ghost workers in some of the 
states as follows:  Kano State, 8,000; Kebbi State, 9,300; Delta State, 
7,000 and 8,000 in Rivers State.
In its issue of December 15, 2015, the Guardian reported that 
in the police pension scheme alone, N1 billion was paid to ghost 
pensioners yearly whereas the amount required was N500 million.. 
In 2012, a workers’ verification exercise at the Power Holding Com-
pany of Nigeria (PHCN) threw up 17,000 fake workers that were 
receiving regular salaries and allowances on its payroll, amounting 
to billions of Naira in fraud. There is a mammoth level of corrup-
tion at all arms of federal and state governments. Two or three 
examples may suffice to illustrate the level of graft at the federal 
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government. In March 2008, the House of Representatives Com-
mittee that investigated the scandal of $16 billion expended in the 
power sector was told that the then President, Obasanjo, inaugu-
rated a non-existent National Integrated Power Project  (NIPP) in 
Cross River State, and illegally deducted money from the Federa-
tion Account to the tune of $3.975 billion over eight years for the 
project. When a commission headed by Ambassador Kabiru Rabiu 
visited the power project sites to verify what the illegally deducted 
money was expended on it surprisingly discovered that nothing 
was on ground at the site of the project inaugurated in 2005, ac-
cording to reports published in March 21, 2008 issues of the Nige-
rian Tribune and the Guardian respectively. At least three Senate 
presidents and two Speakers of the House of Representatives and 
many ministers and commissioners and heads of government 
agencies at the federal and state levels have been removed from 
office since 1999 on corruption charges. In 2003, an Ad-Hoc Com-
mittee of the House of Representatives that investigated alleged 
shortfalls in government revenue found that over N77.188b was 
unaccounted for by various revenue-generating agencies of the 
Federal Government.
The Nigeria Police Force stinks with filthy heaps of corrupt prac-
tices. Interestingly, this is the agency at the forefront of attacks 
against the media in Nigeria. A World Bank and United States 
Agency for International Development (USAID)-sponsored na-
tional survey conducted in 2001 by the Zero-Corruption Coali-
tion, an association of organizations and individuals committed to 
fighting corruption in Nigeria, found that the Nigeria Police Force 
is the most corrupt public institution in the country. Police officers 
extort N20 from commercial vehicle operators at checkpoints, and 
many a time they fatally shoot those who do not give the N20-
bribe (less than 25 US cents). The police force is so corrupt that 
the courts have convicted many of its officers for graft. The former 
Inspector-General Police, Tafa Balogun, served about six months in 
jail for corruption. The court ordered him to pay a fine of N4m in 
2005. Balogun’s immediate successor, Sunday Ehindero, was also 
well fingered in a N21m-fraud, N2.5b of police cooperative money 
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and the source of money for allegedly building eight magnificent 
houses.
Nigeria is so corrupt that in 2001, 2002, 2003, 2005, 2006 and 
2007, Transparency International (TI) regularly ranked it as one of 
the most corrupt countries in the world. Between 2001 and 2003 
for example, TI ranked Nigeria as the second most corrupt country, 
and in 2004, it was ranked as the third most corrupt in the world. 
In 2005, TI ranked Nigeria as the seventh most corrupt country 
while the country received a ranking of sixth most corrupt country 
in 2006. In 2013, Nigeria was the 14th most corrupt country. This 
paper strongly contends that the pragmatic explanation for the 
chronic attacks against the press by the state is to minimize the 
ability of journalists to hold the government accountable and to 
investigate the avalanche of state corruption. This creates an un-
ending conflict between the government and the media, resulting 
in tenuous state-press relations.
Recommendations
The National Assembly should undertake a comprehensive re-
view of the entire legal framework in the country with the aim to: 
a) enact laws that will provide stronger protection for the media; 
b) expunge or significantly reform antiquated laws that are still in 
the statute books. This will help to create a more enabling envi-
ronment for media freedom in Nigeria. 
Enact Anti-Censorship Legislation
The National Assembly should urgently enact an Anti-Press 
Censorship Act that provides against state interference, intimida-
tion, harassment and brutalization of journalists. The law should 
criminalize the use of extra-legal measures such as arbitrary deten-
tion of journalists, closure of media houses and confiscation and 
seizure of media products and equipment by any security agent. 
An example of this legal policy can be seen in Ghana. Article 16 
of the Constitution of Ghana unequivocally provides against press 
censorship, governmental interference, control of the media and 
harassment of journalists. Article 162(2) guarantees that “there 
shall be no censorship in Ghana.” Section 4 of Article 162 provides 
that, “Editors of newspapers and other institutions of the mass 
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media shall not be subject to control or interference by Govern-
ment, nor shall they be penalized or harassed for their editorial 
opinions and views, or the content of their publications” (Kludze, 
1993, p. 140). For a country like Ghana that witnessed the deleteri-
ous effects of state restrictions against the press -- as document-
ed by Anokwa (1997), Ekwelie (1978), Hachten (1975), Bourgault 
(1995), Ofori (1993), Oquay (1995) and Twumasi (1980) -- these 
constitutional reforms are exemplary. Members of the Nigerian 
National Assembly should emulate their Ghanaian counterparts 
and enact anti-censorship legislation that outlaws the arbitrary 
arrest, detention, harassment, intimidation and physical abuse or 
torture of media personnel and seizure of media products and 
closure of media houses.
Abrogate Antiquated Laws
There are antiquated laws that still exist in the statute books. 
One of the laws is the Official Secrets Act of 1962. The law enforc-
es a culture of secrecy in the conduct of public affairs. Today, the 
Official Secrets Act has become anachronistic as it collides with 
the FOIA. It should be significantly reformed to reflect the prin-
ciples of the FOIA. Another anachronistic law is the National Ar-
chives Act. It should be amended so that the clause that provides 
for the non-disclosure of state records or documents until after 
ten years could be formally repealed as it also collides with the 
FOIA. Sedition, an antiquated law that the court has declared as 
unconstitutional, is used strategically by the police to harass and 
intimidate the media. The Federal Court of Appeal declared in Ar-
thur Nwankwo v. Governor of Anambra in 1983 that sedition is 
unconstitutional. Despite the ruling, over-zealous police officers 
periodically bring the charge against Nigerian journalists. The 
National Assembly should follow the Federal Court of Appeal’s 
ruling in the celebrated Arthur Nwankwo case and repeal the law 
of sedition – if only as a matter of formality. Furthermore, the court 
should sternly warn the Nigeria Police Force to desist from bring-
ing cases of sedition before it. On its part, the court should decline 
to hear any case of sedition. As Okonkwor (1993), Onagoruwa 
(1977) and Ogbondah (1997) have noted, some judges have called 
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for the abrogation of all antiquated laws in the country.
Expunge Claw back Clauses and Derogable Measures
Claw back clauses and derogable measures in the Constitution 
should be expunged or reformed. While it is necessary to protect 
individual rights and societal interests, limitations on media free-
dom should be determined by the courts and not by the arbitrari-
ness of the executive or other organs and agencies of the state. 
Schramm (1967) stated this succinctly when he said: “In gener-
al, countries in Western democratic traditions believe that there 
should be a minimum of control on the press and that such con-
trols as there is should rest with…the courts, which we hope will 
limit their attention to such offenses as libel….” (p. 9). This view is 
also articulated by Baron (1973), Knight (1968), Emerson (1970; 
1966), Gilmore, Barron and Simon (1997), Merrill (1974), Meikle-
john (1979), Levy (1963), Lowenstein (1967; 1966) and others.
Public Order Act
The Public Order Act (POA) that requires individuals and groups 
to obtain a police permit prior to holding rallies is anachronis-
tic, oppressive and anti-democratic. The law is a colonial heritage 
used by British imperial autocracy to suppress anti-colonial activ-
ism and criticism. It should be abrogated or drastically reformed. 
Many countries that once had it have expunged it from their stat-
ute books or reformed it. In 2007, for example, the Zimbabwean 
government reformed its Public Order and Security Act (POSA), 
and Britain has progressively reformed its Public Order Act of 1936 
through the Public Order Act of 1986 and the Criminal Justice and 
Public Order Act of 1994. There are other [security] problems fac-
ing Nigeria such as religious extremism, secessionist movements, 
Niger Delta crisis, oil theft, corruption, armed robbery, growing 
availability of arms etc. that pose greater threat to peace, security 
and public order than political rallies.
One of the problems with the POA today is the unrelenting 
action of the police to continue to enforce it despite court rulings 
against the law. In 2005, a High Court in Abuja presided over by 
Justice Anwuri Chikere nullified the Public Order upon the reason-
ing that it was obsolete and a neo-colonialist. The judge specifi-
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cally stated that the law collided with Section 40 of the 1999 Con-
stitution. Then, in December 2007, the Court of Appeal in Abuja 
presided over by Justice Rabiu Danladi Mohammed unequivocally 
declared that the law was alien to the nation’s democracy, and 
therefore “null, void and of no effect.” The Court declared that 
public protests and rallies are part of the freedom of expression 
and association guaranteed by Sections 39 and 40 of the 1999 
Constitution and Articles 9 and 11 of the African Charter on Hu-
man and Peoples Rights. Regrettably, the police continue to insist 
that their constitutional responsibility to maintain public order, se-
curity and public peace was not nullified by the judgment.
FOIA
The Legal Defense and Assistance Project should appeal the 
October 31, 2014 ruling by the Lagos High Court and any similar 
rulings for further interpretation and clarification on whether the 
FOI Act is binding on the states or not. It took a sustained strug-
gle for 17 years by different stakeholders, especially the Nigeria 
Union of Journalists, Civil Liberties Organisation (CLO), and the 
Media Rights Action (MRA), that spearheaded the FOI Bill before 
it was signed into law. The Nigeria Union of Journalists and other 
stakeholders should unite to fight what may be the final phase 
of the battle to entrench the FOIA in all the states and the Fed-
eral Capital Territory. Further, it should initiate the passage of the 
states’ version(s) of the FOIA as well as Open Media Access laws 
by the Houses of Assembly of the respective states. So far, only 
three states’ Houses of Assembly -- Delta, Ekiti and Lagos -- have 
adopted the FOIA since its passage. The States’ Houses of Assem-
bly should act in the public interest by ensuring that the FOIA is 
passed in the 33 states that are yet to do so.
Summary and Conclusion
Nearly two decades after Nigeria transitioned from military au-
tocracy to civil democracy media freedom – ability of the media 
to gather and disseminate information without interference– is yet 
to be fully entrenched in the country. The state continues to utilize 
the same repressive institutions – the SSS and the police – that 
were used by past profligate military dictatorships to restrict me-
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dia freedom. The arbitrary closure of media houses and detention 
and physical assaults of journalists persist. All these are antithet-
ical to government’s promises not to tolerate impunity against 
journalists. For example in his nation-wide broadcast on October 
1, 2000, President Obasanjo said. “I have always believed in fun-
damental human rights and freedom, because I know that these 
values represent the best expression of democracy.” And on No-
vember 7, 2017, the minister of information and culture, Lai Mo-
hammed, while contributing to a debate on “UN plan of action on 
safety of journalists and the issue of impunity” at the 39th session 
of the General Conference of the UNESCO in Paris, said “Nigeri-
an government does not engage in impunities against journalists 
and will never tolerate such’’ (ANON, November 8, 2017). Security 
officers continue to charge editors and political critics with sedi-
tion in attempts to intimidate journalists and minimize freedom of 
expression. This is in spite of the court’s ruling [in 1983] that sedi-
tion is an unconstitutional abridgement of freedom of expression 
(Ekwelie, 1986; Onagoruwa, 1977; Okonkwor, 1983, Ogbondah 
and Onyedike, 1991). These were not what Nigerians hoped for, at 
the dawn of the new democratic order on May 29, 1999. 
Although these incidents endure, they have lessened compared 
with the periods of military rule. The press today has witnessed 
less crushing brutality in the hands of security officers than it did 
under military rule. Journalists have not witnessed incidents like 
that of Dele Giwa, editor of Newswatch, who was murdered with 
a letter bomb in 1986 or the assault of Minere Amakiri, Nigerian 
Observer reporter, who was brutalized in 1973. Further, the Ni-
gerian press has not witnessed the trial – and imprisonment – of 
journalists by a tribunal like the trial and imprisonment of Tunde 
Thompson and Nduka Irabor of the Guardian in 1984. As Nigeria 
has finally made the transition to civil democracy officials of the 
state must understand that a free press will help to strengthen the 
pillars of the new democratic society. A free press will help cata-
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The Road to the Freedom of 
Information Act and Beyond
By Edetaen Ojo
Introduction
The idea of a Freedom of Information law in Nigeria was orig-
inated at some point in 1993 by three civil society organizations, 
independently of each other.  The three organisations, Media 
Rights Agenda (MRA), the Civil Liberties Organisation (CLO) and 
the Nigeria Union of Journalists (NUJ), decided to forge a com-
mon front and work together to realize their goals for the enact-
ment of a Freedom of Information Act.
Their common objective was to ensure the adoption of a law 
which would make documents and information held by govern-
ment or government agencies and officials accessible to citizens 
in an effort to make government transparent and accountable to 
citizens, as well as to ensure that governance was participatory. 
The three organizations constituted a team to work on the proj-
ect, with each organization represented on the team. The team 
was tasked with developing a roadmap for the realization of the 
common objective as well as overseeing the campaign.
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Media Rights Agenda was designated the technical partner in 
the project under the arrangement agreed upon for taking the 
project forward.  In keeping with this role, it was asked to produce 
a first draft of the Freedom of Information Law for consultations.
Media Rights Agenda solicited inputs into the proposed draft 
of the Law by designing and administering a questionnaire on 
identified stakeholders, particularly practicing Nigerian journalists.
Based on responses to the question as well as extensive re-
search into such laws around the world, MRA’s Legal Director, Mr. 
Tunde Fagbohunlu, now a Senior Advocate of Nigeria and a part-
ner in the law firm of Aluko and Oyebode, produced in 1994 the 
first draft of the proposed bill entitled “Draft Access to Public Re-
cords and Official Information Act”. 
The content of the draft drew substantially from the experi-
ences of other countries operating freedom of information laws. 
But it was also based on some of the suggestions arising from 
the consultations among the three organizations as well as the 
recommendations made by the stakeholders on whom question-
naires were administered, particularly practicing Nigerian journal-
ists.
Consultative Process in Finalizing the Freedom of 
Information Bill
The “Draft Access to Public Records and Information Act” pro-
duced by Media Rights Agenda in 1994 became the basis for fur-
ther discussions and debates on the issue and was subsequently 
subjected to a series of review exercises involving various stake-
holders.
The first of such exercises was a two-day technical workshop 
jointly organized by the three partner organizations on March 10 
and 11, 1995 to examine and revise the draft, taking into consid-
eration the views of other interest groups, which might use the 
proposed legislation.
Participants in the workshop included human rights workers, 
journalists, lawyers, university lecturers and representatives of the 
National Broadcasting Commission and the Federal Ministry of In-
formation.
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Chaired by eminent journalist and Nigeria’s former Information 
Minister, Prince Tony Momoh, who is also a lawyer, the main ob-
jective of the workshop was to achieve a consensus among the 
various interest groups that are affected by the availability or oth-
erwise of a legally protected right of access to government held 
information, on the need for a Freedom of Information Act in Ni-
geria and the content of such a law.
There was a common understanding among the various in-
terest groups represented at the workshop that the legal regime 
governing access to government held information in Nigeria must 
undergo a structural transformation.  Their conclusion was that 
since statutes which permit any sort of access to official informa-
tion in Nigeria were few, the overall effect is that a culture of se-
crecy prevails in all government institutions, nurtured and given 
legal effect to by such laws as the Official Secrets Act and some 
provisions in the Criminal Code, which make it an offence to dis-
close certain types of government-held information.
The general consensus at the workshop was that this existing 
legal regime should be replaced with one in which there is a gen-
eral right of access to government held information, unless such 
a right is specifically removed by statute in certain circumstances 
and to protect specific, statutorily recognized interests.
A Campaigns and Monitoring Committee was established in 
accordance with the resolution adopted at the workshop to carry 
out follow-up actions on the campaign for the enactment of the 
revised draft into law.  
However, although getting constitutional backing for the legis-
lation was of crucial importance, and the National Constitutional 
Conference set up by the regime of then Head of State, General 
Sani Abacha, was then still in session, it was agreed  by the partici-
pating groups that it would be inappropriate to lobby the Confer-
ence to provide constitutional support for the draft law.  
The rationale was that having rejected the Conference as lack-
ing in credibility, a civil society advocacy directed at it would con-
fer legitimacy on it and its work. Therefore, the draft was never 
submitted to the Conference. 
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But it was sent to the Minister for Information, and the Attor-
ney-General of the Federation and Minister of Justice. Members 
of the committee also met with the then Attorney-General of the 
Federation and Minister of Justice, Dr. Olu Onagoruwa, to secure 
his support for the enactment of the draft into law.  Although he 
was in principle supportive of the idea, it was clear that he lacked 
the political influence within the Abacha regime to push the draft 
through.
The political situation in Nigeria deteriorated shortly afterwards 
as the Abacha regime became more repressive and brutal and the 
law was never passed.
Following the death of General Abacha in June 1998, the regime 
of Major-General Abdulsalami Abubakar, which took over political 
authority in the country immediately, embarked on a transition to 
civil rule program under which elections were held into various 
levels of government between December 1998 and February 1999.
This development created the necessary political climate to re-
visit the issue. Another opportunity to review the draft law and 
its content came up in March 1999 when Media Rights Agenda, 
working with ARTICLE 19, the International Centre Against Censor-
ship, in London; and the Nigerian National Human Rights Com-
mission, organized a Workshop on Media Law Reform in Nigeria 
at Ota in Ogun State.  
Held between March 16 and 18, 1999, the workshop was at-
tended by 61 representatives of the media, both independent and 
state controlled; regulatory bodies; the legal profession; interna-
tional institutions; local and international non-governmental or-
ganizations; and other interest groups. Participants at the work-
shop included the United Nations Special Rapporteur on Freedom 
of Opinion and Expression, Dr. Abid Hussain; a member of the 
European Parliament, Mrs.Glenys Kinnock; Judge John Oliver Man-
yarara, chairman of the Board of Trustees of the Media Institute of 
Southern Africa (MISA); Justice Paul Kedi Nwokedi (rtd), the then 
chairman of the Nigerian Human Rights Commission; Prof. Auwalu 
Hamisu Yadudu, then special adviser to the Head of State on Legal 
Matters; Prince Tony Momoh, a former minister of information; 
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then Senator-elect, Tokunbo Afikuyomi; Ms Bettina Peters, depu-
ty general secretary of the International Federation of Journalists 
(IFJ) in Belgium; Mr Kabral Blay-Amihere, then president of the 
West African Journalists Association (WAJA); Ms. Jeanne Seck of 
the United Nations Scientific and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO) 
in Paris, Ms Brigid O’Connor, regional information coordinator for 
West Africa at the British Council; and Mr. Olisa Agbakoba (SAN). 
A substantial part of the workshop was devoted to discussion of 
the draft Freedom of Information law, which was further reviewed. 
In The Ota Platform of Action on Media Law Reform in Nigeria, 
a consensus document, which emerged at the end of that work-
shop, further recommendations were made on the content of the 
draft law.  
The recommendations include the following:
a.  In addition to a constitutional guarantee of the right of ac-
cess to public information, a Freedom of Information Act should 
be enacted at the earliest possible opportunity, reflecting the prin-
ciple of maximum disclosure.
b.  The Draft Access to Public Records and Official Information 
Bill published by Media Rights Agenda, the Civil Liberties Organi-
zation, and the Nigeria Union of Journalists should be taken as the 
basis for discussion on this issue, but its provisions require further 
review.
c.  All legislation, which unduly inhibit or restrict the right of 
Freedom of Information, such as the Official Secrets Act, should be 
amended to reflect the principles of the Freedom of Information 
Act.
d.  The cost of obtaining public information should be afford-
able to the majority of citizens.
e.  The proposed Act should contain a provision, which stip-
ulates that, the individual requesting the information need not 
demonstrate any specific interest in the information requested.
f.  Doctoring of public records before they are released to the 
person, entity or community requesting for them and obstruction 
of access to public records should be made a criminal offence.
g.  In the application of any exemption, there should be a pre-
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sumption of access to public information in the proposed Act. Ex-
emptions should be narrowly drawn and subject to a test of actual 
harm.
Following these recommendation, Media Rights Agenda re-
vised the draft access to information law once again to give effect 
to the agreements reached at the workshop.
The Freedom of Information Bill in Fourth National 
Assembly (1999 to 2003)
The legislative process on the Freedom of Information Bill be-
gan late in 1999 with identifying sponsors for the bill from among 
members of the House of Representatives.  Hon. Tony Anyanwu 
and Hon. Nduka Irabor initially agreed to sponsor the Bill, while 
Hon. Jerry Ugokwe had apparently also decided to present a sep-
arate Bill on Freedom of Information to the House. 
However, Media Rights Agenda was able to persuade them to 
harmonize the two versions of the Bill and co-sponsor a single Bill, 
following a series of mediatory meetings and an offer by Media 
Rights Agenda to undertake the harmonization process. The Bill 
was subsequently introduced into the House of Representatives as 
a private member’s Bill and published in the Federal Government’s 
Gazette on 8th December 1999. 
On February 22nd and March 13th, 2000, the Bill went through the 
first and second readings respectively. At the second reading, all 
the members of the House of Representatives who took the floor, 
spoke in glowing terms about the Bill and the House thereupon 
decided that the Bill did not need to go through a public hearing 
since there was a unanimous decision that it was one legislation 
that the country needed very urgently. The House thus rose with a 
resolution that the Bill be referred to the Information Committee, 
then chaired by Hon. Uche Maduako, for the Committee’s review 
of its contents. The Bill was subsequently referred to the Infor-
mation Committee on March 27, 2000 after the conclusion of the 
second reading.
After its review by the committee, a report was presented to the 
plenary session in May 2001 with strong recommendations that 
the bill be passed into law. This was done by Hon. Chijioke Edeo-
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ga, who had taken over from Hon. Maduako as Chairman of the 
House Committee on Information. 
Here, however, unknown and unforeseen political intrigues 
came to play as the hitherto receptive members who had lauded 
the Bill in the first and second readings became hostile and start-
ed questioning the process with a clear indication that quite a 
number of the members of the House present were no longer in-
terested in the Bill or were determined to prevent the House from 
passing it into law. The situation apparently arose from a falling 
out between one of the key sponsors of the Bill, Hon. Tony Any-
anwu, and the leadership of the House of Representatives with 
Tony Anyanwu demanding financial records of the House from 
the leadership, which expectedly set off alarm bells about the kind 
of use to which the Freedom of Information Bill could be put if it 
was passed into Law. At the end of the day, it was decided that a 
public hearing be conducted on it. 
With MRA playing supportive roles to see the public hear-
ing hold, such as providing key resources and personnel, paying 
for media advertisements on the public hearing, paying for the 
transportation, accommodation and subsistence of all the partici-
pants who came from outside Abuja to attend the public hearing 
or make presentations, providing refreshments for participants at 
the public hearing, etc, the public hearing was held on 2nd and 3rd 
October 2001. 
The public hearing was a success as all speakers were unani-
mous in their support for the bill and urged the House to pass it 
without further delay.  However, political intrigues set in again as 
the report of the public hearing remained undisclosed and the 
passing of the Bill lingered for close to two years till that National 
Assembly was dissolved in June 2003 following the general elec-
tions of new members in April 2003.
The Freedom of Information Bill in the Fifth National 
Assembly (2003 to 2007)
  When the 5th assembly was inaugurated, the sponsors of 
the Bill did not return to the National Assembly.  However, many 
newcomers had been elected and so sensitization and enlight-
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enment process had to be started all over again, with MRA still 
leading the advocacy efforts. 
However, it was not a totally hopeless process as Hon. Abike 
Daibri came on board as a new member of the House, with her 
sterling journalism background in the Nigerian Television Author-
ity (NTA) where she had overtly reported civil society and human 
interest issues made her a natural ally.  She pitched her tent on the 
side of the FOI Bill. She subsequently became the lead sponsor of 
the Bill and had as co-sponsor Honourable Duro Meseko, Honour-
able Depo Oyedokun and Honourable Emeka Ihedioha.  All four 
of them were former journalists. The Bill was passed by the House 
of Representatives with minor amendments on August 25, 2004. 
Sequel to the passage by the lower legislative chamber of the 
National Assembly, the Bill was transmitted to the Senate, where 
it went through a first reading on November 23, 2004 and a sec-
ond reading on February 22, 2005. It was thereafter committed to 
the Senate Committee on Information and National Orientation, 
Chaired by Senator Tawar Wada and the Bill went through a public 
hearing on April 26, 2005. 
However, when the report was presented by Senator Tawar 
Wada, chairman of the Senate Committee on Information, for the 
consideration of the Senate on December 20, 2005, political in-
trigues came to play again as some senators objected to it being 
passed just because the House of Representative had passed it, 
while others saw no reason why it should not be passed. 
The debates dragged on and the majority decision was that the 
Bill be stepped down. An ad-hoc Committee was then constitut-
ed to work on the Bill one more time. Members of the commit-
tee were Senator Victor Ndoma-Egba (SAN) as chairman, Senator 
Timothy Adudu, Senator Nuhu Aliyu, Senator Jubril Aminu, Sena-
tor Adeleke Mamora and Senator Udoma Udo Udoma. 
The ad-hoc Committee in carrying out its work noted that the 
Public Hearing held by the Senate Committee on Information did 
not take into consideration the views of some government agen-
cies. The Committee, therefore, organized a hearing on the Bill for 
such government agencies.
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On April 27, 2006, the hearing took place and was attended 
by 11 of such government organizations namely, the Office of 
the Head of the Civil Service of the Federation, the Nigeria Police, 
the State Security Service (SSS), the Nigerian Intelligence Agency 
(NIA), the Defense Intelligence Agency, the Immigration Service, 
Nigeria Customs Service, Economic and Financial Crimes Commis-
sion (EFCC), National Agency for Food, Drugs Administration and 
Control (NAFDAC), and Corporate Affairs Commission, which ex-
pressed their views to the Committee. Most of the agencies were 
in support of the Bill being passed into Law, except the Nigeria 
Police, which expressed reservations.
While Senate legislative process by the adhoc committee was 
going on, the advocacy campaign continued within and outside 
the National Assembly, with many other civil society advocates 
including Freedom of Information Coalition (FOIC) and the Nige-
rian Guild of Editors (NGE), playing key roles to lobby members to 
assent to the Bill. The different efforts yielded fruitful result as the 
Senate unanimously passed the Bill on November 15, 2006. 
With the advocacy now a nationwide campaign, the National 
Assembly in 2007, constituted the Conference Committee on the 
Freedom of Information Bill to harmonize the two versions of the 
Bill passed by the House of Representatives and the Senate. Mem-
bers of the Committee from the Senate were Senator Victor Ndo-
ma-Egba (SAN), Senator Udoma Udo Udoma, Senator Jibril Aminu, 
Senator Nuhu Aliyu, Senator Adeleke Mamora, and Senator Uche 
Chukwumerije. The members from the House of Representatives 
were Hon. Halims Agoda, Hon. Bunza Farouk Bello, Hon. Abdul 
Oroh, Hon. Wale Okediran, Hon. Abike Dabiri, Hon. Bala James 
Ngilari, Hon. Emeka Ihedioha, and Hon. Dipo Oyedokun.
The 14-member Conference Committee which was responsi-
ble for harmonizing the two versions of the Bill as passed by the 
House and amended by the Senate concluded the harmonization 
of the two versions of the Bill on February 14, 2007 and it was fi-
nally passed by both the House of Representatives and the Senate 
in the first quarter of 2007.
From the legislature, the harmonized Bill was thereafter sent to 
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the Executive arm of government to the then President Olusegun 
Obasanjo for his assent. Here again, the efforts got stalled as Pres-
ident Obasanjo claimed he did not receive the Bill. In the waiting 
game that ensued, a civil society delegation sought audience and 
met with Obasanjo, who was completing his maximum eight year 
term as president and was not eligible for re-election. 
The meeting took place in April 2007 and was led by Mr. Ede-
taen Ojo, with the aim of acquainting members of the group 
with the president’s thinking on the Bill which had been awaiting 
Obasanjo’s assent since it was sent to him by the Clerk of the Na-
tional Assembly on March 23, 2007 through his Special Adviser on 
National Assembly Matters, Senator Florence Ita-Giwa. 
The former President expressed reservations about three areas 
of the Bill, which he said he was uncomfortable with, namely: 
Section 1:  The Short Title of the Bill - Freedom of Information 
Act. Former President Obasanjo said he was opposed to the title 
of the Bill and would prefer that it should be called “Right to In-
formation Act” because, according to him, “Freedom” is absolute, 
while “Right” comes with responsibilities.
Of course, the short title of the Bill is hardly of any significance 
and it was difficult to see how this could have informed his refusal 
to assent to the Bill.
The long title of the Bill states its purpose quite clearly with no 
ambiguity whatsoever. It states that it is “A Bill for an Act to make 
public records and information more freely available, provide for 
public access to public records and information, protect public 
records and information to the extent consistent with the public 
interest and the protection of personal privacy, protect serving 
public officers from adverse consequences for disclosing certain 
kinds of official information without authorization and establish 
procedures for the achievement of those purposes and related 
purposes.”  
Section 13(1):  The head of a government or public institution 
may refuse to disclose any record, the disclosure of which may be 
injurious to the conduct of international affairs or the defense of 
the Federal Republic of Nigeria.
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The former President said he was concerned that the Bill only 
excludes from public access records which may be injurious to the 
defense of Nigeria, but did not also exclude records which may be 
injurious to the “security” of Nigeria.
Civil society advocates were of the view that the text of the Bill 
adequately protected Nigeria’s potentially sensitive defense re-
cords and information.
Besides, the protection of the internal and external security 
of Nigeria is also covered by the National Security Agencies Act, 
which is one of the laws entrenched in Section 315(5) of the Ni-
gerian Constitution. It extends to the protection of the documents 
and other acts relating to the security of Nigeria. The actions of 
the national security agencies established under the Act are pro-
tected from judicial scrutiny. 
In effect, the former President’s concerns were adequately ad-
dressed both under the Bill as well as under the National Security 
Agencies Act.
Section 13(2) says:  However, in the interest of the public the 
court may override the refusal by the head of the government or 
public institution to disclose the information applied for.
The former President was concerned that with this provision, 
the courts would be given the power to review any decision by the 
head of a public institution not to disclose any information and as 
such, heads of public institutions could then be compelled by the 
courts to disclose any information which they would otherwise not 
want to disclose.
President Obasanjo’s view suggested that he did not believe 
that the refusal of a government institution to disclose any record 
or document under the proposed Law should be subject to judi-
cial review to determine whether there is a public interest in the 
information being released.  
Such a position is obviously untenable under a democratic form 
of government.  One of the cardinal principles of the doctrine of 
separation of powers is the inherent powers of the courts to re-
view administrative decisions not only to ensure that they are con-
sistent with the Law, but also to prevent arbitrariness and abuse 
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of power.  It was the view of the civil society proponents of the Bill 
that the notion that the decision of a public officer can never be 
questioned in a court of law has no place in a democracy, particu-
larly where that public officer is elected to serve the people.   
This tactically became a dead end for the Bill as the 5th assembly 
was at that time winding up for another new set of elected legis-
lators to come in. Though Obasanjo’s action was widely criticized 
and condemned, it nevertheless changed the reality that the Bill 
was once again stalled for another set of legislative process to be-
gin all over with the new set of incoming members of the National 
Assembly.
The Freedom of Information Bill in Sixth National 
Assembly (2007 to 2011)
With the stalling of the process by the refusal of Obasanjo to 
assent to the Bill before the expiration of his tenure, the advocacy 
for the FOI had sufficiently won nationwide sympathy from many 
more quarters, locally and international. New independent groups 
had joined the fray, offering diverse support, locally, nationally 
and internationally. 
Hon. Abike Dabiri-Erewa had been re-elected into the House 
of Representatives and maintained her disposition to the Bill and 
had emerged the new mouthpiece for the Bill in the House, urging 
fellow members to revisit the Bill. 
In ally with her, was the deputy Senate leader, Senator Ndo-
ma-Egba who also was clamoring for the Senate to similarly revisit 
the Bill. He, along with 24 other members, co-sponsored the Bill 
in the Senate to sail through its first reading in October 25, 2007. 
Senate Ndoma-Egba had reasoned that since the Bill was not 
signed into law by Obasanjo and his veto was not overridden by 
the last National Assembly, it was imperative to re-introduce the 
Bill and allow Senators the opportunity to properly debate it be-
fore passing it.
Following this also, the federal government under President 
Musa Yar’Adua, also made overt pronouncements to dissociate 
itself from the position of the past executive arm, declaring that it 
was disposed to the FOI law being in place. The then Secretary to 
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the Federal Government, Ambassador Baba Gana Kingibe, had in-
deed disclosed on October 26, 2007 that the Umaru Yar’Adua-led 
government was committed not only to stamping out corruption 
but also institutionalizing transparency in the country.
Similarly, as the support for the passage of the FOI Bill grew, 
the House of Representatives had also said that it was not against 
its passage. Speaking on a media interview on January 7, 2009, 
the Chairman, House Committee on Media,  Hon. Eseme Eyibo, 
explained that the passage of the FOI Bill was on top of the House 
agenda in the year, noting that the Bill was central to good gover-
nance in the country and as such could not be discarded by any-
body even as the Newspaper Proprietors Association of Nigeria 
(NPAN), the Guild of editors, the  Nigeria Union of Journalists and 
other stakeholders in the media industry had expressed dissatis-
faction over the continued delay of the passage of the Bill, and 
were generating several comments, reports and editorials in the 
media on the issue.
Also in support of the Bill, the then Minister of State for Infor-
mation and Communications, Mr. Labaran Maku, on August 20, 
2010 described the FOI Bill as institutional to the media. He had 
noted that the Bill was not about individuals; but about ensuring 
that a democratic government is run as a public institution and 
that it is about the future of the country. 
However, despite the wide clamor and support being generated 
for the Bill, majority of members of the House of Representatives, 
many of whom were first timers, still refused to allow the Bill to be 
introduced, a situation which made Abike Dabiri-Erewa, the MRA, 
the NGE and the emerging frontline advocators to continue sen-
sitizing and ‘lobbying’ members of the House. Abike Dabiri-Erewa 
reportedly told her colleagues in December 2010 that the FOI Bill 
would actually ease their work as legislators as they wouldn’t have 
to be making lengthy explanations on issues that are readily avail-
able to the public to access the information.  “Let us have a change 
of perception as a parliament and pass the Bill because the FOI Bill 
will deepen democracy and ensure accountability and transparen-
cy in public service. The Bill is not harmful in any way; it is either 
Edetaen Ojo
66
Watchdogs or Captured Media? . . . 
we want to pass it or we do not,” she said.
The pleas and sensitization notwithstanding, majority of mem-
bers of the House of Representatives remained adamant to pass-
ing the Bill. Earlier on in April 29, 2008, the report of the House 
Committees on Information and National Orientation and Justice 
on the Bill had been rejected by the House.  Also on January 21, 
2009, the majority of the members forced the Speaker, Mr. Dimeji 
Bankole, to stand down consideration of the Bill as they kicked 
against it after a vote to negate the motion. 
Hon. Ita Enang, the Chairman of the House Committee on Busi-
ness and Rules was also shouted down on December 16, 2010 in a 
move to resuscitate the Bill. Enang had in a motion requested the 
House to refer the Bill to the committee on information for con-
sideration before bringing it back to the House but as soon as he 
moved the motion, majority of members, kicking against the Bill, 
shouted No! No! No! to his request. 
Intervention by Deputy Speaker, Bayero Nafada, to save the 
motion proved abortive as he was forced to stand down the mo-
tion till another time as there was difficulty getting a member to 
second the motion. In the ensuing drama, the Deputy Speaker, 
Alhaji Usman Nafada, who presided over the session, had called 
on some lawmakers to second the motion but they declined. 
However when Hon. Peter Linus indicated his intention to 
second the motion, he was not allowed to, as shouts of ‘put the 
question, put the question’ were heard from all directions in the 
chambers, an indication that the motion would not be passed thus 
forcing Honourable Nafada to stand the Bill down.
Many members of the House of Representatives belonging to 
the ruling People’s Democratic Party (PDP) complained that it was 
inappropriate for a proposed legislation as important as the Free-
dom of Information Bill to have as its lead sponsor a member of 
the minority party in opposition, in objection to the Honourable 
Abike Dabiri of the now defunct Alliance for Democracy (AD) be-
ing the lead sponsor.
Meanwhile, as the Bill lingered on, different stakeholders con-
tinued efforts to influence the National Assembly members, indi-
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vidually and collectively towards passing the Bill. These influences 
were to dramatically play out as the House of Representatives, in 
plenary presided over by the Deputy Speaker, Hon. Usman Bay-
ero Nafada, reversed its decision on the Bill on February 10, 2011 
mandating its Joint Committee on Information and National Ori-
entation and Justice seven days to conclude work on the Bill.  
The decision was sequel to motion by Ita Enang and 20 others 
entitled “Rescission under Order 9, Rule 1 (6) of the Standing Or-
der of the House of Representatives: Freedom of Information Bill, 
2007” which asked the House to resend the Bill to the joint com-
mittee for fresh consideration. 
The Speaker of the House of Representatives, Hon. Dimeji Ban-
kole, subsequently assured that the House would pass the Bill and 
then mount pressure on the executive arm to assent to it. The 
Bill was subsequently passed by the House of Representatives on 
February 24, 2011.
As advocacy pressures continued to build, the Newspapers 
Proprietors Association of Nigeria (NPAN) also stepped up ef-
forts to lobby the senate leadership through a courtesy visit to 
the office of the Senate President, Senator David Mark, to present 
their case for the early passage of the Bill by the upper legislative 
chamber.  The NPAN team, which was led by its president, Chief 
Ajibola Ogunsola, chairman of Punch Newspapers; included Mr. 
Nduka Obaigbena, chairman, Leaders and Company, publishers 
of THISDAY newspapers; Alhaji Kabiru Yusuf,  chairman, Trust Me-
dia Limited; Mr. Sam Amuka, chairman, Vanguard Media Limited 
and Alhaji Isa Funtua. The visit alongside initiatives by others was 
to yield fruit as the Senate on March 15, 2011, commenced the 
clause-by-clause consideration of the Freedom of Information Bill 
ahead of its third reading. Consequently on March 16, 2011, the 
Senate passed the Freedom of Information Bill. 
Following this, and in compliance with the Standing Orders of 
both chambers, a 12-man committee of the National Assembly 
was constituted to harmonize the two versions of the Freedom of 
Information Bill. Each of the chambers has six members in the har-
monization committee. While the Senate named its Conference 
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Committee members on March 16, 2011, the House of Represen-
tatives designated its members on May 11, 2011. The Conference 
Committee was made of : Senator Ayogu Eze, (chairperson);  Hon. 
Henry Seriake Dickson, (co-chairperson); Senator Victor Ndo-
ma-Egba (SAN), Senator Adamu Talba, Senator Anthony Manzo, 
Senator Kamorudeen Adedibu, and Senator Otaru Ohize. The 
others were Hon. Abike Dabiri-Erewa, Hon. Ahmed Wadada, Hon. 
Mohammed Sani Takori, Hon. Patrick Ikhariale and Hon.  Nkem 
Abonta.
 The committee met on May 19, 2011, and harmonized the 
differences between both versions of the Bill. While the harmo-
nized Bill was presented before the Senate by Senator Ayogu Eze, 
chairperson of the Conference Committee, the Bill was present-
ed before the House of Representatives by the co-chairperson of 
the Committee, Hon. Henry Seriake Dickson. After considering the 
reports of the committees of the Senate and the House of Repre-
sentatives respectively, the Senate, on May 24, 2011, approved the 
harmonized version of the Freedom of Information (FOI) Bill.
Subsequently, President Goodluck Jonathan who had been 
sworn in as President by the Chief Justice of the Federation fol-
lowing to the death of  President Yar’Adua, signed the Bill into law 
on Saturday May 28, 2011.
Advocacy and campaign strategies employed
Over the course of the 12 years that the advocacy for the adop-
tion of the Freedom of Information Act lasted, a series of planning 
meetings were held by the core group of advocates to forge or 
revise their strategies for the campaign. However, as each plan 
of action was executed, new challenges emerged and new plans 
had to be designed. As the advocacy advanced and the challeng-
es grew bigger, there was the need to device multi-pronged ap-
proach strategies. Of the three partners, which started the efforts 
to secure a Freedom of Information Law for Nigeria in 1993, only 
Media Rights Agenda remained throughout the campaign and 
others became exhausted by a prolonged, exhausting and bruis-
ing campaign. 
In the general context, the strategies involved in the advocacy 
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drive for the enactment of the FOI law in Nigeria entailed a com-
bination of different methods, beginning with the action point of 
making the first draft in 1994, then to the review meetings, the 
stakeholders sensitizations meetings/workshops, legislative advo-
cacy (including official correspondence through letters, one-on-
one visits, parleys, telephone calls, text messages, etc) and media 
publicity. 
Others, which included personal and discreet interventionist 
strategies such as private meetings to principal members of the 
house of assembly, facilitated by administrative aides and assis-
tants to such principal officers as well as strategic alliances built 
amongst different stakeholders both within the civil society fold 
(beyond MRA’s initiatives) and within the National Assembly, also 
played crucial roles. Critical also is the different strategic roles 
played by different funding/donor organizations as well as by 
principal members of the National Assembly who became advo-
cates for the Bill.
A major challenge that the advocacy for the enactment of 
the Bill encountered when the movement started was how to 
broaden the constituency for support for the campaign, especially 
among civil society organizations. Although the civil society 
was united in their desire to enthroning democratic rule, 
not many fancied the idea of a clamor for an access to in-
formation regime, because at that time, it didn’t look like 
a priority issue. This was especially so with all the turbu-
lence associated with the democratic future of Nigeria at 
that time. 
So before 1999, only very few civil society organizations 
understood and shared MRA’s goal of clamoring for a so-
ciety where the freedom of expression and information 
operates. In fact, very few partner organizations bought the idea 
and initiative to embark on follow-up activities or sought to intro-
duce Freedom of Information public enlightenment components 
and campaigns into their core projects and activities. This made 
MRA to become the lead advocate organization for the Nigerian 
FOI advocacy process. 
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In the process to bring in more stakeholders, MRA had to keep 
on the drive whilst at the same time creating niches for interested 
stakeholders to buy into the advocacy process. One of the activ-
ities embarked on in relations to this was to print sensitization 
materials and provide documentation on the FOI, and its opera-
tions in other lands. This, MRA extensively did in year 2000. The 
reach-out drive also included giving sensitization talks in forums 
on how a society that operates a freedom of information policy 
aids development.
To break the barrier of being the only organization driving the 
campaign, a multi stakeholders’ forum was convened in Septem-
ber 2000 with the objective to identify various stakeholders in a 
freedom of information regime, and agree on how the different 
stakeholders can support the campaign for the enactment of the 
Bill into law, amongst others. The meeting was attended by rep-
resentatives of various interest groups, including the Academic 
Staff Union of Universities (ASUU), the Nigerian Labour Congress 
(NLC), the NUJ, the Newspapers Proprietors Association of Nigeria 
(NPAN), the Nigerian Guild of Editors (NGE), humanrights NGOs, 
the media, the legal profession, international organizations and 
agencies, etc.
This strategy for a stakeholder forum paid off as several indi-
viduals and organizations emerged as advocates for the passage 
of the Bill from the parley, under the group, ‘Freedom of Informa-
tion Coalition (FOIC) that was subsequently formed. From this also 
emerged the need to have FOIC coordinators for the campaign at 
local levels and this got many more actors involved both at indi-
vidual and organizational levels as state and zonal coordinators 
of the FOIC across the country. Instrumental to further achieving 
this was the creation of an internet listserve for the group through 
which members were being added and correspondence and view 
on issues bordering on freedom of expression and free press were 
being discussed. 
Over the years, the FOIC internet listserve grew to having mem-
bership base of about one thousand five hundred (1,500) enlight-
ened persons and civil society organizations, most of whom have 
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emerged as notable advocates of the FOI, both at individual, orga-
nizational and institution capacities. The FOIC listserve, managed 
by MRA, is still very much active, discussing daily, related issues 
on the FOI.
Media Campaigns
Media campaigns played a crucial role throughout the advoca-
cy program, and formed the channel through which the issues were 
brought to national prominence. The strategy for the media advocacy 
was with the primary purpose to keep the issue alive in the public 
domain and create a groundswell of public opinion in favor of a 
regime of access to information to act as a further pressure for 
legislative action by the National Assembly. 
The activities under this strategy included visits to media hous-
es to meet with journalists, editors and columnists to solicit sup-
port for the campaign through the publication of articles, editorial 
comments and stories on the freedom of information issue. 
It also entailed issuing periodic press releases and press state-
ments to highlight developments on the issues; granting of press 
interviews on the issue; facilitating publication of feature stories 
and opinion articles, production of briefing packs for journalists 
containing materials and information about the Bill and freedom 
of information issues generally. The strategy also included orga-
nizing sensitization workshops for journalists.
As a result of these efforts, virtually all Nigerian newspapers 
published several editorial comments in support of the Bill. Oth-
ers published news and feature articles, opinion articles, and car-
toons on the Bill. The text of the Bill was also published in full 
in several newspapers as paid advertisements in order to ensure 
wide spread awareness about the Bill and its content. Many radio 
and television stations held numerous discussions and other pro-
grams where guests appeared to promote the Bill and explain the 
principles behind it. 
Some of the broadcast stations in which MRA personnel, col-
laborating partners and other guests appeared to promote the Bill 
and explain its principles include the African Independent Televi-
sion (AIT) in Lagos and Abuja, in its “Kaakaki” program, a popular 
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breakfast program; the sister radio stations, RayPower1 and 2, Mi-
naj Broadcasting International television (MBI), the Nigerian Tele-
vision Authority (NTA) Channel10 in its Morning Ride programme, 
another breakfast programme; the Federal Radio Corporation of 
Nigeria in Kaduna; the NTA in Kaduna; Murhi International Televi-
sion (MiTV) in Lagos; Radio Lagos, Degue Broadcasting Network 
(DBN) television in Lagos, Channels Television in Lagos,etc.
 It’s worthy of note, however, that the fact that the MRA and the 
leadership of its partner organizations were manned by former 
journalists was instrumental to the success of the media advocacy 
as their media skills were the assets used in mass communicating 
the issues.
An Unwilling President
Prior to approaching individual members of the National As-
sembly to sponsor the Freedom of Information Bill, Media Rights 
Agenda had explored the possibility of getting it passed into Law 
as an Executive Bill. By some coincidence, in his inaugural address 
on assumption of office on May 29, 1999, President Olusegun 
Obasanjo identified corruption as “the greatest single bane of our 
society today” and promised that under his administration, “all 
rules and regulations designed to help honesty and transparency 
in dealing with government will be restored and enforced.” 
In addition, shortly after the inauguration of the new govern-
ment, President Obasanjo announced his plan to present to the 
National Assembly for consideration and enactment into law, an 
anti-corruption Bill.
Against this background, Media Rights Agenda felt that the 
time was right to also introduce the Freedom of Information Bill 
to the National Assembly and that it would have an easier passage 
if it was sent to the National Assembly by the President as an Ex-
ecutive Bill.  
On June 10, 1999, Media Rights Agenda wrote to President 
Obasanjo expressing support for his commitment to fight corrup-
tion in Nigeria and his plan to present an anti-corruption Bill to 
the National Assembly.
MRA observed that accountability and transparency in Govern-
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ment were crucial to any meaningful anti-corruption crusade, ar-
guing that accountability and transparency could not be possible 
if citizens have no right of access to information held by the State 
or its agencies or if no mechanism exists for giving practical effect 
to the right to freedom of information.
It therefore requested President Obasanjo to also present the 
draft Freedom of Information Bill to the National Assembly as an 
Executive Bill for consideration along with his anti-corruption Bill 
and support efforts to secure its enactment into law.  
The request was borne out of the organization’s realization that 
Executive Bills would usually receive more serious and urgent con-
sideration from the legislators than private members’ Bills.
Media Rights Agenda also wrote letters to the then Minister of 
Information, Chief Dapo Sarumi, and the Minister of Justice, Mr. 
Kanu Agabi (SAN), apprising them of the existence of the Bill, its 
contents and soliciting their support for its speedy enactment into 
law.
However, by a letter dated July 19, 1999, signed by his per-
sonal assistant, Mr. Ojo A. Taiwo, President Obasanjo declined to 
present the Freedom of Information bill as an Executive Bill and, 
instead, advised Media Rights Agenda to send the draft directly to 
the National Assembly.
Similarly, several months after its letter to the Justice Minister, 
on March 29, 2000, Media Rights Agenda received another letter 
dated January 20, 2000, from the Legislative Drafting Department 
of the Federal Ministry of Justice, in which reference was made to 
the organization’s June 10, 1999 letter to the President. 
In the letter signed on behalf of the Federal Attorney-General 
and Minister of Justice by Mrs. Christie Ekweonu, she said that she 
had been directed to inform Media Rights Agenda “to properly 
channel your cause through the Federal Ministry of Information 
which is the relevant governmental body that regulates the prac-
tice and dissemination of information. Your case will be duly con-
sidered if it originates from the relevant Ministry.”
Ironically, at the time Media Rights Agenda received the letter 
from the Federal Ministry of Justice, the Freedom of Information 
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Bill had already gone through the first and second readings be-
fore the House of Representatives in the National Assembly and 
was already being considered in greater detail by the Information 
Committee of the House.
Legislative Advocacy at the National Assembly
The defining stage for the enactment of the Bill was at the leg-
islative chambers of both the House of Representatives and Sen-
ate in the years from 1999 to 2011. The entry of the Bill into the 
House of Representative was via an international forum organized 
by UNESCO in Abuja to which MRA’s Legal Officer, Maxwell Kadiri 
had gone to speak as a resource person. It was in that forum that 
Hon. Tony Anyanwu and Hon. Nduka Irabor got introduced to the 
Bill. With further interaction, Hon. Anyanwu resolved to push the 
Bill to the House and requested a copy to be sent to him, as well as 
to other members of the Houses. That disposition, created the in-
road for MRA to introduce the Bill to members of the houses, and 
with Hon. Anyanwu’s assistance as well as that of several others, 
the legislative advocacy process began.
This process was to include several visits to members of the 
house in form of door-to-door enlightenment campaigns both in 
their offices in the National Assembly in Abuja and in some other 
parts of the country, and at their homes in the Apo Legislative 
Quarters in Abuja. Despite undertaking several advocacy visits to 
the National Assembly, i t  w a s  r e a l i z e d  t h a t  it would be 
difficult to meet with all the members through such one on one 
meetings especially because the window for such meetings was 
often very narrow as members usually had series of other engage-
ments during intervals between their sitting period at the National 
Assembly and the period they leave for home or other activities.
There was, thus, the need to devise ways of meeting with a 
large number of the members in one venue to plead the cause of 
the Bill. In trying to solve the problem, MRA was advised to con-
sider organizing a function for all the legislators at which issues 
concerning the Bill would be discussed in a relaxed and informal 
environment. Acting on this advice and ahead of the scheduling of 
the Bill for First Reading, Media Rights Agenda, with support from 
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ARTICLE 19, organized a cocktail reception for members of the 
House of Representatives. The event took place at the Abuja Sher-
aton Hotel and Towers. It was attended by about 250 legislators.
The advocacy work at the Senate included meetings and par-
leys with Senators, either in their offices or homes, depending on 
which venue they preferred. However, it should be pointed out 
that unlike their colleagues in the House of Representatives, most 
of the Senators were not favourably disposed towards members 
of the advocacy team meeting them in their homes to hold dis-
cussions focused on the Bill.  As a result of this, a majority of the 
meetings took place in their offices at the National Assembly com-
plex.
These advocacy visits, like the previous ones carried out in the 
House of Representatives, were done in phases. Consequent-
ly, during the first phase of this advocacy exercise in the Senate, 
the advocacy team from Media Rights Agenda met with 30 Sen-
ators in all. Of this number, except for a few of them who were 
non-committal and preferred to wait until the Bill was referred to 
them from the House of Representatives, all the others expressed 
their willingness to support it. They included Senator M. T. Mbu, 
Senator Martins Yellowe, Senator Adolphus Wabara, Senator Fa-
jimi, Senator D.Saror, Senator Femi Okurounmu, Senator Rowland 
Owie, Senator Matori, Senator Ishaq Mohammed, and Senator 
Tokunbo Afikuyomi.
In fact, Senator Owie, the only Senator that agreed to meet the 
advocacy team at home, and who was then the Chief Whip in the 
Senate, promised to use his leadership position and close contact 
with Senator Tafida, the then Chair of the Senate Rules and Busi-
ness Committee, as well as with the then Senate President, Sena-
tor Chuba Okadigbo, to get the Senate to give the Bill accelerated 
hearing. The level of support received by members of the advoca-
cy team from this first time discussion with the respective Senators 
was quite impressive, contrary to the negative public perceptions 
about the Senate.
The Role of Donors and Funding Partners
The advocacy campaign was greatly enhanced by the support 
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received from funders and donor partners. An instance of a crucial 
moment when this came to play was when the House of Repre-
sentatives indicated that it did not have funds to conduct a public 
hearing in 2001 and the MRA, had to confer with the Nigerian 
office of the International Human Law Group (Law Group), then 
headed by Dr. Jibrin Ibrahim, to convert funds earmarked for ad-
vocacy activities to part-sponsor the Public Hearing. 
Through funds provided by the Law Group, MRA substantially 
funded the Public Hearing by covering the cost of the production 
and placement of advertisements in national daily newspapers and 
weekly newsmagazines to announce the Public Hearing, paying 
for the transportation,accommodationandsubsistenceofallthepar-
ticipantswhocamefrom outside Abuja to attend the Public Hearing 
or make presentations, providing refreshments for participants at 
the Public Hearing, etc as well as  production of radio and televi-
sion jingles to publicize the Public Hearing. Others included the 
cost of an independent legal consultant engaged by the Commit-
tee to produce an independent report on the deliberations at the 
Public Hearing.
Other advocacy activities were funded  by the Open Society 
Justice Initiative (OSJI), the European Union, the Foreign and 
Commonwealth Office (FCO) of the British Government, the Unit-
ed States Agency for International Development (USAID) through 
PACT Nigeria. Overheads covered included frequent travels by 
MRA advocacy team partners from other civil society organiza-
tions from Lagos to Abuja, the activities of the Freedom of In-
formation Coalition including workshops, meetings and seminars, 
production of campaign materials, production of radio and televi-
sion jingles, production of radio and television documentaries, etc.
Funds were also provided to MRA and other civil society or-
ganizations for freedom of information advocacy activities over 
the years by ARTICLE 19, The Public Affairs Section of the United 
States Embassy, the United Nations Information Centre (UNIC), in 
Lagos, the United  Nations  Educational, Scientific and Cultural Or-
ganization(UNESCO), Action Aid International Nigeria, the Global 
Opportunities Fund, and many others.
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Advocacy Training Workshops, Seminars, 
Sensitization Workshops
MRA organized and held several seminars, workshops, training 
and sensitization activities at various levels and venues to sensitize 
different sectors of the Nigerian society to the FOI Bill, its under-
lying principles and benefits. Sensitization meetings were held for 
journalists, editors, civil society organizations, including communi-
ty based organizations, faith based organizations, and grassroots 
organizations; government information officers at Federal and 
state levels, etc. These meetings served to enlighten Nigerians on 
the Bill and enlist their support for the passage of the Bill.
Letter Writing Campaigns
Media Rights Agenda and the Freedom of Information Coali-
tion wrote hundreds of personalized letters to various individuals 
and organizations, including all the members of both chambers 
of the National Assembly, all the Ministers in the first cabinet of 
President Olusegun Obasanjo, other presidential aides, religious 
leaders, political parties, media organizations, etc. 
In November 2002, MRA wrote formally to the Speaker of the 
House of Representatives, Alhaji Umar Ghali Na’Abba, and the 
Chairman of the House Committee on Information, Honourable 
Lawan Farouk. MRA reminded Alhaji Na’Abba of his commitment 
to ensure the speedy passage of the Bill and to express concerns 
that the Bill may not be passed as the administrative term was 
drawing to a close. 
In the letter to Honourable Farouk, MRA reminded him that 
the Public Hearing on the Bill on October 3 and 4, 2001 attracted 
impressive participation and contribution from stakeholders with 
a general call for the passage of the Bill.  MRA expressed concern 
that despite this, no word had been heard or action taken on the 
Bill thereafter. It appealed to Honourable Farouk to ensure that 
the Committee’s report was submitted as soon as possible so that 
the Rules and Business Committee of the House could slate the 
Bill for the Third Reading.
MRA also wrote to the 30 registered political parties, prior to 
the 2003 general elections seeking to get them make a commit-
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ment to supporting the passage of the Bill. The letters written in 
April 2003 on behalf of the Freedom of Information Coalition were 
sent to the chairpersons and secretaries of each of the political 
parties as well as their presidential candidates.  
The letters asked them to make the campaign to secure the 
right of Nigerians to have access to public records and informa-
tion a cardinal policy of their parties as well as asking them to 
support the enactment of the Freedom of Information Bill into law.
Along with the letters, MRA also provided the parties and their 
candidates with materials on access to information, including cop-
ies of the Bill, a number of documents giving background infor-
mation to the Bill and a document entitled “The Public’s Right to 
Know”, published by ARTICLE 19, which sets out the ways in which 
governments can achieve maximum openness in line with the best 
international standards and practices.
The import of all these letters was that they served to introduce 
the draft FOI Bill to these important stakeholders who hitherto 
may have been unaware of the draft Bill.  The letters also ensured 
that the FOI Bill remained in the legislative agenda and was not 
consigned to the archives without passage.  Through the letters, 
MRA also presented these stakeholders with copies of the FOI Bill 
and educational materials on the Bill to enlighten them and get 
their support for it.
Short Message Service (SMS)
Short Message Service (SMS or text messages) was also used 
effectively as an advocacy tool at various times. To ensure the ef-
fectiveness of the use of SMS as an advocacy tool, MRA initially 
assembled the mobile numbers of the members of the two cham-
bers of the National Assembly.  These were broken down accord-
ing to their Chambers: Senate and House of Representatives; the 
constituencies of the legislators, and the committees they belong 
for effective use. 
The FOI Coalition broke down these numbers according to the 
constituencies of the legislators and distributed them to its mem-
bers in the various geo-political zones for targeted advocacy.
Text messages were, therefore, sent from the FOI Coalition Sec-
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retariat and from all over Nigeria to the members of the National 
Assembly at critical points in the legislative journey of the Bill.  Text 
messages were sent when there was a Reading of the Bill in any of 
the chambers, during Public Hearing, during committees’ sittings 
and during harmonization by harmonization committees of the 
two chambers.
SMS/Text Messages ensured short, appropriate and targeted 
advocacy messages are delivered to the appropriate legislators. 
During First, Second and Third Readings, it ensured that a specific 
chamber was targeted as well as during the harmonization pro-
cesses, it ensured that only members of the harmonization com-
mittee were targeted.  Responses from these text messages have 
served to help MRA gauge the acceptability of the Bill in the two 
chambers.  MRA got some inspiring and encouraging responses 
from these text messages; of course it also got responses in which 
legislators expressed their opposition to the Bill.  This helped to 
identify opposition to the Bill and to know where to focus future 
advocacy efforts.
Using the Internet for Advocacy
The Freedom of Information campaign also took advantage of 
the rising use and effectiveness of the Internet to further the FOI 
advocacy efforts. In this area the internet was used to widen the 
advocacy efforts and to generate ideas for better advocacy from 
all over the world.  Three internet forums were used to advance 
the advocacy work, namely the FOI Coalition listserv, FOI Coalition 
website, and the MRA website.
Following one of the action plans of the Second Stakeholders’ 
Meeting on the FOI Bill, MRA created and managed a listserv: 
FOICoalition@yahoogroups.com.  It served as a platform through 
which information on the activities of the coalition and develop-
ments regarding the Bill were shared by members.  They also used 
it to suggest new strategies for the advocacy.  Even after the pas-
sage of the Bill into law, it has remained vibrant and relevant in 
being used to share information on openness, transparency and 
accountability, and good governance as well as freedom of ex-
pression, media development and related matters.  But through 
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the listserv, only subscribers could be reached hence the registra-
tion, design and development of a website for the coalition. The 
Freedom of Information Coalition and the MRA websites served 
to complement each other by disseminating information on the 
progress of and activities around the FOI Bill around the globe. 
The FOI Coalition site www.foicoalition.org was used to dissemi-
nate information about the odyssey of the Bill while MRA’s web-
site, www.mediarightsagenda.net was used to disseminate infor-
mation on the activities of MRA as well as on the FOI Bill.
Internet advocacy around the FOI Bill ensured that the Bill ac-
quired international status and recognition.  It became not just a 
Nigerian Bill for Nigerians but a Bill that attracted global attention 
and interventions from individuals and groups from all over the 
globe.  Internet advocacy guaranteed that the FOI Bill got rich 
inputs that ensured we have the quality of FOI Act that we have in 
Nigeria today.
Signature Campaign
At a time when progress on the passage of the FOI Bill into Law 
appeared to have stalled, a signature campaign was embarked 
upon to get signatures from all over Nigeria and from around the 
globe to support a petition asking the National Assembly to pass 
the Freedom of Information Bill into law before the end of 2007.
The coalition aimed to secure at least one million signatures 
in support of the petition from Nigerians across the country and 
in the Diaspora.  The petition was meant to be presented to the 
National Assembly on September 28, 2007, on the year’s “Interna-
tional Right to Know Day”. Launched on September 11, 2007, the 
campaign secured several hundreds of signatures from Nigerians 
scattered across the globe.
Although the FOI Coalition could not get the one million sig-
natures it sought and so could not present the signatures to the 
National Assembly, it was worth noting that eminent Nigerians, 
including then Governor Gbenga Daniel of Ogun State signed the 
petition.  It also galvanized widespread support for passage of the 
Bill and continuously kept the Bill in the legislative agenda.
Production and Dissemination of Educational Materials
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Crucial in all the advocacy efforts for the passage of the Bill was 
the production and wide distribution of information, educational 
and communication (IEC) materials on the FOI Bill. 
With funding support from the International Human Rights Law 
Group, Media Rights Agenda, in August 2000, printed campaign 
materials aimed at creating awareness and soliciting public sup-
port for the Freedom of Information Bill.  MRA printed color post-
ers, handbills titled: “What You Should Know About the Freedom 
of Information Bill”, and three different types of color stickers.
The posters contained messages promoting the values and 
benefits of an open and transparent government to the democrat-
ic process and the economy. The handbills gave highlights of the 
Bill, explaining in more detail its content, purpose and benefits.   It 
contained information about the Bill such as “What is the Freedom 
of Information Bill?”, “Current State of Access to Information in 
Nigeria”, “Benefits of the Freedom of Information Bill”, “Who Can 
Benefit?”, “How Can Nigerians Support the Bill?” etc.  
It provided contact information for members of the National 
Assembly, advising members of the public to write to their rep-
resentatives in the National Assembly or telephone them with a 
request that they pass the Bill.   The stickers contained messages 
of support for the bill and transparency in governance generally.
The materials were distributed in major cities in southeastern, 
south western and the northern parts of the country. These cam-
paign materials complemented other efforts employed by MRA 
and the FOI Coalition to spread information about the Bill and to 
enlighten Nigerians about it and its benefits to them.  Nigerians 
considered them so useful that after distributing what they have, 
the coalition members still requested for more from the FOI Sec-
retariat.
Beyond the FOI Enactment
The level of usage of the FOI Act by journalists and the media 
generally has not been commensurate with the level of interest 
and efforts invested by the media community in ensuring the en-
actment of the FOI Bill into Law.
Agbese (2016) laments that I am unable to reconcile this apparent ne-
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glect to use the law on the part of our news media with the sweat that 
marked the struggle to birth the law. Since the Bill became an act of 
parliament, there has been no major demand, if indeed any, major or 
minor, by the news media on the government and their agencies to 
give them access to the loads of information kept out of the reach 
of the Nigerian public. The worst thing you can to do a law is to let it 
gather dust, half remembered and half forgotten.
Similarly, Olumhense (2013) had earlier wondered: 
Why are more citizens and organizations not taking advantage of the 
FOI? If the press truly understands that its role is to reveal, not conceal, 
why is it not waving the FOI flag at every public door?
Few journalists and media houses are known to have made 
use of the FOI Act to request information from public institutions. 
However, there have been a few exceptions. The Daily Trust news-
paper moved very early  in the life of the Law to test its efficacy, 
beginning in late 2011 when it started using the Law to seek in-
formation from various public institutions.  It has been one of the 
most dogged media users of the Act in Nigeria.  Premium Times, 
the online investigative media outlet, is also known to have made 
vigorous use of the Act in seeking official information from gov-
ernment bodies and has indeed opted for the litigation option in 
enforcing compliance by public institutions which failed to grant 
its request for information.
Beginning from December 2011, Daily Trust wrote at least 12 
requests for information to 11 different government ministries, 
departments and agencies asking for a variety of information but 
only five of them responded, although none of them granted ac-
cess to the information requested. The others simply ignored the 
newspaper’s request.
The ministries and agencies that Daily Trust sent FOI requests 
to are the State House, Abuja; the Office of the National Security 
Adviser, the Office of the Attorney General of the Federation, the 
Ecological Funds Office, the Public Complaints Commission (PCC), 
the Code of Conduct Bureau (CCB), the Office of the Inspector 
General of Police, the Federal Civil Service Commission, the Nige-
rian National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC), the Nigeria Prison 
Service and the National Assembly.
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Of the five agencies which responded to Daily Trust newspa-
per, two said they would not give the information requested; one 
asked the newspaper to be more specific in its request while the 
other two were evasive in their responses. The office of the Attor-
ney-General of the Federation and the State House ignored the 
newspaper’s requests which merely asked for basic information.
On December 8, 2011, Daily Trust wrote the Code of Conduct 
Bureau, asking for copies of President Jonathan’s assets declara-
tion details. After several follow-ups, the Bureau, in a letter dated 
February 20, 2012, responded saying a provision of the Consti-
tution has “precluded the Bureau the liberty” to give such infor-
mation. In the letter signed by its secretary, Alhassan Ibrahim, the 
Bureau said it needed the National Assembly “to spell out the 
conditions and terms” upon which it would make available to the 
public information on assets declaration by public officers.
Daily Trust also wrote a letter to the Ecological Funds Office on 
December 8, 2011, asking for information on amounts of money 
disbursed to states for ecological projects as well as the names 
and locations of such projects.  But the newspaper never received 
any response from the office even after several follow-up visits.
On December 12, 2011, Daily Trust sent an FOI request to the 
Inspector General of Police seeking information on the existing 
framework on personal firearms possession, the number of peo-
ple granted personal firearm licenses and the number of certified 
firearm dealers in the country. The Police did not respond to the 
newspaper’s request. On April 12, 2012 Daily Trust again sent the 
same request to the new Inspector General of Police with a re-
minder but there was no response.
On January 7, 2012, Daily Trust through a Freedom of Informa-
tion request to the Federal Civil Service Commission, sought to 
know the total number of staff in each ministry and their states of 
origin. The commission did not respond to the request.
On March 1, 2012, Daily Trust wrote the Public Complaints 
Commission seeking information on the number of complaints 
received and handled, and budget releases in 2011. On March 27, 
in a letter with reference number PCC/HQ/ADM.16/74 and signed 
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by Mr. C. Nwosu, the Commission said the “information you re-
quested are not yet available.” Instead, the Commission gave the 
newspapers its reports for 2009 and 2010.
On March 1, 2012, relying on the FOI Act, Daily Trust wrote to 
the Nigeria Prison Service, requesting information on the number 
of condemned prisoners, which prisons they are held, the number 
of hangmen and number of gallows available. The service wrote 
back on March 14, 2012, asking the newspapers to send its inqui-
ries to the office of the National Security Adviser (NSA).
On March 27, 2012, Daily Trust wrote a similar request for the 
same information to the the National Security Adviser, referring 
the NSA to the response it received from the Prisons Service.
On May 3, 2012, the Prison Service, by a letter signed by Baba-
tunde Owolabi, provided general information, warning that the 
data “may be sensitive and injurious” to the service if used inap-
propriately. The agency did not give Daily Trust the number of 
gallows available or prisons where condemned inmates are held 
as it requested.
On April 20, 2012, Daily Trust wrote the National Assembly 
requesting details of contracts for the procurement of Jeeps for 
Senators and Toyota Camry cars for members of the House of 
Representatives for their committee work. But rather than provide 
the information, in its reply the National Assembly demanded the 
specifics of the contracts referred to.
Daily Trust also wrote another FOI letter to the National Assem-
bly asking for the Hansard of specific sessions of the Senate and 
House of Representatives. This request was ignored.
Daily Trust wrote a letter to the State House on April 20, 2012 
asking for details on the number of people who were on the Pres-
ident’s delegation during his trips to Australia, Ethiopia and Ger-
many. Initially, officials refused to accept the letter because, ac-
cording to them, Daily Trust used a wrong nomenclature for the 
addressee. The paper wrote another letter the way they suggest-
ed, to the permanent secretary, State House; this was accepted 
but there was no reply.
The Ministry of Justice also failed to respond to Daily Trust’s let-
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ter sent to it on April 20, 2012, seeking a copy of the White Paper 
on the Galtimari-led Presidential Committee on Security Challeng-
es in the North East Zone 
On July 12, 2012, Daily Trust wrote to the Nigerian National Pe-
troleum Corporation (NNPC), requesting details of a recruitment 
exercise that it had just conducted at that time, but the NNPC 
denied the request through a letter dated July 17, 2012, with a 
reference number CSLD.1099.   The letter, signed by NNPC’s legal 
adviser, Mr. Anthony C. Madichie, claimed that the provisions of 
FOI Act did not apply to the corporation.  It claimed that the NNPC 
is a “statutory corporation” and that section 31 of the FOI Act pre-
cludes the application of the FOI Act to it.
In July 2017, Daily Trust wrote to the NNPC requesting informa-
tion on turn around maintenance the corporation had carried on 
the plants in the last 20 years including expenses for them.
In response to the Daily Trust request, the NNPC’s lawyers, 
Omale O.B & Co., said the corporation could not grant the re-
quest because the information sought was a “trade secret” and 
confidential information that may “cause harm.” It said it could not 
also give the information because section 31 of the Act excludes it 
from granting such requests.
On June 1, 2015, Premium Times newspaper, through a Free-
dom of Information letter dated the same day, requested from 
the Central Bank of Nigeria complete data on the deposits and 
withdrawals from the Excess Crude Account; revenues from oil and 
gas exports with dates deposits were made; and deposits from 
the revenue proceeds accrued from signature bonuses from the 
award of oil blocks, royalties on awarded oil licenses/leases, and 
petroleum profit tax/penalties from January 2005 till date.
The newspaper, through another FOI letter also dated June 1, 
2015, requested from the NNPC complete data on oil and gas 
production from January 2005 till date; revenues from oil and gas 
exports with dates deposits were made to bank accounts from 
January 2005 till date; deposits from the revenue proceeds accru-
ing from signature bonuses from the award of oil blocks, royalties 
on awarded oil licenses/leases, petroleum profit tax/ penalties; 
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and complete data on the deposits to the Federation Account Al-
location Committee (FAAC) and Excess Crude Accounts.
Neither the NNPC nor the Central Bank responded to the news-
paper’s request.
In 2013, Atiku Sarki, then reporting for the New Nigerian news-
paper, made seven FOI requests to various public institutions for 
which he got two responses which were mere promises to get 
back to him. None of the institutions supplied the information he 
requested. Atiku Sarki requested from the Accountant General of 
the Federation information on how much had been spent by the 
office on the new Integrated Personnel and Payroll Information 
System (IPPIS) and how much had been saved as a result of the 
introduction of the system.
In another request to the Office of the President, Atiku Sar-
ki asked for the minutes of the meeting of the Federal Executive 
Council (FEC) held on Wednesday, June 19, 2012 at which the 
council approved the resumption of payment of subsidies to mar-
keters which was suspended following the probe in the sector.
From the Federal Ministry of Power, the journalist requested 
information on the amount spent in the last two years [2010 and 
2011] for the procurement of spares for the repair of Egbin and 
Ughelli Thermal Stations. The ministry responded asking him to 
direct his request to the Thermal Power Stations with the excuse 
that the information he requested were not with the ministry.
Atiku Sarki’s FOI request to the Corporate Affairs Commission, 
dated September 19, 2012 sought a breakdown of the Commis-
sion’s annual revenue generation from January 2008 to August 
2013. The Corporate Affairs Commission responded only to say 
that it would get back to him with the information, but it never did.
But it has by no means all been doom and gloom in the usage 
of the Act. While some of the media organizations and individual 
journalists who have attempted to use the Act have faced some 
challenges, there have also been successes recorded by both the 
media and other civil society organizations in either the informa-
tion that they have been able to obtain with the Act or the positive 
judicial pronouncements that have emanated from the courts as 
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a result of the efforts of those that have challenged the action of 
public institutions in denying them information.
Indeed, Malami (2017) had this to say: “It is noteworthy that the 
bulk of FOIA requests since 2011 have invariably originated from 
these organizations (i.e. civil society organizations) that by dint of 
such requests have kept Public Institutions on their toes and also 
enhanced understanding of the practical aspects of the FOIA.”
Although the FOI Act is not yet where a lot of people project-
ed it would be it has nonetheless moved Nigeria from an era of 
secrecy onto the road to transparency and accountability. In the 
space of six years of the existence of the FOI Act, thousands of FOI 
requests have been made to various public institutions at the fed-
eral, state and local government levels on various issues like pub-
lic procurement, health, water, road, education, budget allocation, 
implementation of projects, and so on.
Some of these requests for information have resulted in full 
access to the information sought while some have only brought 
about partial access.  Without doubt, a lot of others have been 
denied with no justifications for denial. From the denial of the FOI 
requests, court cases have sprang up which have expended the 
frontiers of the Law by giving positive interpretations to many of 
the provisions and thereby advanced the implementation of the 
Act.
The Freedom of Information Act and Its Prospect for 
Media Practice in Nigeria
Prior to the enactment of the FOI Act, a major challenge for 
most journalists was the difficulty in obtaining information from 
government bodies, among others, through legitimate channels. 
The situation was worsened by the absence of any legal protec-
tion for journalists’ confidential sources, which created additional 
challenges for journalists and the media to persuade sources to 
give them information unofficially.  Without access to information, 
journalism practice was extremely difficult.   
The Act, if effectively implemented, can change this situation 
drastically.  With the coming into force of the Act, media profes-
sionals now have a real possibility of legitimately obtaining much 
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of the information they require to do stories that will be of interest 
to the public and impact governance. In addition, public officials 
who provide them with information of public interest unofficially 
will also be protected against any adverse legal or employment 
related consequences.
Using the law, journalists can approach virtually any public in-
stitution and where necessary, some private bodies, to request the 
information that is relevant for their work.  If the law works well, 
journalists, like other members of the public, should be able to get 
the information within seven days on average.  
In addition, civil servants and other public officials who are privy 
to information which show a violation of any law, rule or regula-
tion; mismanagement, gross waste of funds, fraud, and abuse of 
authority; or a substantial and specific danger to public health or 
safety will now be encouraged to come forward voluntarily to re-
veal such information to the media or to the public through other 
channels without fear of reprisals.  
Obviously, the responsibility for implementation and ensuring 
compliance with the Act rests with a variety of stakeholders.  But 
the media will be a critical stakeholder in this regard.  
Some of the key stakeholders with responsibility for enforce-
ment and ensuring compliance will have to be prompted or prod-
ded to perform their roles for the law to be effective.  The media is 
ideally placed to do the prompting and prodding.
These media and individual journalists can contribute to the 
effective implementation of the Act,  in the following ways:
•	 Enlightening and educating themselves about the provi-
sions of the Act
•	 Publicizing and popularizing the Act
•	 Using the Act to obtain information from public institu-
tions and relevant private institutions.
•	 Complying with the provisions of the law
•	 Ensuring that the law is working by monitoring its imple-
mentation
Journalists can enlighten and educate themselves about the 
provisions of the Act by reading the Act to ensure that they are 
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sufficiently familiar with and fully understand its provisions to be 
able to discuss it in detail; to enable them ask pertinent questions 
about the Act; and to enable them challenge any misinformation 
or inaccurate representation of the provisions of the Act.  
They should also try to read up as many materials as possible 
about access to information issues generally.  Unless journalists 
have a good knowledge and understanding of the Act, they will not 
be able to write or talk knowledgeably and authoritatively about 
it; they will not be able to ask intelligent and pertinent questions 
of public officials and other individuals about the Act; they will 
not know how to use the Act to obtain information themselves; 
they will not know what to do or how to bring themselves into 
compliance with the Act; and they will not be able to monitor its 
implementation as they will not know what is required to be done 
under the Act by public institutions and relevant private bodies. 
Journalists and the media in general, evidently need to use the 
Act to obtain information in the course of their work as public re-
cords and documents are invaluable assets to journalists and the 
media as a whole.  They are important in ensuring that the media 
have accurate and reliable facts; in helping the media to correctly 
report events that may have escaped public attention when they 
happened or where the full facts are not known.
There are a multitude of records and documents covering a 
wide variety of issues and subjects, generated daily and stored 
by various government departments and agencies as well as pri-
vate bodies.  Public institutions, whether at  federal, state or local 
government levels as well as private entities utilizing public funds, 
performing public functions or providing public services hold a 
vast amount of information that would constitute a treasure trove 
for the journalist and the media, whether print or broadcast. 
The Freedom of Information Act is a powerful tool through 
which the media can gain access to these public records and doc-
uments.  Since government officials are inherently wary of releas-
ing documents which do not favor them to journalists, the Act be-
comes indispensable as it can be used to compel them to release 
such records and documents.
Edetaen Ojo
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Individual journalists as well as media organizations and cor-
porate entities can make an infinite number of applications to any 
public institution and any private body covered by the Act in an 
effort to obtain almost any type of information, except the limited 
categories of exempted information, which can themselves also 
be obtained where an overriding public interest can be demon-
strated.  
By so using the Act, the media can itself contribute towards a 
new culture of openness and transparency as the public institu-
tions get more and more used to being asked for information and 
begin to develop the practice of giving out information. 
Government-owned media, whether owned by federal, state or 
local governments, are themselves public institutions within the 
meaning of the Act.  They will therefore have to fulfill all the obli-
gations of public institutions required under the Act.  
Private media organizations which may be said to be utilizing 
public funds, performing public functions or providing public ser-
vices, will themselves also be subject to the application of the Act. 
They will also have to fulfill the relevant obligations under the Act.
However, for individual journalists and private media organiza-
tions that do not fall within the scope of the application of the Act, 
they nonetheless need to respect and comply with the require-
ments of the Act and the procedures specified in it in seeking to 
obtain information under it. 
Strict compliance with the requisite procedures outlined in the 
Act will also enhance their chances of obtaining information un-
der the Act and successfully challenging any denial of access to 
information.  Whenever they fail or neglect to comply with the 
provisions of the Act, they may unwittingly be providing grounds, 
justification or excuses for public institutions or relevant private 
bodies to deny them access to information.
Journalists and the media also have an important role in en-
suring that the Act is working by monitoring its implementation. 
They can do this in two principal ways, namely:
•	 By submitting requests for information to public institu-
tions and private entities covered by the Act, and thereafter 
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documenting and reporting on their experiences on how many 
relevant institutions satisfy the requirements of the Law.
•	 By a systematic assessment of the level of compliance by 
public institutions with various actions mandated by the law 
and issuing reports of their findings
Since all public institutions and private bodies covered by the 
Act have numerous obligations under the Act, journalists and the 
media have a lot of work to do in monitoring compliance with 
these obligations.
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Corruption in the Nigerian media: 
The brown envelope syndrome
By Lanre Idowu
BACKGROUND TO THE STUDY
The question, “Is the Nigerian media corrupt?” may well be met 
with a reply: Is the color of the sky blue? Nigeria, alongside many 
other states, is grappling with the developmental challenges of 
corruption to good governance, transparency and accountability. 
For much of the period of this study, 1999-2016, corruption was 
a constant challenge for the four administrations that occupied 
office. In recognition of its reality and menace, reformatory insti-
tutional organs were established during this period to curtail the 
spread of corruption by punishing culprits convicted through due 
process. The Independent Corrupt Practices Commission (ICPC) 
and the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC) are 
two of such bodies established to fight corruption. Important leg-
islations such as the Freedom of Information Act, the Fiscal Re-
sponsibility Act and the Public Procurement Act were also passed 
during this period in the effort to throw light on hitherto murky 
terrains that promoted corruption. As an outcome of this anti cor-
3
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ruption fight, EFCC Chairman, Nuhu Ribadu told the BBC in 2006 
his agency had recovered more than $5bn between 2004 and 2006 
and successfully prosecuted 82 people (BBC, 2006).
Ten years later, in 2016, Nigeria’s Attorney General Abubakar 
Malami told a conference in Abuja on financial fraud, cyber crime 
and other cross border crimes that Nigeria recovered $2 trillion or 
N400 trillion in twelve years. Of this sum, $2 million was attributed 
to military dictator, General Sani Abacha in 1998. Malami disclosed 
that a Nigerian government report in 2013 revealed that between 
2001 and 2013, N20.6 trillion or $33.14 billion was tracked as illicit 
funds flows into Nigeria’s financial system of which $7.4 billion 
were proceeds of corruption and embezzlement (Vanguard, 2016). 
The extent of corruption and other social vices in any society 
often reflects the room or latitude given to it and the attendant 
consequences. Mismanagement, avarice, poor legal framework 
and weak enforcement have all combined to crown corruption as 
a way of life and give Nigeria an unflattering reputation. Not sur-
prisingly, as the media do not operate in splendid isolation from 
the rest of society, corruption by various accounts also thrives in 
the media. “Corruption in the Nigerian media: The Brown enve-
lope syndrome” is, therefore, a declarative statement that recog-
nizes there is corruption in the Nigerian media, which is decorated 
in protective garb (of a brown envelope) and is so rife that it has 
become a pattern. 
CONCEPTUAL CLARIFICATIONS
In examining our key words, “Corruption”, “Nigerian media”, 
“Brown envelope” and “Syndrome”, our concern is not esoteric 
pontifications about corruption being real or imagined, home-
grown or imported, but the desired need to set the tone for a 
deeper understanding of a phenomenon that has shaped media 
performance and will continue to do so for more ill than good for 
some time to come. We agree with Skjerdal (2010, 307) that:
On the basis of informal accounts and an increasing number of media 
commentaries addressing the dilemma of brown envelope there is le-
gitimate reason to believe that this phenomenon and other types of 
informal incentives and bribes are common in African media practice.
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Nigeria being an active and big player in African media prac-
tice, our interest recognizes and shares three broad focal areas as 
germane to understanding the phenomenon of “brown envelope” 
journalism. They range from the socio-political factors guiding 
daily living in Nigeria, to the economic realities constraining me-
dia practice, and the interest in seeing journalism as a profession 
and occupation with its own codes of ethics. In weighing the clash 
of these factors and the resultant impact on media practice, this 
essay brings to bear the perspectives of a journalist, who has been 
on the field as a reporter and writer, an editor who has deployed 
journalists to various assignments, evaluated and interrogated 
their submissions, a media ombudsman with extensive experience. 
It adds the insights of a trainer who has interacted with partici-
pants on issues of professional practice, and a spokesperson that 
has experienced, firsthand, journalists and some of their antics in 
relation to the subject of discussion. 
Corruption 
Globally, corruption is a vile word that describes dishonesty, 
bribery, fraud, sleaze, vice and racketeering. It is a development 
issue akin to debilitating diseases for which the world is struggling 
to find a panacea. It navigates the corridors of power relations and 
wealth distribution. Corruption is not a stranger to the contests 
to access power, position and privilege, wealth, especially public 
wealth, and influence. Corruption is driven by the quest to have 
an edge over others using public resources for private gains. It is 
about appropriating to self what belongs or should belong to the 
commonwealth. 
Arising from poor records of governance and a skewed notion 
of public service in its first four decades of existence as an inde-
pendent country, Nigeria as stated has earned an unenviable rep-
utation as a corrupt state where might was seen as right, and im-
punity enthroned as acceptable way of life. The media being part 
and parcel of society reflect the morality and behavior prevalent in 
society (Yusha’u: 2009, p.167) and (Omotoso, 2017). Even as var-
ious news media organisations are making honest efforts to stay 
above board and monitor governance on behalf of the public, the 
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lure of corruption explains why the media as watchdogs of power 
and governance have not always lived up to the constitutional and 
societal expectations of holding government accountable to the 
people. They have not always maintained the professional detach-
ment that is critical to even-handed assessment of happenings 
in society. In not paying sufficient attention to their professional, 
social and constitutional responsibilities, they, alongside political 
and business leaders, share some responsibility for the poor im-
age cultivated for Nigeria in its first five decades of existence. 
Acts of corruption in the media can be seen at three different 
levels involving the individual, the organization and across orga-
nizations. Because of the odious images attached to corruption, it 
is usually done discreetly; its modus operandi known only to the 
initiates or the observant.  A discussion of the lexicon of terms 
applied to corruption in the Nigerian media explains its growing 
prevalence and the rising sense of entitlement that accompanies 
it. The debilitating impact of corruption on the national econo-
my dictates that it engages more than a passing attention. There 
have been some efforts at addressing it. Luckily, the government 
of the day holds the war against corruption as one of its three pil-
lars of concern; the other two being insecurity/terrorism and the 
depressed economy. Presidential candidate Muhammadu Buhari 
was not being alarmist when he declared in 2015: “If we do not 
kill corruption in this country, corruption will kill Nigerians” (The 
Nation: 2015, March 13).
Nigerian media 
By Nigerian media, we refer to the media of communica-
tion employed to reach out to, or communicate with, a mass or 
vast audience in a plural society like Nigeria. It is differentiated 
from person-to-person communication although messages ob-
tained through a mass medium are often reinforced through per-
son-to-person communication. The media are channels and plat-
forms to engage, share messages, and receive feedback. They may 
come as the traditional media of print (newspapers and maga-
zines), electronic (radio and television) or the digital media of us-
ing the internet superhighway to reach audiences on websites or 
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in the social media. The Nigerian media came into being in 1859 
as a missionary effort to promote news-reading. From that initial 
missionary effort, the Nigerian media developed into an economic 
tool of sharing community and trade news, and morphed into an 
organ of raising social and political consciousness, even if their 
performance on this score has been irregular. The Nigerian media 
now cover newspapers, magazines, television stations, radio sta-
tions, and online publications.
Brown Envelope
Brown envelope is a euphemism for bribe; it refers to the pur-
chasing of favorable mention in the media in the short term or 
cultivating favorable relationship in the long term through cash 
and/or material gifts. As Skjerdal (2010, 369) perceptibly observes, 
it has three ingredients: it is personal, confidential and contractual. 
It is a pact between a giver and receiver, a buyer and a seller. It 
attempts to confer legitimacy on the medium by building on the 
time-honored practice of exchanging correspondence with indi-
viduals or corporate bodies through letter writing. The envelope 
confers some respect on the addressee as worthy of special and 
confidential attention from the addresser. 
Syndrome
This refers to a condition, pattern, disorder, and symptoms of 
a larger problem. In the context of the news media, it refers to 
the growth of corruption into an acceptable pattern, a tolerated 
condition, and a disorder that indicates a larger societal problem 
about the scourge of corruption.
Our task then is to examine the existence, indeed, the prev-
alence of corruption in the Nigerian media for which the much 
talked about brown envelope merely illustrates, and establish 
what consequences this disorder has for the professional health 
of Nigerian journalism and what could be done to strengthen the 
capacity of the Nigerian media to play its watchdog role much 
more effectively.
UNDERSTANDING THE NIGERIAN MEDIA, THE THEATRE 
OF, AND ACTOR IN THE DISORDER
The Nigerian media owe their origins to the town of Abeokuta, 
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capital of present day Ogun State, where missionaries from the 
Church Missionary Society of England had established a mission 
in 1846. Freed Nigerian slaves who had been quartered in Free-
town, Sierra Leone, had repeatedly implored the missionaries to 
establish the Yoruba (Abeokuta) mission in their desire to reunite 
with their kin back home and extend the liberating message of 
Christianity. The freed slaves’ clamor finally resonated with the 
CMS who thereafter dispatched three missionaries to Abeokuta 
through Badagry in December 1842 first on an exploratory mis-
sion and later in 1846 as a definite mission. In a setting that saw 
Christianity as a redeeming theology and education as crucial to 
its appeal, it was not surprising that a Caucasian missionary, the 
Rev Henry Townsend (1815-1886) introduced Iwe Irohin fun awon 
Egba ati Yoruba (The newspaper for the Egbas and Yorubas) which 
emphasized the need to develop a pool of readers who can be 
reached through the pages of Iwe Irohin. Townsend’s expressed 
objects of establishing the paper, Iwe Irohin (The Newspaper) in 
December 1859, thirteen years after the establishment of Nige-
ria’s first primary school and six months after the founding of the 
first secondary school, was to stimulate in the people the habit of 
seeking information through reading, promote the virtues of the 
written word, and the empowering influence of information on 
commerce and politics (Idowu, 2017).
Shape
The Nigerian media, today, come in all shapes, sizes, formats, 
and guises. For the print media, they range from the handy, sen-
sationalist tabloids, to the sober, wannabe broadsheets. Various 
magazines, basking in the colors of the rainbow, adorn the news-
stands; all struggling for a limited market share. Numerous sites 
abound on the digital sphere, all in search of audiences. 
Color and Tone
The media parade all sorts of players from the trained to the 
untrained; from the purpose-driven journalists to the gatecrash-
ers, the ethical and the whimsical. They discuss all manner of is-
sues: the puerile, salacious, ennobling and useful, the enervating 
and the elevating. All manner of subjects is covered from politics 
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to economy, religion, sports, real estate, music, fashion, lifestyle, 
to horticulture, agriculture, energy, the environment, oil and gas 
etc. 
Scope
It is a vast world across different platforms: newspapers, maga-
zines, radio and television stations, online publications, blogs and 
chat-rooms and across various offering in the social media. Access 
to information is vast. Mobile telephony is ubiquitous. Internet ac-
cess continues to grow in Nigeria with disruptive consequences 
for the old order of information dissemination and management. 
From a paltry figure of 200, 000 in 2000, there are now 93, 591, 
174 internet users in 2017, which represents a 146, 637% growth 
rate. This figure further represents a population penetration of 
48.8% of Nigeria’s 191 million people, which is close to the world 
average of 49.7%. Facebook holds the widest appeal with 16 mil-
lion users or 10.9% of Africa’s 146.6 million Facebook users (PWC, 
2015). Twitter, Instagram, WhatsApp, LinkedIn are other popular 
platforms. The emergent picture of this growing connectivity of 
Nigeria to the digital public sphere is one of enhancing the pros-
pects of participation, engagement and citizenship (Olukotun, 
2015, p.19). Excessively filtered stories in the mainstream media 
are giving way to other outlets, even if the gate-keeping function 
of the media is increasingly compromised with worrisome conse-
quences for the integrity of the information shared and the speed 
it is disseminated.
The newspapers are experiencing mixed fortunes with the 
growing importance of the digital media. Nonetheless, there are 
58 regular newspapers discussing, politics, economy, and lifestyle 
issues (Media Review, 2015). 
There are at least 43 regular online newspapers and magazines 
with Premium Times, The Cable being household names (Iyare, 
2015). 
The National Broadcasting Commission lists 332 radio stations, 
and two national networks, one belonging to the Federal Radio 
Corporation of Nigeria and the other to Ray Power, Nigeria’s first 
licensed private radio station. In addition, there are 40 Internet 
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Radio stations (Wikipedia). 
There are 112 television stations with the Nigerian Television 
Authority and the African International Television providing net-
work services.
Geopolitical ownership/presence of the Nigerian media 
Table 1.0 Major Newspapers
South West: Nation, Punch, Tribune
South South: Thisday, Vanguard, Independent
South East: New Telegraph, Sun
North Central: Authority, Blueprint, Leadership 
North West: Trust, People’s Daily
North East: Trust
Table 2.0 Television (112)
South West: TVC, MITV, Galaxy, LTV, OGTV
South South: AIT, Channels, Silverbird 
South East: ABS
North Central: PRTV
North West: Abubakar Rimi TV
North East: Gotell
Network: NTA (public-owned)
Table 3.0 Radio (332)
South West: 94 Radio Continental, Inspiration FM, Star FM
South South: 56 Cool FM? Ray Power FM, Rhythm FM
South East: 47 Classic FM, Wazobia
North Central: 42 
North West: 51 Radio Freedom
North East: 24 Gotell
FCT: 18
Network: FRCN and Ray Power
The Nigerian media remain vibrant, diverse with mixed partic-
ipation of various tiers of government, private, religious and ed-
ucational ownership interests. Even as there is positive growth of 
private media organs in the north, especially in newspapering, 
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there is still noticeable gulf in ownership between the north and 
south. Technological advancement has seen rising influence of 
new media in overcoming spatial boundaries, providing a more 
intense media reach, that is as liberating as it is disruptive.  The 
speed and ends to which the new media allow content to travel 
remain a current challenge for the industry in terms of the legal 
environment in which the media operate and the ethical wayward-
ness that envelopes journalism practice.
GENERAL CHARACTER OF THE NIGERIAN MEDIA
Political, Noisy and Confrontational 
Owing to the pattern of growth and development over the years 
from the days of missionary activities, to the era of colonial admin-
istration, the period of nationalist struggle for independence, the 
effort at self rule, to the collapse of the First Republic, the period of 
military rule, and subsequent efforts at civil rule, the mainstream 
Nigerian media have cut the picture of a political, noisy and con-
frontational instrument of constructing social legitimacy (Agbaje, 
1992, Olukotun, 2002). Ownership often comes to define tone and 
content with ongoing uneven efforts to professionalize news con-
tent. The politics of the land is easily discerned in media content as 
often media ownership is another way of playing politics. 
The media remain veritable platforms for contesting ideas and 
influence. Major ownership in newspapering tends to be private, 
with pockets of pronounced politicians owning media organs and 
sympathizers directing affairs at others. Broadcasting remains 
largely in the hands of the public sector even as its operations in-
creasingly tilt to commercial broadcasting in the search for more 
funds to run the stations beyond the grants from the owner-gov-
ernments. The core news content and programming, however, 
tend to reinforce the interests of the current occupants of public 
office, with the opposition given limited media access even when 
they offer to pay to be heard.
Politics remains the main staple of the Nigerian media. Media 
Review’s Annual Top Ten Stories published in the Nigerian media 
as determined by Top Ten Editors for the period 2001 to 2006 
showed politics as the main focus. In the 2006 survey of stories 
Lanre Idowu
102
Watchdogs or Captured Media? . . . 
conducted January 2007, for instance, seven of the Top Ten stories 
were on politics. They ranged from the gale of impeachments, to 
the conflict between President Olusegun Obasanjo and Vice Pres-
ident Atiku Abubakar, spate of political killings, reinstatement of 
Oyo State Governor, Rasheed Ladoja, the declaration of state of 
emergency in Ekiti State and the sacking of Chris Ngige as Anam-
bra State governor (Idowu, 2009, p.174-175). 
Event signalers 
Generally, the media tend to generate more heat than light. 
They are adept at signaling events, sensationalizing on current is-
sues to catch public attention.  In the Top Ten Stories survey for 
2003, Media Review noted the following as elements that guided 
Nigerian editors’ news judgment: conflict and controversy, shock 
and unusualness, disruption and destruction, criminality and 
grandstanding (Idowu, 2009, p.139). Trend reporting of develop-
ment-oriented issues has never been the strength of the media, 
with focus on big political and business figures with elite interests/
clashes framed as public issues.
Between Reporting of Issues of Public Interest and 
Issues in the Public Interest
The quality of content especially on issues of corruption re-
mains concerning. As previously noted, a lot still needs to be done 
in the news judgment and management of our media personnel.
Beyond the general excitement generated in the media, what’s the 
quality of reporting generally? How often do the media break corrup-
tion stories? How do the media cover corruption-related reports? Is 
their focus long shot or close up? Are the reports of public interest or 
in the public interest? Are they excitable watchdogs or docile lapdogs? 
(Idowu, 2009, p.186).
The Nigerian media’s underbelly is in follow ups, tiebacks and 
nuanced interpretations. Too much focus is paid to the immediate, 
the here-now, and to issues of public excitement, which are not 
necessarily those that are in the overall public interest. Attention 
is usually too fleeting and flighty before something else comes 
into the picture. The intrepid and crusading journalism that de-
fined a section of the media’s principled opposition to military 
rule in the 1990s is now a rarity. The result is the steady diet of the 
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predictable and commonplace and the dearth of the rigorous, the 
investigative and the revealing. This enthronement of the ordinary 
and the glorification of the safe and instant materially-rewarding 
journalism results from the corruption of social values. It is a toga 
the Nigerian media need to shed for a more assured future. 
Occasional flashes of Brilliance
To be sure, there have been instances since the return to civil 
rule that the media have discharged themselves creditably on is-
sues of (public) corruption. The exposure that led to the resigna-
tions of the first Speaker of the House of Representatives, Salisu 
Buhari in 1999 and the first Senate President, Evan(s) Enwerem in 
1999/2000 on dodgy academic credentials epitomized the media’s 
moral outrage that leadership must be above board. The muted 
campaign on similar charges related to the former Governor of 
Lagos State, Bola Tinubu, however, suggested double standards 
on the part of the crusading section of the media that contributed 
to the ousting of the legislative duo at the centre. The media cam-
paign in 2014 that culminated in the resignation of Aviation Min-
ister Stella Oduah over questionable expenditure on bullet proof 
cars also stands out to the credit of the media. So did the assault 
on the Goodluck Jonathan administration’s prevarication on the 
issue of corruption that resulted in the president’s faux pas that 
“stealing is not corruption.” The short-lived enterprising example 
of NEXT newspaper deserves commendation. When the health 
of President Umaru Yar’adua was failing, it was NEXT that alerted 
the country to it and the attendant intrigues of a cabal ruling in 
the name of a prostrate president. The exposes on the sweetheart 
deals in the oil sector under the watch of petroleum minister, Die-
ziani Madueke were also refreshingly different.
Partisanship is visible
Although every successful publication must have a defined edi-
torial focus, the professional evenhandedness that should accom-
pany news treatment is not always present. It is not uncommon 
to find several publications not agreeing on the basic facts of a 
story. Often, the editorial position of Nigerian publications is de-
fined by ethnic, religious and geopolitical considerations and the 
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pressures of the commercial place to outdo the competition. The 
good news is that diverse ownership provides some cancelling out 
of the overt prejudices.
Because the country is diverse and the newspaper ownership is diverse 
too, no government can say it controls the media. If one or two news-
papers are supporting a government, there are others, who by virtue of 
ownership structure, will do otherwise (Bello, 2017).
But poorly served is the news consumer who relies on only one 
source. What remains constant is the uneven fidelity to ethics by 
our news media, which in some cases are driven by naked cor-
ruption arising from greed and insufficient homework and latent 
considerations such as the corruption of values, fostered by the 
socio-political climate and the economic realities facing the indi-
vidual journalist or media organization concerned.  
Elite and Hampered Media
Notwithstanding the diversity in ownership of the Nigerian me-
dia, organs of the media have over the years served as instruments 
for the contestation of power and ideas (Agbaje, 1992). Much of 
what is prevalent in the body politic finds expression in the me-
dia. Corruption has been a cankerworm in Nigerian politics. It is 
not surprising that corruption finds bold expression in the media 
as media access in the traditional remains elite-centered, expen-
sive, and limited in reach. This unevenness of media access is in 
itself corruptive and provides a development challenge. Much of 
the publishing model in the country relies on commercial adver-
tising for sustenance. The advertisers are usually the elites with 
the ad capital. Their focus is on the inner cities which hold the 
spending capital. In the face of a troubled economy, the advertiser 
has grown more powerful with enhanced capacity to shape me-
dia content, which increasingly is not the product of independent 
media judgment but the induced preference of the commercial 
advertiser. 
The result is growing disconnect between perceived reality by 
the public and professed reality of the commercial persuaders on 
the one hand, and widening gulf between the urban and rural 
communities, on the other hand. It is a continuing contest for ad-
105
vantage between elite groups. And because the media owners are 
usually political/business interests, access is usually restricted to 
fellow soul mates or those with the financial power to purchase it. 
The result is predictable content, limited flow of ideas, and con-
stricted space for balance in public discourse. The cherished role 
of the media giving a democratic vent for the sharing of public 
intelligence and consequently fostering development is thus com-
promised. Rather than vigilant watchdogs the emergent picture 
for a large section of the media has been one of co-opted partners 
or compromised lapdogs. 
The parlous economy that has seen progressive devaluation in 
the national currency between 2000 and 2015 has also constrained 
the economic power of the media with dire consequences. In par-
ticular, since the fall in oil prices of mid 2014, growth has slowed 
down. Whilst there was 6.3% economic growth in 2014, it fell to 
2.7% in 2015. GDP contracted by 2.2%. By 2016, inflation had dou-
bled to 18.8% from 9.6% in 2015 (World Bank). For the media, 
between 1999 and 2016, many titles like the Sketch,  Concord, Post 
Express, Anchor, Tempo, National Interest, The Comet, New Age, 
Spectator Weekly, Westerner, Newswatch, Next, New Nigerian, Ni-
gerian Compass and PM News/The News have disappeared from 
the newsstand (Olukotun, 2015, p.36-37).
Since then, the National Mirror has joined the list. Tell and 
Champion are occasional publications making cameo appearanc-
es when they strike luck with advertisers. For many others, the 
word is “surviving” not thriving as circulation remains static and 
advert patronage is limited. Business models of publishing are be-
ing reviewed with several migrating online even as the means to 
make online publishing profitable remains a present challenge. 
Where the media are not free and strong enough to discharge 
the expected responsibility to society, it is a matter of time before 
that influence begins to be eroded. That has been the lot of a 
good section of the Nigerian media in the 4th Republic. They have 
resorted to all sorts of schemes to keep afloat in the stormy sea of 
publishing with unpleasant consequences for the media’s ability 
to carry out investigative reporting on which depends such con-
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cerns as transparency, accountability and good governance.
With some knowledge of the theatre of media practice, the 
shape, size, scope of the media and the general underpinnings 
that drive content as useful background, it becomes necessary to 
examine more closely the subject of corruption in the media.
CORRUPTION IN THE MEDIA
Corruption as we have noted is a vile word, which conjures neg-
ativity. Corruption is about dishonesty, bribery, fraud, sleaze, vice 
and racketeering. Dishonesty may entail barefaced lie, an act of 
cover up, the practice of looking the other way because favors 
have exchanged hands or will exchange hands. 
Bribery is inducement to act in a way that one would not ordi-
narily do, or in a way that is unusual, irregular and conflicts with 
acceptable social norms and practice. Fraud is a scam, a hoax de-
signed to deceive and deprive a party of something they would 
not part with ordinarily. 
An act of sleaze is sordid, ugly and repugnant to a community’s 
or society’s ethos. Its ugliness is in its baseness as something to 
be avoided or done in extreme secrecy because there is nothing 
edifying about it to bring it out in the open. Vice is an undesirable 
quality; an act that is bad and without merit. It is the antonym 
of virtue. In religious terms, it is sinful and requires atonement 
for forgiveness to follow. Racketeering is an organized means 
of scamming or depriving the public of something that is rightly 
theirs.
In totality, corruption is abusive in character; it is taking undue 
advantage of public office or privileged position for private gain. 
Globally, it is frowned upon.  The Code of Ethics for Nigerian Jour-
nalists (1998) expressly decries corruption under Article 7 (i) on 
REWARD AND GRATIFICATION: “A journalist should neither solicit 
nor accept bribe, gratification or patronage to suppress or publish 
information.” It explains in 7 (ii) “To demand payment for the pub-
lication of news is inimical to the notion of news as a fair, accurate, 
unbiased and factual report of an event.”
Using the definition of corruption by Transparency Internation-
al as the “abuse of entrusted power for private gain”, corruption in 
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a news media setting can be interpersonal between a reporter and 
a news source in the exchange of money or favors for private gain. 
It can be intra organizational where an editor directs reporters to 
slant stories to fit a preconceived agenda, notwithstanding facts to 
the contrary. It can be inter-organizational where the organization 
arranges with another a stream of favorable reports for a consid-
eration. Corruption obtains in extortion where news subjects are 
blackmailed to part with money/favors for news to be suppressed 
by individuals and organizations. It dovetails into racketeering 
as a non transparent way of funding the media through undis-
closed/invisible support such as behind-the-scene sponsorship by 
government, private or commercial interests to guarantee steady 
stream of positive reporting disguised as independent coverage. 
The Lexicon of Corruption
Corruption’s prevalence in Nigerian journalism is betrayed in 
journalist’s wordlist for it. “Awoof” is an age-long word for a wind-
fall, an extra earning. It resonates so well with West Africans that 
it has been employed as a product name for various sales promo-
tions by telecom giants, MTN and Airtel and a top bank like the 
United Bank for Africa. When journalists talk of awoof, the refer-
ence is to undocumented income, a gift for services rendered or 
expected to be performed. 
“Better life” is an endearing term that sees a bribe as an invest-
ment in a better life for the journalist. It is a parody of a program 
started by Nigeria’s first lady, Maryam Babangida, during the Ibra-
him Babangida military presidency (1985-1993). She had launched 
an empowerment scheme termed “Better life for Rural Women”, 
which promoted agriculture cooperatives and mainstreamed 
women’s plight to national attention. In full, “Better Life” meant 
Better Life for Nigerian journalists through an informal practice of 
cash and or gifts for positive news coverage. Others call it “BTA”, 
an acronym for Basic Transport Allowance, a perquisite for jour-
nalists in the period spanning 1980 through 2000. A cash gift from 
a news source at a news event, for example, qualifies for a BTA, 
which journalists had come to expect as part of the freebies of the 
job. It is seen as a token of “thank you” for attending the event. 
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“Communiqua” is another parody of the word, communiqué. 
Journalists are not unfamiliar with communiqués being issued af-
ter major conferences and seminars. Aside from obtaining these 
official pronouncements at the end of such meetings, corrupt 
journalists also expect their own communiqua as their individual 
takeaways. They rationalize it as akin to the honoraria resource 
persons take home from such parleys. 
“Family support” or “handshake”, is also deceptively attractive. 
It is no more than a description of untaxed income as welcome 
gift in the course of the job. The same is true of “pay as you go”, a 
term borrowed from the advent of global system for mobile com-
munication (GSM) in Nigeria in 2001. The prepaid bouquet as dis-
tinct from postpaid product offering was termed pay-as-you-go 
for uninterrupted access to service. In the same token, continuous 
payment of bribe by news sources to journalists qualifies in their 
lingo as “pay as you go” for regular exposure or coverage.
Corrupting setting, Corrupt Media 
Corruption is a malaise that afflicts all societies. Since Nigeri-
ans are human beings and humans are susceptible to the vice of 
corruption, Nigerians are not immune from corruption. In a de-
veloping country, especially one with weak institutions where the 
processes of transparency and accountability are still in infancy, 
corruption ranks as one of the ills that mark out the underde-
velopment of such societies. There are certain practices among 
various ethnic groups that make up Nigeria, that unwittingly 
predispose the people to some corrupting practices. Among the 
peoples, common values are prevalent. There is respect for age, 
position and authority. Elders are respected, if not venerated; au-
thority figures and positions are highly regarded. Acts of hospi-
tality expressed in extending gifts to visitors are also important 
to Nigerians. It could range from the offer of water or carbonated 
drink to a guest to a whole meal and material gifts when the vis-
itor departs. It is not a one-way traffic. Visitors, too, are known to 
bring gifts to their guests as a hospitable gesture. Some journal-
ists have been caught in this vortex of not being able to differen-
tiate between what is a gift or bribe; between what is a hospitable 
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or compromising act. Consider a situation where a reporter, after 
interviewing a subject, takes his leave and is offered some money 
to supplement his transport fare. His gentle protest not to take the 
gift can be frowned upon as disrespectful. 
(Oshunkeye, 2011) quotes Lekan Otufodunrin, an editor with 
the Nation as narrating the story of Prof. Itse Sagay, a lawyer, who 
gave a journalist a cash gift and reprimanded him (the journalist) 
as being rude for wanting to reject the gift: 
Somebody was telling me recently about a reporter from The Guardian 
who went to interview Professor Itse Sagay, one of Nigeria’s foremost 
constitutional lawyers who just turned 70. When he was leaving, he was 
given some token, but the journalist refused to take it and the Profes-
sor got angry and insisted that he must take it. ‘If I want a favor, I don’t 
have to talk to you,’ Sagay was quoted as saying. ‘I can talk to your 
boss. I know your MD and I know your editor. So, if I give you money, 
it is not because I need a favor from you.’ The Professor also reminded 
him that it was even rude for him to reject something from someone 
that is old enough to be his father. 
Yet the Code of Ethics of Nigerian journalists under article 7 (i) 
forbids a journalist to “neither solicit nor accept bribe, gratification 
or patronage to suppress or publish information.”
HOW CORRUPTION MANIFESTS IN THE MEDIA 
A 2017 Focused Group Discussion (FGD) involving ten journal-
ists, seven print and three broadcast, five men and five women, 
with a mean experience of eight years, provides useful insights 
into the phenomenon of corruption.  Their views will be inter-
spersed with other findings in this section. All agree corruption in 
the media is prevalent and systemic; all admitted being conver-
sant with the code of ethics of Nigerian journalists. All agreed that 
one common area where journalists are exposed to direct bribery 
is at press conferences where a news subject addresses the press 
on issues the subject wants the press to consider as important 
and also fields questions from the press. I begin with a personal 
example.
At Press conferences
My first encounter with media corruption was at an event in 
Ijebu Ode hosted by the Nigerian Agriculture, Commerce, Industry 
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and Manufacturing Association (NACCIMA) in 1983. I had been as-
signed to cover the association’s luncheon, which included a visit 
to its patron, Chief Adeola Odutola (1902-1995). At the luncheon, I 
noticed that about six of us—journalists from various media hous-
es—were on the same table. Midway into the lunch, a man clutch-
ing a folder, brought out some envelopes and placed one before a 
journalist before moving on to the next. When he placed one be-
fore me, I asked what it was. He answered: For your transportation. 
I opened it and saw it contained Naira notes. Then it hit me; it was 
the notorious bribe money I had been warned against. So, I said to 
him: Thank you very much sir, but I cannot accept this. I came with 
my car and my organization is responsible for the fuelling.  He 
looked surprised, and said I should keep it as it’s provided for by 
his organization. I pushed it to him and noticed the quizzical ex-
pression on the faces of two journalists whose acquaintance I had 
just made. One whispered to me; ‘take it, it’s yours.’ I insisted the 
man, who I later learnt was a PRO (public relations officer), must 
take his envelope and he did. After the event as I headed back to 
Lagos with one of the journalists I met there, the PRO accosted 
me, saying he respected me. We talked for about two minutes and 
I told him I understood he was doing his job but he should appre-
ciate I was doing mine also. We parted on a good note and I made 
my way back to Lagos.
Such assignments as a lunch incorporating a press conference 
are desired by some journalists who see them as lucrative events 
to go home with some extra salary benefits. Nkereuwem (2012) 
speaks “of the shame that overwhelms me when I see my col-
leagues rushing for the Brown Envelope that are usually on offer 
at press conferences and other events.” 
Such journalists can be seen milling around after events in the 
expectation that some envelopes would be shared. Where such 
expectation is taking too long to meet, some bold ones are wont 
to ask: “Anything for the press?” or suggestively inform: “We want 
to go back to the office to file our reports.” Where the host is hard 
of hearing, some journalists try other means. “Oga (master), we 
want to go and work on your story but can you help us with trans-
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port money?” For good effect, some may even add; “We haven’t 
been paid for some time, but because of the importance of your 
event, we had to make private arrangements to be here…” They 
usually leave the sentence hanging, hoping the message would 
sink in.
A colleague’s experience in 2016 when she invited a female re-
porter to an event illustrates this point: 
She told me that she had come to cover an event to which I invited her 
only because of her regard for me as she had to hire a camera because all 
cameras had been assigned for other events that day. She mentioned a 
figure and left it hanging that I should refund the ‘cost’ so that the story 
could be aired. I had to pay her.
If the news subject does not play ball, then it is not uncommon 
to black out the interview as it happened back in 1988 to the then 
Primate of the Church of Nigeria, Rt. Rev Abiodun Adetiloye. The 
cleric had spoken to some journalists at the Murtala Muhammed 
Airport, Ikeja on a number of national issues. The journalists, how-
ever, blacked him out because he did not give them “transport 
money” (Idowu, 1996, p.198). 
One story that illustrates the corrupting appeal of press confer-
ences or arranged interviews with newsmakers remains the August 
14, 2010 midnight meeting of former President Ibrahim Babangi-
da with as many as 40 journalists at his Minna home in Niger State. 
Babangida, military president from 1985 to 1993, was positioning 
himself for another shot at the presidency, this time through the 
ballot box. His publicists had arranged this midnight parley with 
senior journalists, including editors, to learn, first hand, of Baban-
gida’s planned return to office. An online news medium, Sahara 
Reporters, reported that Babangida had not only gathered such a 
large crowd of journalists to his Minna home at that strange hour 
but each journalist went home with N250, 000 or $1666 as trans-
port reimbursement. 
Although the news pages of Nigeria’s mainstream newspapers 
kept mute about the development, two critical commentaries at 
that time on its consequences for the health of the Nigerian media 
are relevant here. Idowu (2010) in IBB, Sahara Reporters, and the 
Press, decried the growing practice of journalists receiving money 
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to publish stories and explains the appeal of corruption: 
Too many things are taken for granted in Nigerian journalism that the 
strange has become the accepted. Many journalists see nothing wrong 
in accepting money to publish stories. Take for example the age-long 
practice of facility tours when Governor ‘A’ or Company ‘B’ invites the 
media and pays for the journalist’s passage and accommodation in ex-
pectation of coverage. While the facilitators see it as opening doors to 
better media access, the journalists, sadly, find such trips augmenting 
if not guaranteeing their pay for the month. In their thinking new con-
tacts have been cultivated; new horizons are waiting to be explored. 
The result is a pattern of tainted reporting far from the envisaged pro-
fessionally processed news served to the public………Receiving mon-
etary gifts in the name of transport reimbursement, no matter how 
popular it is, compromises the integrity of news. 
Olatunji Dare, in his column of September 7, 2010 in The Na-
tion, accused the editors present at the chat of indiscretion:
They unwittingly stultify themselves when they lend themselves to that 
kind of usage and invite the kind of speculation that has attended what 
was clearly a misadventure, however, noble their intentions……(dismiss-
ing midnight as)….hardly the most auspicious time of day or of night 
for transacting serious, honest-to-goodness business.
So far, we can say “Brown envelope” remains inducement giv-
en by individuals and organizations desirous of positive mention 
in the media. It thrives because it obeys the law of supply and 
demand. There must be a giver and a receiver and for as long as 
there are people willing to pay there will be those ready to accept. 
The third point is that such episodic public assignments attract a 
breed of journalists.
Pack Journalism          
Corruption is the name of the game where journalists operate 
like cartels by encouraging pack journalism. Those who practice 
this find it beneath them to hanker for envelopes at public events. 
Theirs is an effort to deodorize an odious practice. In full bloom, 
pack journalism operates with appointed coordinators to negoti-
ate their fee for covering their ‘clients’ events. They usually work 
under the guise of beat associations of reporters and correspon-
dents. The client’s contact person deals with the coordinator, who, 
in turn, shares out what is due to the respected participants. These 
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participants are also graded with “A” publications/organizations 
earning more than the “B” or “C”. Sometimes, also, the promised 
coverage guides the fee charged. A straight news report on the 
front page carries higher reward than an inside story. An extensive 
feature commands more gravitas than a short news report. Usu-
ally the coordinator arranges the slant of the reporting and plants 
similar write-ups in the selected publications. Pack journalism 
helps in suppressing stories and promoting particular viewpoints. 
The money does not go to the organizations but the individuals 
for whom it remains a windfall. 
The failure of previous efforts to control, ban, or eradicate pack 
journalism through outlawing beat associations shows the ex-
tent of the problem facing the media. In 2002, the trio of Nigeria 
Union of Journalists (NUJ), the Nigerian Guild of Editors (NGE) and 
the Newspaper Proprietors’ Association of Nigeria (NPAN) under 
the umbrella of the Nigerian Press Organization (NPO) banned 
journalists from belonging to beat associations in reaction to the 
widespread perceived corruption of the associations. As I noted 
then:
They (associations) are accused of operating like cartels, which rather 
than foster competition among members, encourage pack journalism. 
Members, upon pain of exclusion, reportedly share reports from the 
pool and agree on angles to play up in their reports for reasons that 
are hardly altruistic. The result is that members’ reports to their various 
media are beginning to sound, read and appear too similar (Idowu, 
2009, p.122).
The desperate action was not expected to put the corrupt prac-
tice out of business and it did not. As I warned:
Banning these beat associations does not mean they have ceased to 
exist. The directing minds may well choose to be subtler about their 
operations. Truth is solving a problem has created another. In saying 
that reporters cannot freely join an association, their right to free as-
sembly is being short-changed. In slapping a blanket ban on these as-
sociations, the NPO is adjudging all guilty before trial. This is hardly 
an ennobling statement about our emerging democracy (Idowu, 2009: 
124).
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Protection fee
Some well-heeled reputation managers of some organizations 
also support their media contacts through regular payments of 
money into their accounts as a way of maintaining their rela-
tionship of mutual benefits. The money is paid to the contacts 
to watch out for negative reports and snuff them out before they 
grow into public nuisance or disturbance and also as an expres-
sion of goodwill for regular use of their reports. This may not be 
tied to specific events but qualifies as a protection fee payable 
regularly, sometimes at festive occasions. In this regard, a racket 
is put in place to exploit the traditional virtues of hospitality to 
seduce and compromise the media. 
No matter the veneer the institutional persuaders may apply 
to the practice, corruption is the name of the game where news 
managers offer protective news coverage to clients in exchange 
for regular pay. Olukotun (2002, p.79) cites the example of an of-
fer to a senior journalist at the Daily Times in the early 1990s by a 
top management staff of the paper to write “pro-government ar-
ticles in order to attract allowances outside his salary from security 
agencies.” 
The practice was not limited to security agents. Private indi-
viduals, especially politicians, also promoted it. Nwabauni (2015) 
gives an account of a top politician who pays protection fee to 
editors regularly. In one of her contributions to the BBC Letters 
from African journalists’ series, she says of the politician:
I know a top Nigerian politician who goes beyond brown envelopes 
to listing a number of editors on his payroll. As he disburses his staff 
salaries monthly, he also makes payments into the editors’ bank ac-
counts. This ensures that whenever he has any “news” to disseminate, 
it gets published in several media without any questions asked or facts 
checked.
Looking elsewhere and Passing off
Corruption also resides where compromised journalists ask ir-
relevant questions when faced with opportunity to grill opinion 
leaders. Usually, a big name is lined up for an interview with great 
expectations that some earthshaking disclosures will emanate. In-
stead of grilling the news source, the journalists revel in asking soft 
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questions that do little justice to the occasion. Biodun Oduwole, 
a past president of the Nigerian Guild of Editors, in (Idowu, 2018) 
explains that whilst trying to fund the Guild’s activities during his 
tenure of office (1993-1996) his executive was forced to rely on 
public office holders:
We had a program that brought experts in government to come and 
address us. I remember one of such incidents; we went to Kaduna and 
we asked the governor to come and talk to us. I invited Wada Maida 
(also a past president of the Guild) and I asked him about what the 
man had done that we could ask questions about. Wada told me he 
had done nothing. The event turned out a big embarrassment because 
after the man had addressed us, we started asking question based on 
the information we had and the man was overwhelmed. But there was 
a limit to which we could go, because the man was our host. And in 
that situation, there was nothing we could do? You just have to look for 
sponsors and because many corporate organisations were not interest-
ed in what we do, we had to look towards political sponsors.
In other words, the Guild could not grill the governor much so 
that they would not come across as ingrates who whilst enjoying 
his ‘benevolent’ sponsorship of their meeting were also embar-
rassing him with hostile questioning. So they settled for looking 
elsewhere, moving on to other safe subjects.
By extension the obsessive practice of seeking state sponsor-
ship of professional and industry activities which is common to 
media organizations predisposes them to being beholden to such 
sponsors. It is an admission of the organisations’ ill preparedness 
for creative solutions to challenges of their trade outside of the 
watchful and approving gaze of state sponsorships and endorse-
ments. Over time, it blunts their journalistic pens and detracts from 
the weight and impact of the media in the democratic process of 
holding government accountable to the people.
Dubious Honors
Corruption drives the popular practice of media houses con-
ferring dubious honors on office holders whose activities they are 
supposed to monitor. Such titles like: “Most Media-friendly Gover-
nor”, “Best performing Senator from the South South”, “Most Gen-
der Sensitive CEO”, “Best News Source”, “Most corporate socially 
responsible Bank etc without clear parameters betray an attempt 
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to confer undue honor and advantage on news subjects, contrary 
to the notion of reporting as a fair and balanced account of hap-
penings in society. It is no more than a fraudulent attempt to pass 
off such persons in borrowed garbs. 
When reporters begin to crown news sources with questionable awards, 
one needs not be clairvoyant to know that the critical faculties that 
good journalism needs would become blunt over time (Idowu, 2009, 
p.123).
The tragedy is that what was deemed a shortcoming of beat 
associations in 2002 has since been taken over by media organi-
zations who now organize all sorts of awards for their clients, with 
many of them beholden to the sponsors. 
As one of the FGD participants observed:
Today, you have newspapers giving awards. Even NUJ (Nigeria Union 
of Journalists) gives awards. If you get money from such enterprise, 
it is not very likely that you would do very balanced stories (on your 
patrons).
Indeed, news organizations have been known to confer awards 
on all sorts of characters with questionable antecedents without 
any sense of shame or remorse.
Deceptive Content packaging
Corruption is at the heart of the practice where the news me-
dia present sponsored special section stories as news features. It 
amounts to non full disclosure and shortchanges the audience. 
Corruption is promoted where the media unduly sensationalizes, 
where the headline has little bearing on the body of the story. It 
is a depraved and short-lived attempt to hoodwink the consum-
er into patronizing media products that are otherwise undeserv-
ing. Corruption is inherent in the use of undue adjectives such as 
“leader of thought”, “opinion leader” to qualify news subjects to 
whom journalists have a less than professional association. Such 
stories are said to smell of patronage such as a bottle of beer 
in bygone era. These days, it refers more to exchange of money. 
Public relations practitioners speak a lot of many press releases 
published in the media today only seeing the light of day when 
supported by pecuniary or material gifts. 
Appearance fee at briefings 
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Some journalists, usually the senior ones, also receive what is 
known as appearance fee when they attend high profile briefings 
by politicians or corporate big guns. Sometimes expensive gifts 
are preferred to cash and this set of journalists has been known to 
receive high end laptops, I-Pads etc. 
WHAT IS RESPONSIBLE FOR CORRUPTION? 
As stated elsewhere, factors responsible for corruption in the 
media range from the economic to the political and the social.
Economic: Poor branding, Sliding sales, limited advertising, erosion of 
appeal by social media, impaired ability of employers to meet obliga-
tions—late salaries, inability of staff to discharge their responsibility, 
pressure to moonlight to make ends meet 
Political: Inability to differentiate between political sympathies and loy-
alty to professionalism. Dwindling influence of the media, which are 
seen as irritants and barely tolerated in political circles. 
Social: Playing catch up in the face of sweeping social media impact 
(accompanied) by a sense of professional inadequacy ((Idowu, 2015).
At the heart of corruption is an opportunity for extra income 
of the illegitimate or difficult-to-justify type. It is not wrong for 
journalists to want to augment their income as multiple streams 
of income remain valid, provided they do not arise from situations 
that conflict with their professional and ethical obligations. The 
problem arises where the source is hazy, shady and difficult to 
justify in the open. 
Irregular and Poor remuneration 
Irregular or low pay can sometimes be a factor in stimulating 
corrupt practices in journalism. The industry has never been high 
paying, but the matter is compounded when the low pay is not 
forthcoming.  Journalists resort to moonlighting to make ends 
meet. Such legitimate outlets as speechwriting, teaching, and re-
search provide additional opportunities for journalists to hone 
their skills and earn extra income. Others embrace options that 
provide quicker returns but are less honorable.  Journalists of this 
mould engage in racketeering. In more recent times where the 
distressed economy has impaired employers’ ability to discharge 
their obligations, journalists have received added boost to indulge 
in unwholesome practices. 
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Nkereuwem (2012) provides the depressing salary compensa-
tion for Nigerian journalists as ranging: 
Between N20, 000 and N40, 000 ($124-$247). One or two pay about 
N70, 000 ($432)--these ones are the high flyers. It is therefore conclu-
sive that more than 80 per cent of the journalists in the country do not 
earn enough to pay their basic bills.
Such reality, says Oshunkeye (2011), provides justification for 
unethical behavior:
As long as we continue paying journalists slave wages, as long as me-
dia owners continue to pay wages that hardly take journalists home, 
so long would the roots of corruption in the industry deepen. So long 
would mediocrity continue to thrive in the industry, and so long would 
the consuming public continue to doubt products that the media churn 
out day after day. If the journalists happen to come from organizations 
that are struggling, or if they work in a media where they are being 
owed four or five months’ salary, it becomes so easy for them to ratio-
nalize their decision to accept the offer of ‘brown envelope’. And the 
easier it becomes for them to adulterate the truth they know.  And this 
often puts the society in great jeopardy in the long run.
A female participant at the FGD discussion cites the example of 
NEXT, an enterprising newspaper, which vanished after two years 
in the market: 
When (Dele) Olojede started NEXT they were paying well until they 
couldn’t sustain it, because the company could not service their loan. 
Some of their reporters who were not collecting bribes initially had to 
start collecting it because they stopped paying. There is a particular 
case of one who had refused on one occasion, but had to go back to 
collect it when he realized he had bills to pay.
Greed
 Greed has always been a motivator for those without self 
contentment. The corrupt journalist can be found in the league of 
those who covet that extra income from unacceptable means that 
is undisclosed to employers and hidden from the state. It is driven 
by the desire to keep for oneself what otherwise would have been 
shared with employers or taxed by the state. It is this factor that 
appeals more to Nkereuwem (2012) than poor or late pay:
As much as we may argue that journalists are prone to taking bribes 
because of their poor remuneration, the truth is that it is greed and the 
desire for more than we can legitimately acquire that pushes journalists 
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to take bribes. If a person cannot take a gun to rob another person be-
cause he does not have enough, he ought not to take a bribe because 
he does not have enough. Both are criminal acts; if you are religious, 
both are sins.
Low ethical values
Improper conduct is at the heart of corruption. It is the “con-
scienceless appropriation of the commonwealth for private gain” 
(Idowu, 2009: 183). At play is the self above the common good. 
Whilst the common good is about a journalism that informs and 
educates, that empowers the citizen with useful information and 
commentary to guide conduct, the corrupt journalist is concerned 
with self interest and the accruing private gain. While public jour-
nalism crows about the journalist’s independence of action in se-
lecting the news fare to process and disseminate, corrupt jour-
nalism imprisons independent judgment in the court of vested 
interests. While the service delivery of public journalism is com-
mitted to common good if tinged in parts with elements of en-
lightened self interest, corrupt journalism is about naked self in-
terest. In ruling out poor pay alone as a corrupting factor, Agu 
(2008) alludes to poor ethical values in journalists as also propel-
ling corruption:
The remuneration system is bad. Although it has improved in a number 
of media houses, there is still room for improvement. This, however, 
does not mean that a good pay alone is a panacea to the prevalent 
level of corruption. Some people who are well paid are still very fraud-
ulent. There is the need to dwell more on ethical training, history and 
philosophy, so that the role of the journalist as a trustee of the public 
and the society becomes internalized as an article of faith.
An environmental journalist who participated in the FGD recalls 
how his strong ethical values prevented him from succumbing to 
the lure of lucre:
In 2014, I did a story on environmental degradation as a result of ce-
ment production. The moment we got to the community, the people 
told us they would not talk to us because other journalists had come at 
different points but did not do the story. We promised them we would 
be different. As we continued the story, the company got wind of it and 
they offered us N10million, but we rejected it. They threatened us on 
several occasions and got people to talk to me. On another account, 
they went to my school to report me to the HOD. If you are the type 
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that loves money, don’t go into journalism.
Wanting to be like Joneses 
Journalists get drawn into corrupt acts when they fail to un-
derstand the difference between journalism and other sectors of 
the economy such as banking and energy. Whilst it is true that 
journalism does not have to sentence its workers into penury, it is 
unrealistic now to expect basic reportorial duties to command the 
same pay as an executive in any of the above mentioned sectors. 
Journalists who become disgruntled because they cannot match 
up with their relations or friends in these sectors are prone to cor-
ruptive acts. Whilst those with strong moral fibre may engage in 
other legitimate endeavors to augment their income, the morally 
weak or those with personal sense of inadequacy may readily re-
course to accepting invisible income to keep up with the Joneses. 
A print journalist at the FGD speaks to the problem when she 
observed:
If you want to play according to the rules, you have to be comfortable. 
What stops me from earning as much as anybody who is any industry? 
Until people realize that we have a duty to make the democracy work, 
they won’t pay attention to the challenges in the media.
Lack of sufficient Interest
There are many in journalism that are mere birds of passage; 
they see the occupation as a stepping stone to other things, and 
lack any passion for it. For such people whatever they can make 
from journalism and however they make it adds up to the mission 
of exploiting the job for the immediate rewards it brings. Accord-
ing to the duo of Jimi Disu and Taiwo Obe in the July 9, 2017 
edition of The Discourse on Classic FM 97.3, the culture of the 
newsroom has changed from what it was in the 1980s when they 
were foot soldiers in the newsroom.  The passion of news hunting, 
they say, has yielded way to journalism as a meal ticket with few 
news organs showing zero tolerance for corruption.
Conflict of interest
Inability to differentiate between the role of a public interest 
journalist and special interest publicist is also a common prob-
lem for journalists. Many find it difficult to maintain an emotion-
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al detachment from the stories they investigate and report. They 
become so involved they soon wear the garb of a sympathizer 
and publicist who crosses over from the professional reporter to 
the unofficial spokesperson that manages the reputation of the 
organization they are paid to monitor and report on. Because they 
are so involved, they begin to suppress some unpalatable stories 
about the organization. They do not need to be paid for the ser-
vices being rendered. The corruption is inhered in the fact that 
they have unwittingly started to shortchange their audiences by 
giving incomplete accounts of what is happening in that sector. 
It amounts to what I have described elsewhere as “attempting to 
run with the hare and hunt with the hounds” (Idowu, 2002), (MR, 
June), 5 2009, p.123).
Ethical ignorance and Poor articulation of Editorial 
philosophy by Corporate Bodies
There are journalists who are deployed to the field with little 
grounding in the ethics of the job. Some do not know they are not 
expected to collect gratification from news sources. Some see it as 
perks of the office and are acculturated by despicable seniors to 
see it so. They grow up with a false sense of entitlement with great 
injury to their individual sense of worth and the soul of the pro-
fession. At a seminar for maritime journalists in June 2015 (Idowu, 
2015) of the 30 participating journalists, half confessed not being 
conversant with the code of ethics of Nigerian Journalists, which 
was adopted in 1998 and a follow up to the Formal agreement 
of 1978 (NPO). At another seminar for journalists, this time an in-
house seminar in a Lagos media house in 2014 (Idowu, 2014), sev-
en of the twenty participants struggled to articulate their organi-
zation’s editorial policy; a clear indication that many work almost 
mechanically without a robust understanding of their place within 
their organization’s larger editorial mission. In such situation fidel-
ity to the journalist’s pact with society becomes a mere lip service; 
the watchdog role of the media, clearly understated.
Skills Deficiency is another
Many people lack sufficient knowledge of their job and the re-
quired dedication to pursue the long route of cultivating needed 
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understanding with their contacts on the type of material useful 
for publication. So, rather than invest in building that relationship, 
they resort to the short course of inducing media access. A male 
FGD participant captures the situation:
One of the problems confronting the industry is inadequacies on the 
part of several stakeholders. The PR man who wants his material pub-
lished knows that some of his material are not worthy of being pub-
lished, so he seeks to influence the media. Rather than just send their 
invitations and count on the media to use their discretion, what they do 
is to tout. And when you tout, you pay, knowing that stories compete 
for attention. PR practice in Nigeria is largely media-driven and they 
know it. 
Poor Branding, Inadequate Capitalization
This poor articulation also speaks to the erosion of the brand 
identity in the market place, which fuels poor performance as re-
flected in poor sales and inability to cope with the changing busi-
ness mode, and which in turn impair employers’ ability to pay their 
workers in due season.  Bello (2017) of Thisday offers an interest-
ing perspective:
The media has always been badly funded. We have investors who think 
the media is what you get into and reap immediately, forgetting that 
it is expensive with high cost of running and as such profits take time. 
When they realize this, they stop funding and the workers are left to 
fend for themselves. There are also investors who go into media busi-
ness for politics. The readers and stakeholders out there are very dis-
cerning. The moment they see that this particular media is for political 
promotion and it is (being) done in an unprofessional way, they will 
not buy. When this happens, you will not have a market share or make 
enough money. That is where the problem begins.
The cumulative result of poor funding, product packaging and 
market research is that both the organization and the employee 
resort to desperate measures to stay afloat with dire consequenc-
es. 
The result is a dance of survival, which leaves many with broken limbs 
and sprained ankles, which translate to inability to discharge their re-
sponsibilities such as paying salaries on time. In this pitiable condition, 
individual practitioners find ready excuse to resort to dishonest means 
to make ends meet and corporate players become mincemeat for ca-
pricious interest groups. The public’s right to as full a picture of the 
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course of events as possible becomes compromised (Idowu, 2002:5, 
2009, p.123-124).
Survival
In full realization of the reality of publishing as big business 
and the deflation of promoters’ outsized ego, many publishers be-
come contractor-publishers ready to do the bidding of the state 
and other vested interests by turning their media to grateful lap-
dogs for patronage. Many journalists convert their identity cards 
to extortion licenses in emulation of what the publishers do. Nwa-
bauni’s well known example brings a chilling reminder:
My friend, who was a reporter with one of Nigeria’s popular newspa-
pers, said her boss often justified his non-payment of salaries by saying: 
I’ve given you a platform to make money. Use it. 
This survival mentality accounts for the dent in image when 
the media was fingered as a beneficiary of slush funds from the 
amount budgeted for fighting the Boko Haram insurgency in the 
country’s Northeast. Nowhere in recent history is the underwhelm-
ing state of the media in matters of rectitude publicly displayed 
than in the Office of the National Security Adviser’s (ONSA’s) slush 
fund that was paid to keep the media quiet following a brazen sei-
zure of newspaper copies from distribution vans and newsstands 
in June 2014. Government agents had justified the action under 
the guise they were looking for arms and ammunitions. Expected-
ly, the move attracted media condemnation, more so when these 
seizures did not unveil any of these deadly weapons for arms and 
ammunitions. In the uncertainty of the time, normal operations 
were disrupted. Issues begging to be addressed ranged from 
whether the raid was a prelude to renewed assault against the 
media as was the case under military rule. Some of the victims 
threatened to sue the government. Some called for a trenchant 
opposition to the administration. 
Spotting an opportunity to resolve the impasse, the newspapers 
under the aegis of the Newspaper Proprietors Association of Ni-
geria (NPAN) resolved to dialogue with the government. A meet-
ing was arranged with then President Goodluck Jonathan in Lagos, 
who apologized for the embarrassment caused NPAN members. 
An agreement was reached to settle the matter out of court. A 
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sum of N120 million was agreed to be shared among twelve (lat-
er 13) newspaper organizations affected: Blueprint, BusinessDay, 
Guardian, Independent, Leadership, Nation, New Telegraph, Nigeri-
an Tribune, People’s Daily, Sun, Thisday, Trust, and Vanguard. Each 
organization was to pocket N9 million and the balance of N3 mil-
lion, given to the NPAN secretariat. By the time the scandal broke 
out at the probe panel instituted by the government of President 
Muhammadu Buhari, eight of the beneficiaries had collected their 
allocations. The deal became a scandal in the public space when 
it was established that the slush fund was from the money ear-
marked by the previous administration to fight the Boko Haram 
terrorist insurgency in the Northeast of the country. The circuitous 
manner in which the payment was routed through the account 
of a company that was alien to the NPAN under the dodgy ex-
pense head of energy consultancy showed the untidiness of the 
deal. When it became clear, the media coordinator of the deal, 
NPAN’s President, Nduka Obaigbena, also secured additional sum 
of N550 million for his organization ostensibly as compensation 
for the bombing of his newspaper’s Abuja office in April 2012, the 
image of the media nosedived.
The NPAN scandal epitomizes grand corruption where the or-
ganized media agreed to collect public funds secretly from the 
government as compensation for earlier infractions against the 
media. It was not wrong for the media to reach an out of court 
settlement. What was odious was that it was done secretly; it was 
an abuse of entrusted power for private gain, which prevented the 
media from establishing the principle for the general good that in 
a democracy all actions by the government and the people must 
be rooted in respect for the rule of law. By shielding its agreement 
with government from the public, it made a mockery of the me-
dia’s cry for free access to information, promotion of transparency 
and accountability in governance.  It failed in making the public 
know that the law is no respecter of persons and governments. 
The immediate consequence as Fatade (2015) observes is the 
crisis of legitimacy it creates for the organized media:
It remains doubtful if the present crop of media owners and journalists 
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can superintend Nigeria’s democratic journey to the Promised Land 
based on what we have seen so far.  We cannot also continue to pre-
tend that all is well with our profession by refusing to speak out against 
corruption that is incapacitating us from playing our watchdog role 
effectively. Of course I support the argument that we might not expect 
the media to be different as corruption permeates every area of our 
lives but with the self-assigned and constitutionally-guaranteed over-
sight functions of the media, Dasukigate offers us ample opportunity 
to review our activities and how we have succeeded in throwing the 
profession to the dogs.
CONSEQUENCES OF CORRUPTION ON THE 
NEWS PROCESS AND SOCIETY
The immediate challenge resides in the nature of corruption 
and its erosion of the fidelity attached to news as the balanced, 
professional and independent processing of information into 
news of value for the consumer. Journalism’s role in society is to 
guide public understanding through a fair, balanced portrayal of 
happenings. It is a professional task, which presupposes that to 
every issue there is more than one side and demands journalists 
should evaluate the issues at stake, leaving no stone unturned be-
fore presenting findings the public can trust and act upon. After all 
as Dennis (1991) quoted in Idowu (2015, 5) says:
The public is buying a communication system, they are paying for pub-
lic communication, and it stands to reason they want the resulting in-
formation to be competently gathered, accurate and useful to them.
Where what is presented as facts are no more than procured or 
manufactured alternative facts, a credibility problem arises. Where 
the public cannot trust the media, a great pillar of democracy be-
comes weakened and the constitutional role of holding govern-
ment accountable to the people compromised. 
Redefines the Concept of News 
Because corruption is deceitful and amounts to the enthrone-
ment of self interest above communal good, it ends up eroding 
standards. As previously observed: 
Rather than an unvarnished picture of happenings in society it becomes 
a tainted account for special interest groups. Rather than the forum for 
ventilating useful ideas, the integrity of news becomes compromised 
and a steady and dangerous disconnect between society and its com-
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ponent parts is set in motion (Idowu, 2013, Media Review March/April 
2013).
Takes the audience for granted 
Corruption insults the intelligence of the audience by purport-
ing to give them a tainted and fractured picture of reality. It makes 
a mockery of the ‘truth’-searching function of journalism, which 
should propel journalists to dig and unearth the many sides to 
an issue in the effort to get as near a complete picture of an issue 
as humanly possible. This enterprise is expected to be guarded 
jealously as it gives both the reporter and the news medium ad-
vantage over others. That is the contract journalists have with so-
ciety, not the enthronement of pack journalism, which promotes 
conformity and not divergence. 
Ultimately Damages Media credibility 
Nothing makes a medium gasp for breath early than one that 
is lacking in credibility (Idowu, 2015: 9). When what a medium 
is publishing is at variance with what the public is experiencing, 
the medium soon slides into irrelevance because rather than be a 
long distance runner it loses steam early as a sprinter. Withdrawal 
of patronage is the punishment an abused patron can visit on a 
medium that takes delight in calling the patron a fool. The saying 
that you can fool the people sometimes but not all the time un-
derscores the relationship between a medium and its patrons.
Corrodes the notion of public service and 
compromises standards
Corruption lowers standards and corrodes the public service 
meaning of much of serious journalism. It results into a situation 
where the people look up to the media to play out its agenda-set-
ting role but in exchange receive a diluted coverage, full of fury 
without substance. Where they get a docile lapdog instead of a 
vigilant watchdog, the notion of public service is corroded, stan-
dards become compromised, and negative values are enthroned 
(Idowu 2013). 
Underreports important areas of the economy/society
A situation where progressively, the media deploy cloudy lens 
to monitor society results into the media ignoring some important 
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areas of society thereby imperiling and weakening society’s reli-
ance on the media as a faithful barometer of public opinion and 
happenings in society. 
Corruption encourages the media to promote the asinine at 
the expense of the deep and developmental. The World Bank in a 
publication on how corruption impacts development, says:
Corruption is bad for development. It leads governments to intervene 
where they need not, and it undermines their ability to enact and im-
plement policies in areas in which government intervention is clearly 
needed.
It can be said that corruption is bad for journalism. Develop-
ment issues, which may not bring immediate bread and butter 
benefits such as associated with the political and economic news 
beats, tend to suffer. Corruption leads media organizations to ele-
vating pseudo events into big events and emphasizing issues that 
do not justify such attention. It has the capacity to undermine the 
robust concern for the socio-economic transformation of society 
as envisaged in Chapter II of Nigeria’s 1999 Constitution on the 
fundamental objectives and directive principles of state policy, 
which cites concern for the environment, provision of jobs, food 
and shelter for the citizenry as urgent state duties.  
Ethical disservice
Corrupt reporting compromises the editorial independence of 
the journalist, which is one of the cardinal professional ethics, in 
that what is published becomes what is procured not what is sig-
nificant. It undermines the media’s ability to independently ex-
amine society, and pick areas truly deserving of media attention. 
It makes a mockery of the maxim that He who comes to equity 
must come with clean hands since tainted conscience and com-
promised hands cannot see corruption as a national war to pre-
vent the conversion of commonwealth to private pockets. 
COMBATING CORRUPTION
In fighting corruption in the media, efforts must be made to 
promote awareness of corruption by connecting its menace to real 
life situations. Journalists must also be reminded of their quadru-
ple mandate of responsibility to self, the profession, the state, and 
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their organization. The notion of responsibility needs to be devel-
oped first in the individual for it to be imbibed and practiced. The 
ethical concerns of journalism emphasize its truth-seeking func-
tion in the concern for such principles as accuracy, fairness and 
balance. The constitution of the land assigns a watchdog role to 
the media, enjoining a vigilant oversight of freedom to uphold the 
responsibility of government to the people. Finally, every self re-
specting medium must nurture and defend its credibility before its 
publics. An increasingly professionalized media can only be useful 
to an organization if it is useful to society since no medium exists 
just for itself. So, a number of measures are needed to be able to 
stimulate the desired change in media environments. 
Produce media managers (beyond reporting)
The training of mass communication professionals needs 
strengthening in the area of media management. What current-
ly obtains emphasizes the reporting side of training with scant 
attention to the management side. More courses in the fields of 
economics, business administration/management and marketing 
need to be integrated into the training curriculum of mass com-
municators with the ultimate goal of allowing specialization in me-
dia management. Too many promising publications have simply 
disappeared because of marketing and management problems. 
Using the travails of Newswatch magazine, which resulted into a 
takeover, as reference, I had noted in 2011:
The financial difficulties experienced by Newswatch are being replicat-
ed in many newspapers across the country. In many instances, accom-
plished writers do not necessarily make successful managers. In the 
long term, media training curricula require that closer attention be paid 
to media/business management than has hitherto been the case. In the 
short term, we, media managers need to rethink our business models, 
bury our egos and seek for help if we are not to supervise the untime-
ly interment of our enterprises or hand them over to publishers with 
questionable credentials. (Idowu 2011, NEXT, May 11).
Fund media operations and Pay journalists better
Improved business management should make a difference in 
the fortunes of the news media with vital areas of marketing, dis-
tribution, engagement, penetration, reporting and editing being 
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run by specialists. In such a situation, needed funds will be avail-
able for improved compensation that can reduce the temptation 
for journalists to moonlight to make ends meet.  Whilst poor pay 
is not sufficient reason for corruption, it does alongside irregular 
payment provide incentive for receiving sop. 
Eniola Bello, managing director of Leaders and Company, pub-
lishers of Thisday titles, is unequivocal on fair and timely payment 
of wages:
The first thing is to ensure there is proper funding. Pay well and pay 
on time. For instance, why would a journalist leave his job where he is 
a core staff and go to work in banks where he is a support staff? It is 
certainly not because they enjoy the job, it is about resources. The or-
ganizations send them on funny errands, and even request to see their 
press releases in some instances. I give you a funny example. When 
I was the editor, a journalist-turned public relations executive came 
to my office and complained that I used a photo where his boss was 
frowning. I sent him away.
With proper funding media organizations should be able to pay 
their staff better, invest more in investigative reporting through 
which the capacity of media to connect more with their audienc-
es, impact on governance, and promote change would be better 
enhanced. With a more credible media, standards and patronage 
will improve and journalists better remunerated. 
Ground journalists in the rudiments of the profession
Deploying journalists to the field without adequate grounding 
is counterproductive. Many have not imbibed the corporate phi-
losophy sufficiently well before being assigned to corruptive en-
vironments where bad behavior is easily copied. When the abnor-
mal appears normal, it becomes almost a mission impossible to 
make them unlearn their bad habits. A situation where journalists 
are unfamiliar with the ethics of their profession is dangerous. Not 
only should they be exposed to its contents, periodic in-house 
and external seminars will help them deepen their understanding 
of the challenges of their trade, help them to compare notes with 
peers and prepare them for better professional engagement. As I 
noted elsewhere:
The combined import of the codes is to have the media act rationally, 
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fairly, sensibly, and responsibly in the public interest. The pursuit of 
truth through honest, fair, factual and balanced account of significant 
happenings in society is at the heart of the watchdog and gate keep-
ing functions of the media. When that trust in the content of what the 
media serve the public is missing, journalism becomes at best fiction 
writing, and at worst, a danger to the society it purports to serve.  So 
codes are useful, regulatory guides to shape professional conduct. 
They distinguish the profession of journalism from a free for all trade 
without standards. They recognize the power of the media for good or 
ill to shape society and seek to reassure the public that media respon-
sibility is something taken seriously, not only as a constitutional duty, 
but indeed a personal, professional and organizational responsibility 
(Idowu, 2015B).
Retrain journalists regularly
Journalism is a knowledge-based activity which requires updat-
ing of practitioner’s knowledge to be able to inform the public 
appropriately. It is a craft that requires constant honing of skills. 
Regular training and retraining remain pivotal for it to play the 
role of a pathfinder and educator in society.  
Move journalists round beats periodically
Part of what predisposes journalists to undue familiarity with 
news sources is prolonged stay on particular beats. Whilst expe-
rience helps in cultivating contacts and servicing networks, jour-
nalists’ overall professional development is helped where there is 
wide exposure to other fields. Promoters of pack journalism can be 
found largely in the rank of journalists covering specialized fields. 
Develop reward schemes to encourage professional jour-
nalism
Awards remain useful barometers for benchmarking and as-
sessing professional output in the media. They spur journalists to 
greater productivity and generate healthy competition. They bring 
recognition that opens wider opportunities for professional devel-
opment and remain a cherished tool to enhance professionalism. 
Examples of such media awards in Nigeria include the Diamond 
Awards for Media Excellence (DAME), which has run annually from 
inception in 1992 to date, the Nigeria Media Merit Award (NMMA) 
and the Wole Soyinka Investigative Awards (WSIA). Such platforms 
need to be strengthened by development partners, media owners, 
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corporate bodies committed to excellence so that they can con-
tinue to be fountains of encouragement for ambitious journalists 
who want to be acclaimed for professional excellence. 
Provide journalists with outlets/forums to discuss 
professional challenges
Media owners need to devote more attention to ethical chal-
lenges and provide outlets for regular assessment of media per-
formance. Internal and external ombudsmen are necessary to in-
terface regularly with the workforce to provide timely feedback 
on performance and stimulate discussion of challenges faced on 
the field. Media NGOS and professional associations also require 
more encouragement in this area. If journalism is to continue to 
remain relevant and impactful, there must be sustainable interest 
in discussing the challenges of the profession. 
Punish infraction of journalistic codes through naming 
and shaming mechanisms
The organized media must come to terms with the need for 
media regulation as a public trust-building mechanism to en-
hance media credibility. Too much energy has been dissipated on 
whether a statutory or voluntary regulatory body is desirable. Ex-
perience has shown that both models are problematic. The Nige-
rian Press Council, first established in 1978, rechristened Nigeria 
Media Council in 1988, and renamed Nigerian Press Council again 
in 1993, is distrusted by the organized media who see in it a ruse 
for government control. The government, on its part, through in-
consistency, has fuelled this distrust. The media’s preferred alter-
native, the Independent Ombudsman mechanism, remains a fine 
idea in print, which is yet to get the public’s buy-in since its estab-
lishment in 2009. The statutory model is underperforming having 
had most of its assigned responsibilities adjudged incompatible 
with provisions of the 1999 Constitution by a federal high court. In 
the face of no serious attempt to challenge the court’s judgment, 
a hybrid public-private mediatory body that is jointly funded may 
offer the most promising future. It will require men and women of 
good faith admitting failure and expressing desire to start de novo 
for a new partnership that will result in an inexpensive mediatory 
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council where ethical breaches can be addressed and regular pro-
nouncements on media infractions made. Such declarations will 
have the salutary effect of using moral suasion of naming and 
shaming to moderate media behavior. There is no point having 
codes of ethics that no one is examining periodically. The growth 
of professional practice is best assured where the media as an 
institution is prepared to submit to the peer review of fellow pro-
fessionals operating independently in such a council. The example 
of Media Review as an independent, private effort has shown that 
it is possible to subject the media as an institution to regular anal-
yses for self improvement.  If such a model could run for a quarter 
of a century years, a better funded version by a committed pub-
lic-private partnership should be able to improve on it. 
Encourage plural ownership and commit owners to 
ethical journalism
Media pluralism in a society as diverse as Nigeria along lines 
of ethnicity, religion, gender, class remains not only desirable but 
imperative. Media owners need to be encouraged to see their in-
vestments as public trusts that require credibility for them to be 
useful to even the owners. Media businesses should be nurtured 
along sound business principles and less as ego trips for longev-
ity in the market place. To encourage public interest journalism, 
funding models need to be reviewed in light of the digital disrup-
tion that continues to alter the old ways of doing business. The 
alternative will be slow, painful death of their businesses. Whilst 
strong media organs are necessary, government, through the le-
gal environment, should also put in place antitrust measures to 
ensure that what should be a democratic and liberating industry 
is not reduced to a monopolist, restrictive agenda-setting sector.
Last Word
There is hope for the future but a lot will be expected of people 
of goodwill from owners to managers, workers, and professional 
bodies to take the necessary internal cleansing steps within the 
media. From the governments, there is need to provide positive 
legal framework to encourage responsible journalism to thrive 
such as strengthening antitrust laws to discourage media oligop-
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olies. There must still be room for Public service journalism es-
pecially on public owned electronic stations. Everything cannot 
be abandoned to the whims of commercial journalism as there 
remain legitimate public concerns and developmental issues that 
commercial journalism cannot adequately serve if our media must 
be seen as watchdogs and our democracy endure. 
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The Nigerian media have come a long way from their incarna-
tion as traditional outlets, manifested in orature, festivals, town 
criers and village square assemblies through the rudimentary print 
journalism and pamphleteering of the colonial period and the an-
alogue format of newspapers and television in the post colonial 
period, to the more recent digital innovations and the hybridized 
structures intermeshing electronic formats with more familiar 
forms (Olukotun, 2002, 2003 and 2013). It has been argued by 
scholars such as Kerr (2011) that the new media with its bloggers, 
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dialogic and bottom-up horizontal communication modes of the 
indigenous African media, and therefore, are all the more partic-
ipatory and democracy enhancing. There is of course, a contrary 
point of view, which alludes to the rise of a Netocracy, populated 
by young urban professionals with access to the internet and its 
global spinoffs, as opposed to an underclass that, in a metaphor 
employed by Castells (2000) are switched off from global currents. 
This chapter discusses issues of changing economics, technol-
ogies, ownership and production in the period between 1999 and 
2016, in order to assess the capacity profile of the media, with 
reference to their abilities to carry-out their roles as watchdogs. 
Obviously, the capacity of the media to act as healthy watchdogs, 
which has a long ancestry in Nigerian media history and culture, 
is a function of such issues as ownership structure, changing 
technologies, production modes, governance structure as well as 
shifting perceptions of audiences who consume media products. 
Hence, despite the fact that many Nigerian newspapers have cru-
sading titles, such as Vanguard, the Punch, Nigerian Tribune and 
the Champion, their performance of the watchdog role which is 
also stipulated by Section 22 of the 1999 Constitution, is a mat-
ter to be determined less by a militant press ideology than their 
strength or weakness as players in the economic and technolog-
ical market place. That point is put differently by Coronell (2010: 
13), who argues that “The journalist as watchdog therefore, is a 
role defined differently across countries and cultures. That defini-
tion is fluid often contingent on the existing social, political and 
economic conditions and a reflection as much of the historical 
moment as it is of preexisting structures and media cultures.”
Unsurprisingly, therefore, the watchdog role of the Nigerian 
media in the period understudy has been enhanced by the emer-
gence of a diasporic online media, typified by the investigative 
Sahara Reporters, which has often provided stimulation and ac-
tual corruption stories for the local media which are increasingly 
inserted into global news flows. Another example of the impact of 
changing technology of the Nigerian media is provided in the ear-
ly days of the Fourth Republic by TheNews magazine, which broke 
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the news concerning the fake credentials of the former Speaker 
of the House of Representatives, Salisu Buhari. While reporters of 
TheNews carried out investigations within the country, the Amer-
ican angle of the research, which required a verification of Bu-
hari’s claim to have attended the University of Toronto, Canada 
was conducted by Dapo Olorunyomi, who had lived in the United 
States on exile in the twilight of the military years, as well as Kunle 
Ajibade, another founding director, who was also in the United 
States at the time. This transnational collaboration, checking of 
data, as well as the use of internet facilities gave a robust mien to 
the expose, which led to the resignation of the former Speaker. 
As a postscript to one of the finest moments of that magazine, it 
is interesting to remark that the vicissitudes and hardship, which 
surround media production, occasioning the closure of several 
newspapers, has turned TheNews into an occasional and irregular 
publication which exists mainly as an online medium, mirroring a 
global trend in the decline of newspapers.
The rest of this chapter is divided into three sections, namely: 
the global backdrop, changing economic and technological pro-
files of the Nigerian media as well as the concluding section which 
ties the issues together.
2.1 The Global Backdrop
The media, in their variegated genres, are central to global-
ization and indeed to civilization. There is no doubt concerning 
the pervasiveness of media demonstrated by the widening spread 
of internet penetration, the use of personal computers, cellular 
phones, as well as the reach of Cable News Network (CNN). As 
Castells (2000) reminds us, political leadership and much of the 
substance of politics have become inseparable from the power of 
the media to draw, and to fix images in the public consciousness. 
Nigeria and much of Africa remains a backwater, recent changes 
notwithstanding, in an information age, in which the United States 
and a handful of countries including China are dominant. For ex-
ample, ‘platform imperialism’ by which it is meant the hegemony 
of the United States on social networks, search engines and smart 
phones leaves Nigeria at the margins of these transforming devel-
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opments.
As Jin (2013,145) informs:
The hegemonic power of American-based platforms is crucial because 
Google, Facebook, iPhone, and Android have functioned as major digi-
tal media intermediaries thanks to their advanced roles in aggregating 
several devices. The U.S, which had previously controlled non-Western 
countries with its military power, capital, and later cultural products, 
now seems to dominate the world with platforms, benefitting from 
these platforms, mainly in terms of capital accumulation.

















Google google.com 1 1 Search engine U.S
You Tube youtube.com 2 3 Video sharing U.S
Facebook Facebook.
com
3 2 Social Network US
Baidu Baidu.com 4 11 Search engine China
Wikipedia wikipedia.org 5 5 Encyclopedia U.S
Yahoo! yahoo.com 6 4 Portal and 
media
U.S




Google India google.co.in 8 9 Search engine India
Tencent QQ qq.com 9 36 Portal China
Taobao Taobao 10 65 Online shop-
ping
China
Amazon amazon.com 11 14 Retail U.S




Twitter twitter.com 13 6 Social network U.S
Google 
Japan
google.co.jp 14 20 Search engine Japan
Sohu Sohu.com 15 204 Portal China
Windows live live.com 16 7 Email.web 
services and 
software suite U.S
VK Vk.com 17 12 Social network Russia
Instagram Instagram.
com
18 15 Photo shar-
ing and social 
media
US





360.cn 20 85 Internet securi-
ty software
China
Source: Alexa.com, July 23, 2017.
As table 1 above shows, the domination of platforms by the 
United States is moderated slightly by the emergence of China 
as a notable global player. Hence, what we have is the carrying 
forward and strengthening of the preeminent position of the Unit-
ed States in information, cultural, and now platform imperialism. 
The significance of this for Africa, and Nigeria in particular is that 
the emerging global public sphere, is as Curran (2000:13) informs 
“developing in a lopsided, uneven way which is clearly connected 
to wider inequalities of power and resources in the world”. This 
information asymmetry is reinforced by the global dominance of 
news agencies located in the United States, and Europe, as well 
as the increasing concentration, through vertical and horizontal 
integration of media in a few hands. This results in the efficient 
transmission of Western, especially cultural perspectives and the 
dominance of a neoliberal world view. Franklin and Love (1998) 
are substantially correct, therefore, when they see the global me-
dia dominated by the United States as agenda setters for Nigeria, 
Africa, and the rest of the world. 
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Another trend worth mentioning is the decline of newspapers, 
and their uncertain future in the form in which they have exist-
ed for centuries. Particularly hit by the downturn are newspapers 
in the United States and Britain, where the digital revolution has 
been reshaping the industry. The Bloomberg QuickTake in a report 
on May 19, 2015, entitled The Fading Newspaper informs that in 
the United States:
Industry’s revenue has fallen by more than a third since 2005, its best 
year, when sales reached $60.2billion. Newsrooms are shrinking and 
most papers are printing less news. Today, newspapers employ rough-
ly a third fewer professionals than they did at their peak in 1989… 
Since2011, prominent papers like the New York Times, the Washington 
Post, and the Chicago Tribune have started digital subscription plans in 
hopes that readers would pay to preserve traditional news gathering.
In the United Kingdom, according to The Audit Bureau of Cir-
culation, between 2001 and 2014, the circulation of the ten major 
national newspapers declined from 12.6million copies sold on av-
erage each day, to 6.89million copies. The predictions and pros-
pects for growth or recovery in that country and several others 
in Western Europe are not too bright. This decline, though real, 
appears not to have diminished the political influence of newspa-
pers since it doesn’t take account of online readers, as well as their 
power to set agenda for television, and the online media.
As Harvard Professor, Norris Pippa (2000) warns, it is possible to 
make too much of the narrative of newspaper decline, which has 
been frequently espoused before the challenges posed by the in-
ternet. It also understates both the popularity of newspapers and 
their ability to connect or adapt to changing modes of production 
and distribution (Pippa 2000). There is also a counter narrative to 
the story of decline in Asia and Latin America. In India for example, 
newspapers are booming in the face of growing internet penetra-
tion. An article, in the Huffington Post (May10, 2015), informs that 
despite 214 million internet users in India, the newspaper business 
is thriving with 94,000 registered newspapers, up from 14,000 in 
2011, and strengthened still by increasing circulation for several 
newspapers. 
Before zeroing in on Nigeria, it is important not to erect the 
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examples of the United States and Western Europe into a typology 
that fits all cases. It is also interesting to observe as Thussu (2007) 
has documented, that global media flows, dominated by the Unit-
ed States are also countervailed by contraflows from developing 
countries, some of which like South Africa and India, are increas-
ingly global players.
Nigeria, still at the margins of this development, has already 
entered the global market place with Nollywood, and the emer-
gence of a diasporic online media such as, Sahara Reporters which 
are accessed globally. As Thussu (2000,18) correctly observes, 
on this score “In this era of globalization, the one way vertical 
flow, has given way to multiple and horizontal flows as subaltern 
media content providers have emerged to service an ever grow-
ing geo-cultural market”. For example, Hollywood, and Nigeria’s 
growing entertainment industry, estimated to be worth 55 billion 
dollars, and increasing annually, is rated in some quarters as one 
of the most profitable businesses internationally, thus providing a 
clear example of lucrative subaltern contra flow. 
2.2  Changing Economic and Technological Profiles
The period between 1999 and 2017 witnessed phenomenal ex-
pansion in the media industry as a result of the liberalized polit-
ical space, the exigencies of political competition warranting the 
replication of media outlets; as well as an economic boom riding 
on unprecedented increase in the price of oil in the world market 
for many of these years. Nigeria’s oil boom produced a new class 
of billionaires, and economic players, several of whom invested in 
the media industry. The period consequently, reinforced Nigeria’s 
position as the country with the largest and most vibrant media 
industry in Africa, followed by South Africa and Kenya. The num-
ber of publications is put roughly at 120, several of them founded 
in the period since 1999. To give an idea of the expansion of the 
media industry cutting across several types, the former Director 
General of the Nigerian Broadcast Commission, Emeka Mba, in-
formed two years ago (Punch, September 1, 2015) that Nigeria has 
the biggest broadcast sector in Africa, as it boasted of 133 feder-
al television, 122 state radio, 68 state television, 51 multi-chan-
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nel, multi-point distribution services, 97 private radio, 43 private 
television, 63 federal radio, and 27 campus broadcasting stations. 
Obviously, therefore, the country is well covered in terms of the 
electronic media with the majority of them owned by the state. 
In a trend mirrored across the media, many of these outfits are 
rudimentary and exist at the margins of survival. The breakdown 
provided by Mba did not include community radios, 17 of which 
were approved by the federal government after many years of 
struggle and agitation by civil society organizations. It should be 
noted that the broadcasting sector is trapped in relative obso-
lescence as a result of the failure of the country to undertake the 
switch over from analog to digital broadcasting. This implies that 
Nigeria will continue to broadcast analog signals until it is able to 
migrate, hopefully at the end of 2017.
As mentioned, over 120 newspapers, not counting communi-
ty publications survive in the Nigerian market; although many of 
these are shoestring enterprises which can capsize and sometimes 
reappear without notice. For example National Interest staged a 
comeback in 2003, after it was rested for six months only to go off 
the streets terminally three years later. Circulation figures remain 
contentious because of the failure of the effort made to revive in 
2008, the Audit Bureau of Circulation, which had been comatose 
for years.
An important development, mentioned earlier, is the growing 
number of Nigerians who are able to access the internet and social 
media networks, thus resulting in better engagement and partici-
pation of citizens in democratic discourse. Significantly for exam-
ple, the elections of 2011 and 2015, as well as social outbursts such 
as the anti-fuel price increase of 2012 and President Muhammadu 
Buhari’s health travails in 2017, were attended by interesting if 
occasionally frightening conversations on the social media. Ac-
cording to the Nigerian Communication Commission, the number 
of internet users on the Global System for Mobile (GSM) Commu-
nications Network jumped from 76,322,802 in 2014 to 81,892,840 
by January 2015. It should be mentioned that the increasing use of 
social media platforms and internet application is a direct conse-
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quence of the continuous rise in the number of people who sub-
scribe to the mobile telecommunications networks. The National 
Bureau of Statistics put the figure of subscribers at 86 million for 
2016; up from 2.3million subscribers in 2002.
Access to the internet, has obviously been of tremendous value 
to professional journalists as well as citizen journalists, in view of 
the abundance of information and the opportunities to connect 
with national and global discourse. The problems associated with 
patchy networks, breakdown of computers, fitful electricity not-
withstanding, journalists are increasingly information technology 
savvy, a situation that did not obtain at the beginning of civilian 
rule. 
As Kperogi (2012) observes, pertinently, the Post Express blazed 
the trail of online journalism in Nigeria. According to him:
By the close of the 1990s, a few other newspapers, notably the (Nigeri-
an) Guardian, Punch, Vanguard, and ThisDay, had websites where they 
episodically republished selected contents from their print editions. By 
early 2000s, almost all the legacy newspapers in Nigeria had some Web 
presence aided in part by the aggregation and distribution of their con-
tent, along with those of African newspapers, by the AllAfrica.com, the 
Washington DC-based multimedia content service provider widely rec-
ognized as the world’s largest Africa-centered site (Kperogi 2012:447).
To be noted too, is the fact that the majority of Nigerian news-
papers can be read online and maintain active websites. Kperogi 
(2011) insists, however, that their online activities and presence 
are limited to interactivity, and does not, for the most part, include 
the latter stages of multimediality and hypertextuality. As he put 
it, “the websites of Nigerian homeland newspapers failed the re-
quirement of Duze’s multimediality and hypertexuality and seem 
to be stuck in Pavlik’s first stage in the evolution of online journal-
ism.” (Kperogi, 2011, p.123).
Kperogi recognized, even as at 2011 that several newspapers 
such as Leadership, Daily Trust, Punch, and the Nation had moved 
on beyond the first stage of online journalism; although he is cor-
rect to say that hypertextuality, whereby newspapers can update 
content as news breaks, as well as stream video and audio is still 
a rarity, while hitches with website functionality were frequent. 
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Nonetheless, the situation is rapidly improving, and the vitality of 
online journalism has been increased by the addition to the media 
space of such online news publications as the Cable commenced 
in April 2014, Premium Times, started in October 2011, and Eagle 
online started in January 2012 and Bounce commenced in March, 
2017. See Table below.
Table 2: Online News Publications
Name of publication Founder Date 
The Gleaner News Online Tony Iyare November 2003 
The Cable Simon Kolawole April 29th,2014
Premium Times Dapo Olorunyomi October 1st 2011
The Eagle Online Dotun Oladipo January 9, 2012
Sundiata Post Max Amuche September 2013
Global Patriots Simon Ibe March 2015
The Rainbow Chijama Ogbu February 2013
Freedom Online Gabriel Akinadewo January 9, 2015
Newsdairyonline Danlami Nmodu September,2008
Real news Maureen Chigbo November 19, 
2012
Prompt News Akeem Oyetunji May 18, 2013
Nigeria Politics Online Semiu Okanlawon April, 2010
News Express Isaac Umunna August 29, 2012
New Mail Semiu Salami September, 2010
The Quick News Monday Ashibogwu November  10, 
2007
Greenbarge Yusuf Ozi-Usman July 20, 2013
Watchdog Ben-Bright Mkpuma August, 2009
Urhobo Today Laba Oghenekevwe May, 2012
biztejjers.com Yemi Adeoye October, 2011
Metro Watch Collins Edomarusen November,2013
New Sentinel Peter Jones March 2014
The Citizen Malachy Agbo June, 2012
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Global village Extra Taiye Olayemi 2013
persecondnews.com Femi Soneye February, 2012
EnviroNews Nigeria Micheal Simire August, 2012
World Stage Segun Adeleye February 7, 2008
Sahara Reporters Omoyele Sowore 2006
Sahara Reporter TV Omoyele Sowore April, 2011
DigitalSENSE Remmy Nweke August 30, 2009
Frontier News Horatius Egua November, 2011
You News Afolabi Odeyemi February, 2012
Gamji.com Dr. Ismaila Iro 1998
The Boss Dele Momodu November, 2015
Ynaija Chude Jideonwo May, 2010
The Simon Ateba News Simon Ateba May, 2015
The News Guru Mideno Bayegbon October, 2016
Lindaikejiblog Linda Ikeji 2007
Daily Post James Bamisaye March, 2015
Bella Naija Uche Eze July, 2006
Bounce Media 24 March, 2017
Source: Research Notes
The list above, it should be pointed out, includes several sites 
that are no longer active, or have become moribund, again reflect-
ing a trend in which other kinds of media, in particular newspa-
pers started with gusto, and go off the streets after a few years of 
publication. Nonetheless, it is conceivable, given Nigeria’s youth-
ful population that the number of daily readers of news pages on 
the web is bigger than the number of those who buy ink stained 
papers.
Table 3: Top leading sites










Vanguardngr.com 5:55 2.70 17% 13,835
Punchng.com 7:37 3:46 8.60% 8,896
Guardian.ng 4:39 2.36 21.90% 1,114
Thisdaylive.com 4:01 1:92 20:40% 1,692
Sunnewsonline.com 3:57 2.08 14.20% 1,466
Channelstv.com 3:13 1:86 14.90% 891
Tribuneonline.com 4:57 2.26 10.90% 1,947
Pmnewsnigeria.com 7:52 2.61 11.30% 817
Nan.ng 11:04 6:46 5.50% 289
Source: Alexa, July 23, 2017
As the table above shows, an increasing number of Nigerians, 
mainly the elite, are able to get their news, from either the online 
versions of major newspapers, or online news sites such as the 
influential Premium Times or diasporic Sahara Reporters. Consid-
ering that newspapers increasingly source their reports from on-
line publications, a synergy has been created between both forms 
of media, especially on anticorruption and human rights issues. 
Social media, in spite of their abuses such as the impersonation 
of prominent Nigerians like Professor Wole Soyinka and Chief 
Olusegun Obasanjo, as well as recycling rumours and fake news, 
constitute exciting spaces for civic participation and democratic 
discourse. 
Nigerian journalist, Tolu Ogunlesi alluded to this dimension 
when he wrote (The Punch September 28, 2015) that:
You also have to remember that this is a country for which most of 
our history, what one might call truly mass media was in the hand of 
the government (television and radio until the liberalization that began 
mid-1990s), and what was passed for private or independent wasn’t 
really ‘mass’ in its distribution (the newspapers, newsmagazines). It is 
into that context that social media have landed, offering us something 
truly liberating: mass media in which we are not only consumers but 
also producers and distributors as well.
The other side of the explosion in newspapers is the high mor-
tality of titles as a result of a mismanaged economy with severe 
infrastructural deficits. Hence, the birth of several new titles as well 
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as the high death rate of titles can be seen as two sides of the 
same coin. Some of the prominent new titles which have survived 
include the Nation 2006, the Sun 2003, Daily Independent 2002, 
Leadership 2004, Daily Trust 2001, New Telegraph 2013, and Busi-
ness Day 2001. Among those that did not survive are; Nigerian 
Compass, National Interest, The Comet, Next, New Age, the Anchor, 
NewsWatch, the Examiner, Tempo, PM News and others.
The economic climate also affected older titles such as the Post 
Express, founded in July 1996 by businessman Sony Odogwu, but 
rested in July 2003, the New Nigerian, which for many years was 
the regional voice of the northern part of the country, was finally 
rested in 2012. The Champion, owned by an Igbo businessman, 
Emmauel Iwuanyanwu, has remained comatose for a decade. The 
distress was particularly hard on the magazine sector where Tell 
and TheNews had to downsize considerably and as at October 
2015 were owing their staff several months of salaries. News-
Watch, respected for its sober and dignified analysis, was acquired 
after several years of distress by businessman, Jimoh Ibrahim, who 
turned it into a daily newspaper, entitled Newswatch Daily. Ibra-
him also owns National Mirror, founded in 2006 but which had 
become comatose. 


















 Source: Research Notes
As mentioned earlier, the protracted default on salaries is a pro-
nounced feature of these years, with some titles and electronic 
media, owing as many as 20 months of salaries. News broke two 
years ago concerning the sealing of the premises of Daily inde-
pendent, by the Nigeria Union of Journalists, which accused the 
management of owing 23 months of salaries (The Nation, October 
8, 2015). There was also the celebrated case of ThisDay newspa-
per, against which a former editor, Paul Ibe, won a landmark case 
in court compelling the company to pay his outstanding salaries 
and allowances. The paper reportedly owed between 6-8 months 
of salary arrears, a story that is replicated across a wide stratum 
of the media.
In this respect, the demise of Next newspaper, which excitingly 
deepened accountability through investigative journalism is typ-
ical of the difficulties faced by independent newspapers seeking 
to make a mark. Adaobi Nwaubani captures this dimension of the 
problem when she wrote that:
But revenue soon began to dry up. In Nigeria, established newspapers 
are paid to keep big stories off the front page. Adverts are supposed 
to buy silence. Often, Next would run a story in its popular weekend 
edition, only for editors to arrive at the office on Monday to meet an 
aggravated marketing team- certain big advertisers had terminated 
their business that morning. After one revelation about corruption in 
the oil trade, scores of advertisers instantly pulled out (BBC Africa Re-
port, March 5, 2015).
The point being made here is that advertisers exercise 
indirect veto on editorial content by sanctioning independent pri-
vate media, which set out to be fearless and daring. Considering 
that the state is the biggest advertiser, it has often used this pow-
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er to skew the media playing field, in favor of state-owned elec-
tronic media as well as compliant and complacent, private media. 
Important as that issue is, it is not the only reason for the rapid 
collapse of newspapers.
Regarding the escalating cost of input into newspaper produc-
tion, in most of the years under study, the table below is instruc-
tive.
Table 5: Rising Cost of Newspaper Production Input (2004-2016) 
N Value
Item Qty 2004 2008 2012 2015 2016 2017
Black Ink 1 Kilo 380 500 1300 2421 1,300 2,500
Printing Film 1 packet 21,990 33,000 34,000 N.A N.A N.A
Newsprint 1 Ton 109, 000 N.A 145,000 185,000 185,000 400,000
Plates 1 packet N.A 18,000 21,500 94,500 120,000 160,000
*N.A - NOT Available                                                                Source: Research Notes
As Table five shows, the increasing cost of newspaper produc-
tion inputs such as newsprint, plates, and black ink put pressure 
on publishers, many of whose enterprises were undercapitalized 
to begin with. Another dimension of the problem is the addition-
al pressure  that the lack of adequate infrastructure, power and 
security, brought  on businesses, including newspapers and the 
electronic media. Drawing attention to this problem, Mr. Steve 
Ojo, President of Galaxy television, a fiercely independent medi-
um argued that:
Government has not supported the industry; the infrastructural facili-
ties that would ensure that the industry thrives are not there. For ex-
ample- we supply our own power, water and every other infrastructure 
we need. Under any circumstance, anywhere (else) in the world, the 
government provides all these facilities. In Nigeria the reverse is the 
case. (The Punch, April 30, 2005 pg 24)
Noticeable too, is what may be called the return of the north 
to Nigeria’s discourse map because of the rebirth of the Northern 
media in the years under study. In an ethnically divided country, 
and given Adebanwi’s jibe that Nigeria lacks a national media, but 
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instead has an Arewa media, Ngbati media and Nkenga media 
(Adebanwi, 2002), this rebirth is crucial. As backdrop to this de-
velopment,  the lamentation of the former governor of Nasarawa 
state, Dr. Abdulihi Adamu, on the virtual absence of a northern 
media from the nation is instructive.. In a 2005 lecture,  “Where is 
the Northern Press?”, to the Arewa Media Group, he elaborated:
Is there something, I wonder that makes it impossible for newspapers 
to survive in this part of the country? Perhaps, the answer lies in the 
stubborn refusal to appreciate the role the news media play in the de-
velopment of societies and in the contest for power, particularly in a 
democracy. The balance of power or the balance of terror is a stabi-
lizing factor in every society. I do not argue for a press war. I argue 
for freedom from other people’s mass media in order that we may be 
heard (Media Review, July 2005, p26).
At the same time as Adamu made these remarks, the New Ni-
gerian had become comatose; it however, did not suspend pub-
lication until February 2012. What is of interest is the recent es-
tablishment and relative profitability of a clutch of newspapers 
based in Abuja such as Leadership, Daily Trust, People’s Daily, and 
Abuja Inquirer, among others. In this list, easily the most successful 
are the Trust group of publications, which includes, Weekly Trust, 
Daily Trust, Sunday Trust and the Hausa language Aminiyah, and 
Leadership, founded in 2004 by Sam Nda Isaiah, most recently, a 
presidential candidate on the platform of the All Progressive Con-
gress in  the 2015 election. These independent newspapers ap-
pear to have broken the jinx of frequent collapse of newspapers in 
that part of the country. When you add to these, private television 
stations such as Desnims, founded by Halifa Baba Ahmed, Go-
tell TV based in Yola, and the Kano-based Radio Freedom owned 
by Bashir Dalhatu among others, one gets a sense of the bounce 
back of a northern regional media. The consequence of this is that 
of an increasingly level playing field, with regards to the access of 
diverse ethnic groups to the media. In this same connection, the 
vacuum created by the eclipse of Champion newspapers, has been 
filled to a large extent by the newspaper chain of former governor 
of Abia state, Dr Orji Uzor Kalu. The chain includes: the Sun and 
New Telegraph. Although these are based in Lagos, they draw a 
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substantial part of sales and advertising revenue from the South-
East and the South-South.
Table 6: Ownership and Location of Major Media Institutions
Name Of Medium Location Proprietor & State Of Origin
The Guardian Lagos Maiden Ibru (Delta)*
ThisDay Lagos Nduka Obaigbena (Delta)
The Vanguard Lagos Sam Amuka-Pemu (Delta)
The Punch Lagos Ogunsola/Aboderin (Oyo)
Daily Trust Abuja Kabiru Yusuf (Kano)
The Nation Lagos Bola Tinubu (Lagos)
National Mirror Lagos Jimoh Ibrahim (Ondo)
African Independent Television Lagos Raymond Dokpesi (Edo)
Channels Television Lagos John Momoh (Edo)
The Sun Lagos Orji Kalu (Abia)
Leadership Abuja Sam Nda Isiah (Niger)
Source: Research Notes
As Table six demonstrates, although nine out of eleven major 
media institutions are located in Lagos, only three of these, the 
Punch, the Nation and National Mirror have Yoruba proprietors. 
Indeed, the emerging trend as shown in the table is a preponder-
ance (five out of eleven) of media owners from the Niger Delta 
area, a fact that may not be unrelated to the petroleum-driven 
political economy of Nigeria and the incorporation of the elite 
from the Delta area into national framework of accumulation and 
distribution of spoils.
As may be expected, a good number of newspapers and elec-
tronic media are owned by politicians across the political spec-
trum. Media Review, in an article, entitled A Peep into Tinubu’s 
Media Empire, mentions that the former governor of Lagos state, 
Bola Tinubu is a major shareholder in The News magazine, as well 
as a proprietor of the Nation newspaper, and the broadcast giant, 
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Radio and Television Continental, concluding that he is truly one of 
Nigeria’s few media moguls (Media Review, April 2012). Tinubu is 
not the only politician to establish media institutions. The case of 
Dr. Orji Kalu has already been mentioned; there also is the Nigeri-
an Compass and the Westerner, established by former Ogun state 
governor, Gbenga Daniel both of which are defunct. Then there is 
the Union, reportedly owned by Diezani Alison Madueke, former 
minister for petroleum, and the newspapers of Mr. Jimoh Ibrahim, 
a member of the People’s Democratic Party. Ibrahim owned Na-
tional Mirror, founded in 2006, as well as Newswatch Daily which 
he bought over from the former owners of NewsWatch magazine. 
Gotel Television based in Yola is owned by Atiku Abubakar, Nige-
ria’s former Vice President. Although to some extent, ownership of 
media by politicians tends to widen the discourse space, it carries 
nonetheless, the price tags of partisanship and censorship of jour-
nalists who work in these newspapers. 
It is worth mentioning too that Nigerian Journalists work under 
far from ideal conditions of employment. As the preceding narra-
tion has demonstrated, defaults on workers’ salaries are a rampant 
syndrome, often presaging the collapse of newspapers. Hence, al-
though most newsrooms, following a trend blazed by ThisDay, 
have been updated with computers and other information tech-
nology gadgets, widespread abuse in terms of the irregular pay-
ments of the salaries of workers has not abated. As African Media 
Barometer (2011,52) expressed it:
Across the industry, working conditions for Nigerian Journalists and 
other media professionals are poor. Salaries are low, irregular and in 
some cases, inexistent. This is not only true of private media organiza-
tions even journalists of state-owned media are underpaid and com-
plain of lack of career prospects. Many workers in the state-media are 
also recruited as casual staff and work under even more pathetic con-
ditions.
CONCLUDING NOTE
 The preceding sections suggest that the media in the peri-
od under study continued to be vibrant and visible in national 
discourse despite such downsides as frequent collapse of me-
dia, economic distress, and protracted defaults on the wages of 
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journalists as well as the poor working conditions. Hardest hit are 
courageous newspapers such as Next newspaper, which published 
major investigative stories of the rot in the petroleum industry. 
Its assemblage of a fine crop of professionals and state of the 
art equipment could not save it from the economic blizzard ac-
centuated by state and corporate denial of advertisement from 
collapsing a few years after it excitingly made appearance on the 
media scene. In other words, journalists and media organizations 
most likely to be at the forefront of playing the watchdog role face 
tremendous pressures, not just from the vicissitudes of the harsh 
and mismanaged economy, but from being informally blacklisted 
by the establishment which often penalizes such media organiza-
tions. Yet another side to that unhappy story is the active courting 
by the states and the corporate public sphere of critical journalists, 
who are often co-opted, and media institutions which have a ten-
dency to throw up subaltern discuss and do daring investigating. 
 That apart, the instability and the shoestring nature of media 
enterprise and the hand to mouth journalistic culture suggest that 
the cost of advocacy can be quite high. A further restraining factor 
is the increasing ownership of media by high-profile politicians 
who set them up to equalize what they perceive as a journalistic 
public sphere skewed against them. The best that one can expect 
from these political tinged media are exposures or muckraking 
against political opponents, rather than watchdog journalism of a 
professional, agenda building kind. In view of these disabling fac-
tors, some critics of the media have opined that under the Fourth 
Republic they have lost their bite and keen watchdog role. For ex-
ample, Olumhense (2005), a former editor of ThisWeek magazine, 
who now lives in the United States, bitingly stated on one occasion 
that: 
On a sustained basis, none of the sordid assorted deals within the Na-
tional Assembly has been investigated and reported; none of the co-
lossal ethical chaos in the states has been profiled and nothing of the 
crisis of the unimplemented policies nationwide has resulted in a front 
page show and tell, none of the unrestrained looting in the states that 
the federal government unveiled nearly one year ago have been nar-
rowed down to anyone. In other words our corruption stalemate has 
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persisted for so long partly because the press has become complacent 
or became a part of it (The Guardian, April 2, 2005).
Olumhense came close to portraying the Nigerian media as a 
captured institution in the above statement. However, this por-
trait does not take into account several media-led crusades such 
as the one cited earlier, which resulted in the resignation of the 
Speaker; as well as the expose conveying an investigative scoop 
by Channels Television on the rot in the Police College, which led 
to temporary redress of the situation. In other words, despite the 
lean topography of the media, their location, ethnic and regional 
divisions and the far from friendly economic climate, a few in-
dependent media organizations, notably, those begun by media 
professionals, have kept advocacy for good governance on the 
front burner as well as redeemed to an extent, the looming decline 
of the media into a captured Fourth Estate of the Realm.
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Democracy and the Digital Public Sphere
By Lai Oso &
Tunde Akanni
Media institutions and technologies shouldered the 
burden of extreme hopes, expectations and fears 
throughout the twentieth century, and this show lit-
tle sign of abating in the digitised twenty-first .... The 
persuasive role of mediated communication in con-
temporary social, political and cultural life is, howev-
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In both popular and academic discussions, the central role of 
the media of communication in the democratic process is gen-
erally acknowledged. The importance of the media has led many 
scholars to theorize the ‘mediatization’ thesis or media logic (Al-
theide and Snow, 1979; Hjarvard, 2008; Ampuja, Koivisto and 
Valiverronen, 2014). Habermas’ theory of the public sphere is also 
an effort to understand the role of the media in the political and 
democratic processes. The media provide the space to discuss, 
debate issues, acquire information and knowledge which are es-
sential ingredients for democratic participation by citizens.
Technology has expanded the public sphere, and also our un-
derstanding of the mass media. Incidentally, these new technolo-
gies and the communication platforms they gave birth to arrived 
in Nigeria, like in many other African countries, with the wave of 
political and economic liberalization. In this case, the transforma-
tion of the political and democratic processes coincided with the 
transformation of the media landscape and the public sphere.
While the Nigerian print media have largely been private-
ly owned and offered some level of diversity, Nigeria’s genuine 
road to liberalization of access to public information disseminated 
through the broadcast media may be said to have begun no fewer 
than four decades after the pioneer, indigenous broadcast station, 
especially the television, was established in 1959. Broadcasting, 
from inception in 1932 till 1992, was owned and controlled by the 
government at both federal and state levels.
Several countries of the world including Nigeria will continue to 
remain indebted to the third wave of democracy, which enabled 
them to belong in the league of democratic entities providing for 
free speech, free press and allied rights among others as enshrined 
in the renowned universal charter of rights.
The story began with the need for support from Bretton Woods 
Institutions in the 1980s during the era of the Structural Adjust-
ment Program (SAP). Among other conditions was the insistence 
by the prospective loan providers that Nigeria should begin to 
consider the processes of democratizing, deregulation and pri-
vatization. It was, for instance, required that Nigeria should open 
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up its airwaves for private participation. Finally in 1992, the in-
cumbent military government under General Ibrahim Babangida, 
then promulgated a decree which legitimized private ownership 
of radio and television stations (Mohammed, 1996). The develop-
ment paved the way for  Raypower Radio and African Independent 
Television (AIT) to enter the media family. The two new stations, 
owned by an individual, have since been joined by several others 
which have, in their respective ways, availed different sections of 
the society limitless opportunities to publicly volunteer their opin-
ions on national and regional issues even as they have also served 
as veritable sources of information.
The privately owned broadcasters only came to complement 
the window of opportunities for Nigerian citizens’ involvement 
in public debates.  Beyond any government policy, law or even 
some international pressure, McLuhan’s prediction, premised on 
the promise of technology, of the world as a global village espe-
cially via the computer, beyond the realistic television capabili-
ties of his time, has since manifested and changed the world’s 
communication landscape. The globe, according to McLuhan, has 
been contracted into a village by communication technology and 
the instantaneous movement of information from every quarter 
to every point at the same time.  He added that the next medium 
after television, whatever it may be, may be the extension of con-
sciousness and would include television as its content, not as its 
environment, and will transform television into an art form (Mc-
Luhan, 1962; McLuhan, 1964). Not only has this come to pass, the 
reality today is also that the pre-existing print media genre has 
become another content accommodated by the all-encompassing 
internet.
This shared planet for the hitherto delineated genres of the 
print and the broadcast media has conferred the common fea-
ture of enhanced interactivity not only between the electronical-
ly served media contents and their audiences but also between 
the literally wired up audiences taking advantage of substantially 
blurred physical and social boundaries made possible by digital 
innovations. This new age of digital interaction has enabled in-
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formation exchanges between interested discussants of common 
issues within whole nations and also transcending geographical 
restrictions. “We are helping to change the lives of over two bil-
lion people, by connecting everyone, raising voices and enhancing 
participation through the open web” declared Lee, the founder 
of the worldwideweb in a statement issued to commemorate the 
28 year anniversary of the innovation on Sunday March 12, 2017 
(http://newtelegraphonline.com/ business/www-28-years).  Dis-
tance, and to some extent, social barriers, are being eliminated in 
the new media and communication ecology.
This chapter will focus on the technology-driven public sphere 
in relation to democratic politics in Nigeria. It will examine the 
most used digital platforms for engagement with Nigerian issues. 
It will as well investigate the online activities of what has come to 
be known as citizen journalism and general online conversations. 
This study will as well examine the place and interactivity friend-
liness of two leading online news media namely Premium Times 
and the Cable and how they have affected public policy over time.
THE NIGERIAN MASS MEDIA: A NARROW WINDOW FRAME
“... news as a frame, characteristics of the window, its size and compo-
sition, limit, what may be seen ... (Tuchman: 1978, p. 269).
The mass media in their various forms, which now include the 
digital media, are the main organs of the public sphere. In Nige-
ria, since the colonial time, the newspaper press has provided the 
public space for actors in the civil and political society to venti-
late their views, discuss national issues and intervene in the policy 
process. Despite their dwindling circulation figures and even their 
precarious survival, they remain quite influential especially among 
the political and policy elite. It seems impossible to talk of Nige-
ria’s political development and democracy without giving a pride 
of place to the press.
As Olukotun recently observed, “Shining as the role and the 
record of the media have been, the story contains contradictions 
and rough patches” (Olukotun, 2017, p.4). In the main, the Nige-
rian press is accused of being ethnic and regional in orientation, 
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largely reflecting the ownership structure, location and the pattern 
of political competition in the country. Another problem is com-
mercial and economic fragility of many of the media organiza-
tions. This has greatly affected the professional autonomy of the 
organizations and their journalists.
The Nigerian press from inception, has always being political 
(Omu, 1978) and cantankerous. With its base in Lagos which was the 
seat of the colonial government, the press was largely an instrument 
of agitation by the educated elite against their exclusion and mar-
ginalization by the colonial government. From its small beginning 
as one-man enterprises, where the owner is also the journalist, the 
newspaper press has continued to function as a veritable barometer 
to gauge the political mood of the country. Whether during the co-
lonial period or under the military, many Nigerians credit the press 
for its role in the country’s political and democratic process.  The 
tradition of a highly voluble and political press which, in the main, 
mirrors the cantankerous nature of Nigerian politicians continues 
till today. The Nigerian press does not just mirror the character of 
the Nigerian society and the events happening in it; it is an active 
participant. Some of the leading newspapers are owned by the 
politicians and businessmen. It is also important to observe that 
the newspapers, due to economic pressures, low circulation, com-
petition from the new media, are cutting down on pagination and 
editorial contents. The highly competitive media market has also 
led to a lot of sensationalism and entertainment-oriented cover-
age of events apart from increasing attention being devoted to 
celebrity news. The Nigerian press is becoming more and more 
responsive to the dictates of the market in the process of news 
production. Events that will either increase circulation or generate 
advertisement are more likely to be captured in the news net than 
any other. A glaring example of the press’ response to market 
pressure is how the front pages of newspapers are sold to ad-
vertisers in the practice known as wrap-around. We can also note 
that the front pages have been turned to display boards to adver-
tise stories and attract readers’ attention to such stories which are 
tucked in the inside pages.
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In terms of representation of the country’s diversity, it is gener-
ally taken that the Nigerian media are largely urban and elite ori-
ented, and class biased. The media represent very narrow ideolog-
ical interests, those of the contending factions of the ruling elite. 
Just as the poor are poorly and marginally represented in the state 
and its institutions and apparatuses (Ake, 1985), so are they sym-
bolically annihilated in the media. The Nigerian media are pro-es-
tablishment and pro-capital. No Left-oriented publication has sur-
vived in the country. A prominent member of the establishment 
intellectual class, Sam Oyovbaire, eloquently expressed the situa-
tion some years back that, despite its radicalism, anti-colonialism, 
anti-dictatorship, the Nigerian press is indeed a capitalist press 
(Oyovbaire, The Guardian, August 29, 2001). The media, both old 
and new, often serve as ventriloquists of the unruly debates and 
ethnic cacophony that are the hallmarks of Nigerian politics. There 
is no doubt that by its architecture, the culture of news production 
does limit popular participation. This is, of course related to the 
social inequality and distribution of power in the society.
While broadcasting started as part of the apparatus of colonial-
ism, the political and commercial context under which it operates 
has not been too dissimilar to that of the newspapers, especially 
under the prevailing political economy.
Despite the privatization of Broadcasting, government contin-
ues to be the dominant player in terms of ownership and control, 
and regulation. There are about 201 TV stations owned by both 
the Federal and State governments as against 43 privately owned. 
The state and federal governments own 185 radio stations while 
the privately owned ones are 97.
Although broadcasting seemed to have made substantial prog-
ress over the years availing Nigerians with multiple windows to 
ventilate their views, the statutory challenges for it are not any less 
encumbering especially with regards to regulation, which is still in 
the hands of the Federal Government.
The National Broadcasting Commission (NBC), established to 
regulate broadcasting nationwide, is largely run by government 
appointees who hardly reflect different shades of stakeholders of 
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the broadcast media sub-sector. As if to ensure maximum hold on 
NBC, government appointees to the N.B.C. board include repre-
sentatives of the State Security Service (SSS), as well as those of 
the Information and Culture ministry. Even at that, though NBC is 
the sole regulator for broadcasters, unlike its contemporary, the 
National Communication Commission (NCC), it does not have the 
power to approve license. At best, it can only receive and process 
applications and pass its recommendations to the President.
Most of the TV and radio stations in the country maintain active 
presence on the internet. This is in addition to their being accessi-
ble to audiences across the globe through satellite connection. It is 
also worth to note that the policy of deregulation, which ushered 
in commercial and private broadcasting in the country, effectively 
ended the philosophy of public service broadcasting in the coun-
try. The Federal Government-owned Federal Radio Corporation of 
Nigeria (FRCN) and the Nigerian Television Authority (NTA) have 
been forced to operate as commercial organizations in competi-
tion with privately-owned ones like Channels TV, AIT/Raypower, 
Television Continental (TVC) and Radio Continental (RC), Silverbird 
Television (STV), all of which appear to be more popular than any 
government-owned broadcasting organization in the country.
The inhibitions above notwithstanding, the broadcast me-
dia sub-sector in Nigeria has been trendy in performance with a 
substantial measure of  broadcasting being done on the internet, 
complemented interestingly by the multimedia presence of sever-
al Nigerian newspapers.  Technology has also enabled many voic-
es to get into the airwaves through phone-in programs, e-mail, 
twitter and other new devices.
THE PUBLIC SPHERE
The general opinion is that technology has created a new me-
dia ecology which has widened the public sphere. With digital 
technology, journalism can now throw its net wider and deeper to 
capture more social actors as both sources and consumers, there-
by enriching democratic participation.
The idea of digital public sphere is of course linked to the now 
popular concept of public sphere which came into the front page 
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of academic discourse with the publication of Habermas’ book, 
Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere: An inquiry into a 
Category of Bourgeois Society. The central idea is the existence of 
an open space where citizens can exchange views and ideas like 
the Greek agora or a town-hall meeting. According to the Haber-
mas, it is “a realm of our social life in which something approach-
ing public opinion can be formed” (Habermas, 1974 p.49). The 
public sphere is  characterized by equal access and participation 
by all citizens. It is an assembly of individuals, not just as a public 
or crowd, but as an institution which allows for participation of 
those involved. To the German theorist:
Citizens behave as a public body when they confer in an unrestricted 
fashion — that is, with the guarantee of freedom of assembly and asso-
ciation and the freedom to express and publish their opinions — about 
matters of general interest.
Although Habermas prefixes it as bourgeois, the public sphere 
affords “general accessibility especially to information, the elimi-
nation of privilege and the search for general norms and the ratio-
nal legitimation” (Garnham, 1986, p.42).
As an autonomous space, it is independent of both the state 
and market; it is a sphere “which mediates between society and 
state” and “has made possible the democratic control of state ac-
tivities.” Through reasoned argument, the state is held account-
able and illegal use of power is brought into the open through 
publicity.
Another feature of Habermas’ conception of the public sphere 
is the role of rational critical thinking; “in which the merits of argu-
ments and not the identities of the arguers were crucial” (Calhoun 
1992, p.2).
Beyond providing a forum for debate and exchange of ideas 
and views, the inclusive and universal character of the public 
sphere has led to the view that it could facilitate the emergence of 
a common public culture. The public sphere, the argument goes, 
should also facilitate “participation in a broader public culture and 
nurturing a sense of cohesiveness, common identity and belong-
ing” (Hodkinson, 2011, p.176). The idea is that citizens’ meaningful 
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participation in the polity must be based on a shared set of com-
mon values, sense of belonging and community (Garnham, 1992). 
Benedict Anderson’s notion of ‘imagined communities’ addresses 
this function of the media in the construction of common identity 
and feeling of ‘nationess’ among people. The media do this by 
their provision of a common media experience to the people.
From the above, the two main requirements for the public 
sphere adequate for a democracy are quality of discourse and 
quantity of participation (Calhoun, 1992, p.2). In effect, as Schud-
son has argued, it is not just that people must participate but the 
quality of such participation and involvement is equally of impor-
tance (Schudson, 1992). Dahlgren adds one additional require-
ment, universality, i.e. the norm that it must be accessible to all 
citizens (Dahlren, 2001, p.35).
The theory as postulated by Habermas, has been criticized by 
many scholars as being “not wholly satisfactory” (Fraser, 1992, 
p.111). Fraser has argued that rather than guaranteeing equali-
ty of access and participation, the bourgeois public sphere the-
orized by Habermas was actually exclusionary; especially on the 
basis of gender, ethnicity, class and status. Habermas seems to 
have over-privileged a public sphere inhabited and dominated by 
bourgeois white male. She also argued that Habermas failed to 
acknowledge the existence of “other, nonliberal, nonbourgeois 
competing public spheres” (Fraser, p.115). She was also of the 
view that the public sphere was “a masculinist ideological notion 
that functioned to legitimize an emergent class rule.” In this con-
text, the bourgeois public sphere was an institution mechanism 
for hegemony and political domination. The import of Fraser’s 
critique as noted by Mustapha is that “there was never a single 
public sphere built on rationality, consensus, and accessibility ... 
but a multiplicity of public spheres and counter publics, built on 
conflict, contestation, and the containment of “awkward class and 
groups and their preferred modes of cultural and political expres-
sion” (Mustapha, 2009, p.3).
As Habermas noted, the ‘unrestricted’ conversation in public 
sphere “requires specific means for transmitting information and 
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influencing those who receive it.” Thus the mass media are the 
main organs of the public sphere (Habermas, 1974).  The mass 
media are expected to serve “as an instrument or a forum for the 
enlightened, rational, critical and unbiased public discussion of 
what the common interests were in the matters of culture and 
politics” (Gripsrud: 1992, p.89).
But of recent, many scholars have raised a lot of concern about 
the health and functions of the mass media. It is believed that the 
mass media have fallen short of public expectations of their role in 
the democratic process. Whether expressed as ‘democratic defi-
cit’ (Hackett, 2010) or ‘media malaise’ (Norris, 2000), journalism 
is blamed for some of the ills of democracy — low citizen partic-
ipation, cynicism and lack of trust in political leaders, poor civic 
engagement.
It is also argued that the media have increasingly become cap-
tive instruments of the powerful social class.
The transformation of the media has of course been foreshad-
owed in Habermas’ concept of refeudalisation. Journalism was 
taken over by organised private interests, an expanded state and 
the logic of the market. With the establishment of the bourgeois 
constitutional state, the press was “relieved of the pressure of its 
convictions ... and take advantage of the earning possibilities of 
a commercial undertaking, thus the transformation from a jour-
nalism of conviction to one of commerce” has begun (Habermas, 
1974, p.53). The rational and dialogic character of the public sphere 
was lost to commercialism. These forces affected the critical edge 
of journalism. The result is captured by the British media scholar, 
James Curran:
Modern media fell under the sway of public relations, advertising and 
big business, whereas the early press had facilitated participation in 
reasoned public debate, the new mass media encouraged consumer 
apathy, presented politics as a spectacle and provided pre-packaged 
convenience thought. The media in short managed the public rather 
than express the public will. (Curran, 2002, pp.23-24)
The main argument is that recent developments in the media 
and the society in general — commercialization, privatization, 
deregulation, technological innovations, globalization — have 
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“amplified and broadened the mercantile logic of media opera-
tions ...” (Dahlgren, 1991, p.10). The restructuring of the economy, 
which came in the wake of the ascendency of neo-liberalism in the 
1980s, changed the structure, ownership pattern and the operat-
ing philosophy of the mass media, especially in broadcasting, in 
many parts of the world including Nigeria. The mass media have 
become more dependent on capital and social control of the priv-
ileged class.
Colin Sparks (2001) has identified three main ways in which the 
mass media have fallen short of the ideal of the public sphere. 
First, the limitations set by the market, concentrations of owner-
ship and dependence on advertising revenue. This factor mirrors 
the argument of critical political economy (Murdock and Golding, 
2005).
The second way is the elite orientation of the media. According 
to Sparks: “The existing media superserve social elites. The serious 
press tends to be the preserve of the upper social groups, exclud-
ing largely for economic reasons the poor.” Lastly, due to their 
scale of operation and the need to make profit which dictates a 
high level of professionalism “media professionals effectively ra-
tion public discourse in our societies.” Hence, “the room for gen-
uine public access is very small ....” (Sparks, 2001, p.78). The two 
main determinants of news are money and power (McQuail, 2013).
The public sphere has not only become very narrow in terms 
of access and the voices and interests it represents, it has become 
depoliticized and depoliticizing. The symbolic absence of wom-
en, youth and other disadvantaged groups has been observed by 
many scholars. The “crisis of public communication” (Blumler and 
Gurevitch, 1995) has no doubt affected the quality of citizens’ en-
gagement in democratic politics.  
In the Nigerian situation, the ethnic and regional orientation 
and ownership structure of the country’s media which, as Ade-
banwi recently observed, rendered “the Nigerian press ... totally 
captive to ethno-regional and ethno-religious passions and cal-
culations” (Adebanwi, 2016, p.223) has affected their functions as 
organs of democratic communication. In the main, the Nigerian 
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press expresses very narrow partisan and parochial interests of-
ten clothed in the garb of ethnic, religious and regional interests. 
Olukotun has observed that the working environment of Nigerian 
journalists and the fragility of media business, among other fac-
tors, limit their role in advancing democratic causes (Olukotun, 
2004). As Tuchman metaphorically remarks, the Nigerian media 
net is for the big fish (Tuchman, 1978, p.21). The majority of Nige-
rians, due to many factors, are outside the symbolic space offered 
by the mass media.
THE NET IS WIDER
There is a long tradition of millenarian prophecy in relation to new 
media (Curran, 2011, p.99)
It is in that light that many express the hope that the emer-
gence of the digital media offers a discursive opportunity for sym-
bolically  marginalized voices to insert the views and ideas in the 
public sphere and enhance their representation and participation 
in the democratic process. The role of the social media in the ‘Arab 
Spring’ has greatly heightened the euphoria about the power of 
the digital public sphere to enhance popular participation in the 
democratic process.
Negrine (1997) notes this age of silicon-chip society makes 
information processing incredibly easy. This is possible through 
innovative use of silicon boards in a variety of forms and tech-
niques enabling a revolution in information technology. “As one 
form of communication is overtaken by another, and yet anoth-
er, the inherent possibilities of more varied forms and patterns of 
communication become ever more complex” (1997, 51).  Negrine 
further explains that the convergence of computer and telecom-
munications facilities signifies the transition from the more tra-
ditional and commonplace forms of communication via the wire 
telephone network to a sophisticated system of communication. 
This links together three essentials, namely, computers, processors 
and telephone systems (including mobile telephony and satellite). 
One result of all these is the collapse of the boundaries between 
different networks or systems of communication, in what is gen-
erally termed convergence. This subsequently makes it possible to 
171
talk about a wider electronic communication infrastructure rather 
than separate technologies which transmit information.  Castells 
(2000, 46-47) recalls that whereas in 1956, the first transatlantic 
cable phone carried 50 compressed voice circuits, optical fibres 
in 1995 could carry 85,000 similar circuits. “This optoelectronics 
based transmission capacity, together with advanced switching 
and routing architectures… are the basis of the so-called 1990s 
information superhighway…”   Castells and Henderson (1987) par-
ticularly note that the superhighway has since been characterized 
by what they describe as “space of flows” and “space of places”. 
The new territorial dynamics tend to be organized around the 
contradiction between placeless power and powerless places, the 
former relying upon communication flows, the latter generating 
their own communication codes on the basis of  historically spe-
cific territory.
Recently, a study by the Tow Center for Digital Journalism at 
Columbia Journalism School has revealed that:
•	 Technology platforms have become publishers in a short 
space of time, leaving news organizations confused about 
their own future. If the speed of convergence continues, more 
news organizations are likely to cease publishing — distribut-
ing, hosting, and monetizing — as a core activity.
•	 Competition among platforms to release products for 
publishers is helping newsrooms reach larger audiences than 
ever before. But the advantages of each platform are difficult 
to assess, and the return on investment is inadequate. The loss 
of branding, the lack of audience data, and the migration of 
advertising revenue remain key concerns for publishers.
•	 The influence of social platforms shapes the journalism it-
self. By offering incentives to news organizations for particular 
types of content, such as live video, or by dictating publisher 
activity through design standards, the platforms are explicitly 
editorial.
•	 The “fake news” revelations of the 2016 American Presi-
dential election have forced social platforms to take greater 
responsibility for publishing decisions. However, this is a dis-
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traction from the larger issue that the structure and the eco-
nomics of social platforms incentivize the spread of low-qual-
ity content over high-quality material. Journalism, with high 
civic value — journalism that investigates power, or reaches 
underserved and local communities — is discriminated against 
by a system that favors scale and share ability.
•	 Platforms rely on algorithms to sort and target content. 
They have not wanted to invest in human editing, to avoid 
both cost and the perception that humans would be biased. 
However, the nuances of journalism require editorial judg-
ment, so platforms will need to reconsider their approach.
•	 Greater transparency and accountability are required from 
platform companies. While news might reach more people 
than ever before, for the first time, the audience has no way 
of knowing how or why it reaches them, how data collected 
about them is used, or how their online behavior is being ma-
nipulated. And publishers are producing more content than 
ever, without knowing who it is reaching or how—they are at 
the mercy of the algorithm (http://www.cjr.org/tow_center_ re-
ports/platform-press-how-silicon-valley-reengineered-jour-
nalism.php)
There is no doubt that technology had always had a telling ef-
fect on political communication and the political process in gen-
eral. For instance, Blumler and Kavanagh note that the emergence 
of television marked the beginning of the second age of politi-
cal communication in the 1960s. The third age, which is the cur-
rent phase, “is marked by the proliferation of the main means of 
communication, media abundance, ubiquity, reach and celerity 
(Blumler and Kavanagh, 1999, p. 213). This, no doubt, refers to 
the multiple and diverse communication platforms that have been 
developed through ICTs during this era of information revolution. 
Digital technologies have created many internet-based commu-
nication platforms that have no doubt changed the media and 
communication landscape. As a writer has observed, “Whether re-
ferred to as cyberspace, the web, the information superhighway 
or, more formally, the internet, this new medium has linked the 
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world through a shared, virtual space that brings a whole new 
meaning to McLuhan’s (1964) conceptualization of the global vil-
lage. (Tedesco, 2004, p.507)
The arrival of the internet led to an enthusiastic acceptance and 
proclamations of its potential to revive the public sphere and de-
mocracy. The role of the internet in the public space is premised 
on the open-ended and non-controlled nature of communication 
that it has enabled. Also the lacking of traditional social mark-
ings in internet interactions which enables voices which hitherto, 
have remained silent and unheard to come forward, further en-
hances its role (Dahlgren, 2001). To the cyber-utopians, or those 
Cormunello and Anzera labelled ‘digital evangelists (2012, p. 462), 
the internet is the magic wand to cure the media of their ailments 
and democratic deficit and restore the health of democracy. The 
internet, to many, is enriching traditional journalism with greater 
access to sources and information. As James Curran puts it, “... the 
internet is bringing into being ... an efflorescence of web-based 
journalism which is compensation for the decline of traditional 
news media ... the old order of monopoly journalism was a ‘desert 
of MacWorld, now being reclaimed by a legion of bloggers, citizen 
journalists and proliferating web-based start-ups” (Curran, 2011, 
p.113). The inherent features of the technology give it the poten-
tial and possibility of addressing some of the failures of the tradi-
tional mass media. The internet dubbed ‘the network of networks’ 
is “revolutionary because it is a hybrid of the largely one-direc-
tional print, audio, and video media while offering opportunity for 
a two-way communication feedback loop. Another feature of the 
internet is its lack of information control structures or gate keeping 
that characterize traditional print and broadcast media” (Tedesco, 
2004, p.510). The internet has enabled the old and new journalism 
to converge “in a protean synergy of network journalism” (Curran, 
2011, p.113). The vertical and hierarchical gatekeeper model of 
journalism is being replaced by an “open-ended, reciprocal, hor-
izontal, collaborative, self-generating and inclusive reporting and 
comment of a kind never experienced before” (Curran, 2011).
The internet offers citizens, notwithstanding their professional 
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skills, the opportunity for access (in terms of production, dissem-
ination and consumption) to the public sphere and registers their 
voices, views, agenda and interpretative frameworks. It has been 
found useful as a tool of advocacy and mobilization by non-main-
stream and oppositional groups. In a way with the internet, the 
monopoly of discursive power hitherto enjoyed by the powerful 
and media professionals has been disrupted. Barber and his col-
leagues have summarized the structural possibilities of the inter-
net as follows:
(a) inherent interactivity; (b) potential for lateral and horizontal com-
munication; (c) point-to-point and non-hierarchical modes of commu-
nication; (d) low costs to users (once a user is set up); (e) rapidity as a 
communication medium; (f) lack of national or other boundaries; and 
(g) freedom from the intrusion and monitoring of government. (Barber 
et al 1997, p.8, quoted in Tedesco, 2004, p.511)
One does not need to be a new media determinist before 
agreeing with Castels that “we are in a new communication realm” 
which, according to him, “... is self-generated in content, self-di-
rected in emission, and self-selected in reception by many that 
communicate with many.” (Castells, 2010, p.9)
It is argued that participation in public debates becomes more 
open, as access to information online media provide the world with 
diverse information and perspectives about governments, interna-
tional organizations including non-governmental organizations. 
This online regime equally avails the citizens with the needed en-
ablement to voice their positions publicly without the interference 
of gate-keeping activities of formal media organizations and their 
professional journalists. It is also worth noting that it makes con-
nective action less dependent on large infrastructure and could be 
hardly restrained by the authorities.  Furthermore, given that this 
production online of the digital public sphere aims at non-market 
goods by employing non-market means, it has been portrayed 
as an effective way of circumventing the commercial logic that 
influences traditional media communication (Schafer, 2015). Also 
important, perhaps, is the interplay between traditional forms of 
street protest and social media interventions to direct actions.
Jenkins (2016, 11) recalls that the efforts of Youth and Partic-
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ipatory Politics (YPP) Research Network discovered young activ-
ists who have overcome enormous difficulties in gaining access 
to the means of cultural production and circulation. These include 
“bloggers who did not own their own computers to film makers 
who did not own their own cameras and who relied on communi-
ty centers and public libraries for digital access … many of those 
economically deprived, socially marginalized, historically disem-
powered-do not.”
Many other commentators advise caution, if not total rejection, 
of some of the celebratory claims of the cyber-utopians. The pes-
simists hold that in spite of the celebratory disposition of many to 
the inception of the internet and accompanying offerings, digital 
divide is still real.  To them, online debates hardly reflect diversity as 
search engines discretionally profile users as they hide filter bub-
bles leading to what has been described as “echo chamber effect”. 
This is a situation in which certain views are not challenged but 
rather echoed and consequently justified in online communities 
(Sustein, 2001).  Pessimists also argue that economic interests of 
online platform operators may also depoliticize the environment 
and consequently cushion consumerism. The big players among 
the telecommunication services providers are often concerned 
with their profit alone in utter disregard for the plight of the peo-
ple lending so much strength to the claim of the pessimists.
There is also the issue of access. As many scholars (Golding, 
1990, Golding and Murdock, 1986) have argued, access to the 
means of public communication is determined by structure of so-
cio-economic inequality that exists in society. The adoption and 
sustained use of innovations are related to socio-economic op-
portunities as they are distributed among the population. Elabo-
rating on this critical issue, Annika Bergström explains that:
The diffusion of media technology and use of it has proven to be 
strongly related to socio-demographic factors. Age particularly plays 
an important role for the adoption of digital technology, and younger 
persons are over-represented among the so called innovators and ear-
ly adopters. (Bergström, 2017, p.81)
The idea of digital divide (social and geographical) is real and 
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multidimensional. It is related to not just having access to com-
puter and/or internet but other factors like availability of social 
resources, literacy and linguistic skills, economic cost and, in the 
Nigerian case, power supply. Digital gap also ranges from the 
global to national and domestic where gender and age stratify 
access and use (Livingstone, 2010). Many people lack the crucial 
capitals for a meaningful participation in the public sphere. Pur-
chase of internet facilities is not a one-off thing. The gadgets and 
software are regularly being updated which requires purchases to 
keep updating and acquiring the requisite new skills. Norris has 
argued that the internet, unlike other older mass media whose 
technologies are more-or-less stable, has a tendency to exacer-
bate inequalities because of the “chameleon-like capacity of the 
digital technologies to morph, converge, and reappear in different 
guises” (Norris, 2001, p.17, quoted in Livingstone, 2010, p.128). 
Within the African context, there is the fear that the internet may 
widen the existing gaps between the rich and urban based elite 
and majority of rural and urban poor (Sonaike, 2004; Oso, 2007). 
Related to this is the poor state of ICT infrastructure in Nigeria and 
other African countries.
We may illustrate this position by noting the literacy rate in Ni-
geria. A national survey conducted in 2012 by the National Bureau 
of Statistics, puts adult literacy rate at 56.9% “with huge variations 
between the states” (UNESCO, 2012). For instance, compare states 
like Lagos (92.0%), Osun (80.0%) and Anambra (75.1%) with Bor-
no (14.5%), Katsina (21.7%) and Jigawa (24.2%). In terms of geo-
graphical disparity, urban areas record 74.6% in comparison to 
rural areas 48.7%. Gender inequality is also reflected as the male 
population is credited with 65.1% literacy rate to 48.6% for female. 
The survey also shows that there are 40 million adult illiterates in 
the country.
Another source (CIA World Factbook) puts the total literacy rate 
at 59.6% as at 2015 with male literacy rate at 69.2% and female 
at 49.7%. The age disparity is also reflected in another collation 
by Koema. According to this source, there are 9.4 million young 
illiterates in the country compared to 41.2 million adults. Adult 
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female illiteracy rate is put at 61.4%, while youth female illiterate 
rate is 62.1%. (https://knoema.com/atlas/Nigeria/topics/ Educa-
tion/Literacy/Adult-literacy-rate).
Suffice to say that these disparities will be related to access and 
use of ICTs and even in the ability of the various social groups to 
participate in the democratic process. While the hype about the 
so called pervasive influence of the internet in almost all areas of 
our lives is quite all over the place (Livingstone, 2010), the reality 
at least in the context of Nigeria and other developing countries, 
may suggest a lot of cautious optimism and skepticism. One can 
also detect a form of return to the old and discredited notion of an 
all powerful media theory; though with a reverse order — the peo-
ple using the internet-based platforms to influence and change 
things. Even a notable scholar, Sonia Livingstone, has pointed to 
“a rising disappointment that many of the much vaunted oppor-
tunities — the internet’s potential to revitalize democracy, re-mo-
tivate learners, overcome social exclusion and enhance global 
understanding — are far from coming to pass (yet) (Livingstone, 
2010, p.123).
Contextualizing the Digital Sphere in Nigeria
As at February 2017, Nigeria had 154,120,484 active telephone 
lines amounting to 110.09 per cent of the 140 million population 
according to the 2006 Census figure. The distribution along the 
available technologies of GSM, CDMA, Fixed Wireless, and VOIP 
are 99.7 per cent, 0.10 per cent, 0.15 and 0.05 respectively. NCC 
estimates that as at May 2017, internet users in Nigeria stood 
at 91,595,319 with 91,565,319 on the GSM network. Meanwhile, 
based on the projected population of 182,201,960, Nigeria is said 
to have 53 per cent internet penetrations, while mobile subscrip-
tion has increased to 81 per cent (Chima, 2017). Of all internet 
users in Nigeria, 36% of them are women (Web Foundation, 2015). 
Nigeria also ranks 13th out of 58 countries surveyed on the 2017 
Affordability Drivers Index (ADI) showing a decline from the previ-
ous year’s rating. This may not be far from slow or ineffective pol-
icy and regulatory process (A4AI, 2017; Akanni, 2016).  Although, 
Whatsapp seems to have caught up with most social media users 
Lai Oso & Tunde Akanni
178
Watchdogs or Captured Media? . . . 
over time, Facebook is credited with whopping share of 93.72% of 
social media users in the country (Statsmonkey.com, 2015).
These figures may also hide a lot of things;for instance, Nigeria 
ranks 5th in Africa in terms of quality of internet access. We also 
know that class, regional and geographical disparities also exist. 
As in most social services, the urban poor and rural dwellers are 
poorly served.
Today in Nigeria, a youth-led social media campaign is raising 
awareness of the link between sexual violence and reproductive 
health and adding a critical new voice to the national debate over 
reform of the country’s anti-violence laws.
Since 2014 “#Choice4Life” campaign has been engaging thou-
sands of Nigerians online and providing young people, in particu-
lar, a space to openly discuss the dangers of unsafe abortion and 
speak out in support of the Violence Against Persons Prohibition 
(VAPP) bill pending at the National Assembly. The bill would pro-
vide an important legal framework for dealing with issues includ-
ing rape and female genital mutilation.
As many Nigerians will recognize the “turning point for so-
cial media as a tool of political engagement in Nigeria was 2010” 
(Ogunlesi, 2013, p.20). With the 2011 General Election then a year 
away, the then President, Dr. Jonathan opened his Facebook page 
in May of that year. This followed the success of Barak Obama in 
the US Presidential election where he used the Facebook to mo-
bilize support for his campaign and electoral feat. According to a 
study:
Jonathan actively engaged the people on his Facebook page during the 
campaign. He was able to attract more than 500,000 Facebook fans in 
daily conversation on many issues of national importance. (Oso, Odun-
lami and Adaja, 2011).
Other politicians followed Jonathan. Since then, many Nigerians 
as individuals and groups have maintained active engagement on 
the social networks for different causes and issues.
In other words, digital media’s impact appeared to begin to 
register on Nigerian electoral process and political campaign in 
2011 (Ibraheem, 2014) peaking up in 2015. According to Policy 
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and Legal Advocacy Centre, PLAC (2012) the Independent Na-
tional Electoral Commission (INEC) even endorsed this by ensur-
ing regular updating and easing the access of the public to it as 
fully demonstrated in its collaboration with technologically sav-
vy civil society organization, Enough is Enough (E.I.E.). According 
to Asuni and Farris (2011), more than 70,000 people were able 
to contact INEC directly to report incidents and have their ques-
tions answered, while the commission also received about 4,000 
tweets and 25 million hits on its website in three days during the 
presidential election alone.  INEC’s use of social media during the 
2011 elections significantly strengthened its capacity to receive 
and respond to the concerns of election stakeholders during the 
general elections.  The EiE coalition further worked with INEC to 
set up Facebook and Twitter accounts that allowed for the open 
exchange of information, ideas and comments between INEC and 
other election stakeholders. EiE also established a Youtube cam-
paign strategy where videos of important events are shared with 
the public. It included training citizens to partake in the monitor-
ing of the electoral process by capturing events on their mobile 
phones and uploading same and making it go viral within sec-
onds.  Not the least was EiE’s Revoda, a mobile phone applica-
tion for election mapping. Revoda made it possible for users to 
register their phone numbers with a particular polling unit, so that 
reports made about the polling unit could easily be authenticated 
and followed up by INEC (Asuni and Farris, 2011, p. 2). As at June 
2012, Revoda had been downloaded almost 10,000 times. This ap-
plication made it possible to document logistical deficiencies and 
fraudulent behaviors during the 2011 elections.
In what was similar to Kenya’s Ushaidi internet platform, which 
came into being after the 2008 election riots in Kenya, Community 
Life Project in Lagos set up what it called an interactive website 
called Reclaim Naija.  The Reclaim Naija platform enabled citizens 
to report incidents of violence and electoral malpractices through 
text messages. The messages so received were to be plotted on 
an interactive map. Between the National Assembly elections of 
April 9, 2011 and the presidential election of  April 16, 2011, citizen 
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observers submitted 6,000 incident reports to the platform (Har-
wood, 2011). The Reclaim Naija platform was also used to report 
incidents and progress during the voter registration exercise in 
January 2011. The reports sent through Reclaim Naija were collat-
ed in real time and fed back to the Independent National Electoral 
Commission (INEC). This assisted INEC in troubleshooting in many 
locations across the country. The information was also useful to 
the media in monitoring and publishing stories on the voter reg-
istration exercise, thereby helping to amplify the voice of the peo-
ple. In addition, the Reclaim Naija website serves as a one-stop 
online resource for information on the 2011 elections. It features 
all the polling units, senatorial districts and wards, the Nigerian 
Constitution, information on candidates, the 2010 Electoral Act, 
the election timetable, electoral guidelines, certified voters’ regis-
tration figures, political parties as well as civic and voter education 
modules (PLAC, 2012).
Significantly, PLAC (2012, p. 8) notes that the use of the digital 
media by INEC and the civil society bodies must have been en-
couraged during electioneering seasons, even if indirectly, by the 
Electoral Act of 2010 which among others, provides:
•	 Section 154 which empowers INEC to make use of elec-
tronic media to conduct civic education and public enlight-
enment. 
•	 Section 34 which requires INEC to “publish by displaying or 
causing to be displayed at the relevant office(s) of the Com-
mission and on the Commission’s website, a statement of the 
full names and addresses of all candidates standing nominat-
ed”, at least thirty days before the day of the election.
•	 Section 71 which requires INEC to “cause to be posted on 
its notice board and website, a notice showing the candidates 
at the election and their scores; and the person declared as 
elected or returned at the election”.
•	 Section 56(2) which states that INEC “may take reasonable 
steps to ensure that voters with disabilities are assisted at the 
polling place by the provision of suitable means of commu-
nication, such as Braille, large embossed print or electronic 
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devices or sign language interpretation, or off-site voting in 
appropriate cases”.
Unlike the civil society organizations, the political parties, 
though aware of the digital media and their capabilities, made 
minimal use of them prior to 2011 elections (Asemah and Edegoh, 
2012). This, however, may have changed with the increasing us-
er-friendliness of the digital media and their increasing popularity. 
In addition to their media advisers who are mostly conventional 
journalists, many governments including the Federal Government 
now have new/social media advisers. It, however, appears that po-
litical parties still give more attention to the old media than the 
new media. There is no doubt that the political parties, govern-
ments and members of the ruling and corporate elite recognize 
the power and influence of the new media. They, however, view 
its existence with a lot of fear and trepidation. Their inability to 
control the online exchanges may be a factor in this regard. Also is 
the fact that the traditional media are still regarded as influential.
What appears to be the pioneer internet-related law in the 
country came in 2015 when Nigeria enacted the Cybercrime Act 
of 2015. It objectives include  providing “an effective and unified 
legal, regulatory and institutional framework for the prohibition, 
prevention, detection, prosecution and punishment of cyber-
crimes in Nigeria… ensure the protection of critical national infor-
mation infrastructure… promote cyber security and the protection 
of computer systems and networks, electronic communications, 
data and computer programs, intellectual property and privacy 
rights”. The seven-part Act focuses on the Protection of Critical 
National Information Infrastructure, Offences and Penalties, Du-
ties of Financial Institutions, Administrations and Enforcement. 
The remaining parts are Arrest, Search, Seizure and Prosecution as 
well as Jurisdiction and International Cooperation.  
Strangely, before this Act became a law, the government of 
President Goodluck Jonathan awarded a USD 40million ‘internet 
spy’ contract to an Israeli firm, Elbit Systems. The company was to 
help spy on citizens’ computers and internet communications un-
der the guise of intelligence gathering and national security.  Earli-
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er in April 2013, researchers at Munk School for Global Affairs had 
hinted that Nigeria, Kenya and Egypt were deploying surveillance 
and censorship technology developed by an American company, 
Blue Coat, which specializes in online security. The company was 
to enable the government to invade the privacy of journalists, ne-
tizens and their sources.  Its censorship devices use Deep Packet 
Inspection, DPI, used by many western Internet Service Providers, 
to manage network traffic and suppress strange connections. An-
other USD61.9million was reportedly set aside for ‘Wise Intelli-
gence Network Harvest Analyzer System’, Open Source Internet 
Monitoring System, Personal Internet Surveillance System and 
Purchase of Encrypted Communication Equipment (Emmanuel, 
2013).
It is, however, widely known that the Department of State Se-
curity, DSS, carries out surveillance of the media and takes action 
in response to content the government considers inappropriate. 
It could be recalled that in June 2009, the Federal Government 
of Nigeria announced a USD5 million plan to support govern-
ment-friendly web sites and prevent government-critical web sites 
from influencing Nigerian public opinion. Approximately 50 “pa-
triotic” web sites were scheduled to be launched before the 2011 
elections (Open Net Initiative, 2009).
CITIZEN JOURNALISM: POWER TO THE PEOPLE?
One crucial aspect of the new digital technologies, which has 
greatly altered and expanded the public sphere, is citizen jour-
nalism. Through different internet-based platforms and even the 
mobile phone, ordinary citizens are producing and disseminating 
journalistic materials (news, features, analyses, comments, photo-
graphs, cartoons etc.). Citizens’ eyewitness accounts of events are 
now acceptable to conventional newspapers and television chan-
nels as part of their news. Citizen journalism, apart from eroding 
the gate keeping agenda-setting and framing power of media or-
ganizations, have the potential of opening up the public sphere 
thus enhancing the discourse power of marginalized groups and 
challenging that of the power elite.
While the members of the political class have found such plat-
Lai Oso & Tunde Akanni
184
Watchdogs or Captured Media? . . . 
forms as Facebook and Twitter ready tools to connect and engage 
the citizens, citizens on their own have appropriated citizen jour-
nalism to promote some form of alternative and sometimes op-
positional discourses. Though the definition of citizen journalism 
has no settled boundaries (Goode, 2009) and continues to prove 
contentious and even acrimonious at times for reasons shaped by 
the perspective interests and motivation of the individual or group 
advancing their preferred definition (Allan, 2013, p.92), it refers 
generally to “direct news gathering and reporting by ordinary cit-
izens — your neighbor, high school boys and girls, home-makers, 
corporate middle management — using widely available digital 
tools — blogs, websites, mobile and social media.” (Min, 2016, 
p.570)
Though it is commonly accepted that citizen journalism is inter-
net-based, Goode has rightly pointed out that “it does not begin 
and end online or even digital interactive media” (Goode, 2009, 
p.288). Going beyond the digital technology-centered definition 
of citizen journalism, Banda defines it as “a rapidly evolving form 
of journalism where common citizens take the initiative to report 
news or express views about happenings within their community. 
It is news of the people by the people and for the people” (Banda, 
2010, p.26). As independent citizens, citizen journalists are not so 
much constrained by the professional concerns of the convention-
al journalists.
Today, there are at least two registered associations populated 
by online publishers in Nigeria. The  Guild of  Corporate Online 
Publishers (GOCOP), describes itself as “a Nigerian, non-govern-
mental, non-partisan, non profit making organization, borne out 
of the growing need to ensure that online publishers uphold the 
tenets of journalism in doing their jobs” (https://www.linkedin.
com/company/gocop-guild-of-corporate-online-publishers-) The 
second, Online Publishers Association of Nigeria (OPA Nigeria), 
founded in May 2010 assert that “…These discerning group of 
trustees and founders recognized the shift in the mode and means 
of social engagement; and understood the shifts, disruptions and 
changes that may occur which would overlap with current laws 
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and rules guiding conduct and practice and therefore sought to 
create a self regulatory body that would provide the means-test-
ed standards for users and practitioners to operate by” (http://
onlinepublishersng.com/about_association.php). 
Bloggers, indeed, consider themselves ‘citizen journalists’ and 
believe they are better suited to provide the diversity that today’s 
democracy needs than traditional journalists. They pride them-
selves on being the ‘watch-dog’ of the traditional watch-dog me-
dia. Beginning in 1990, bloggers are largely self-motivated and 
today run into millions, ranging from rants by teenagers to loosely 
disguised product advertising, from political commentary to news 
reporting (Burkholder, undated).
Jurrat (2011, p. 9) notes that citizen journalism can range from 
commenting on an existing news piece to publishing an article, 
podcast, photo or video on a personal blog or on Twitter, a ded-
icated citizen journalism website like the Huffington Post or on 
YouTube, or on interactive websites that work as extensions to 
mainstream media, such as Cable News Network’s (CNN) iReport. 
On sites like CNN iReport, editorial gate keeping is left to the au-
dience: uploaded content will be published unedited as long as it 
is considered news (as distinct from advertising, for example) and 
respects principles of taste and decency. Other sites, such as the 
South Korean OhMyNews.com, only fact-check hard news contri-
butions before publishing them; and then there are websites that 
operate like a traditional newsroom, also called pro-am ventures, 
such as the Huffington Post, where professionals edit all-user-gen-
erated content (UGC) before publication.
Politically inclined ones like the renowned Youdecide2007.org 
provided the enablement to interested individuals to report on lo-
cal electoral contests in Australia far beyond what the mainstream 
could do.  Most prominent, perhaps, was the visibility it earned 
political activities and issues in remote areas including the north-
west Australian electorate of Kalgoorlie that may otherwise nev-
er get featured by the mainstream media. Citing Coleman (2009), 
only political junkies may likely have the commitment it requires 
to run political websites such as Youdecide2007.org and myHei-
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mat.de typify (Bruns, undated)
There are basically two types of citizen journalism; institution-
al and non-institutional (Banda, 2010, p.28). The non-institutional 
places the individual at the center of the content production pro-
cess, which “readily lends itself to different forms of social net-
working, where private citizens use a combination of platforms to 
generate content and disseminate it as widely as possible.” The 
almost free and unfettered access to the cyberspace has greatly 
enhanced this type of citizen journalism.
On the other hand, the institutionalized variety thrives within 
an organizational setting with some level of organizational con-
straints. It must also be noted that these two types could be re-
garded as polar ideals. A news website could start as a one-man 
endeavor and over the years, become more institutionalized as it 
becomes more commercialized and acquires more resources. It is 
also in this context of the political economy of citizen journalism 
that Goode has cautioned against restricting this genre of jour-
nalism “to sites that are set up explicitly as alternatives to ‘main-
stream’ or ‘traditional’ journalism (Goode, 2009, p.1289).
The traditional news media run by professional journalists are 
now involved in some form of citizen journalism through inviting 
citizens to send stories, comments and pictures which they print/
air as part of their normal news menu. In Nigeria, we have exam-
ples of the Punch newspaper which created a page “for readers 
to create their own news.” The page is labeled “My News.Com 
(Salawu, 2011) and Channels TV which has I-Report segment on its 
main news at 10:00 p.m. featuring eye witness accounts of events 
and photographs from members of the public. The Nation has just 
invited citizens to send in eye-witness reports for publication in 
the paper (The Nation, Saturday, June 10, 2017.
Furthermore, almost all online versions of the main newspa-
pers in the country have features that enable news-readers to 
comment on stories and/or share such stories through Twitter, 
Facebook, e-mail, Google etc. The point is such user generated 
contents enhance the participation of citizens in public discourse 
which is one of the main characteristics of citizen journalism and 
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the public sphere. Many readers now read their news online. Radio 
and television have shed their earlier Yorùbá name of “asòròmág-
bèsì1” as listeners and viewers can now respond to them in real 
time through the Internet enabled devices.
Some of the country’s online newspapers like Premium Times, 
Cable, will also fall under the institutionalized citizen journalism 
category. However, the non-institutionalized type has mush-
roomed over the years. According to a report, there are about 
120 of such sites “based on Nigeria content and largely controlled 
by Nigerian citizens at home and in the Diaspora by 2009” (Dare, 
2011, p.21). In a recent study, Olukotun listed 40 Nigerian online 
news publications (Olukotun, 2017, p.9). Some that readily come 
to mind include the Nigerian Village Square, Nairaland and Linda 
Ikeji which hardly bother about journalistic rules and routines but 
attract millions on regular basis. The Linda Ikeji variety seems more 
interested in materials like scandal, celebrity and sensational news 
that will attract audience and boost their commercial prospects. 
This category will also include the highly popular and controver-
sial platform, Sahara Reporters, which was established in 2006 by a 
former student union activist, Omoyele Sowore. From the begin-
ning, Sowore never pretends to any journalistic professionalism. 
He is more of an agitational anti-corruption crusader in the tra-
dition of the muck-raking journalism of old. In the words of Dare,
Sahara Reporters, as a citizen journalism website, makes no pretence 
about its philosophy of aggressively exposing corruption, using ordi-
nary citizens as foot soldiers and sources of information and content. 
(Dare, 2011, p.30)
Of course, like all news organizations, it justifies its existence 
and style of practice by an appeal to the public interest. Its edito-
rial policy, inter alia, states: “The forum’s major aim is to empower 
all citizens of various African nations to actively demand and de-
fend their democratic rights. Our journalistic mission is to beam 
a critical searchlight on the people and practices that undermine 
and subvert the democratic process” (quoted in Dare, 2011). This 
claim to social service is part of the ideology of professionalism.
Reiterating its commitment to some of the professional ethos 
1  The one who speaks without getting a reply.
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of mainstream journalism, it declared on the day it was launched 
in New York:
It is a unique organization, comprised of ordinary people whose only 
mission is to seek truth and publish it without fear or favor. This means 
that apart from the team of professionals running its affairs, Sahara 
Reporters is also an umbrella for anyone who has something to say and 
seeks an avenue to say it, as far as what he/she says is verifiable and 
ascertainable as true and the information there in, is the public interest.
There is no doubt that citizen journalism via the internet has 
enriched not just democratic politics in the country, but the prac-
tice of journalism itself. The online media as exemplified by Premi-
um Times, Cable and Sahara Reporters have revived investigative 
journalism in the country. In an interview, the Editor-in-Chief of 
the online medium, the Cable, Simon Kolawole, recounted that 
the conventional media used to thrive on investigative journal-
ism in the 1970s and 1980s. Sunday Times, Guardian on Sunday, 
Newswatch, TELL and several others used to devote resources to 
investigations. “Online journalism is bringing that back. The height 
of this was counting Premium Times as one of the consortium 
of global newspapers that won the  Pulitzer Prize for Explanatory 
Reporting  in 2017. Beyond this, citizen journalism has deepened 
and widened the journalistic net to embrace more actors and voic-
es. It has further liberalized access to the public sphere. For the 
Editor-in-Chief and Chief Operating Officer of Premium Times, 
Musikilu Mojeed, liberalization of access to information is critical 
to the building of a better society where fundamental judgments 
by citizens is based on well-informed state of mind. Liberalization 
is the most significant value online journalism has added to the 
“market place of ideas”. According to him, information about gov-
ernance, society and their interaction is no longer the exclusive 
preserve of the rich and powerful. Online journalism has demy-
stified information sharing, cutting down the cost of information 
distribution and acquisition while delivering at a faster pace than 
traditional sources. Such is the extent to which Premium Times 
subscribes to the liberalization philosophy that it has created a 
WhatsApp group on which it simultaneously shares opinion arti-
cles published on its website. This enables members of the group 
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to comment freely on issues raised without having to reach the 
website. 
Kolawole is also of the view that online is forcing the traditional 
media to be more creative in news delivery. Most of the stories 
are broken online every minute so the newspapers have to find 
new ways of saying the same thing”. He further noted that the 
online media regime’s peculiarity of enhanced interactivity has led 
to i-reporting which is quite helpful especially as there was a limit 
to which resources available to them could take them.  Such is the 
extent to which the said interactivity had been beneficial that the 
Cable had received e-mail messages that specifically drew atten-
tion to certain issues, sometimes hinting on corruption and abuse 
of office.  Some have also alerted them to wrong use of photos or 
some other inaccuracies.
The liberalizing trait of the internet applies as much  to activ-
ist organizations as it is to the mass media.  Civil society lead-
ers across civil rights advocacy, anti-corruption and digital rights 
campaigns as well as environmentalists in Nigeria reckon strongly 
with the digital public sphere that the internet is. 
The digital rights campaign organization based in Kano, Cen-
tre for Information Technology and Development, CITAD, for in-
stance, has many Facebook profiles dedicated to different aspects 
of its work.  These include “Peace Now” which is dedicated to 
peace campaign.  Another is the “Friends of CITAD”, which is a 
general platform on issues concerning CITAD. A third one is the 
“North East Education and Development Forum”, which deals with 
CITAD’s activities with the education sector in the north east of 
Nigeria.  There are still some others dedicated to various issues 
such as the organization’s mentoring program, the peace clubs, 
hate speech countering and so forth. CITAD also has at least three 
Twitter handles. These are @ICTAdvocates that  focuses more on 
ICT related issues; @CITAD3, which deals with peace building and 
anti-hate speech campaign as well as @NE, which deals with en-
gagement with peculiar issues of the conflict-ravaged north east 
of Nigeria. All of these platforms according to the executive di-
rector, Yunusa Yau, have “helped us get out our messages to the 
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audience, engage people with what we do and aid our advocacy. 
For instance, we have a monthly social media peace messaging 
campaign whose aim is to get young people to send out peace 
and anti-hate speech messages than just waste their precious 
time on chatting.”  CITAD particularly appreciated the immedia-
cy advantage of the online environment because “the immediacy 
offers a tool to engage your constituents. They tend to feel part 
of your program because they get to see and listen as they are 
taking place. This deepens participation and a sense of ownership 
by constituents to an organization. It also promotes openness that 
is needed for developing a robust democratic culture in organi-
zations. Multimediality means that conventional media is chal-
lenged as whereas before you needed to listen, watch and read 
before you get a comprehensive sense of event; now everything is 
available in one medium. Newspapers and broadcast stations with 
their processing of events and products before they are let out to 
the public are challenged as more people are looking for more 
immediate events.”  
The use of digital platforms has not been any less resourceful 
for the anti-corruption advocates and environmentalists. Nigeria’s 
foremost environmental group, Environmental Rights Action, ERA, 
had no fewer than 400 followers on Twitter in addition to 7,272 
friends on Facebook, according to its Head of Media, Philip Jak-
por.  He added that the multiple platforms available online had 
also helped the organization in maintaining close proximity with 
different classes and age groups in the society. “We engage with 
the older people in the society on Facebook and the younger on 
platforms like Twitter” he added.
For the anti-corruption campaigners, digital media have been 
particularly delighting for “helping to demystify political elites’ ex-
clusive ownership of the media to historically control traditional 
media through censorship…” declared, Olanrewaju Suraju, chair, 
Civil Network against Corruption, CSNAC. “These digital platforms 
are the mainstay of our advocacy for reforms and public mobili-
zation for engagement of government and public space” he add-
ed.  CSNAC preferred Twitter because it can easily be linked with 
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Facebook thus providing access to two platforms simultaneously.
WhatsApp, however, seems to have caught the fancy of many 
virtual and real groups availing members with access to informa-
tion as well as the opportunity to ventilate their opinions.  For the 
intellectuals for instance, examples include the “Proudly Cheve-
ning” and the “Network of Seminar Scholars”.  While the former is 
exclusively set up for the alumni of the British Chevening Schol-
arship scheme, the latter is open to Nigerian intellectuals both at 
home and in the Diaspora.
Although this age of convergence of media genres has height-
ened citizens’ expectations, a number of news media are still 
struggling to do multimedia delivery of their output. For the Pre-
mium Times, according to its Editor-in-Chief, “online newspapers 
such as ours serve a critical role in society as the most effective 
information bridge to people with lower economic power. This 
demography represents the bulk of our society and we owe an 
immediate duty to serve this community with factual stories. Serv-
ing this role effectively demands the use of multimedia strate-
gy, allowing readers the opportunity to interact with our stories 
through different entry points.”
The digital media platforms have substantially extended the 
terrains of the media even as they have enabled the spheres of 
their engagement with audiences spread around the world to 
bourgeon almost limitlessly. A global public sphere has emerged 
through such channels as CNN and the new media. Interesting-
ly, an average news platform available online with the relevant 
resources can deliver multimedia information materials thus re-
defining the traditional categorization of media genres along the 
print and broadcast tracks.
Humanity’s seemingly insatiable yearning for information and 
engagement with issues arising therefrom have become mani-
fest by the enhanced digital technology capacity of the media, by 
the prompt, self efforts of civil society organizations to constantly 
bridge up with their members and others as well as the media 
which used to serve as the only channel of reaching out to their 
adherents.
Lai Oso & Tunde Akanni
192
Watchdogs or Captured Media? . . . 
A major challenge inevitably deriving from this new era of digi-
tal sphere, however, is the crisis of quality that audiences will have 
to contend with more than ever before and probably beyond 
imagination.
Between the public sphere of the medieval era in Europe and 
the contemporary version variously labeled virtual sphere, digital 
sphere and so forth are far reaching similarities and differences. 
While the former, as espoused by Habermas (1989), provided for 
physical relationship between participants, the conspicuous dis-
regard for physical presence in the digital version does not affect 
participants’ involvement except for certain understandable vari-
ables.  Indeed, the fact that interested participants do not neces-
sarily have to mobilize some unusually tasking logistics beyond the 
computer hooked to internet to get involved is a lot incentivizing. 
This situation also helps to nurture whatever form of democracy 
any society is able to run among those identified by Pinkey (1993). 
Such is the liberalized access to information, and the consequen-
tial engagement with it has been recurrent and unmistakable that 
they now instigate quick actions and/or reaction from those con-
cerned, both in government and in some other realms.
Perhaps the most interesting in the digital sphere is the extreme 
extension of the operational terrain of journalism practitioners in 
which they now face stiff competition from sheer enthusiasts who 
require little or nothing to publish information. The report of the 
recent edition of Columbia Journalism Review journal cited earlier 
has manifested most amply in this clime.  Commissioned persons 
and others now share media contents across platforms leaving 
producers with little or no control thus undermining their verifi-
ability.  Worse, the susceptibility of the transmitted and retrans-
mitted information materials to manipulation is highly plausible. 
The end result of this is the increasing incidence of fake news.
Fake news is probably the most disturbing issue on the inter-
net today as reflected in the concern expressed by Prof. Lee in 
his statement commemorating the 28th anniversary of the world-
wideweb. Sahara Reporters, which had its account suspended by 
Facebook itself, had to contend with a counterfeit version at some 
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point. Incidents of hijacking of Facebook accounts or unautho-
rized duplication or replication are also common, thus leaving 
news media platforms and civil society organizations at the mercy 
of mindless charlatans who may get away with some havoc before 
they are found out.
Conclusion
It is curious that for a nation of normally voluble and verbally talented 
people, we seldom hold genuine dialogue among ourselves. Threats, 
recriminations, diatribes, infantile, tirades, hate-suffused ethnic propa-
ganda and summary state clampdown have become the currency of 
personal and group exchanges as well as the denominator of national 
dialogue (Williams, 2017).
The inception of the digital public sphere in Nigeria, as in other 
parts of the world, is a consolidation of some evolving socio-po-
litical and technological progress which became more noticeable 
in 1990s as the continent of Africa endured the third wave of de-
mocracy. As the broadcast media opened up to the participation 
of private players, the internet, cell phone and other ICT platforms 
came into being to further open the public sphere for wider access 
and participation by the citizens. The liberalized and pluralized 
public sphere has no doubt fundamentally altered the environ-
ment and instrumentalities of public communication and demo-
cratic politics.
Convergence has enabled the conventional media to insert the 
voices of the ordinary people into the media space. Talk radio has 
proliferated while most public affairs programs on radio and tele-
vision now include call-in segments. This has no doubt strength-
ened the feedback loop in the communication circuit; in a way 
making the audience more active in the political and democratic 
processes.
While we acknowledge the potential of ICTs, particularly the in-
ternet to enlarge the public sphere and give voice to more people 
in the society, we deplore any attempt at any notion of technolog-
ical determinism. The media, both old and new, may be powerful; 
they seldom act on their own. As Barrie Axford once remarked the 
fact that all politics now subsists within space or frame of electron-
ic media (Castells, 1996) does not negate the claim that agents are 
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active in the construction of their own world (Axford, 2001, p.2). 
To borrow a statement from an American scholar, there is a great 
distance between the passionate and acrimonious debates in the 
new media and political action (Schudson, 1995, p.27). He further 
explains that “Political activity leads people to follow the news. 
News does not ordinarily lead people to political activity”. In fact, 
the virtual debates and discussions among anonymous debaters 
and discussants can really become, to borrow Haberman’s phrase, 
“tranquilizing substitute for action” (Habermans, 1991, p.164).
In the euphoria of the moment, many techno-utopians may 
tend to forget the historical fact that “technologies tend not to 
be determinative but rather are conditioned by what is going on 
in the society in which they grow....” (Barber, 1998). Debates and 
conversations may be required for democracy. They are not suf-
ficient. Talk, as the saying goes, is cheap. Nigerians love to talk a 
lot and this is clearly evident in the digital public sphere. But as 
Michael Schudson has aptly expressed it,
Current preoccupation with the media mistakes the public parlor of lo-
quaciousness for the heart of society. The life of a house is more often 
to be found in the kitchen or the bedroom. Still, we judge ourselves and 
are judged by others on the quality and character of talk in the public. 
(Schudson, 1995, p.24)
This raises the issue of the prospect for social action that inter-
net activism can generate and sustain.
It is unhelpful to unhinge the new media from the social struc-
ture and existing configuration of power. The media, either old or 
new, do not exist in a vacuum. Social and material conditions with-
in which people live their daily lives are crucial in any discussion 
of the role of the media in politics and society. Media access and 
consumption are regulated by the existing distribution of power 
and other social resources. The new media would not be an ex-
ception. We must also note the importance of local social context. 
The media and their possible effect/influence do not operate in 
a vacuum. While noting the significant role of the social media in 
the Egyptian revolution, Eltantawy and Wiest, however, observed 
that “we must consider the powerful influence of outside condi-
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tions, particularly the social, political and historical contexts of the 
movement as well as the availability and interplay of resources 
(social media and others) and the actors’ efficacy in utilizing avail-
able resource to meet their goals” (Eltantawy and Wiest, 2011, pp. 
1218-1219). Likewise, Comunello and Anzera cautioned against 
technological deterministic framework for contextualizing the role 
of the social media but rather “we should consider the complex 
interactions between society, technology and political systems” 
(Comunello and Anzera, op. cit, p. 465). In this wise, it is unhelp-
ful to consider to conceive the power of the media without tak-
ing into account the issue of human agency and other prevailing 
social conditions. As Warschauer like many critical scholars has 
also remarked, “technology must be situated within underlying 
unequal power relationships that exist in society.” (Warschauer, 
2003, p.209)
For the digital public sphere to fulfill its potential and not fall 
into the same trap as the conventional commercialized media, the 
people as agents and social actors must acquire the right type 
of knowledge and democratic etiquette. For now, the nature of 
debates and conversations on the new/social media among Ni-
gerians is hardly edifying and democratic. Just like they exist in 
the traditional media, the conversations and debates are cantan-
kerous, unruly and hardly meet Habermas’ criterion of reasoned 
argument. The divisive and parochial factors; ethnic, regional and 
religious affiliations that are so evident in media discussions and 
debates are replicated on line. The character of debate staged in 
the Nigerian media was appropriately described by a newspaper 
columnist,
... in the best of times, brash and sensational; in the worst, just on think-
ing, arrayed along ethnic, regional or even religious lines; and in-be-
tween and irredeemable lover of sensation, that though push copy 
sales, retard society (Hardball, 2017, p.48).
Another columnist and journalism scholar, Olatunji Dare has 
also observed the unruly tone and tenor of public conversation on 
the Internet. According to him,
Reading comments on Nigerian news on the Internet sites frequented 
by Nigerians, you would think the constituent groups are engaged in a 
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war of attrition. Nothing is sacred any more. Vileness has become the 
standard of elocution (Dare, 2017, p.48). 
Many scholars have also expressed the fear that the multiplicity 
of public spheres created by the internet may lead to fragmenta-
tion of the public. The internet, it is argued, connects us as discrete 
units in an electronic coherency, while isolating us socially ...” (Ake, 
2000, p.28).
It is argued that if the old media, especially public service broad-
casting, through their programming, had centripetal social impact 
by binding members of society together, the “new media environ-
ment is more likely to have a centrifugal impact, facilitating social 
and cultural fragmentation (Hodkinson, 2011, p.184). The inter-
net is considered a centrifugal and fragmenting medium with a 
poor chance of offering a meaningful public sphere (Moyo, 2009; 
Haywood, 1998). The celebrated pluralism ushered in by digital 
media technologies has led to what Michael Tracey called “retrib-
alization” of society (Tracey, 1998). Elaborating on this tendency, 
Hodkinson has argued that:
A ... difficulty with optimistic proclamation of an online public sphere 
revival is that, at the same time as introducing greater interactivity into 
everyday use, the vastness and diversity of the internet seems liable to 
have a fragmentary effect even more concentrated than that of digital 
broadcasting. Rather than encouraging people to share content with 
or engage with diverse groups of others as part of broad publics, the 
ability to choose exactly what or who to engage with seems more likely 
to result in pursuit of particular interests and association with narrower 
groupings (op. cit, p.189)
The scholar identified two main implications of this tendency. 
First, is the possibility for internet users to avoid matters of public 
affairs and political controversies! According to him, for people 
with previous little interest in such matters, the internet makes it 
easier for them to “opt out of the broader public sphere in favor 
of their existing interests.” Second, for those who use the internet 
to learn about or engage in political discussions, they often “seek 
out content and other users that cohere with existing perspec-
tives” instead of engaging with “diverse forums oriented towards 
broad cross-sections of society”. This argument echoes the old 
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argument of the reinforcement effect of the media.
As Oso (2012) has remarked, the anonymity offered by the in-
ternet and social media can confer on some people power without 
responsibility which, as they say, is the power of the prostitute. 
Such anonymity and the openness of the internet make the new 
media platforms amenable to being used to manipulate and mis-
inform the public. As McQuail has remarked, “... large scale public 
support and approval can be bought without much risk of discov-
ery” (McQuail, 2013, p.191). The phenomenon of fake news that is 
becoming very prominent on the social media is a case in point.
Of recent, the Federal Government and many Nigerians have 
expressed concern over the use of the social media and other In-
ternet platforms for the dissemination of hate speeches and fake 
news. For instance, a fake version of President Buhari’s speech at 
the 2017 United Nations General Assembly was disseminated on 
the same blogs including the popular Linda Ikeji. The threats and 
counter threats being issued by various agitational and separatist 
groups mushrooming in the country litter the digital public space.
Certain things must attract our attention about the viability of 
the digital public sphere. First as many scholars have argued, is 
the tendency of any ‘new’ media to go the way of the old after all 
the initial enthusiasm and euphoria must have settled. This has 
been the fate of radio and television. This tendency is of course 
the outcome of the ability of the powerful to incorporate such 
‘new’ media as part of its ideological apparatus. The second thing 
of worry is the pernicious effect of commercialization. Habermas’ 
idea of re-feudalization addresses this. The commercial logic has 
the tendency to push the media towards the safe mainstream 
strand of public debates and in the extreme toward soft/human 
interest stories and sensationalism that have little or nothing to do 
with public affairs. While it may be very difficult for the powerful to 
capture or colonize the digital public sphere because of its pecu-
liar open architecture, the ever expanding impact of commodifica-
tion and  commercialization may render many of the ICT-enabled 
platforms ineffective as organs of public sphere.
To take full advantage of the digital public sphere, we need to 
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return to some of the original ideas postulated by Habermas. The 
public sphere must not just be spaces for ethnic, religious and 
oppositional politics. This has been the main bane of the conven-
tional media in Nigeria. The digital public sphere must be rescued 
from going that way.
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The attainment of democratic functions has often hinged on 
features of modern society like the mass media.  Members of a 
democratic society should have a voice and expect to be heard, ei-
ther directly, or through some form of representation.  Democracy 
requires that public policies and collective actions are not the ex-
clusive preserve of a few.  There should be universal participation, 
so that all members of society have a say in public deliberations, 
over matters of mutual concern.  Both require representation or 
mediation.  Citizens should be equipped to hold accountable 
6
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those who are official custodians of power.  This assumes that 
there is openness in society and free flow of information. Mod-
ern societies are complex, consisting of large populations. With 
social distances and isolation, society cannot rely solely on per-
sonal interactions that were characteristic of traditional societies 
to function.  Herein lies the importance of the mass media for any 
system of governance – be it authoritarian or liberal democratic. 
Ideally, in a liberal democratic system, the media should be free to 
perform these roles. It is important to examine how well the media 
adapt to fulfill core notions of democracy as societies evolve.  In 
this chapter, our attention is focused on television broadcasting 
and what roles it plays in the attainment of Nigeria’s democratic 
aspirations and maintenance of its democratic culture. In discuss-
ing this, we consider what mission was assigned to television, how 
well aligned the mission is with democratic principles.  Has it ful-
filled this mission, or has it been held up from doing so – by whom 
or what?  
Media and the Democratic ideal  
As a mode of governance, democracy works on principles of 
self-determination.  With democracy, it is assumed that all mem-
bers of society, not merely particular elements or groups, are ad-
equately endowed with ideas. These ideas are required to access 
resources intended for the wellbeing and prosperity of the society. 
Ideally, democratic societies should offer scope for universal par-
ticipation. This is the junction where media and mass communica-
tion meet with governance.  
Davis (2010, 84) provides a summary of the normative ideals set 
out for media and public communication in democratic societies. 
They are to provide objective and widely available information, 
ensure the accountability of the powerful (institutions, organiza-
tions and individuals), offer access to a wide range of perspectives 
and viewpoints, constitute an arena for rational deliberation, and 
debate on issues of common interest.  This space should be as 
Habermas (1989) had proposed of the public sphere: accessible to 
all citizens, and conducive to informed, coherent, and rational dis-
cussion, without any fear of reprisals. Here, citizens should engage 
207
with public issues, armed with appropriate and adequate informa-
tion.  Quality decisions arrived at in the public sphere are crucial to 
the stability of society, and without these, development could be 
stifled. Transparency in decision making, and consequent regard 
for the consensus of opinion arrived at within groups, evoke con-
fidence and encourage compliance with recommended appropri-
ate actions (Saeed, 2009; Pettit, Salazer & Dagron, 2009). As ar-
gued above, such universal participation expected in a democratic 
society is hardly feasible when information flow is restricted or 
lopsided.  Media professionals have to act as representatives for 
the wide range of people whom they serve.  Guarantees of free-
dom that apply to citizens should apply to media professionals in 
greater proportions.  The media should be free to operate (access 
information, seek clarification, raise and contribute to debates) 
without fear of reprisals.
A structure proposed by Christians et al (2009 cited in McQuail 
2013) sets out four normative roles of the media in a democratic 
society.   Media roles are monitorial, facilitative, radical and col-
laborative.  The collaborative role acknowledges the importance 
of media working with other key social actors, the need for inter-
action and mutual dependence.  The radical role calls media pro-
fessionals (journalists in particular) to a higher pedestal.  By their 
superior training, they are to recognize imminent dangers, alert 
and prepare society for such eventualities. Media professionals, 
regardless of the genre in which they work, are the sentinels or 
watchdogs of society.  In the facilitative role, media provide ade-
quate, meaningful and relevant information as discussed above. 
They ensure that the various groups get necessary information 
required to make appropriate decisions about matters concern-
ing themselves and others.  The monitorial role involves the doc-
umentation of information about current and topical events re-
lating to governments and private individuals whose actions are 
consequential in society. Such documentation is to ensure that 
the powerful are accountable.  Though it overlaps with the other 
three, McQuail suggests a primacy of this role, [almost as a pre-
condition] for democracy: “In its fullest expression, the monitori-
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al role appears well-suited to the needs of a democratic political 
system, provided the conditions of independence of monitors’ 
from power holders are met and there is freedom to express 
unwelcome ideas and transmit uncomfortable information” 
(2013, 108) [my emphasis].  To be effective, the media should be 
free of all encumbrances.  The question then is to see if they are. 
Has Nigerian television been free to be a watchdog, or has it been 
captured by the powerful who it should be monitoring?  Given 
that government determines the orientation of service, and pa-
rameters of operations, there is a tendency to regard government 
as being the powerful to be monitored, and state impositions are 
commonly considered as encumbrances to the media. However, 
it is in understanding the media performance that further restric-
tions affecting the media can be seen.  
In practical terms, the task of informing, explaining, clarifying, 
and harnessing diverse views held by members of society is the 
challenge for media. The media then have to harvest [and advo-
cate for] ideas that are in the best interest of all. The media should 
facilitate a remembering of past events, and recognition of links 
between different events and utterances.  Without the freedom 
to do these, the monitoring role is likely to be compromised.  The 
overall burden rests on the entire media system, which consists of 
a variety of media operating within national settings along with 
those operating transnationally.  The specificities of each society 
determine what media mix works best and for which particular 
task.  Media systems involve different firms, with different owner-
ship structures and modes of governance; they consist of sectors 
usually differentiated based on the technology in use, and in some 
cases, the types of service offered (McQuail 2013, 119–120; Hallin 
& Mancini 2010, 2004)). Typically, media systems consist of print 
media and audio-visual forms (terrestrial and satellite enabled ra-
dio and television broadcasting,).  These remain dominant even 
though new message forms disseminated through new platforms 
[internet enabled, online media including video on demand and 
social networking sites] have gained much ground.  These newer 
media are distinct.  Inspite of the massive audiences that they at-
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tract, they are largely fragmented spaces constituted around par-
ticular interests. Mass media still constitute a broader space for 
diverse identity groups who are engaging with common concerns. 
Radio and television had been saddled with this responsibility 
since they were deemed to be more effective in cutting across the 
social spectrum. Informed at the time by an assumed scarcity of 
airwaves, broadcasting was regarded as a public resource to be 
strictly regulated. British public service broadcasting was instruc-
tive – public interest was paramount, but from its inception, tele-
vision in Nigeria also adopted the commercial orientation. Though 
Western Nigeria government, owners of the pioneer station, had 
foreign partners briefly, ownership of broadcast stations in Nigeria 
was restricted to government.  Broadcast reached far more audi-
ences than print media messages whose audiences had to be lit-
erate (hence elitist).  Broadcast stations were free-to-air thus more 
conveniently accessed. Citizens were to be well equipped to par-
ticipate meaningfully within the public sphere as expected with-
in democratic cultures. The broadcast industry was charged with 
this task. In the following section, we shall examine how television 
fared in this mission.
Engaging Audiences 
Television, like other mass media, is a feature of modernity. At 
inception in Nigeria, it was urban-based and professionalized, so 
service was distant from grassroots audiences. That was the first 
layer of disconnect but there was another.  In a country as popu-
lous and diverse as Nigeria, coordinating a range of ideas located 
at the grassroots in various regions of the nation is a challenge. 
In the early days, stations were few; each in its designated market 
had to cater for ethnically, linguistically and socio-culturally di-
verse audiences.  There were inevitable compromises in represen-
tation, and once novelty of the new box had waned, the issue of 
particular identity groups did arise.  The challenge of expressing 
differences was muted by the authoritarianism and unitary com-
mand of military rule. Then emphasis was on unity, rather than 
difference.  Not so in the democratic dispensation that resumed in 
earnest in Nigeria in 1999.  
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For many voices to be heard as required in a healthy democrat-
ic society, a pluralistic media arrangement (or a simulation of this) 
is desirable.  Such a simulation was evident in the British public 
service broadcasting model.  At its inception the BBC then offering 
only radio service was a commercial entity (product of the coop-
eration of receiver set manufacturers known as British Broadcast-
ing Company).  It became the British Broadcasting Corporation 
in 1927 when it became a public service broadcaster.  There was 
no domestic competition then, even though signals from pirate 
broadcasters aroused audience discontent to some of BBC’s pa-
ternalistic fare.  The mission for British public broadcasting ser-
vice established under BBC’s first Director-General John Reith, is 
often summed up in three evergreen words – inform, educate, 
and entertain.  Yet these have had varied emphasis.  In its first in-
carnation, British public service broadcasting was set to establish 
standards for society through programming – trust, uniformity in 
cultural outlook and a distinctiveness that reflects national identi-
ty.  News and such factual genres may have been appreciated for 
the impartiality and objectivity, but to some audiences, entertain-
ment fell short compared with the pirate radio service. This was 
before television which was introduced whilst the BBC maintained 
a monopoly in British broadcasting.
The monopoly on television gave way to a public service duopo-
ly when ITV was established in 1955.  In spite of its commercial 
operations, emphasis remained on setting high standards. Distinc-
tive service was maintained.  Rather than counterprogramming 
expected in a strict competition, ITV and BBC in the early days 
juxtaposed similar programs so viewing audiences regardless of 
which channel they tuned to would be exposed to similar genres /
content in society’s best interest.  With several independent com-
mercial licensees operating in different regions and across the na-
tions –England, Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland, television 
was brought even closer to the people. Similarly, BBC created its 
second national TV channel (BBC2); existing BBC regions were re-
configured to improve the challenge of regional representation. 
Renewal of BBC Royal Charter every 10 years offers opportunities 
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to review and refine public service broadcasting as service adapt-
ed to new social and technological realities, including the current 
deregulated regime.    For example, Channel 4 introduced in 1982 
as a self-funded, commercial though not-for-profit public service 
broadcaster had a remit to innovate, develop the independent 
production sector and reflect cultural diversity. This helped im-
prove representation of minority groups and others on the fringe. 
From the onset, the BBC placed a high premium on quality pro-
grams, in order to improve the taste and outlook of the masses. 
Pluralism had to be accommodated within existing limited chan-
nels (Keane, 1991).  Statutorily, Britain’s public service broadcast-
ers were minded to offer opportunities for inclusion of diverse 
social groups through a service that sought to be objective and 
impartial, with a varied diet of programs that catered for audienc-
es drawn from a broad social spectrum.  This remained even after 
revised views on scarce public airwaves as convergence of televi-
sion with other delivery platforms expands opportunities. Britain 
continues to review its conceptualization of public service in this 
dynamic media environment. 
Proper pluralism is enabled in the liberalized era.  Though com-
mercialized, digital broadcasting allows different groups to aspire 
to self-expression through dedicated channels. However some 
argue that these developments jeopardize laudable principles of 
public service (Cushion, 2012). The jury is out on how desirable it is 
to have a mushrooming of media channels for diverse interests or 
groups; the question remains whether the public should engage 
in these public sphericules or if it is better to convene in a public 
sphere as national channels once were (Gitlin, 1998).  
It is often argued that when media are closer to the audiences, 
they are more efficient. Proximity can be viewed in terms of phys-
ical and cultural location of media operatives to their audiences. 
Thus, national broadcasters operating at regional or national cen-
ters, distant from grassroots audiences, tended to be less efficient. 
This reasoning is evident in the trajectory of British broadcasting 
discussed above.  Decentralized media were likely to be more 
faithful in tackling the concerns of local audiences; especially if 
Yinka Esan
212
Watchdogs or Captured Media? . . . 
close proximity meant that the audiences could easily access or be 
accessed by stations.  It will be even better if the stations were run 
by those who truly represented their targets, by being sensitive to 
their cultural or distinct positions.  
Initially, high costs and complex technical requirements of op-
erations prevented Nigeria’s television industry from being as lo-
cal as the ideal argued above.  Instead service was centralized; 
stations were owned and funded by regional (later federal and 
state) governments.  This was consistent with views that regard-
ed television as a national (perhaps global) medium (Katz, 2009). 
Since conditions (technological, economic and political) fostered 
liberalization in the 1990s, global television service (like CNN, Sky, 
Disney, DSTV) has become regular.  
Television is well suited to delivering national and even glob-
al audiences to share media spectacles. Long before deregula-
tion, audiences from around the world joined to watch the moon 
landing (1969).  More recently, global sporting meets (World Cup, 
Olympics), inauguration of American presidents, wars, and global 
disasters have graced screens in homes around the world simulta-
neously.  Television has thus lived up to its metaphor as a window 
on the world.  It has always been susceptible to international influ-
ences, due to prevalent business models in industry.  A good pro-
portion of television programs were distributed transnationally. In 
the case of Nigeria, the flow was unidirectional, from predictable 
Western sources (USA, Britain).  In 1962, third year of operations 
on Nigeria’s first television station, the hours of transmission were 
limited yet 75% of entertainment programs were foreign (Ikhime, 
1979: 40).  So TV audiences were always subject to global influ-
ences, though locally produced output in other areas was high 
- public enlightenment 87.7%, News 100%. The figure for local 
news production masks reliance on wire copy and newsreels from 
international news agencies (Paterson, 1998) which showcased the 
practice of western democracies ostensibly raising aspirations.  In 
this, television was more like a mirror through which audiences 
could refract their prospects in life and compare with what they 
could see of others.  As noted by Barker (cited in Chadha and Ka-
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voori, 2010), stations like this could not contribute to global flow 
of information.  Local producers and audiences alike had always 
contended with the acculturating impact of international broad-
casting. It can be argued that such exposure was good for rous-
ing aspirations for the dividends of democracy, but frustrating for 
audiences who lived under successive military regimes.  In time 
the balance was altered.  By policy, local productions, which ar-
ticulated concerns of the government and the people, increased. 
Yet consistent with military rule, government-controlled television 
was used more as a notice board.  There was little room for ex-
pression, dialogue or participation as expected in a democratic 
culture.  This varied in different genres of television as will be dis-
cussed hereafter.
The summary of the foregoing argument is that the ultimate 
goal of the media in a democratic society is to foster participation 
of the different members of society, and enable informed deci-
sion-making at private and public levels by citizens, regardless of 
their physical or social distance to the centre.  For the medium to 
function successfully in the set ideals, television should be orga-
nized in such a way as to offer ordered access to receive and gen-
erate relevant messages.  This argument will be reviewed using a 
selection of stations and programs, to demonstrate how television 
attempted to help the nation fulfill its democratic aspirations.  
Audiences are here regarded as citizens who exist in a range 
of spaces—local, national and global.  In these spaces, audience 
identity is still shaped by different markers—education, age, gen-
der, income, and occupation.  Ethnicity, nationality, and religion 
are also relevant. In this chapter, we consider how equitable the 
prospects of media access are for different groups.  We also con-
sider how effective television is in serving these groups, and if it 
can be a platform for rational debate between diverse groups.  In 
deliberating these arguments, we aim to see if television is able to 
foster a democratic culture. Does it serve as a watchdog or is it a 
captive to the challenge of serving a diverse audience. 
The broad and multi-dimensional nature of these questions 
makes it imperative to consider the history and texts of the me-
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dia institutions.  To properly understand television—a familiar and 
ubiquitous medium, it must be considered in its context.  It is re-
ductionist to conceptualize television as a simple technological 
device.  Similarly it is misleading to focus simply on the social con-
text of its use.  As has been eloquently argued (Williams, 1990; 
Winston, 1995, Winston, 1998), television is as much a technology 
as it is a product of the context in which it is used, the custodians 
of the technology (producers), and those who consume the medi-
um (viewers, advertisers).  This complex mix of factors within the 
historical context of the medium must be acknowledged (Kack-
man, 2011). Already the issue of ownership and authoritarian ori-
entation of the military has been brought into the frame.
Nigerian Television Service – Growth in Context
Nigeria’s journey to democracy has been long and arduous. 
Television was involved in this quest from its inception, if the story 
is taken from the first republic.  The first television service was in-
troduced just ahead of independence, in 1959, by the Western re-
gion, an administrative area in Nigeria, and given priority as a stra-
tegic medium for communication.  By independence in October 
1960, the Eastern region had also established a service.  Less than 
two years later, in the first quarter of 1962, the remaining admin-
istrative regions—Northern Nigeria and the Federal Capital Terri-
tory, Lagos, also had their television services.  Television is thus a 
feature of postcolonial and aspirational modern Nigeria, with the 
quick adoption of television services after independence suggest-
ing that no region wanted to be outdone (Esan, 2009).  Television 
was a novelty—coming after print media (newspaper, magazines/
periodicals) and radio (with the rediffusion service), each of which 
inspired how television was adopted for use.
Newspapers had served the educated elite, who in different 
ways sustained the newspaper business.  Although some were 
press barons and others were contributors, many elites were mere-
ly patrons—advertisers, regular subscribers, or readers who kept 
the business alive.  As it was in the United Kingdom, newspapering 
in Nigeria was largely within the private sector.  Leading political 
activists involved in the struggle for independence (notably Azik-
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we and Awolowo – see Uche, 1989) were newspaper proprietors. 
Alongside other services rendered in the press, print media consti-
tuted the space for the struggle for independence.  Anti-colonial 
sentiments, the merits, schedule, and agenda for independence 
were debated on the pages of newspapers.  Thus, an appreciation 
of debates and political discourse was established.  With this, po-
litical activists recognized the power of the pen; newspaper was 
a space for agitation and Nigerian leaders learnt to place a high 
premium on establishing newspapers through which they could 
speak to the governed—establishing unidirectional means for in-
formation dissemination. 
Broadcasting allowed messages to reach mass audiences 
across vast distances, in a range of predominantly domestic spac-
es—usually in the convenience of their homes.  Messages were 
received simultaneously, by far flung audiences, as immediately as 
when transmitted. Certain messages, such as the news and Grade 
A shows, were even delivered in real time, as live broadcasts. Un-
like radio, which is cheaper to acquire and easier to operate, tele-
vision is expensive, more elitist, and distant from rural audiences, 
who constitute the bulk of the Nigerian population.  Those vision-
ary leaders who introduced the medium were undeterred by such 
limitations when they invested in television, even when it was a 
novelty in other nations.  At inception, most television services 
in Nigeria were extensions of existing radio services, as was the 
global trend (Katz, 2016).  This pattern was replicated in the era 
of deregulation, as private broadcasters tended to rely on profit 
from radio operations to keep their television service afloat. The 
synergy within broadcasting was possibly due to shared technol-
ogy.  Both media rely on the conversion of sound, and light in the 
case of television, to electric energy, in order that moments can be 
captured, processed, and disseminated through public airwaves. 
These similarities in the broadcast process meant that there could 
be a symbiosis of operations—staffing, administration, program-
ming costs could be shared.  The joint management of services 
helped establish institutional cultures, as did elements within the 
cultural contexts of the target markets.  These institutional cul-
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tures, along with ownership are indicators of the power relations 
behind media messages, and possible impediments to service that 
foster attainment of democratic aspirations.  Key among these el-
ements is staffing and the resource base from which program-
ming is drawn.  This addresses questions such as whose stories 
are told and what language is used.  Cultural indicators seen in the 
education, ethnic origins, gender, and inferred or declared politi-
cal affinity of the staff, are as important in defining the power re-
lationships within the media organizations, as well as the relation-
ships amongst audiences, between them and the stations.  Staff 
interpretation of their mission is often informed by their loyalties, 
whether to slavishly pursue an agenda or creatively subvert this, 
(for example, with their countenance, in jokes, or camera work).
The proliferation of stations that happened after the creation 
of the Nigerian Television Authority (NTA) by military decree in 
1977 should be regarded as crucial in the quest for democracy. 
Television was brought closer to more people.  It was due to the 
politicking of the time yet the move was arguably part of plans to 
consolidate the nation. The political upheavals of the 1960s, espe-
cially the civil war (1966–1972), necessitated a reorientation of the 
mission for television.  The new emphasis was to foster national 
unity, rather than difference (distinction) inherent in the regional 
services that existed at the onset.  Exigencies of national life ac-
counted for more stations being established around the nation. 
Military rule with its unitary command persisted.  New states had 
been created out of the three-regional structure.  Stations had 
to be established in each state in the federation, and subsumed 
within a common framework.  This policy set the course for prolif-
eration of widely dispersed government funded stations.  Stations 
increased as new states were created to bring government closer 
to the people.  This is similar to the BBC action which increased 
the number of regional centers in England from four to eight in 
recognition that the English nation was less homogenous than 
other British nation-regions – Wales, Scotland and Northern Ire-
land (BBC 1969). In this was an acknowledgement that designating 
market boundaries should consider both technical and sociologi-
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cal factors. UK is instructive, though it is not as diverse as Nigeria. 
Station proliferation made NTA the largest television network in 
Africa, consisting of stations in closer physical proximity of au-
diences. Yet there was widespread dissatisfaction with its factual 
programming in particular.  Seen as its master’s voice, television 
appeared to evoke cynicism not confidence.   
Television in Nigeria was undoubtedly a critical tool for na-
tion-building.  When regional autonomy and rivalry that had char-
acterized the early years gave way to the unitary focus, a feder-
al system with a strong centre emerged in television governance 
too. NTA central authority determined the thrust of programming. 
National priorities constituted Grade A broadcasts; stations had to 
suspend locally scheduled programs to hook up to the national 
network.  Prime time was reserved for national programs.  These 
were centrally commissioned and foreign programs centrally ac-
quired.  Representation of federal character was a strategy em-
ployed to foster understanding and unity. As priorities of stations 
were negotiated within the context of the nation, the advantage 
of their proximity to the grassroots was necessarily compromised. 
These developments had implications for how well television ser-
vices articulated voices of different audience groups in the nation 
and became evident in television’s failure to reflect the national 
mood in years leading up to the third republic.  Viewer apathy 
to news and factual programs from government-owned stations, 
negotiated readings of media texts revealed audience disgrun-
tlement. Nigerians’ disillusionment with military rule and their 
strong yearning for democracy was attested to by voters’ behav-
ior in relation to the aborted 1993 elections.  Although this was 
palpable in the press and on radio, television’s role in address-
ing them was questionable.  That existing television stations were 
within the stranglehold of governments was amply demonstrated 
through news and government-sponsored public notices.  Televi-
sion sang its masters’ tune.  Professional call of media managers 
and audience interests were subordinated to government’s (Esan, 
2009, p.139). This imbalance was hardly consistent with normative 
media ideals though in principle service continued to be aligned 
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with laudable visions of the founding fathers.  But while television 
succeeded in disseminating information, it also generated disaf-
fection towards government, even by its omissions. 
Subordination of audience interest was contrary to expecta-
tions of the public service orientation. Television’s performance in 
actualizing Nigeria’s democratic aspirations was gravely compro-
mised.  Government patronage, which guaranteed capital funding, 
held this medium captive. Nowhere was this more evident than in 
state-government owned stations which were established during 
the second republic. Government control in these was as in the 
NTA which they were set up to challenge.  In the case of Lagos 
Television, for instance, the semblance of independence built into 
governance of television stations was removed.  Rather than being 
a government parastatal run by public servants headed by a gen-
eral manager and answerable to a board, the staff are regarded as 
civil servants, headed by a chief executive (permanent secretary) 
answerable to the state governor through the commissioner for 
information.  
In no other genre was government stranglehold most obvious 
than the news – the most privileged and most frequently fea-
tured genre.  Defined narrowly by operationally shackled televi-
sion news managers as what important people do, news brought 
government officials into sharp focus. Audiences were inundated 
with images of leaders - their private and public lives.  They even 
managed to encroach into lifestyle/entertainment shows.  Tele-
vision remains a mirror on the world, a court of public opinion, 
purveyor of faiths, and a social diary. Although consistent with 
traditional lifestyles, the drive for funds amplified the importance 
of these television forms on program schedules. Since programs 
(even news) were commercialized, stations relied on the revenue 
from these shows.  Regular scheduled programs would even be 
shunted in favor of sponsored shows. Pleasures of viewing were 
thus unpredictable. 
Tabloidization – a penchant for gossip, sleek living and celeb-
ritification on television was consistent with global trends.  The 
humble social diary, which parades private celebrations of the af-
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fluent and the powerful, has been elevated. The genre has since 
multiplied across television schedules.  Bisi Olatilo Show, which 
prides itself as the leader of the pack, delights in its showcase 
of quintessential taste and folks with pedigree. This genre is an 
inadvertent social commentary, an informal (even inadvertent) 
monitoring of the powerful revealing the incongruence of their 
lifestyles compared with the reality of the masses.  Television helps 
to expose those living better lives despite biting economic reces-
sion. It is thus likely to generate disaffection against the powerful 
and the media tightly controlled by them.  In its failure to properly 
address these issues, television may be deemed by audiences as 
agents of frustration – a sentinel that raises alerts, yet is unable 
to drive away intruders.  In this case it is a captive to commercial 
interests.  
Without government involvement and policies in television, 
the number and location of television stations could have been 
severely limited.  Tested and proven government markets paved 
the way for the commercial intervention by private entrepreneurs, 
whose arrival marked the third phase of television broadcasting 
in Nigeria.  This liberalized regulatory regime was also consistent 
with global trends and with the mood of the nation.  The era of 
global deregulation, entrenched in the 1990s, marked a departure 
from the stranglehold of terrestrial broadcasting (Hong & Hsu, 
1999).  The introduction of satellite transmission led to new modes 
of transnational broadcasting, with the incursion of notable trans-
national media corporations (TMCs) like BSkyB in the UK, and the 
global operations of CNN, MTV, StarTimes, and the African-fo-
cused DSTV, into sub-Saharan Africa.  This was characterized by 
intense commercialization, sleek aesthetics, competitiveness, 
and cultural homogenization with the replication of formats, or 
franchised brands. Although the prohibitive cost of broadcasting 
in Nigeria was a deterrent for private ownership, the enterprise 
remained alluring.  The statutes were changed to permit private 
broadcasting in 1993.  Private radio was quick off the block.  In 
reality, privately owned television stations only materialized in 
1995, with the establishment of Channels TV, the first Nigerian 
Yinka Esan
220
Watchdogs or Captured Media? . . . 
news Channel.  DAAR Communication’s Africa Independent Tele-
vision (AIT) came on air thereafter, in 1996.  Several more inde-
pendent channels have since been established across the nation. 
Earliest among these were Lagos stations such as DBN, MITV, Mi-
naj, Silverbird TV, along with Channels and AIT. They stood out 
for their innovation in different aspects of programming – sports, 
indigenous entertainment, foreign content, local drama, audience 
participation shows and news.  Success was short-lived for some 
but newer players like TV Continental, and later TVC News now 
dominate the scene. In its current democratic dispensation (post 
‘98 era), television remains largely urbanized but so has a higher 
proportion of the population.  Since 1960, population density has 
increased, from 49/km2 to 297/km2 in 2017(World Population Re-
view, 2017).Urban centers have also increased and spread widely 
across the nation, thus justifying television’s urban focus. Similarly 
global migration justifies extension of television service to audi-
ences in the Diaspora. These appear to be indices of a progressive 
democratic culture, yet it is in the impact of such services that 
progress should be assessed.
Social impact of Television 
Technology and participation
The impact of television in society is driven by a combination of 
factors - political, economic, social and cultural factors, along with 
the prevalent technologies in operation.  Regarding technology, 
the first dimension to consider is its intrinsic (technical) properties. 
The fact that television is an audio-visual medium determines its 
messages and how they are received.  The nature of the audienc-
es, and their social milieu, further commend the use of the medi-
um, which lends itself to a population who would prefer to see, to 
believe.
The ability to demonstrate action or vicariously transport view-
ers to witness events and outcomes for themselves, are properties 
of television that align with the manner in which audience needs 
can be met, and their values negotiated. Differences in the social 
context of audiences — their educational attainment, gender roles, 
domestic situations, and daily lifestyles — affect their disposition 
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to viewing (Esan 1993).  Consequently, the ability to properly de-
code broadcast messages is also affected.  When this ability is not 
uniform in audiences, television cannot be equivalent of the ideal 
public sphere.  The assumed equality of experience in the sphere 
becomes a mere illusion.  However, its edge in communicating 
with unschooled audiences remains.  Being akin to oral cultures 
with which they are familiar, broadcast messages communicate 
better with illiterate audiences. Where the reception facilities are 
available, these messages reach them directly, whereas newspa-
pers cannot.  Even those with little or no educational attainment, 
received messages that they saw and heard!
Technology is required to produce and communicate televi-
sion messages.  The broadcast chain consists of various compo-
nents, of which, transmitters are most crucial since their location 
determines the extent, scope, and clarity of reception, and they 
are most expensive.  Production equipment includes cameras, re-
corders, microphones, mixers and editing suites.  The cost of this 
hardware, even without reckoning the cost of intellectual proper-
ty, makes television an expensive mass medium.  By far the most 
visible technological elements in the business of television are re-
ceiver sets, the cost of which is borne by the consumers.  Television 
requires the highest investment for information and communica-
tion.  The cost and capability of receiver sets inform the viewing 
experience, meanings, and pleasures derived.  These technological 
factors impact on the availability, ownership and access required 
for democratic culture.
As with other innovations in their infancy, the cost of televi-
sion receiver sets was higher than the larger proportion of the 
populace could afford.  In the 1960s when television service was 
new to Nigeria, TV sets were priced out of reach of most citizens. 
Unlike radio, which was generally more affordable, especially with 
the availability of low-cost portable transistor radio sets, televi-
sion was primarily elitist. Ownership of television conferred status; 
it was a desirable item of furniture, even among the lowly-paid, 
many of whom went on to acquire sets as soon as their econom-
ic circumstances permitted.  This was the case of civil servants, 
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who got an upward review of their salaries made effective retro-
actively. Known as the Udoji award, this windfall-payment of un-
expected salary arrears had a multiplier effect that was felt even in 
rural areas.  Some families acquired TV sets to end the indignities 
associated with their reliance on sets owned by more fortunate 
neighbors.  An influx of imported and locally assembled television 
sets helped to make them more affordable, further increasing the 
number of sets in circulation, and expanding the audience-reach 
of television.  Gradually, the practice of congregating around the 
neighbors’ sets, or watching through neighbors’ windows out of 
necessity reduced. Communal viewing persists in the new millen-
nium for other social reasons constituting sites for discussion of 
messages.
Another technological dimension affecting television oper-
ations and reception is the limited supply of electricity.  The is-
sue in the earlier days was that this essential social infrastructure 
was restricted to urban areas.  Distribution of electricity has since 
been extended to many more communities than in the 1960s, 
but national electricity supply is sporadic. Households and busi-
nesses had to rely on generators at great costs. In television it is 
a considerable proportion of required operating costs, arguably 
a distraction from the core business.  For viewers, the supply of 
low cost versions in the 2000s meant more people could generate 
electricity for their subsistence economic activities.  Consequently 
televisions sets could also be powered from homes and places of 
work – shops, reception areas, waiting rooms, restaurants - such 
enterprises conducive to communal viewing.  Number of receiver 
sets in circulation had increased making the medium less elitist. 
Its ability to reach the teeming population had improved.  Riding 
on the success of the burgeoning music industry and film indus-
try, (Nollywood), which television helped to create, more television 
programs were created to align with popular cultural beliefs and 
outlooks. These developments are double edged when consider-
ing media’s contribution to a democratic culture.  Arguably, access 
to media messages is the first step towards meaningful participa-
tion. In that regard, these are progressive.  However, there is the 
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matter of content – do accessed programs constitute a distraction 
or facilitate quality engagement?  Some clues to answering this 
question lie in other ancillary technological devices. 
Key features in television’s timeline are development of do-
mestic devices which gave viewers more control, for example time 
shifting devices like the video (later DVD and other hard disk) re-
corders.  These altered the manner of viewing, reducing enslave-
ment to TV schedules.  In other climes, these devices meant that 
viewers could record their favorite shows in order to watch them 
at more convenient times, however social infrastructure described 
above, prevalent lifestyles and time pressures undermined this. 
In reality though, these devices meant audiences could reorga-
nize their own viewing pleasure.  Opting out of terrestrial broad-
cast, they could watch programs of their choice – home videos or 
DVDs bought or hired from video clubs for instance. Later devices 
such as set top boxes (cable/satellite) facilitated more convenient 
distribution of options, though at the cost of subscription. These 
helped extend exposure to other local and globally located public 
service stations. Audiences were thus able to subvert public ser-
vice broadcasting that they deemed irrelevant.  In the process they 
had also missed items that may have been relevant.  
The role played by the humble video cameras in enhancing the 
democratic culture should also be noted.  Its domestication was 
due to supply of affordable and user friendly designs.  The number 
of people who could make or contribute to television programs 
thus increased.  TV programs were once produced by highly skilled 
professionals, often studio-based or in limited outdoor locations. 
The arrival of the VHS camera (home video recorders) broke down 
those restrictions. Initially, recordings by audience featured in lim-
ited entertainment shows—You’ve Been Framed (UK) America’s 
Funniest Home Videos (USA).  Roving camera reports were also 
included in shows like Candid Camera and Beadle’s About (UK). 
Nigerian audiences were privy to these precursors of produsage 
- a term referring to user generated content (Bruns, 2007).  In Ni-
geria, it became standard practice for videographers to record pri-
vate functions for private consumption.  Eventually some products 
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were broadcast, incorporated into social diaries, or in news and 
enlightenment programs. These practices raised the importance 
of spot assessments, interviews, and eyewitness reports.  When 
mobile telephones got converged with cameras and internet facil-
ities, consumers knew what to do. 
In the early days, there was little room for public participation 
in televised programs.  Except when picked up in the press or 
from limited studio audience, audience reaction went unseen. No 
wonder television news was regarded as little more than a no-
tice board, a town crier, which could not field questions making 
some audience members indifferent to civic duties. (Esan, 1993). 
Factual programs on television in particular consisted of talking 
heads—radio with pictures.  In time, the situation improved with 
formats including discussions, use of vox populi segments, and 
studio audience participation. These formats, especially those 
relying on experts drawn from limited pools of available human 
resources undermined broad based representation. The trend im-
proved when global satellite mobile (GSM) phones flooded the 
Nigerian market. Interested viewers could elect to participate in 
the televised discussions.  Though mobile telephony was in cir-
culation in the 1990s, it was not widely available till the 2000s. 
Nigeria was reported to have the fastest uptake in mobile tele-
communications services (Okafor, 2016). Based on NCC data, it is 
claimed that in July 2016 there were approximately  150 million 
active mobile GSM subscribers, as opposed to around 2.2 million 
in 2002 (Oxford Business Report, 2016). Access to phones enhanc-
es public participation when stations create those opportunities. 
Independent television stations being leaner and more innova-
tive were quick to create these opportunities which had previously 
been jealously guarded in government owned stations.  
The scope of produsage is much wider now since the conver-
gence of mobile telephony with communication devices.  Smart 
phones are now miniaturized production suites; users can record, 
process, disseminate and store messages.  Democratized access 
to such devices (phones, tablets, Ipads) is a key development.  It 
demonstrates interdependence of both technological and social 
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dimensions of television - that technological capabilities only be-
come meaningful when they can be accessed and used.  It further 
attests to the importance of political, economic, and social con-
text.  As Williams had argued, by acknowledging both technolog-
ical and socio-cultural dimensions of the medium, we gain more 
robust perspectives of the way television has aided the quest for 
democracy.
Convergence with other media technologies and social net-
working sites (Facebook, Twitter, Instagram, YouTube) has facili-
tated wider coverage, and enhanced participation in novel ways 
– audience phone in, other forms of live contributions to shows, 
redistribution of segments of shows, and through this (viral mes-
saging of video segments, or documentation in public space like 
YouTube) a public memorialization of televised moments.  Ac-
knowledging these brings more agencies (people and institutions) 
under critical scrutiny.  So it can be argued that the collaborative 
role of the media has been enhanced.  A broader definition of 
those who monitor and those who are to be monitored now ap-
plies.  Scholarly and professional attention can thus be challenged 
to reconceive the concept of the powerful - look beyond usual 
government office holders that had hitherto been the obsession. 
This is most enabling for monitoring the powerful, arguably the 
most critical role of the media in a democracy (McQuail, 2013, 
p.109).
Assessing Content
Having looked at the technological dimension to television, 
and demonstrated how this is compounded by political and eco-
nomic factors, in this section, we shall examine how its forms have 
enhanced or impeded television in the execution of its mission 
to help establish /maintain a democratic culture as consistent 
with the aim of public service broadcasting.  Drawing a sample of 
genres to consider returns us to a longstanding debate on media 
forms and formats.  It is based on the legitimacy of a conventional 
hierarchy of programs. Implied in this is an indication of the qual-
ity of the programs, the value of taste groups, (social divisions of 
the audiences) who consume particular programs.  Programs like 
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the news have been regarded as serious, consumed by the elite 
(Sparks, 1991).  The genre has commanded much professional and 
scholarly attention.  Others, particularly entertainment programs 
with mass audiences, are often denigrated as being trivial. In the 
final analysis, media texts have to attract the right size and type of 
audience to be viable.
Being the later arrival on the media scene, television built on ra-
dio’s success, adapting its successful message forms—news, talk, 
music, and drama.  The medium also borrows ideas from books, 
theatre, film, and indigenous media that had preceded it.  Perhaps 
due to the tendency for television service to be sustained by enter-
tainment, television was once not regarded as a worthy academic 
enterprise (Dayan & Katz, 1994). Scholarly attention was reserved 
for genres in the purview of political communication (news, docu-
mentaries) and education (schools, broadcast). Yet, viewing sched-
ules were sustained by genres such as situation comedy, drama, 
variety shows, and children’s animation.  These genres have since 
attracted critical attention, especially as they have proven to be 
commercially viable. 
Stratification of genres is relevant for another reason - it is re-
flected in allocation of resources. Genres deemed more serious are 
privileged in resources for production and dissemination - mon-
ey, talent, facilities, even slated airtime.  The pleasures of certain 
audience segments are thus better guaranteed. Such audiences 
are likely to be better engaged with issues.  Poorly resourced and 
poorly researched programs  tend to generate audience apathy. 
In program commissioning, ideas development and production, 
media institutions themselves need to adopt inclusive strategies. 
Regardless of statutory assignments, stated missions or covert 
agenda of owners and staff, audience pleasure is television’s ulti-
mate goal.  That being so, programs (as with good dramas) should 
be engaging even if participation is merely vicarious. Audiences 
can be supported to use their imaginations – contemplate solu-
tions to problems confronting them.  A narrow interpretation of 
participation leads to an underestimation of such genres.  Con-
versely, setting too much stock by the relevance of certain genres 
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like news, for example, in the coverage of electoral campaigns, 
leads to over emphasis on news.  In reality, audiences experience 
media messages in a flow. Though electoral campaigns occur only 
periodically what happens before and after elections are interest-
ing.  Newscasts may lack the scope for continuity, yet to be efficient 
in television’s normative roles; other formats that enable analysis 
of background, context and implication of issues are required. A 
variety of news shows now exist with audience participation built 
in. They contribute to the fulfillment of television’s obligations of 
ensuring that citizens are responsible, well informed, and motivat-
ed to properly appraise available range of viewpoints, in a con-
trolled environment devoid of rancor and bitterness.  Audiences 
are now more than targets to be delivered to advertisers. Their 
views are being tapped in manners akin to the collaborative role. 
The popularity of their concerns also helps set program agenda. 
Phenomena from social networking sites (Facebook, Twitter, Insta-
gram) now inspire issues covered in the media. 
In Nigeria, news has always been central to TV schedules as 
evident in a sample of published schedules from WNTV.  (Ikhime, 
1979).  The broadcast day usually started and ended with the news. 
Slots for a major newscast featured in the course of the evening. 
News accounted for almost one hour of a six-hour long broadcast 
day on WNTV in October 1962.  In later years this pattern persist-
ed on newer stations including slots for news in brief segments in 
English and Nigerian languages dominant in designated market 
areas. The longest slot was always reserved for news reports from 
home and abroad. The slot for news kept increasing over the years 
– from 15 minutes reserved for the main evening news on WNTV 
in 1972, to 45 minutes devoted to 9 o’ clock news on NTA net-
work in the 80s.  News is still central in the post 1999 deregulated 
era, by which time independent television stations had emerged. 
The broadcast day was longer, stations were transmitting almost 
round the clock, and the privileged status of news was evident on 
the schedules. News had slots across different times of day. Two of 
these independent stations are specialist news providers – Chan-
nels and TVC News. Although AIT has mixed programming, its 
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news content is still as dominant as found on government-owned 
stations. This increase broadened the scope of coverage and facil-
itated innovation in the definition and treatment of news. There is 
now decent attention to other aspects of living (Health, Art, Law, 
Lifestyle, Environment); Politics, though Economy/Business, and 
Sports remain prevalent. The range of voices being heard has in-
creased as each station found its stock of experts.  Pluralism has 
generated competition; stations work to attract and deliver the 
right type of audiences to advertisers, by delivering reliable and 
relevant information.  Their slogans and station promos reflect 
their mission. AIT - “Sharing the African Experience”, Channels TV 
– “Your Home for News”, TVC News “Through African Eyes. First 
Accurate and Reliable”. Implicit in this is a commitment to present 
distinctive narratives in the global arena.  While serving local audi-
ences, stations also had eyes for global audiences. Local stories are 
being picked up by transnational broadcasters like CNN, BBC and 
others. The stakes are higher in a globalised economy and profes-
sionalism is rewarded. From the start of its operations, Channels 
committed to delivering a fresh perspective in news.  It promised 
to maintain balance, going beyond the jaded view of stories hav-
ing two sides, acknowledging instead the multidimensional nature 
of issues. Through a 2017 station promo it commits to following 
stories.  In this is recognition that news should be more than re-
ports of moments signaled in the headlines.  Back stories are es-
sential for audience appreciation of headlines.  The rhetoric in the 
promo invites audiences along with the station to take the long 
route if they are to fully appreciate issues.  “. . . We follow the story 
because the need to know never changes.  We don’t have all the 
answers, but keep our eyes open to keep our minds open. . . We 
follow the story because we are part of the story.” 
On one level this attests to a station being responsible, but on 
a deeper level it urges audiences to be responsible too.  It illus-
trates broadcasters fulfilling their radical role and is indicative of a 
more collaborative culture emerging in television news.  Promos 
from TVC News bring this into sharper focus.  They stress the im-
portance of engagement, analysis, and interpretation and have in-
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novative approaches for delivering these. Besides usual strategies 
employed in producing television news (careful coordination of 
correspondents, strong, personable and respected anchors) TVC 
employs other formats and taps into opportunities offered by its 
multiplatform operations to make this possible.  Audiences are 
invited to be involved through social media platforms like Twitter, 
to keep abreast of developments –to “follow, engage and share”. 
Such dynamism empowers viewers and strengthens the demo-
cratic culture (locally and globally) in a post-CNN, 24-hour rolling 
news era. At a time when so-called fake news and hate speeches 
demonstrate the licentiousness occurring in less regulated social 
media spaces, access to authoritative professional and reliable 
television sources via these platforms is salutary.  
Innovation in the broadcast media can be attributed to the im-
proved training and exposure of broadcasters.  Audiences have 
also become more sophisticated, having higher expectations of 
television services.  Globalisation that characterized the dereg-
ulated era has been long coming. Besides broadcasting foreign 
content, formats of foreign shows were adapted for the Nigerian 
audiences. In the 80s, Lagos Weekend Television (fashioned after 
London Weekend Television), a marathon (24-hour, weekend) ser-
vice was introduced by Lagos Television in the short lived second 
republic. NTA 2 also pioneered a breakfast television talk show, 
“Morning Ride”. Magazine style, the show included a variety of 
segments—bite size reviews, analysis, and discussion of topical 
issues and events. A digestible, entertaining live talk show, with 
studio guests and a phone-in segment, it was lively but did not 
conform to NTA’s usual strict restrictions imposed due to concerns 
for security and national priorities.  Yet an exception was made. 
Federal government funded NTA was responding to competition 
from LTV, a station controlled by the rival party.  This design ex-
emplified results of staff exposure to global trends as confirmed 
by the creator /producer /presenter: 
“Every vacation … I had the privilege of going abroad, watch a lot of 
[UK] TV shows …. I saw TV as it should be, so when my colleagues were 
just learning the ropes, I had already been honed in a way by [viewing 
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professionals like] Michael Aspel, Eamonn Andrews, and all the shows, 
[such as] TV AM, and I saw that there was a need for us to establish 
something that was going to capture the imagination.  Remember in 
those days, 85 / 86, NTA in the mornings were transmitting documen-
taries on earthworms, tomatoes and all sorts of things, grasshoppers . 
There was no life, and I felt that we needed to seize that morning belt, 
and I felt there was a need to be able to capture the imagination of 
people …”   
(Danladi Bako in Interview with TVC This Morning July 2017)
The format was initially regarded as a risk because the unpre-
dictable nature of contributions from audience who phoned-in to 
a live show necessarily compromised usual strict editorial controls. 
Morning Ride’s success opened new prospects, offering a voice to 
the unseen public, and getting direct feedback from them.  The 
format strengthened the media in their monitoring function. How-
ever it was in the post 99 era that it flourished; the convergence 
of television with other platforms and new modes of communi-
cation (phone calls, email, Twitter) really enhanced this develop-
ment.  The format has since become a standard feature on both 
independent and government owned television stations.  The talk 
show format has become a workhorse being refined by new en-
trants into the market—AIT’s Kakaaki, Channels’ Sunrise Daily, and 
TVC’s TVC Breakfast.
These shows offer more comprehensive and in-depth engage-
ment with topical concerns than had been previously possible. 
Whereas standard television programs were 30 minute packag-
es, newer shows were easily multiples of this.  Kakaaki (AIT) runs 
weekdays for three hours from 6:00 a.m. till 9:00 a.m. NTA’s AM Ex-
press ran for180 minutes, taking audiences on whistle-stop tours 
of the nation.  Channels Television’s Sunrise Daily runs for 90 min-
utes.  Anchored by a panel of three hard-nosed interviewers noted 
for their adversarial style, the show occupies a niche consistent 
with the reputation of the originating institution - the first special-
ist news station in Nigeria.  It is the station’s “hard-hitting flagship 
news and current affairs program. It asks the crucial questions and 
gets behind the stories that make the news-from political lead-
ers, corporate decision-makers to everyday individuals of note.” 
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[emphasis mine]—Channels Television website. 
The emphasis in the quote confirms as noted earlier, that the 
broadening of attention beyond government functionaries to in-
dividuals strategically positioned to impact everyday living is a div-
idend of deregulated broadcasting and democratized media.  On 
6th March and 28th May 2016 for example, electricity distributors, 
teachers, women and children advocates were featured.   Longer 
transmission days created opportunities for more content and 
chances to incorporate similar novel accessible formats to address 
different audience groups.  Segmented by interests (politics, busi-
ness, sports), language (Yoruba, Igbo), age (youth) gender per-
spective (women), shows like Journalists’ Hangout (TVC), “Patito’s 
Gang” (Channels), “Mini Jojo” (AIT), “Your View” (TVC) are worthy 
examples.  Longer transmission days also legitimized repeat trans-
mission of shows which made viewing more flexible. 
Factual programs aside, Fiction has a role to play in the foster-
ing of a democratic culture.  Entertainment dominates television 
schedules for good reason – they are social lubricants attracting 
and keeping audiences happy in between broadcast of factual 
(graver) fare. Yet entertainment can also have serious consequenc-
es, helping to shape audience world views. Concerns about early 
television’s dependence on foreign shows like “I Love Lucy”, “Perry 
Mason”, “Little House on the Prairies” were based on the fears 
of potential acculturation. Simply put, audiences could become 
disgruntled with lived realities when mediated experiences offer 
realities deemed better than theirs, especially when no tangible 
paths to rectify their realities are offered. There are more serious 
economic, cultural and political implications of this. For this rea-
son, transnational media texts ought to be culturally relevant, rais-
ing aspirations without creating frustrations.  
Programs should respect peculiar sensibilities of audiences, 
adapt existing oral cultures, adopt fare suited to perceived tastes 
and aspirations of local audiences. Central to television’s response 
to serving its diverse ethnic identities is the question of language. 
Imposition of a dominant hegemony manifests first in the use of 
language.  Since it was expedient to use the most widely spoken 
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dialect or language, minority groups tended to be marginalized 
within a centralized designated market area.  Whereas national 
radio was able to transmit news summaries in English along with 
several Nigerian languages—Edo, Efik, Fulfulde, Hausa, Igbo, Izon 
(Ijaw), Kanuri, Tiv, and Yoruba—national network television was 
often restricted. Selected local languages were better accommo-
dated within decentralized television news services.  Even these 
lacked depth and failed to cover the range of existing groups due 
to the extreme linguistic diversity of the country.  Entertainment 
and enlightenment programs, which were charged to transmit cul-
tural heritage were better able to reflect diverse cultures.  Drama 
with its scope to present a range of characters was better suited 
to this role. Characters in serial dramas, like “Village Headmaster”, 
depicted different ethnic groups and facilitated the imagining of 
a variety of locations.  For example, Amebo, the village gossip’s 
references to Ahoada, brought to limelight areas then less well 
known (Bayelsa State).  Similarly, music and dance programmes 
drew on cultural troupes from across the nation.  In the case of 
NTA’s “Nigerian Dances”, audiences were introduced to existing 
cultural diversitythough in time, dancing seemed out of place in 
the face of other pressing national needs. 
Addressing burdens of representation was part of the remit for 
NTA’s Programmes directorate. Its successful drama programs to 
that end include “Cock Crow at Dawn”, “Samanja” (North/Middle 
Belt), “Masquerades”,  “Icheoku” (South East), “Koko Close”, “Sura 
the Tailor”, (South West), and “Hotel de Jordan” (South South/Mid-
West).  Featured on the network service, these shows transported 
audiences across the nation and were more than passing fancies. 
Perhaps more than politically explicitly charged current affairs 
programs, the dramatic genre helped audiences to confront and 
explore contrast and similarities in issues of living.  They gave con-
text to differences, and raised common issues of concern. On this 
score, NTA programs  deserve credit for laying the foundation in 
the eighties - presenting diverse slices of national life. This tradi-
tion persists, through independent television stations, Nollywood 
and independent producers which supply content to television.  
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Use of appropriate local languages attracted large audiences 
and enhanced participation especially where communal viewing 
occurred.  Dramatized storytelling (fictional) like “Feyikogbon”, 
“Super Story”, in-depth features of odd occurrences unlikely 
to make the news “Nkan Mbe”, ombudsman /counseling pro-
grammes like “Gboromiro”, “Mini Jojo” had strong water cooler 
effects offering talking points carried beyond viewing experience.
Schedules had other bankers for specific audience segments. 
Children watched locally produced shows, alongside foreign car-
toons, action hero series and adventure series. Liberalization in 
the post ‘99 era offered access to more foreign channels.  Dis-
ney programs like “The Suite Life of Zach and Cody” or “That’s So 
Raven” may have outmatched attention to local productions on 
Africa Magic channels. In any case, middle class parents tended to 
regulate viewing of Africa Magic more strictly. 
Africa Magic is a suite of channels on DSTV, carrying content 
produced for Africa by Africans. DSTV is a subscription funded sat-
ellite distribution television service, a continental initiative owned 
by Multichoice.  Its operations involved redistributing the prod-
ucts of other transnational media corporation (TMCs) including 
Disney, Cartoon Network , news and movies channels from across 
the world – Africa, America, Europe, Asia - China, and India. It of-
fers audiences a choice of fare beyond what national broadcast-
ers provide. Once synonymous with Nigerian movies notoriety for 
negative portrayals, children’s viewing of Africa Magic was strictly 
regulated but its operations are now more diversified as seen on 
its seven channels. They carry local language productions, popu-
lar serial drama like “Tinsel”, “Jacob’s Cross”, and “Shuga”. Some 
are collaborative productions involving Nigeria, South Africa and 
Kenya.  Aiming to offer the best in entertainment, Africa Magic 
commissions original shows, draws on franchises (Deal or No Deal 
Nigeria, Big Brother Naija), adapts formats (Africa’s Young Entre-
preneurs fashioned after BBC’s Dragon’s Den). Globally franchised 
entertainment formats were also popular on terrestrial television 
in the post ‘99 era.  High stakes in competitive formats like -Who 
Wants To Be a Millionaire, Big Brother (Africa), StarQuest, Nigeria’s 
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Got Talent promoted a voting culture. Outlook and lifestyle of dif-
ferent generations of Nigerians may have directed their affinity 
and exposure to these. Where it occurs, engagement with such 
shows may strengthen inclinations towards democratic participa-
tion.
Comedy as a form has since evolved from the days of half-
hour comedy dramas (“Alawada”, “Icheoku” and “Samanja”) with 
their comic characters, slapstick style and focus on human foi-
bles.  Comedy skits and stand-up comedy with its irreverence 
now abound (Ali Baba, A Y Show, Princess, Basketmouth, Helen 
Paul, and Mr. Patrick).  These characterize the post ’99 democrat-
ic era.  The genre offers new spaces for audiences to reflect on 
their situations.  These candid appraisal of socio-political trends, 
and open lampooning of the powerful are features of a flourish-
ing democratic culture. It is consistent with Bahktin’s celebration 
of the carnivalesque – liberating spaces in folk culture (like the 
carnival) where authority is temporarily inverted. New order can 
be broached here and the powerful reproached without fear. Such 
absence of reprisals is an advantage of comedic forms. Once over-
looked, the power in the genre is now recognized and may be un-
der threat of being hijacked by the powerful. Performers are hired 
to entertain the wealthy at private functions and during political 
campaigns.  Such patronage could become stifling.
Music also flourishes on television as programs and as fillers. 
Yet recent preoccupation with love songs, relationships and the 
consumerist culture that trendy musicians promote, may have wa-
tered down music’s contribution to democratic aspirations (See 
top ranking songs in the charts e.g. Popular Naija Songs: Top 30 
2016; Africa Charts - Official Top Music Videos Nigeria 2017; Offi-
cial Top 50 Songs Nigeria 2017).  However, the potential for inci-
sive social commentary from music videos, such as Lagbaja’s 200 
Million Mumu – The Bitter Truth (2012), should not be discounted. 
Indeed Eedris Abdulkareem’s track, Nigeria Jagajaga (2004), was 
deemed so abrasive, that it was outlawed, even in a democratic 
dispensation.  These examples are reminiscent of Fela Anikulapo 
Kuti’s Afrobeat style, which remains relevant and popular, though 
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it met with stiff resistance from the military rulers of his time. The 
contrasting experiences attest to shifting cultural paradigms.  The 
potential of other musical genres like Juju to foster serious reflec-
tion and enhance the democratic culture has also been demon-
strated. A classic example is Onyeka Onwenu and Sunny Ade’s 
collaboration, Wait for Me (1985), used to promote positive re-
productive rights behavior. It illustrates the hybridised genre, in-
fotainment that has since become more prevalent beyond musical 
genres.
Conclusion - Democratic Forms on Nigerian Television 
Television helps exhibit life and lifestyles and thus helps to es-
tablish the political agenda.  Its ability to represent diverse groups 
may lie in its treatment of matters of interest, employing the right 
format as appropriate for target audiences.  Traditionally televi-
sion programs may be classified broadly by a station’s organi-
zational structure—Public Enlightenment, Entertainment, News, 
Sports and Current Affairs.  These classifications matter to the end 
that they determine resource allocation—both financial and hu-
man.  With proliferation of channels, including specialists (niche) 
channels, the need for competitiveness and innovation, program 
classifications have broadened the scope of audiences served.  Ni-
gerian media, which had relied on the elite in society and the “seri-
ous” genre (news and current affairs), to deliberate on and convey 
political information, is now reaching out beyond those.  There is 
evidence to suggest the democratizing of television service.  This 
may be attributed to the mix of factors—technological, economic, 
socio-cultural, and political—discussed above.  The tendency to-
wards discussion, concurrent dialogues, and, principally, the ability 
to participate directly, makes television more than a notice board 
as it used to be.  With formal moderation of its space, unlike social 
media, television is a platform for reasonable and rational debate 
between these diverse groups. 
Media roles have been variously defined, but it can be argued 
that the ultimate goal for media in a democratic society is to foster 
participation and informed decision making.  Messages must be 
relevant, and audiences ought to have ordered access to contrib-
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ute views that can be rationally considered. Nigeria is richer for 
access to diverse (global and local) perspectives, and media are 
making bold strides towards building an inclusive society.  Wide-
scale coverage was the first step in guaranteeing access for wider 
segments of the population. This is now in place. With its frag-
ile geopolitical context, the Nigerian television market should be 
segmented mindful of complex identity politics.  Education, age, 
income, occupation, and gender aside, ethnicity, nationality, and 
religion remain much more sensitive markers. Balancing the need 
to be distinct with the imperative to belong remains a challenge 
to television’s impact. 
Televisual language and the medium’s genres commend it for 
the mission of creating an enabling culture for Nigeria’s democ-
racy.  Audio-visual forms were often readily recognizable when 
stations got their formula right.  Successful formats have been 
reminiscent of familiar forms yet fresh enough to be engaging. 
However the assumed success also relies on audience ability to 
properly decode the messages.  Where there is shared affinity 
between producers and audiences, nuances in the codes of po-
litical communication will be accessible.  Even when individuals 
have gaps in their decoding skills, having others who were familiar 
with the codes means they could be easily supported to interpret 
the message.  Not so when messages are technically or culturally 
distant from generality of the audience.  This is one advantage of 
the increased opportunities for more members of the audience 
to have direct access, even dialogues with producers and other 
members of the viewing public.  In other words, it is an advantage 
of media convergences and emerging cultures.
Television has come a long way since the authoritarian control 
maintained under the military.  Both the organizational structure 
and program designs were inhibiting. The vibrancy of public dis-
cussions conducted on varied TV shows since the opening of com-
munication floodgates contrast sharply with previously observed 
political apathy in sections of society, and resentment among the 
voiceless.  This broad based participation in demanding account-
ability of powerful groups is empowering.  Surveillance of society 
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is now collaborative, and not left to professional intermediaries. 
Consequent to the new narratives, new heroes and villains are be-
ing identified.  Through its various forms, including dramas and 
comedy, television helps viewers to see, imagine and re-imagine 
their society. It thus contributes to building the informed citizen-
ry required to make informed decisions.  Changes in television’s 
landscape are most encouraging.  There is a commitment to inter-
preting current events, attempts to predict the future, and guide 
the plans for same.  Although it is not yet ideal, television does 
frame the democratic culture and supports Nigeria’s democratic 
aspiration.
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Radio is the dominant medium and main source of information 
in Nigeria (Freedom House, 2012; Akoh & Jagun, 2012), compared 
to other forms of mass communication.  It is considered  Nigeria’s 
most obvious and effective means of mass communication be-
cause of the immediacy of its impact (Akoh & Jagun, 2012), even 
with the advent of technology and the incursion of new media, 
notably Twitter and Facebook. A radio listening culture is preva-
lent in Nigeria perhaps because it is “most accessible and available 
to the ordinary, non-literate Nigerian living in a rural area with 
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unreliable electricity access” (InterMedia cited in AMDI, 2005, 15).
A  2008 survey  submits that “three quarters of households” in 
Nigeria own radio sets (ITU cited in Akoh & Jagun, 2012, 6) while a 
2010 survey indicates that 43.5% of households in urban and semi 
urban areas own radio sets (Akoh and Jagun, 2008). 
In Nigeria, as it is prevalent globally, radio continues to con-
verge with new technologies such as the internet and mobile 
phones. New socio political dynamics such as live online stream-
ing and podcasting continually emerge to keep radio alive as a 
dialogical and participatory medium. 
According to Gunner, Ligaga & Moyo (2011), across Africa, ra-
dio continues to “focus on the everyday” and still “engage with 
moments of high national and cultural drama”. The unique ability 
of radio to merge these two makes it a powerful and dangerous 
broadcast medium. 
Historically, in Nigeria, radio was used by British colonizers in 
an ideological way. It was used to represent the interests of the 
colonial class. They also used it to advance their ideas about cul-
ture and the political order to the indigenous majority. Years later, 
radio also provided a powerful channel for state propaganda in or-
der to constitute differing levels of political identity (Larkin, 2008). 
The agitations about the exclusion of regional governments by 
Nigeria’s colonial central administration, led to the development 
of regional broadcasting and the transformation of broadcasting 
in 1959 (Ladele, Adefela & Lasekan, 1979). 
The Western Nigeria Television (WNTV) started in 1959, fol-
lowed by the radio arm, Western Nigeria Broadcasting Service 
(WNBS) in 1960 (Uche cited in Ariye, 2010:416; Ejiofor, 2002 cited 
in Atoyebi, 2002, 7). The Eastern Broadcasting Service (EBS) started 
in 1960 while the Northern region followed suit with (BCNN) in 
1962 (Saulawa, 2001 cited in Atoyebi, 2002, 7). Regional govern-
ments wielded immense power and engaged in tribal invectives 
until 1967 when civil war broke out. States then came into being in 
order to “wither the powers of the regional governments and limit 
the use of regional broadcasting services for propaganda and pol-
itics” (Atoyebi, 2002, 7). Twelve states were created, and each of 
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them established their respective radio and TV stations (Atoyebi, 
2002). Nigerian radio thereafter transformed from regional tools 
in the hands of colonial masters to state apparatuses used by the 
Federal Government (Larkin, 2008). 
In most developing nations across the world including Africa, 
the diversification of radio from the monopoly of state broadcast-
ers is closely “tied to processes of political and economic liberal-
izations” (Fardon and Furniss, 2002, 3). This has created an array of 
local community radio stations, where local issues are prioritized 
and local languages are used. In Nigeria, this liberalization was 
achieved through commercial radio stations. 
The National Broadcasting Commission was established in 
1992 through the promulgation of a decree, which brought about 
“private participation in the ownership and operation of broadcast 
stations” (Akingbulu, 2010, 12). 
In appraising radio broadcasting in contemporary Nigeria, the 
role of niche radio stations using indigenous languages must be 
factored, especially for their role in heightening citizens’ cultural 
identity evident in the surge in the use of indigenous languages, 
including Pidgin English, by radio stations in the country’s ma-
jor cities of Lagos, Abuja and Kano which reflect the multilingual 
composition of Nigeria (Durodola, 2013).
Radio stations using indigenous languages offer governments 
the opportunity to communicate their actions and policies to the 
grassroots, the un-educated and the semi-urban population out-
side the capital cities in their languages. As Soola (2002) states, 
radio is particularly relevant to the needs of the rural, marginalized 
and disadvantaged poor. Radio is thus being used as a tool for 
development across Nigeria, similar to its use in other developing 
nations with a large illiterate population (Larkin, 2008). In Nigeria, 
radio has evolved as a veritable tool for mass mobilization, na-
tional orientation and creation of awareness on a variety of issues, 
including democratic governance and accountability.
How Radio Blossomed in Nigeria since 1999
The Nigerian broadcast sector was liberalized with Decree No. 
38 of 1992 (Jibbo & Simbine 2003, 182). It paved the way for pri-
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vately owned radio and TV stations to begin operation. The de-
cree also provided for a regulatory body known as the National 
Broadcasting Commission (NBC). In 2000, FRCN was directed by 
the Federal Government of Nigeria to operate FM stations at vari-
ous state capitals. That same year the broadcast sector was privat-
ized, paving the way for ownership and operations of broadcast 
stations by individuals. Another expansion drive for more stations 
started with the FRCN and NTA at the beginning of the millennium 
(Akingbulu & Bussiek, 2010). 
By 2009, 17 years after liberalization, the industry had devel-
oped such that there were “more than 394 stations and an annual 
advertising revenue estimate of about 2 Billion Naira” (NBC, 2009). 
This informed the need to allow alternative networks in the in-
dustry, more importantly however, the plurality of broadcast was 
informed by “the size of Nigeria, culture, her religious diversity, 
commercial and national interest” (NBC, 2009).   
The Evolution of Talk Station Formats in Nigeria
Nigeria has a duopolistic state broadcasting system, with sta-
tions owned by the federal government and state governments 
(Akoh and Jagun, 2012; Akingbulu, 2010; Mytton, 2013; Bolarin-
wa, 2011). The two forms compete “in providing news and current 
affairs content, especially when the political affiliation of the state 
administration differs from that of the Federal government” (Akoh 
& Jagun, 2012, 28). The Federal Government owns the Federal Ra-
dio Corporation of Nigeria (FRCN) network and the Voice of Ni-
geria (VON) “which provides Foreign Service broadcasts” (Bolarin-
wa, 2011, 1). The monopoly of the FRCN, which is the broadcaster 
mandated to “perform a federally defined broadcasting function,’’ 
does not cover state radio broadcasting (Akoh & Jagun, 2012, 28). 
Each state has its own broadcasting corporation, which provides 
both radio and television services (Akoh & Jagun, 2012). These 
broadcast in English language and the predominant indigenous 
language(s) of the state. They relay the National Network News on 
the Federal government-owned network, thereby contributing to 
the federal radio broadcaster’s widest reach in the country (Aking-
bulu, 2010).       
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Talk radio in Nigeria was pioneered by the FRCN Network, a 
public broadcaster turned state broadcaster, which has grown 
in dimensions and scope since 1932. After privatization, Daar 
Communication’s RayPower FM emerged as the alternative radio 
platform, especially to counter government’s views and position 
on sundry issues. Early in its existence it established itself as a 
formidable platform for holding the government accountable to 
the people. It was thus seen as a people oriented platform, per-
forming the role of a watchdog in Nigeria’s emerging democracy, 
without the limitations of a state broadcaster. Somide (2017) says 
Daar Communication’s radio has since evolved into a radio net-
work broadcasting across Nigeria and Sierra Leone.
Although owing to issues bordering on political economy, aris-
ing from its owner’s involvement in partisan politics in 2015, which 
resulted in money laundering charges (Balancing Act, 2010), the 
sense of ownership of the station by the people and credibility has 
waned, particularly its television arm, AIT. However, Raypower FM 
continues to produce participatory programs that enjoy listener-
ship and patronage. 
The Nigeria Broadcasting Commission (NBC) in 20 years li-
censed 402 operational broadcasters, 123 of them were privately 
owned. There were also 233 radio and television stations owned 
by the FCT, federal and state governments, as well as 46 cable sta-
tions (PM News, 2012). Talk radio stations in Lagos include Radio 
One 103.5FM, Nigeriainfo, Brilla FM a niche sports station, Lagos-
Talks owned by Megalectrics Ltd and WFM, a talk station for wom-
en. Most radio stations in Lagos and indeed Nigeria operate the 
general format of broadcasting, combining talk and music. 
The Impact of Radio on Citizenship & Influence of 
Talk Shows on Citizens in a Democracy
An impact study about three local community radio stations 
in Uganda, Kenya and Tanzania submits that radio stations have 
significant effects on enlarging the public arena for citizens to 
be heard in public on matters of priority public concern. It also 
states that the ability to harness local information and use them 
for information and decision making improves significantly with 
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broadcasting from radio stations. It further states that citizens ex-
perience an increased sense of dignity; and that citizens are op-
portune to catch sight of themselves as a public and to discuss 
issue of public interest. 
According to the study, radio, used in this manner, evolves into 
a tool used by the citizen in holding political leaders to account. 
This makes citizens become active participants and contributors to 
the debates around elections and governance. Erichs (2007) posits 
that the media can continue to play an active role in the building 
of public opinion by widening the variety of voices heard. This is 
the rationale behind using the BBC media Action Town Hall meet-
ing Format of discussion to bring about inclusion in governance in 
Nigeria. This usage cuts across talk radio stations in Nigeria. 
Erichs (2007) states further that the media generally can 
strengthen the capability of citizens to be agents of change by 
holding actors in power accountable to the general public. It can 
contribute to the strengthening of citizenship by supplying par-
ticipatory opportunities to have rights and citizenship practiced in 
real life.
Carey (1995) states that to be a citizen is to be seen and heard, 
and to have a public life. Media audiences participate ritually in 
meaning construction. Both vocal and visual communication 
channels of radio and television make communicating individuals 
into personalities with a voice, a face, a character and a histo-
ry, personalities with whom recipients can sympathize or empa-
thize, whom they can like or dislike, detest or revere (Thompson 
1990:228, original emphasis). This results in valorization (Deacon 
et al, 2007). 
In the age of interactional communication on both mediums, 
made possible by ‘technological production and diffusion’; they 
create the same effect or response from callers, citizens who are 
seen as vocal in their response to ‘hailing’ by radio station regard-
ing issues of common interests in a democracy. These are known 
by their voices, more so by their consistent contributions to vari-
ous issues raised by radio stations, day in, day out. This accounts 
for the popularity of talk show presenters and anchors and the 
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subsequent popularity of their shows.
In the regional politics of Nigeria in the 60s, radio was a vi-
tal tool for information and mobilization, for both primary and 
secondary engagements of the citizen. It was also used inadver-
tently to incite violence. Babarinsa (2003) documents the Western 
Nigeria elections of 1965 conducted under a civilian regime led 
to a revolt against the regime of Chief Ladoke Akintola, tagged 
‘wet e’ due to the negative use of radio. He also gives a personal 
account of the coverage of the gubernatorial elections in Ondo 
State between Akin Omoboriowo of the National Party of Nigeria 
and Adekunle Ajasin during which Radio Nigeria, Akure and Ondo 
State Radio Corporation were used by both parties to fan the em-
bers of violence (Babarinsa, 2003). 
In the aftermath of the annulled presidential elections in 1993, 
radio played a prominent role, at some point evolving into an op-
positional tool by civilians to combat military rule.
In the fourth republic, there were landmark political develop-
ments in Nigeria which were heralded on radio and then further 
analyzed and debated in the court of public opinion on talk shows. 
I present two instances of media organizations that played the 
role of a watchdog in democracy in contemporary Nigeria. These 
are Radio Nigeria, notably breaking the news about the abduction 
of former Governor of Anambra State, Chief Chris Ngige, to the 
nation; playing a major role in the return of Governor Peter Obi, 
of Anambra State through the coverage of the court case; policing 
the 2007 election through effective and objective reportage,  the 
BBC Media Action’s Town Hall discussion format about inclusive 
engagement of citizens, in partnership with several radio stations 
across Nigeria and the watchdog role of BBC Hausa Service in 
Northern Nigeria.
Radio Nigeria and its Role as a Watchdog in the 
Fourth Republic
Public broadcasters in Nigeria as represented by Radio Nigeria 
(FRCN) and Voice of Nigeria and the Nigerian Television Author-
ity (NTA) presently account to the executive arm of government 
across the tiers of government instead of the public through the 
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legislature. These modes of operation negate the declaration of 
the principles of freedom of expressions in Africa (BBC cited in 
Akoh and Jagun, 2012, p.27). This projects these public broad-
casters as a captured media, government’s mouthpieces which 
routinely report government’s activities without an agenda to in-
vestigate corrupt practices or hold government accountable. This 
is the case with state owned broadcast services controlled by sit-
ting governors across Nigeria. The courage to then report a sitting 
governor in Anambra State on national radio was redeeming for 
Radio Nigeria. It remains a reference point in Radio Nigeria’s re-
cent history.
Ononye (2017) in her personal account as the Head of Repor-
torial at the Radio Nigeria headquarters says the first contact on 
the issue was with an aide of the then governor of Anambra State, 
Dr Chris Ngige, who hid in a bush for fear of being found out. 
He gave the account of how the former governor was abducted 
amidst sporadic shooting, in an interactive on the Radio Nigeria 
Network. The then DG alerted the PDP secretariat in Abuja, which 
was oblivious of the development. These two acts checkmated a 
civilian coup, which could have resulted in the swearing in of the 
deputy as acting governor. The Chief Judge of the state heard 
the news on the 4pm Network News of Radio Nigeria, which stat-
ed that the national leadership of the PDP was not in support of 
the development. That stalled the ‘installation’ of the deputy and 
eventually the governor was restored.
It turned out that the abduction was the result of a tussle be-
tween a political Godfather and his candidate (Dawodu, 2015). 
“The impact was such that, something like that had never hap-
pened before; people were worried, nobody actually knew where 
the governor was or what was happening; there was great panic in 
the environment. The impact was multifaceted. Radio Nigeria was 
able to, as a leading light break the story (Ononye, 2017).  
In the context of the watch dog role of the media, “The FRCN 
was doing what it was supposed to do; we broke a story that oc-
curred; that was what we were supposed to do, we didn’t do it be-
cause of the governor, we did it because it was our responsibility 
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to do so” (Ononye, 2017)
The unbiased coverage of the 2007 elections by Radio Nigeria 
is another instance of how a state owned radio network operated 
72-hour election coverage, with live streaming and deployment 
of a large contingent of reporters across Nigeria. The election was 
considered one of the freest and fairest in Nigeria’s democratic 
history. FRCN reporters reported from polling centers and stayed 
until election results were announced (Okere, 2017).The election 
ushered in President Umar Yar’Adua. The coverage was acclaimed 
in the country’s broadcast history as a pioneering, pace setting 
and objective reportage, contrary to widespread belief that Radio 
Nigeria was a captured media.
Another significant contribution in Radio Nigeria to democracy 
is the creation of the talk show, ‘The President Explains’ during 
the administration of President Olusegun Obasanjo in 1999. “The 
idea that Chief Obasanjo speaks with the generality of the peo-
ple on his programs and policies via Radio Nigeria was born, run-
ning in the process, 15 editions of robust engagements and un-
censored interactions with every category of the populace in a 
monthly program known as The President Explains” (Aloko, 2014, 
p.1).This talk show anchored by the President of Nigeria during 
which he engaged the citizenry became quite popular.  It was a 
phenomenal talk show bridging the gap between the government 
and the governed without an intermediary.           
Okere (2017) states that ‘The President Explains’ was a very im-
portant watchdog platform that Radio Nigeria instituted during 
President Obasanjo’s administration; and there were major break-
throughs achieved through that program within those years. 
The BBC Media Action in Nigeria produces a range of talk pro-
grams including drama, town hall discussion formats and inter-
views to educate Nigerians about democratic governance. These 
include voter rights, rights as citizens and active participation in 
democracy. The organization has achieved this through partner-
ships and collaborations with radio stations across Nigeria. 
Lewis & Booth (1989) make a clear distinction between public 
service broadcasting and commercial broadcasting. They state that 
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while the former should be in “the business of selling programs 
which inform, educate and entertain, to audiences”, the latter is 
expected to sell “audience to advertisers” (Lewis and Booth, 1989: 
99). The boundaries of the basic functions are, however, blurred 
in Nigeria; the context of FM broadcasting is such that Federal 
Government-owned FM stations in Nigeria compete with privately 
owned FM stations for revenue from advertising (Akoh & Jagun, 
2012).  Daar Communication’s RayPower and Radio Continental 
are examples of such commercial general format radio stations. 
Political talk shows on both stations are further analyzed in this 
chapter.
 Understanding Talk Radio
Talk radio stations operate and function as niche stations, carv-
ing out particular tastes for their fragmented listeners. Radio sta-
tions, including those which operate the general format have spe-
cific programs through which they function as watchdogs, playing 
a role of the umpire between the government and the governed, 
in the society. A large number of radio stations in Nigeria belong 
to this category. They include Raypower Fm, Eko FM, City FM and 
more.
Talk radio stations may not necessarily churn out reportages 
in the news form. Tettey (2010) cited in Gunner, Ligaga & Moyo, 
(2011, 9) states that such radio “ensure that issues do not die with 
the news cycle, but can be kept in the public realm and in the pub-
lic consciousness for some time”. He argues that talk radio “moves 
the debate beyond the monotony and fleeting nature of “current 
news and passing public interest”. 
Talk is contextually defined, and media talk, irrespective of the 
medium, involves different discursive relations in different forms 
of context. Social divisions are displayed, intricately enacted and 
confronted in televised talk (Deacon et al, 2007). This works for 
radio as well. In Lagos, Nigeria, these social divisions are obvious 
in the programming and target audience of stations such as Bond 
FM, Radio One, Nigeria Info and Wazobia FM. Some programs 
attract certain people from particular social classes, because they 
see themselves reflected in the content, or they can identify them-
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selves in the programming. Talk in the media is conditioned by 
the genres and types of programming in which it occurs; there are 
differential gradations (Deacon et al, 2007:286). 
In the broadcast media generally, the site and setting of a talk 
program are created in a sustained and thorough going manner 
such that it reflects certain realist representations of social life 
(Deacon et al, 2007). This is attractive to the listener and sustains 
his interest and participation actively or passively in the program.
“Where talk takes place and with whom, can influence considerably 
what it accomplishes, and how” (Deacon, Pickering, Golden, Murdock, 
2007, p.286). 
   Talk on radio can be monologic or dialogic or a combination 
of both.  It is monologic where one person speaks to many listen-
ers, as in a lecture or speech. It is formal, even where what is said 
or heard has a familiar structure. This manifests on radio as news 
commentary or news analysis as is the case on the Radio Nigeria 
Network News. It is sometimes the intro of a program, the mono-
logue, as is the case with Kubanji Direct on Radio Continental or 
Issues in the News on FRCN’s Radio One. Dialogic talk is a process 
of interaction between two or more people. It can be informal 
and familiar, formal and unfamiliar and have variants of the two. 
This is dependent on those involved and the context of interaction 
(Deacon et al 2007). Talk shows combine both to elicit a robust 
engagement from the public.
Talk Shows
“The right and ability to participate as listener and speaker in public 
debates is essential to competent citizenship” - John Dewey in Peter 
Erichs (2002) cited in Erichs (2007).
Participatory program formats in radio and television are the 
norm in many countries today. One of such participatory formats 
is talk shows, which has made the public arena more inclusive 
(Erichs, 2007). It has given poor people and other previously ex-
cluded citizens the access, representation and voice needed for 
participation in a democracy. Tettey (2010) says talk shows often 
heighten public awareness of specific issues concerning minority 
and the marginalized social groups and issues. 
    In analyzing the verbal encounters of a radio talk show, in the 
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book Confrontation Talk (1996), Ian Hutchby reveals how power is 
instantiated, at a micro level, in what is said, and argued between 
participants in institutional settings.  
There are two types of discussion talk shows. There is the pop-
ulist TV discussion program which results in tabloidization. It is the 
construction of ‘the public sphere as a sort of spectacular circus 
show, it is characterized by intense vocal contests, often leading to 
the open expression of vitriol and abuse. It is an unrestrained form 
of talk, and it delivers premium entertainment value. The second 
type or format is the televisualization of academic talk, which is 
to ‘the public sphere as a professor’s living room on air’. It is a 
restrained form of talk, characterized by having ‘university dons, 
writers, and politicians explore differences of views about given 
topics in a generally sedate and sequentially ordered fashion and 
in a manner of mutual absorption in ideas raised’. Other forms 
are constructed in between these two types which correspond to 
stratifications of social class, status and educational background 
(Deacon et al, 2007). 
Another is the radio magazine which takes different forms, 
styles and genres. It is a format of program in which the present-
er’s links provide the logic of why all the different items in the pro-
gram are provided (Ali, 2008). Examples include breakfast shows 
and popular magazine talk shows like the Ellen Degeneres Show 
and the Oprah Winfrey show in the United States; Soni Irabor Live, 
Kubanji Direct on Radio Continental, Talk Nigeria on Radio Con-
tinental, This Morning, Wake Up Naija and Nightline with Funke 
Treasure on FRCN’s Radio One 103.5FM,  RayPower’s Political Plat-
form and Fact File. 
These popular talk shows, characteristically, elicit discursive par-
ticipation from citizens and promote inclusion through interactive 
sessions. Such talk programs also exist in indigenous languages 
and pidgin. 
Broadcasting reproduces the world as ordinary but that seem-
ing obviousness is an effect. It is the outcome of a multiplicity of 
small techniques and discursive practices that combine to pro-
duce that deeply taken-for-granted- sense of familiarity with what 
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is seen or heard(Scanell 1991, 8). One of these taken for granted 
practices is the act of talking which is reproduced in the studio. 
The features of which are similar in reality and in the simulated 
space of broadcasting Deacon et al (2007) state that the features 
of talk are turn–taking, topic maintenance, establishing transition 
from one topic to another, offering appropriate forms of initiating 
and terminating talk. It is pertinent to note how these features 
come into play in a show host’s engagement with citizens.
Political Talk Shows in Indigenous Languages & 
Pidgin English
In Lagos, there are four radio stations broadcasting in indige-
nous languages. They are: Radio Lagos-Tiwantiwa, FRCN’s Bond 
FM, FRCN’s Choice FM and lastly Daar Communication’s Faaji FM. 
In addition, there are two NigP radio stations bringing the number 
to six non-English language radio stations out of the 26 radio sta-
tions (NBC List, 2013) in Lagos city. On RayPower’s Faaji FM, “Peo-
ple who find it difficult to express themselves in English during 
‘Fact File’ or ‘Political Platform’ find it easy to express themselves 
in their local language, the Yoruba language on ‘E gbe yewo’ (So-
mide,2017).                                     
NigP radio stations, which developed in Lagos, a city original-
ly populated by Yoruba-speaking Nigerians, caters for the needs 
of non-Yoruba-speaking indigenes in the metropolitan city. They 
also address people from the different ethnic groups in Nigeria, 
who are not necessarily educated. These NigP radio stations have 
thus become quite popular and have expanded from Lagos to 
other major cities in Nigeria (Durodola, 2013). 
Radio One’s pidgin breakfast show, ‘Wake Up Naija’ continues 
to be a participatory talk show that encourages citizen engage-
ment. The station like Wazobia FM liberated a previously mar-
ginalized majority through its language of communication. Soola 
(2002) submits that 
Wazobia FM activated a “community-specific and situation-rel-
evant” radio station which is also “dialogic and participatory” 
(Soola, 2002, p.24). 
In a series of interviews with hosts of Talk Shows in Lagos, Ni-
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geria, I interrogate the thinking behind these programs, whether 
presented in English or indigenous languages; and how they have 
functioned as watchdogs in Nigeria’s emerging democracy in a 
series of interviews with show hosts.    
Analysis of Interviews with Talk Show Hosts
Radio is used as a tool of subversion under military and dictato-
rial regimes. It is difficult to achieve or sustain that under a dem-
ocratic dispensation. Tettey (2011) writing about talk radio and 
politics in Ghana states that the increase in ‘non-state controlled 
radio stations in several countries has led to a vibrant, pluralistic 
and competitive radio landscape. And this has led to the expan-
sion in the media spaces available for the expression of citizens’ 
preferences and perspectives. This is reflected in an interview with 
Ambrose Somide, the director, Radio Services, Daar Communica-
tions.
RayPower 100.5 FM
There are two political talk shows on the radio station, Fact File 
and Political Platform. Fact File is as old as RayPower FM. It runs 
between 8.30 and 9.00am, weekdays. Political Platform, which 
started from Lagos and used to last for 15mins, now runs between 
9.15am - 9.45am weekdays on the RayPower Network which cov-
ers Nigeria. Media research and monitoring reveal that those are 
the two key programs on the RayPower Network that shoot the 
listenership up (Somide, 2017). 
Political platform is managed by the political desk in the news-
room, headed by Austin Okhiria Agbonsurenmi, who is the lead 
anchor; there are four other presenters from the political desk, 
two ladies and two gentlemen. They “look at topical issues in the 
news, that people are talking about, take reports, bring in a guest 
to comment and analyze, either on phone or in the studio, do a 
bit of analysis themselves looking at different angles. Phone calls 
are not allowed on the program; they rely on feedback via let-
ters, emails, text messages in the course of the program (Somide, 
2017).
The program has a huge influence on its listeners and could 
be said to have contributed to shaping civic competence among 
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citizens:
“we have some people who can lay claim to part ownership of the 
program because of the length of years they have been listening to 
the program and following it;  they feel like a part of that program” 
(Somide., 2017:2). 
Listeners on the program thus have a sense of ownership. Ross 
(2004) says participation in talk radio reflects active agency, which 
is critical for ‘growth, consolidation, and sustenance of democracy’ 
(Ross, cited in Tettey, 2017, 21):  
“whenever, due to technical issues, we fail to run Political Platform on 
the network. . . as I said, the program originates from Abuja. . . you will 
see people calling in, cursing because the program is  a no holds barred 
kind of programme where people, the presenters, the analysts and the 
guests express their opinions freely on any subject” (Somide, 2017, 4).
Sometimes RayPower runs afoul of the rules and regulations 
guiding utterances on radio in the bid to accommodate all shades 
of opinions: 
“It’s very engaging, although at times they talk themselves into trouble 
and this has put us at loggerheads on a number of occasions.  I have 
had to visit NBC (the National Broadcasting Commission, the regulat-
ing body for broadcasting) several times for views expressed, guests 
featured, content of the program and all of that” (Somide, 2017, 1).
It is a documented fact that talk show hosts represent particular 
political interests. Issues treated on Fact File and Political Platform 
and statements from high profile guests, however, continue to 
make the front pages of newspapers the next day.
  “ I recall one particular  edition (Fact File) where I interviewed the cur-
rent Minister of Communication, Adebayo Shittu, That was when there 
was this proposal, by ‘telcos’, that was endorsed by NCC for increase 
in data rate.  . . and I asked him if he was aware of the development… 
He said that has not been discussed with him. He was not aware; he 
was just hearing this for the first time on radio. The question I put to 
him was, “are you really in charge of communication? Because if some-
thing has been endorsed by an agency under your watch and you are 
claiming on radio that you are just hearing for the first time, are you 
really sincerely in charge? And he said one or two things that made the 
headlines the next day in the newspaper” (Somide, 2017).
Media production should be carefully linked to the uses, mean-
ings and values made of the media products consumed (Deacon 
Funke-Treasure Durodola
258
Watchdogs or Captured Media? . . . 
et al, 2007). The meanings made by some citizens are as diver-
gent as the views expressed on the two programs are varied. So-
mide (2017) says at a point during the Jonathan administration, 
the presenters were accused of being quite biased, and serving 
the interest of the PDP; and that many times, the present Minister 
of Information, Lai Mohammed, who used to be the spokesper-
son for the APC then refused to go on that program. Even after 
winning the election and President Buhari took over government, 
presenters of ‘Political Platform’ are accused of playing the oppo-
sition card and being the mouthpiece of the PDP (Somide, 2017). 
This situation on RayPower’s talk show validates the assertion that 
political talk radio offers a ‘facade of a deliberative public sphere’, 
a thin public sphere where the media operates as a billboard of 
opposing viewpoints as against a  space for  proper debates and 
analyses of issues (Tettey 2011, p.26):
“And that’s a long battle that we’ve been fighting. And when people 
say you are too biased, some would also commend them to say you 
are bold, you are courageous in taking the government up on some of 
these issues” (Somide, 2017,4).
As in other parts of Africa, talk show hosts in Nigeria function-
ing in their professional role of watchdogs continually struggle to 
strike a balance between being disinterested parties in discussions 
and debates and facilitators of objective analyses of issues (Tettey, 
2011). 
Radio Continental, Lagos
Another talk show that has a huge followership on radio in 
Lagos is ‘Kubanji Direct’. It is a news magazine on which topical 
issues from politics, economics to sports are discussed. It is gen-
eral interest, but as the occasion demands, it delves into politics 
and political issues. It is anchored by Jones Usen known as Citizen 
Jones on the program. He has been the anchor since 2012 when 
the program attracted sponsorship from a household brand in Ni-
geria The program starts with a prologue that sets the tone of the 
program and then the guests take over, the two guests usually 
don’t agree (Usen, 2017).   
     ‘Kubanji Direct’ airs on weekdays, at 7pm, the prime time for 
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major radio networks, as a ‘creative alternative to them’, especially 
to compete with Radio Nigeria which relays a Network News and 
program at that time (Usen, 2017:1). Citizen Jones treats ‘topics 
that are not common to radio stations in Lagos and around the 
environment: 
“I swim against the tide, when it is fashionable to latch on to a particular 
subject matter in the country; I come from a different plan. I approach 
issues that ordinarily would have been forgotten by the listenership. So 
I don’t go with the flow. I try to be different” (Usen, 2017, p.2). 
This is instructive, and in tune with the characteristics of talk ra-
dio, which is to ensure that issues are kept in the public realm and 
in the public consciousness for some time. Usen (2017) reiterates 
that the essence of radio is to provoke and stimulate debates: 
“Just bring these issues to the debate and allow the listener to make up 
his mind. As far as that goes, I would imagine I take on issues that are 
germane to the listenership and so participation is keen” (Usen, 2017, 
p.3). 
Tettey (2011) says this approach makes it difficult for the sub-
ject of a news stories or even public officials to ride out an issue 
with the hope that it will die with the news cycle. 
Talk radio is live and so instant feedback is another character-
istic of talk shows. Tettey (2011) states further that phone-ins are 
the main vehicle through which citizens participate in talk pro-
grams. Usen (2017) agrees with this assertion. He offers that on 
‘Kubanji Direct’: 
“The social media engagement would tell you that sometimes when 
we open the telephone lines, it is surreal and I would say the traffic is 
stimulating” (Usen 2017:3).
Usen (2017) talks about the peculiar democratic experience in 
the country, arguing that, the failure of leadership necessitates 
that the people must be engaged. He asserts that although the 
issues are there, they need to be provoked and so citizens rely on 
radio (Usen, 2017):
“Radio is not just the king of the electronic media due to its blind na-
ture but a personal medium too,  so they (citizens) tend to yield  to any 
radio station that gives them what they want” (Usen, 2017, p.3).
And the peculiar democratic experience arose from the disap-
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pointment about the rulership of the political class and the fact 
that ‘the military severed the bridges we had built overtime, so 
radio comes in to provide the succor’ (Usen 2017, p.3). 
In his analysis of the verbal encounters of the radio talk show, 
Hutchby (1996) submits that there are various ways in which pow-
er relations are given form, reproduced and resisted.  Participation 
on ‘Kubanji Direct’ is keen as with most talk shows, although Citi-
zen Jones has not featured too many women as guests. In terms of 
engagement, a sizable number of women call in once the lines are 
thrown open; more call in when the programme ends to engage 
with the presenter (Usen, 2017). 
Soni Irabor Live
Soni Irabor Live was initially on NTA and AIT from February 
1997 till April 2010. It was a general interest talk show with a focus 
on public officials and public intellectuals. Political party presiden-
tial candidates like Basorun MKO Abiola, Baba Gana Kingibe, Tom 
Ikimi and cabinet ministers appeared on it.  His interview with for-
mer Minister for Information, Walter Ofonagoro, was serialized in 
Weekend Concord of Dec 23, 1995. Soni Irabor Live radio version 
started in June 2011 on Inspiration FM and continued as a general 
interest show. It, however, prides itself on dealing with political 
issues before human interest. Foremost political personalities like 
INEC Chairman, Attahiru Jega, when INEC was  preparing for the 
2011 elections and also in 2015, prominent political figures relent-
lessly featured included  the INEC Chairman, Attahiru Jega, Gov-
ernor of Lagos State, Akinwunmi  Ambode and a number of other 
government functionaries (Irabor, 2017).
Soni Irabor also pioneered the presentation of Radio Link, an 
audience participatory talk show on the Radio Network which he 
hosted for a year and half and stopped presenting in 2000. Ra-
dio Link was credited with getting debt paid to Nigeria Airways. 
(Irabor, 2017:3) recalls another watchdog moment in 2000 “when 
President Obasanjo raided Aguleri, they (Radio Nigeria Manage-
ment) tried to stop me. We had to tone down the reactions.”   
During the military regime, he was invited by the SSS and de-
tained for seven hours for making a statement about the Structur-
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al Adjustment Program (SAP) on Radio Scope.  
In the beginning of the fourth republic, an interview talk show, 
‘Media Chat’ was created for President Obasanjo to field questions 
from the media. It was a multiple interviewers and one interview-
ee format talk show, which was jointly produced and presented 
by Nigeria’s public radio and TV, Radio Nigeria and the Nigerian 
Television Authority. It had no feedback channel of a phone –in. 
Soni Irabor interviewed the new democratically elected Nigerian 
President Olusegun Obasanjo, who heralded the fourth republic in 
Nigeria, four times on ‘Media Chat’. 
Free expression is critical in fostering and consolidating dem-
ocratic governance (Tettey, 2011), yet the Nigerian media strive 
to achieve it in successive democratic governments. Irabor (2017) 
recalls the dismissive and sometimes combative responses of 
President Obasanjo then when asked questions bordering on 
governance in Nigeria on Media Chat and how they managed it. 
Although they backed down eventually, the interviewers still asked 
hard questions. One was about the police force, the many con-
tracts being awarded for developments and how the new presi-
dent told him off saying: “ are you their lawyer?” (Irabor, 2007, p.3) 
Conclusion 
The media space is agog with talk shows in English and indig-
enous languages, helping citizens to make meaning of political 
developments and issues; and creating  a deliberative democracy. 
Radio has for long played a major and definitive role in Nigeria’s 
democracy, in alignment with Castells (2007) who says the me-
dia have become the social space where power is decided. The 
media have a democratic mandate to scrutinize political power 
in line with their role as the fourth estate of the realm. The man-
date arose from the normative functions of the press, to represent 
public interest by making it possible to hold powerful actors in the 
society accountable to the public. 
Although, radio stations and talk show hosts have become in-
creasingly partisan, as Tersmeden (2007:133) argues, journalists 
cannot become silent for fear of criticizing a government they 
support. To do so is to abandon their watchdog role in society. 
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In Nigeria of the 80’s, radio played a vital role in engaging the cit-
izenry about government’s policies and developmental projects. 
Federal government-owned agencies like MAMSER and the Na-
tional Orientation Agency; and initiatives like Better Life for Rural 
Women and Family Support Program were powered using radio 
as a tool.  
A Department for International Development, UK White Paper 
2006 states that the biggest difference to the quality of gover-
nance is active involvement by citizens. It affirms that politics is 
the only thing that can, in the long run, “transform the quality of 
decision making in developing countries and the effectiveness of 
the States”.  
Contrary to the claims that radio is a dying and forgotten me-
dium, in relation to advancement in technology through new me-
dia, radio has continued to adapt to changing circumstances. It 
continues to be relevant for new kinds of imagining the self as 
an individual and citizen (Gunner, Ligaga and Moyo, 2011), just 
as the utilization of indigenous languages is equally continually 
relevant in engaging citizens on programs bordering on politics 
and governance.   
Since the traditional role of the media in a democracy is to con-
tinually challenge the authorities and bring about an awareness of 
democratic values (Tersmaden, 2007), Nigerian radio stations have 
continually held this up not only in their coverage and reportage 
of developmental issues in the fourth republic, they have consis-
tently done so through an array of talk shows.
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Media and Diversity Reporting of      
Ethno-Religious Conflicts in Nigeria:      
A Perspective
By Nathaniel D. Danjibo
Introduction
There is a relationship between ethno-religious violence and 
the media in Nigeria. For most Nigerians, these stories are heard 
only on radio, television and newspapers; and Nigerians react and 
relate to the stories depending on how the media frame their re-
ports. The media, therefore,  serve as the mouthpiece and ears of 
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many a Nigerian. In the same vein, the media also play a vanguard 
position in governance by letting the public know what govern-
ment’s activities are all about and by conveying to the government 
the desires and aspirations of the public. The media thus become 
an integral part of society in facilitating mutual understanding 
between the governed and the government(s).  However, “While 
conflict discourse systems and their interrelations of opposition 
and alliance can be identified in individual conversations about 
news, it is more effective to concentrate on media content as an 
indirect method of observation because of the unique fast mov-
ing feedback involved in daily journalistic production” (Arno, 2009, 
p.6).In times of tension and actual expression of conflict, people 
rely on the media to act and react, just as people become emo-
tional when media reportage is deemed highly sensational.
It is observable that a lot of items reported as news are in fact, 
pseudo-events that are simply created for the media, which oth-
erwise would not have taken place. This is a bit complicated. The 
question is-could there be any reportage of an event considered 
not to be a news item? This brings us to the place of ethics in me-
dia reporting, where a journalist has to make discretionary deci-
sions on whether or not to report particular news items in the face 
of its devastating effect on the general public. This is why Sharkey 
(2003, 20) suggested that:
Reporting only what you see, might not, on first hearing, seem like 
such a bad thing. It sounds like a basic definition of objectivity: factual, 
unembellished coverage. But good journalism includes an appreciation 
of nuance and an ability to place ‘what you see’ in a broader context…
it also demonstrates that there is a difference between seeing and un-
derstanding.
A good deal of what the media report about conflicts center 
on  what is seen without adequately investigating the root caus-
es and the consequences thereafter. In some dire cases, a lot of 
hearsay and speculation is passed for news.  Moreover, Grimes, 
Husken, Simon and Venbrux (2011, 5) were of the view that “Medi-
atizing conflict spreads it”. In  other words, spreading news items 
in the media about conflict and violence only helps to exacerbate 
conflict, especially in the manner in which conflict cases are re-
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ported with strong adjectives without due consideration for the 
after effect. Accordingly, the phrase ‘mediatized conflict’ “is used 
to emphasize the complex ways in which media are often impli-
cated within conflicts while disseminating ideas and images about 
them” (Cottle, 2006, p.8-9). Moreover, media profession in Nigeria 
has a lot more to do with ownership, business, politics, ethnicity 
and religion than strict adherence to the principles of ethics and 
morals. Dautrich and Hartley (2011, 137) observed: “As with other 
institutional actors, the professional norm of journalists, editors 
and producers have an impact on their actions.”
Ownership of the media has a great impact on media reportage 
in the sense that the ownership guides what is publishable and 
what is not publishable. In other words, news and editorial pub-
lications are dependent on the owners’ interests; in our setting, 
they are also largely dependenton the owners’ ethnic, religious 
and political leanings.. News reporters and editors are constrained 
to tailor their works to please the  owner. This development co-
lours  reporting and weakens the appeal of media products as fair 
and comprehensive accounts of goings on.  Isola (2010, 12) aptly 
captures the point about media ownership and economic interest 
when he wrote:
Economic and ownership influence also tend to affect the actions of the 
media…. Journalists are mostly employees who are strongly influenced 
by those who own and control the media. Like other employees in the 
capitalist enterprise, journalists are subjected to direct economic power 
of media owners. The fact that most news media organizations are con-
stituted as lucrative capitalist enterprises, whose owners play key roles 
in the domestic economy and politics, sometimes turn media owners 
and their employees into pro-systemic individuals.
Two other variables that cannot be ignored in the analysis of 
media reportage in Nigeria are the issue of corruption and poor 
remuneration of the workers in the media industry. The poor, ir-
regular and sometimes non-payment of workers in the media in-
dustry has negative effects on media reportage as most reporters 
and editors would have to go an extra mile to make ends meet. 
That extra mile is not often decent or honorable.  Indeed there 
are reports of some media owners  boldly  telling their workers 
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to utilize their  identity cards as meal tickets. This immoral and 
unethical conduct tacitly encourages  corruption to be part and 
parcel of the media industry  and de-emphasizes the role of ethics 
in media reportage. 
Ethnicity and religion are not new concepts in Nigeria’s politi-
cal development. For a long time, the Nigerian people have been 
defined and have defined their identities based on ethno-reli-
gious differences (Suberu, 1996; 2004; Campbell, 1997; Nnoli, 
1980; 1995; Osaghae, 2001; (Sklar 2004; Young 1999; Nnoli 1980; 
Osaghae 2002; Horowitz 2000; Kukah 1994; Kastfelt 2004; Falola 
1998). Often times we are misguided by a wealth of  literature that 
tends to segregate the Nigerian state into two distinct social cate-
gories of the Christian south and the Muslim north, and this false 
categorization has helped to heighten mutual suspicion between 
those in the south and those in the north of the country. Nigeria 
is both a multi-ethnic and multi-religious state, and there is no 
doubt that ethnicity and religion have impacted negatively on the 
body politic of the Nigerian state with enormous consequences 
on both human lives and properties. This, in fact, tends to negate 
the cardinal principle of most religions to promote peace in hu-
man organizations.  
There was the broad assumption that both ethnic and religious 
conflicts were a characteristic of military regime, but contemporary 
experience, the world over, has shown the contrary. Huntington’s 
Clash of Civilization was to portray the emergent conflict between 
the Arab and Western worlds based on religious undertones. To-
day, terrorism and the fight against it have derived their justifi-
cation from religious beliefs. We can, therefore, assert that both 
ethnicity and religion have become catalysts of conflicts among 
new and old democracies.  
Nigeria transited from military to civilian rule in May 1999. There 
were high hopes that the new democracy would offer prospects 
for better governance, including bringing about peaceful co-ex-
istence among different ethno-religious groups. Unfortunately, 
shortly after the country embraced democracy in 1999, Nigeria 
was confronted with the enigma of ethnic and religious conflicts. 
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This study focuses on analyzing major ethnic and religious con-
flicts that have occurred in Nigeria since 1987, with the intention 
of providing lessons for Nigeria’s media professionals on how to 
investigate and handle the dissemination of news items. Such con-
flicts as the Shari’a crisis; the Yoruba-Hausa Sagamu/Kano conflict; 
the Miss World religious crisis; the crises in Jos; and the ethno-reli-
gious crisis in Maiduguri, Kontagora and Onitsha as a result of the 
cartooning of the prophet of Islam in Denmark, and the effective 
way in which Boko Haram uses the media shall be our cases for 
discussion. 
Media Role and Functions in Conflict Reportage
Media can be defined as “the paths, ways or means through 
which messages are disseminated. They are the channels through 
which information are (sic) passed across” (Sadeeq, 2006, p.249). 
Defleur and Dennis (1981, 148) defined mass media as “devices 
for moving messages across distance or time to accomplish mass 
communication”. The media have a great role to play in the life of 
a nation and its people. As the name suggests, the media are the 
intermediary between the people and the state and vice versa. 
The functions of the media in a society are unquantifiable. Apart 
from providing information and knowledge, the media serve as 
the voice of the people. Lord Bingham of the British House of 
Commons summarizes the functions of the media thus:
In a modern developed society it is only a small minority of citizens 
who can participate directly in the discussions and decisions which 
shape the public life of that society. The majority can participate only 
indirectly, by exercising their rights as citizens to vote, express their 
opinions, (and) make representations to the authorities from pressure 
groups and so on. But the majority cannot participate in the public life 
of their society in these ways if they are not alerted to and informed 
about matters which call for or may call for considerations. It is very 
largely through the media…. The proper functioning of a modern par-
ticipatory democracy requires that the media be free, active, profes-
sional and inquiring (cited in Welsh, Tom, Walter Greenwood and David 
Banks, 2007, p.3).
Generally, the media are regarded as the Fourth Estate of the 
Realm because of the vanguard role they play. They exercise over-
sight functions over the activities of the three arms of government- 
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the executive, the legislature and the judiciary, but also inform the 
government about the pulse of the people whilst educating the 
people on government’s plans and  activities. So, the media have 
a noble and crucial role in the political and economic develop-
ment of a nation. Information is vital; it can build and it can de-
stroy a nation; stabilize and destabilize. People and nations go to 
war because of information and people and nations also become 
friendly because of information. And it is in the media that infor-
mation usually has a free reign. As (Nwosu, 1990, p.31) observed, 
the mass media “help people to find new norms and harmony in 
periods of transition, change the power structure in the society by 
giving knowledge to the masses, create sense of nationess (sic), 
lead to increased political activity or participation….” In the same 
vein, McQuail’s description best captures the role of the media as: 
Windows that enable us to see beyond our immediate surroundings, 
interpreters that help us make sense of experience, platforms or car-
riers that convey information, interactive communication that includes 
audience feedback, signposts that provide us with instructions….(1987, 
p.52-53).
Bryant and Thompson (2002, 306, cited in Isola, 2010, p.8) listed 
eight important functions of the mass media in a democracy:
1. Surveillance of contemporary events which are likely to af-
fect citizens positively and negatively
2. Identification of key social and political issues
3. Provision of platform for advocacy for causes and interest
4. Transmission of diverse contents across the various dimen-
sions and factions of political discourse
5. Scrutiny of government officials, their institutions and oth-
er agencies
6. Giving of incentives and information to allow citizens to be-
come actively informed participants rather than spectators
7. Provision of principled resistance to external forces at-
tempting to subvert media autonomy
8. Respectful consideration of the audience as potentially 
concerned, sense-making efficacious citizens.
Ethics and the Media
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Ethics is a necessary and obligatory condition needed for the 
proper functioning of the media in the society otherwise the me-
dia would evolve into channels of disseminating false information 
and become anarchical and irresponsible in  their activities. Here, 
“Ethical thinking involves considering the effects of one’s actions 
on multiple and distant stakeholders and on the integrity of a 
larger community” (Carrie, 2014, p.4). What this suggests is that 
no matter how captivating a news item is, it should not be dissem-
inated  if that would bring about a greater danger to the people. 
And “Central to ethical thinking is impartiality, or disinterest: the 
capacity to look beyond one’s own interest, feelings, and empathy 
for close relations in order to make decisions in the interest of 
a larger group, public or society” (Carrie, 2014, p.5). According-
ly, “Ethics should provide the journalist certain basic principles or 
standards by which he (or she) can judge actions to be right or 
wrong, good or bad, responsible or irresponsible” (Adelabu, 2015, 
183). But to be able to do this, the media must imbibe the culture 
of moral discipline. They must also demonstrate expertise in the 
field by disseminating information that that is true and lucid, reli-
able and verifiable.
However, on the part of the Nigerian media industry, there is 
a lot to praise and vilify the media for. Routinely,  many Nigerian 
media houses  fall short of the standards of media practice with 
regards to some ethical principles such as:
•	 Objectivity in reportage;
•	 Disseminating true and unbiased information
•	 Protecting national interest. 
According to Sadeeq (2006, 258), “The reporters on the field 
too are not left out of the bastardization of their media ethics. 
Being the first gatekeepers, they choose what to write and what 
to suppress based on their selfish reason and the gratification that 
accompany such stories”. The distortion goes down the line as line 
editors and title editors are no less guilty.
Diversity in Interests and Diversity in Reporting
Nigeria is ethno-regionally based. We moved from the First 
Republic of four regions to the present 36 states, conveniently 
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grouped into six Geo-political Zones in public discourse. At other 
times specific reference and recognition is given to other political 
entities such as the Niger-Delta and the Middle Belt regions. There 
is also diversity in religious beliefs and identities with Christianity 
and Islam as the two predominant and salient ones. In terms of 
what we may refer to as “territorial politics”, Nigeria is again divid-
ed into North and South. The media industry is also caught in the 
web because they are not just regionally, ethnically and religious 
based, they also reflect these tendencies in their output.  There is 
reference to  “northern newspapers” and “southern newspapers”. 
This is to say that these papers speak and protect either the inter-
est of the north or that of the south. Such papers as New Nigerian 
and Leadership, mostly promote the interest of the north, while 
such papers as the Guardian and the the Sun mostly promote the 
interest of the south. There are also ethnically based papers such 
as the Oodua News and Gaskiya Tafi Kwabo (Hausa- Truth is bet-
ter than money) for the Hausa/Fulani. Each tries to promote and 
protect its individual and group interests. Even the government 
owned non-print media such as the Nigerian Television Authority 
(NTA) seem to project the interest of the local states where they 
have branches instead of being national representatives. For ex-
ample, NTA and federal government owned FM stations in a good 
number of states in the north do not allow for Christian programs 
in the erroneous belief of protecting communal interests at the 
expense of human rights and the overall national interest of the 
people to freely practice their religion. Such media organizations 
are guilty of pursuing a dubious Agenda Setting, which is prede-
termining what “issues are regarded as important at a given time 
in a given society” (Umuerri, 2008, p.191). 
Ethno-religious Crisis in Nigeria 
Nigeria is a multi-religious, multi-ethnic and multi-cultural so-
ciety (Horowitz 2000; Young, 1999; Suberu, 2001). On ethnicity 
alone, scholars have not agreed on the specific number of the 
country’s ethnic groups. The number ranges from 250 (Otite 1990) 
to about 370 (Osaghae 2006). There are predominantly three re-
ligions- Christianity, Islam and the Traditional African Religions. 
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Of course, the cultural complexity of the country is as much as 
the ethnic composition. The ethno-religious complexity of the Ni-
gerian state was reinforced by colonial social formation that had 
pitched various ethnic groups against themselves. First, there was 
heightened competition for the control of the Nigerian state by 
any of the three dominant groups- the Hausa-Fulani, Igbo and 
the Yoruba on one hand (Nnoli 1980; 1995; Mamdani, 2003) and 
the problem of majority-minority relations with the latter crying 
foul of marginalization (Suberu 1996; 1997; 2001;Danjibo 2005; 
Osaghae, 2006). The bitter rivalry for the control of the Nigerian 
state led to threats of secession by each of the dominant groups 
at one point or the other, which culminated in the declaration of 
the Biafran Republic by the Igbos in 1967 that eventually led the 
civil war that lasted three years (1967-1970). The war was spirited-
ly fought to keep Nigeria one (Oluleye 1985).
In Nigeria, religion has continued to remain a potent catalyst 
of inter-ethnic and group relation (Mu’azzam, 2001; Egwu, 2001; 
Ilesanmi, 2001; Salamone, 1991; Alanamu, 2004; Otite, 1990) with 
two dominant religions Islam and Christianity expressing high lev-
el of competitiveness (Falola, 1998; 2003; Ohadike, 1992; Udoidem, 
1997). Unmindful of the fact that these two religions were actu-
ally alien to the Nigerian pre-colonial society, adherents of both 
religions express fundamentalism as if these religions originated 
from their traditional societies. For example, religion has caused a 
divide between the north and the south that most scholars falsely 
fractionalize the country into ‘Muslim north’ and ‘Christian south’ 
as if Christians are not in the north and Muslims are not in the 
south. This fallacious divide has impacted negatively on inter-eth-
nic identities and group relations to the extent that every person 
from the north of the country is often viewed as Muslim despite 
the fact that there are numerous ethnic identities that are not 
Muslims. The Igbos, for example, are generally seen as non-Mus-
lims and are treated so; likewise the Hausa-Fulani are generally 
seen as non-Christians and are treated so. Yet in the north, major-
ity of non-Hausa/Fulani are Christians while a great number of the 
Yoruba in southern Nigeria are Muslims.
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Religion cannot be ignored in Nigerian government and poli-
tics. During the regional governments, religion made a subtle en-
croachment in Nigerian politics to the extent that minority groups 
in northern Nigeria who were mostly Christians were disenchant-
ed with the way the Hausa/Fulani were using Islam to manipu-
late the activities of the Northern Peoples Congress (NPC). This 
made the minority groups mostly from the Middle Belt to form 
the Middle Zone League (MZL), which later transformed into the 
United Middle Belt Congress (UMBC), a political party of mostly 
Christian minority groups to free themselves from the  political/re-
ligious hegemonic activities of the NPC (Sklar 2004; Ksatfelt 2000; 
2003). However, the question of religion came to  light during the 
Constituent Assembly of 1977/78 when the debate on whether 
to establish a Shari’a Court of Appeal or not almost stalled the 
constitutional process (Kukah 1994). In 1986, the smuggling of 
the Nigerian state into membership of the Organization of Islamic 
Conference (OIC) by the Ibrahim Babangida military government 
brought another religious controversy between the Christians and 
the Muslims (Kenny, 2004; 1996). 
Suspicious of the government’s intention with the membership 
of OIC and disenchanted with the perceived plan to islamize the 
country by removing Christian army officers from key strategic 
positions and replacing them with Muslim army officers,  some 
young army officers led by Major Gideon Orkar staged a coup to 
overthrow the regime of Babangida in 1990. Unfortunately the is-
sue of ethnicity and religion was reflected in the coup when Major 
Gideon excised some five northern states from the federation. As 
a result of this miscalculation, the coup that was initially welcomed 
lost the support of the majority of Nigerians (Kenny 1996). 
Despite the influence of religion and ethnicity in the political 
history of the Nigeria, we must recognize the fact that at certain 
periods these issues were even tolerated. For example, the Bu-
hari-led military government (1983-1985) had both the Head of 
State and his Deputy, General Tunde Idiagbon as Muslims; like-
wise the duo of Moshood Abiola and Babagana Kingibe during 
the 1993 Presidential election. If the Christians tolerated this, it 
277
was unlikely the Muslims would have. For example, the Muslims 
protested vehemently, and even threatened to embark on a jihad 
(holy war) against the Nigerian state if Muslims were not consid-
ered in the appointment to head the National Political Reforms 
Conference of March 2005 after Justice Nikky Tobi and Rev. Fr. 
Matthew Hassan Kukah were appointed as Chairman and Secre-
tary respectively (The Guardian, March 13, 2005). To douse the 
tension, President Olusegun Obasanjo had to appoint two other 
Muslims as co-Chairman and co-Secretary. This clearly shows that 
issues of religion and ethnicity are still very crucial and germane 
in Nigerian government and politics and it is with this background 
that we shall analyze ethno-religious conflicts and diversity in me-
dia reporting from 1999 till date, while drawing lessons for the 
future.      
Reported Cases of Some Salient Ethno-religious Conflicts in 
Northern Nigeria
Ethnic and religious conflicts have a long history in Nigeria, but 
the explosive nature of the conflicts manifested in the 1980s, espe-
cially after the introduction of the Structural Adjustment Program 
(SAP). The introduction of SAP by General Babangida administra-
tion in 1986 and the attendant rise in poverty that followed suit 
was linked to the violent resurgence of ethno-religious politics in 
Nigeria (see, Jega, 2000; Okafor, 1997). Between 1980 and 2008 
there have been unprecedented cases of ethnic and religious con-
flicts spread across Nigeria, and scholars and analysts are of the 
opinion that deaths and destruction as a result of ethno-religious 
conflicts from 1987 to 2017 have outnumbered those recorded 
during the Nigerian civil war of 1967-1970.* It is not possible to 
give a detailed discourse of all the ethno-religious conflicts that 
occurred in Northern Nigeria, as that will be beyond the scope of 
this paper. However, salient ethno-religious conflicts as the Shari’a 
law crisis of 2000; the Miss World crisis of 2002; the crisis  resulting 
from the cartooning of Prophet Muhammed in 2006; and the Jos 
crises of 1991, 1994, 1998, 2004, and 2008 will be discussed in the 
light of media diversity in reporting. 
The Shari’a Law Crisis
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At the wake of ‘democratic’ rule in 1999, Shari’a controversy 
became a very potent catalyst of conflict that led to the death 
and displacement of several persons, apart from the destruction 
of property. Shari’a means judgment in Hausa while in Arabic it 
connotes the whole of Islamic jurisprudence that must guide the 
life of Muslims in the society (Khuri, 1994). The complex issue is 
how to practice Shari’a in a society of mixed religions, especially 
in a democracy. 
Addressing a large crowd that converged for the inaugura-
tion of Shari’a law on Thursday, October 28, 1999, Governor Sani 
Ahmed Yerima of Zamfara State stated thus:
It has become pertinent that we wake up from this sorry state of slum-
ber and live up to our responsibility to the Almighty in order to avoid 
his curse…Let me make it unequivocally clear that we are not un-
aware of the multifarious nature of our society as a multi-religious and 
multi-ethnic one and we do not intend to impose the Shari’a law on 
the non-Muslims in the state as is being deliberately and mischievously 
falsified by agents of blackmail” (cited in Oduyoye, 2000:1). 
In the same vein, the Governor of Niger State, Abdullahi Kure, 
reiterated the neutrality of the practice of Shari’a towards those 
who belonged to other religions. Thus, according to Kure, “Cer-
tainly, it (Shari’a) will not pitch one religion against another” (The 
Guardian, December 22, 1999). As it turned out, assurances by 
both governors that Shari’a would not affect the non-Muslims was 
rather unrealistic. In Zamfara State, for example, Christian wom-
en were subjected to trekking long distances as commercial mo-
torcyclists were banned from carrying women, but also were not 
allowed to enter vehicles designated for carrying Muslim wom-
en. Christian tenants were forced out of their rented houses by 
Muslim landlords who preferred to have their houses vacant than 
to accommodate Christians; Christians were forced to settle their 
cases in Shari’a courts; and there were cases of kidnapping some 
women to force them convert to Islam (interview conducted with 
Mr. David Ishaya, the former Secretary of the Christian Association 
of Nigeria, Zamfara State Branch).
No sooner the Shari’a law was launched in Niger State, than 
Muslims loaded themselves in trucks from Minna and Kontagora 
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towns and headed to Salka town inhabited by Kamberi people 
who are mostly of the Traditional African Religion. It was on a mar-
ket day in September 2001. Most Kamberi people brew beer from 
their farm settlements and bring the liquor for sale on markets 
day. The Muslims who arrived in trucks went round the markets 
and started breaking the clay jars of the brewed beer. The Kam-
beris mobilized their folks and laid siege on the Muslims and mas-
sacred several of them (interview with Rev. Bulus, now Catholic 
Bishop of Kontagora Prefecture). Sad enough, the media have not 
devoted their attention to reporting the impact of Shari’a in Zam-
fara and played deaf ears to what had happened in Salka town 
of Niger State, which did not even feature as a news item in any 
media outlet. 
The Kaduna Shari’a crises of February and April 2001 were the 
most obvious because of the gravity and magnitude of conflict 
experienced. Christians and Muslims almost in equal proportion 
populate Kaduna State. Whereas the Muslims predominate the 
north of the state, the Christians predominate the south. Like most 
states in the north, the Hausa/Fulani are mostly Muslims while mi-
nority ethnic groups are mostly Christians and traditionalists. The 
Muslims in Kaduna were pressurizing the government to adopt 
and implement Shari’a like other northern states; the Christians 
were opposed to Shari’a. Crisis ensued when the Christians em-
barked on a rally round Kaduna city to protest against the adop-
tion of Shari’a. Some Muslims barricaded some streets and start-
ed stoning the Christians. Things got out of hand and the result 
was the death of several persons, burning down of churches and 
mosques and other properties. There were reprisal attacks on the 
Hausa/Fulani Muslims in Onitsha, Umuahia and Owerri by the Igbo 
in retaliation for the Igbo killed in Kaduna. The Tribune reported 
that about 1,000 people lost their lives (see, Sunday Tribune, Jan-
uary 11, 2009, p. 19), while ThisDay reported that Shari’a claimed 
over 10,000 lives (see, ThisDay, April 2, 2005, p.2).
Very disturbing, however, was the manner in which the media 
handled the Shari’a Law issue. For example, The Punch newspaper 
had a story titled “Shari’a: Advent of a Millennium Monster” 
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(The Punch, Thursday, February 17, 2000, p. 12). This kind of re-
portage demonizes Islam as a religion and exacerbates tension 
between Christians and Muslims because the media in Nigeria are 
mostly seen as a Christian industry. The style of reportage also 
shows great ignorance on the part of both the reporters and news 
editors. Sharia law is not just intricately connected to the practice 
of Islam but is the very basis of Islamic religion. During an inter-
view with two Islamic scholars- Umar Koba and Nasiru Herge, they 
made it clear that without shari’a there cannot be Islam, because 
Islamic jurisprudence is the fundamental principle that covers all 
aspects of    shari’a. Moreover, the Penal Code operated by most 
states in northern Nigeria today has its foundation in shari’a law 
even before the advent of colonialism in Nigeria.
The Sagamu/Kano Crisis
The Hausa/Fulani had lived and interacted with the Yoruba in 
Sagamu, a town in Yorubaland in present day Ogun State known 
to be the harbinger of kolanut farming and trade for many centu-
ries without any major friction. Unfortunately, July of 2000 turned 
a dark month for the two groups. The Yoruba were celebrating 
Oro- a masquerade dancing festival mainly for male initiates. In 
Yoruba tradition and culture, only men are allowed to come in 
contact with the Oro masquerade. Two Hausa women were said 
to have violated the rules by insisting on seeing the masquerades. 
Their arrogance infuriated the Yoruba worshippers of Oro who 
took laws into their hands by hacking the two women to death. 
The Hausa/Fulani in Sagamu protested the killing of the two wom-
en who were widely reported to be ‘prostitutes’ by the media. Vi-
olence ensued between the two ethnic groups and the end result 
was the death of scores of lives. 
The violence in Sagamu spread to Kano where several Yoruba 
people were killed in retaliation for the ‘massacre’ of the Hausa/
Fulani in Sagamu (Alanamu, 2005).Oro is a Yoruba traditional Af-
rican belief system, and the question is: should the belief system 
be binding on peoples of other beliefs and cultures? If the answer 
is in the affirmative in order to justify the violence, then what is 
wrong in imposing shari’a law on non-Muslims in some states of 
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northern Nigeria? Moreover, the Yoruba who teamed up to fight 
the Hausa/Fulani in Sagamu were not just traditionalists, there 
were Christians and Muslims also, which reinforces Insa Nolte’s 
argument that the control of the economy of Nigerian National 
Petroleum Corporation (NNPC) depot and the overzealous intent 
to deal with the Hausa/Fulani who ‘annulled’ June 12, 1999 elec-
tions were the remote reasons. An interviewee who witnessed the 
violence in Sagamu and who is also an indigene of Sagamu was of 
the view that bottled-up ethnic animosity was at the heart of the 
conflict in the sense that though Oro is a traditional cult in Yoru-
baland, Christians and Muslims joined the traditional worshippers 
as actors in the violence.
The November 21 Miss World Crisis
Nigeria was billed to host the Miss World beauty contest on 
December 7, 2002. Most Muslims who saw it as the import of 
Western immorality considered the Miss World beauty contest ob-
scene. That opportunity came in hand when a female reporter with 
the ThisDay newspaper, Miss Isioma Daniel asked what Prophet 
Muhammed would make of the beauty contestants. Writing in the 
November 16, 2002 of the ThisDay Daniel said “What would Mu-
hammed (the prophet of Islam) think? In all honesty, he probably 
would have chosen a wife from one of them (the contestants)”. 
This certainly was provocative journalism, which did not take into 
consideration the feelings of the Muslims and the reaction that 
was bound to take place. The main issue was that the statement, 
which was written in the holy month of Ramadan (Muslim period 
of fast) depicted Muhammed as a womanizer, which was inter-
preted as an unacceptable sacrilege.
There were violent protests in the streets of Kaduna, Kano and 
Abuja that led to the death of over 100 persons (see, The News, 
December 15, 2008, p. 26). As a result, the contest was shifted 
from Nigeria to London. The violence resulted from poor judg-
ment on the part of the newspaper.  Furthermore, the comment 
by the Guardian newspaper that “The protesters chanting Allah 
Akbar (sic) (Allah is the greatest) also passed a fatwa (death sen-
tence) on the publisher of ThisDay, Mr.Nduka Obaigbena and the 
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editor, Mr. Eniola Bello for alleged blasphemy of Prophet Moham-
med in a recent publication was untrue in the sense that the fat-
wa (death sentence)was actually passed on Isioma Daniel and not 
the publisher and editor respectively. Here again, the media was 
trying to be emotive and sensational than report the actual facts 
concerning the reportage (The Guardian, Thursday, November 21, 
2002, p. 3.). According to an Anglican Bishop in Kaduna, what the 
media should have concentrated efforts on was to question why 
an Islamic Sheikh or cleric would issue a fatwa on Isioma in Nige-
ria- a country that had not adopted any religion as state religion; 
or why did the Muslims in Kaduna and Abuja not seek redress 
in the courts instead of taking laws in their hands by violently 
demonstrating and destroying lives and property. These were the 
real aftermath issues rather than dissipate energy on statements 
that were emotional and non-factual. 
The Danish Cartoon and Maiduguri Crisis
The Danish newspaper, Jyllands-Posten, in its 30th Septem-
ber 2005 edition, published 12 editorial cartoons of Prophet 
Muhammed. Muslims across the world staged several protests 
against the cartooning of the prophet of Islam. Muslims protested 
in Lebanon, Iran and Syria and Gaza where flags of some Europe-
an countries were burnt. In Nigeria, there were violent protests 
by Muslims in Kontagora town in Niger State and Maiduguri in 
Borno State where shops, churches and buildings belonging to 
Christians were razed and several Christians killed. There were re-
prisal attacks and killings, particularly in Onitsha and Aba in East-
ern Nigeria. What is interesting here is the fact that media did not 
investigate the reason for the protest in Borno. At the periphery, 
it seemed the Muslims in Maiduguri protested against the car-
tooning of Muhammed; but an interaction with a Professor from 
Maiduguri who was close to the then Governor Ali Modu Sheriff 
revealed the political undertone to the violence that greeted the 
Danish newspaper cartooning of the prophet of Islam in Maidu-
guri. 
The Professor said the violence in Maiduguri was actually 
state-sponsored as  the governor of the state  needed to cause 
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a distraction from stories that he was on the watchlist of the Eco-
nomic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC). Political religion 
became a handy instrument of distraction and destruction as 
Muslim fundamentalists were mobilized to cause mayhem. This 
violent group called the ‘ECOMOG’ and a large number of the al-
majeri (plural- street children attending Koranic schools) were the 
ones that attacked Christians and churches to make it look like it 
was the Muslims protesting against the cartooning of the prophet 
of Islam. The cartooning of the prophet of Islam, therefore, pro-
vided an alibi that prevented Obasanjo’s watchdog, the EFCC from 
clamping down on state officials in Borno State. The violence in 
Kontagora was equally fierce but received scanty reportage by the 
media.
The Jos Crises
The media have consistently reported the Jos crises of 1991, 
1994, 2001, 2004 and 2008  as one of the combined forces of 
religion and ethnicity on the one hand and that between the in-
digenes and settlers on the other. There are several ethnic groups 
who originally inhabit Jos city while the Hausa/Fulani are regarded 
as the settlers. The crises have their root causes in the quest for po-
litical and economic control of Jos North Local Government, which 
is now predominantly occupied by the Hausa/Fulani. As noted by 
Mavalla (2014, 101), “The cause of conflict in Plateau State was not 
so much religious as the issue of the indigene-settler divide para-
digm. The causes of the so-called ‘religious conflicts were…rather 
socio-historical, ethno-political and socio-economic.” The Hausa/
Fulani influenced the creation of Jos North local government in 
1991 and since then sought to displace the indigenes from the 
political and economic control of the local government, a move 
continually resisted by the indigenes (Best, 2007; Egwu, 2008). 
Thousands of people have lost their lives and properties worth 
billions of naira have been destroyed as a result of the crises, yet 
the media have constantly reported the channels of vexation rath-
er than the actual root causes. 
The media have not been able to ascertain why the conflict in 
Jos is between the Hausa/Fulani and the indigenes and not be-
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tween the indigenes and non-Hausa/Fulani groups, but one cen-
tral issue surrounding the incessant violence has to do with the 
control of Jos North Local Government Area where the biggest 
market and economy of Plateau State is located. The Hausa/Fulani 
who are the predominant population in Jos North wanted to take 
both political and economic control of the city, which has been 
firmly and fiercely resisted by the indigenes most especially the 
Berom. During an interview session, some of the indigenes raised 
concern about the near universal citizenship accorded the Hausa/
Fulani in Nigeria over and above other groups. The question was 
asked why was it possible for a Hausa/Fulani man to migrate from 
Kano or Katsina or Zaria to Jos and seek to become the Sarki (local 
chief), a local government chairman, a senator and aspire for other 
higher positions as an indigene of Jos and difficult for a Berom to 
go to Kano and become a local government councilor? Moreover, 
the Hausa/Fulani are not the only migrants into Jos; the Yoruba, 
the Igbo, Nupe, Auchi people and Igala and several other ethnic 
groups live side-by-side with the indigenes without any form of 
conflict. Why the Hausa/Fulani? These are questions that the me-
dia, academics, and policy analysts will need to find answers to.
The Shiites and the Clash with the Nigerian Army
December 12 and 13 2015 would ever remain sad days in the 
history of the Shiite community in Zaria. The Shiites otherwise 
known as the Islamic Movement of Nigeria is led El-Zak Zakky. 
Every year the group holds public rallies in major cities in Northern 
Nigeria such as Kaduna, Zaria, Funtua, Kano and Sokoto where it 
has some preponderance of followership. El-Zak Zakky has a long 
history of radicalization beginning from his days as a student in 
Ahmadu Bello University Zaria where he was instrumental to orga-
nizing series of demonstrations in the 1980s against the Nigerian 
state. He later became the leader of the Muslim Brotherhood, with 
ties to some Middle East groups and leader of the Shiites who 
certainly are at loggerhead with the dominant Sunni in Northern 
Nigeria. El-Zak Zakky was said to have received his indoctrination 
and funding majorly from Iraq and other Shi’a dominated Arab 
countries.
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In their yearly demonstrations, the Shiites have constituted 
themselves into Lords with flagrant disregard for the laws guiding 
public conduct. They were known not to seek permit from the 
police and not to allow anybody pass on major roads where they 
conduct their rallies. On 12 December 2015, the Chief of Army 
Staff, Lt. General TukurBuratai was on his way to pay a courtesy 
visit to the Emir of Zazzau (Zaria) when the Shiites who were con-
ducting their rally halted his convoy. A Brigadier General came out 
of his car and pleaded with the Shiites to give way but they gave 
deaf ears to the plea. Even when the security details of the Chief 
of Army Staff wanted to take military action, the General pleaded 
with them not to. The Shiites were said to have attacked the mili-
tary convoy with sticks, clubs and machetes. The next day, soldiers 
from 1 Division in Kaduna stormed the Shiite community in Zaria, 
killing hundreds of the members. El-Zak Zakky was said to have 
lost one of his wives and two sons, while he and another of his 
wives were taken captives. There were conflicting figures about 
the casualties. Whereas the Guardian on Sunday, of December 13 
put the number of casualties as ‘unspecified’ the same paper lat-
er estimated the number of deaths to be 34 including the three 
sons of El-Zak Zakky (The Guardian, Friday 20, 2005. The Secretary 
to the Government of Kaduna State would later admit that 347 
corpses were buried after the soldiers and the Shiites clashed (see 
The Punch, Tuesday 12 April 2016, p.12). Yet, towards the end of 
2016, Amnesty International came up with a more alarming figure 
of more than 800 persons. , 
Boko Haram and the Kidnap of the Chibok Girls
The violent activities of Boko Haram terrorist group spanned 
from 2011 to 2016 and too wide for the scope of this paper to 
capture. However, the media succeeded in making heroes and 
heroines out of the Boko Haram members by constantly referring 
to the group as the “dreaded Boko Haram” and presenting the Ni-
gerian state and its security forces as weaklings. On 14 April 2014, 
Boko Haram abducted some secondary school girls in Chibok 
community of Borno State. While the CNN and Al-Jazeera gave 
the figures of the kidnapped girls as over 270, the Nigerian media, 
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For example, two days after the abduction, The Punch reported 
“Boko Haram abducts 100 schoolgirls in Borno” (The Punch, 
Wednesday, April 16, 2014, p. 2). 
Conclusion
The media will continue to play a very crucial role in the life of 
the Nigerian state, and to a large extent, the media can be ad-
judged to have performed above the average. However, the Ni-
gerian media are confronted with daunting challenges such as in-
adequate welfare for journalists, , constraining ownership interest, 
ethno-cultural and religious bias which limit their effectiveness. 
For as long as journalists are poorly remunerated, their commit-
ment to higher ideals of professionalism will be compromised and 
sensitivity to conflict reporting will be dampened. Media owner-
ship in Nigeria is another issue that needs to be addressed in the 
sense that it affects the independence and workings of the media 
industry. Most owners of media houses find it extremely difficult 
to detach themselves from the industry and reporters and editors 
are unduly pressured to navigate the tightrope in order to keep 
their jobs to the detriment of the news process. 
One obvious major challenge confronting the Media in Nigeria, 
however, is  inadequate investment  in investigative journalism 
and the continuous training of journalists and media reporters in 
this aspect. Media bodies such as the Nigerian Broadcasting Cor-
poration and the Nigeria Union of Journalists must lead the fight 
in ensuring ethical journalism thrives and ownership does not be-
come an albatross to the industry.
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Media coverage of Ethno-religious   
Conflicts in Nigeria: Another Perspective
By Ayo Olukotun & 
Margaret Ayansola Jesuminure
Introduction 
This chapter discusses media reportage of ethno-religious con-
flicts in Nigeria in the Fourth Republic. It attempts to contribute to 
the global debate on the character and impact of media coverage 
of ethno-religious conflicts.  From a wider perspective, it should 
be noted that Nigeria, like many African and other multicultur-
9
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al states are tormented by frequent religious and ethnic clashes, 
based on actual or manipulated identity claims. Globally, the role 
of the media in shaping events as well as the reciprocal relation-
ship between the outbreak of conflicts, disorders, wars and the 
media representation of these, (Olukotun, 2011) constitute an im-
portant subject in contemporary analysis. 
That is another way of saying that the narrative strategies and 
framing which media employ in times of conflicts have bearing on 
the trajectory and outcomes of those conflicts. Indeed, the grow-
ing popularity of conflict-sensitive journalism in Nigeria, which 
trains journalists to be more conscious and aware of the conse-
quences of irresponsible, flamboyant, partisan, and overtly biased 
reporting is a proof of the recognition of the importance of the 
reportorial frames of journalists in time of conflicts. 
In Nigeria, there is a rough coincidence of ethnic and religious 
cleavages, to the extent that the Northern part of the country is 
predominantly Muslim, while the Southern part is predominant-
ly Christian. To fill in the picture a little bit, there are pockets of 
Muslim communities in Southern Nigeria, especially Yorubaland, 
while there are scattered populations of Christian communities in 
the largely Muslim North. In the North, Islam tends to be more 
radical and fanatical, especially, with the advent of heretical and 
fringe sects such as the Maitasine and Boko-Haram, which mount 
crusades against the established religion adopted by the majori-
ty. Although, ethno-religious conflicts are frequent in the history 
of postcolonial Nigeria, they gained more salience in the Fourth 
Republic with the adoption of Shari’a by some states in the North, 
and the more liberal atmosphere of a democracy, which allowed 
freedom of expression.
Some of the salient conflicts in the period under study include 
the February 2000 clashes between Christians and Muslims over 
the implementation of Shari’a law in Kaduna, the 2002 clash-
es over the proposed hosting by Nigeria of a Miss World beauty 
pageant, the 2008 clashes between Muslims and Christians in Ad-
amawa state, as well as the 2010 clashes between Fulani Muslims 
and Christian-dominated villages in the Jos area in 2010. In the 
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last two years, coinciding with presidency of Muhamadu Buhari, a 
Northern Fulani, there has been an escalation of attacks by Fulani 
herdsmen and other groups on Christian communities around the 
Middle Belt, South-East Nigeria, and elsewhere. 
Regarding the media, it is, largely for historical reasons, domi-
nated by the Christian South with a preponderant section of them, 
located in the Lagos-Ibadan axis. The media-- print electronic and 
digital--reflect fratricides and fractures of the nation state, to the 
extent that Adebanwi (2002) could argue that Nigeria does not 
have national media but, ‘Arewa media’, ‘ Nkenga media’ and 
‘Ngbati media’ corresponding to the major ethnic division in the 
country. Our narrative strategy is a case study approach, in which 
we look in detail at particular ethno-religious crises with a view to 
analyzing how the media, overwhelmingly located in the South, 
more precisely in the South-West, report the clashes. We draw 
upon primary and secondary data, including interviews with edi-
tors of newspapers as well as content analysis to tease out import-
ant trends.
SECTION TWO
Identity Conflict and Media Framing: Contextualizing the 
Issues
The concept of identity derives from a Latin word (idem), which 
connotes uniformity and continuity and belongs to the category 
of essentially contested concepts in the social sciences, featuring 
a confounding wide array of definitions. As is commonly quipped, 
ours is the age of controversy deriving from different approaches 
and disciplinary orientations over the concept of identity. A rough 
and ready elaboration is to conceive of identity as a person’s men-
tal image and expressions of their individuality or group affiliation. 
It resides in the interstices of negotiation between individual and 
socially determined roles, suggesting that it can be viewed as a 
coterie of group affiliations that mark out the individual. 
Obviously therefore, language, socialization and cultural attri-
butes loom large in the appreciation of identity as socially con-
structed phenomenon; and it goes without saying that the media 
in all its variegated forms are central to the construction of iden-
Ayo Olukotun & Margaret Ayansola Jesuminure
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tities. The repertoire of symbols, totems and ancestral myths from 
which  identities as cultural projects are constructed and reinforced 
are supplied by the media, while in conflict situations  antagonistic 
factions draw upon and appropriate media narratives to shore up 
their legitimacy or to reinforce their  sense of ‘them’ and ‘us’ (Ke-
linar, 1995). Class, gender, religion, and ethnicity furnish the ba-
sis for identities, and identity conflicts, although obviously in the 
African context, given the particular ways in which nation-states 
were constructed as colonial amalgams or experiments in political 
cloning, ethnicity and religion are among the most contentious 
and around which pitched battles, occasionally leading to the dis-
solution of states have been fought.
In Nigeria, as well as elsewhere, in Africa, study after study 
have borne out the premise that the framing of media coverage 
of identity conflicts directly affects the unfolding, trajectory and 
prospects of eventual resolution of the conflicts. The inflammato-
ry broadcast of Radio Kaduna, as well as the editorial slant of the 
New Nigerian newspaper--a paper, which advertised its mission as 
“telling the words and pictures of leading story of Northern Nige-
ria”-- direct to the genocidal killings of Ibos in 1966 in many parts 
of Northern Nigeria  set the fragile nation on an irreversible course 
of conflagration. In her doctoral study on this period of Nigeria’s 
media history, Doyin Abiola (formerly Aboaba) informs pertinently 
that the press and radio of the North unleashed a campaign of 
verbal hostilities against the South. These mass information media 
were fully employed in denouncing the 15 January coup, reject-
ing proposals for unitary government and preparing the people’s 
mind for the counter coup that was to come on 29th July (Aboaba 
1990:9, 1979). 
Of course, the hostility and war mongering of the Northern me-
dia was more than reciprocated by Eastern Nigeria Radio, as well 
as the Eastern Outlook, as the media fissured trenchantly along 
geo-ethnic lines (Adebanwi: 2002). In more recent times, the pic-
torial elaboration in August 1999 of the Hausa/Yoruba fratricide in 
Sagamu, Ogun State, sparked off reprisal conflicts and mayhem in 
Kano, Northern Nigeria. As Bamigbetan (2000, 96) informs on this 
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score: 
There were gory blood-chilling pictures of dead victims packed in 
trucks and station wagons apparently being conveyed to the mortuary. 
Although, there were no visible marks to indicate the ethnic identity of 
the victims, the pictures serve the disruptive purpose of rousing hatred 
between the divided. The result was the reprisal in Kano, which again 
left several dead. Media analysts, considering the impact of the pic-
tures, believed the editors should have exercised restraint in printing 
the horrid scenes. 
Elsewhere in Africa, the seminal culpability of Radio-Television 
Libre Des Mille Collines (RTLM) and that of the Tutsi folk singer, 
Simon Bikindi, in the genocidal killings in Rwanda has been noted 
in several studies. As Craig (2006, 41) remarked: 
Around the time of the genocide, the solid links established between 
RTLM staff and their listeners became an operational framework for 
mass murder. Inflammatory broadcast made on RTLM were clearly 
linked to attacks on Tutsis and Hutu moderates alike, within the course 
of everyday operations. RTLM staff provided the militias with list of 
prominent ‘enemies’ (who were then targeted for assassination) and 
provided a steady supply of anti-Tutsi folk music by popular artiste 
such as Simon Bikindis.
Operating on tenterhooks, often on the edge of bankruptcy, 
many media houses have several times lent themselves to recruit-
ment as combatants in the many civil wars in Africa. 
Our discussion is anchored on the theory of framing which 
refers to various ways in which journalists structure or more ac-
curately pre structure news and other media output by drawing 
attention or giving salience to certain aspects more than others. 
The theory is derived from the word ‘frame’ which refers to the 
marking of boundaries in the same way as an image is demarcated 
by putting a border around it. According to the Oxford Dictionary 
of Media Communication (Chandler and Munday, 2011), frames in 
media theory refer to “the ways in which representations function 
to re contextualize (and thus change the meaning of) that which 
they represent”. They go on to argue that frames are “particular 
techniques and devices employed in representations as a means 
of constraining interpretation”. In other words, news and other 
media output are anchored by journalists, using selection strate-
Ayo Olukotun & Margaret Ayansola Jesuminure
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gies which are used to lead the audience to view their reports in 
the light of the codes favored.
SECTION THREE
Media in a Divided Nation
In a plural and divided nation, such as Nigeria, there has been 
a longstanding debate concerning the role, orientation, and geo-
graphical location of the media. This is particularly important, in 
the context of analyzing media coverage of ethno-religious con-
flicts; for, obviously, the media, are not neutral institutions stand-
ing above society, but are embedded and implicated in the divi-
sions that are dominant features of a polity. Hence, media location, 
ownerships, and profile of the media have bearing on the frames 
which they employ in reporting conflict. For example, in a formu-
lation of the role of ethnicity, geography, and impliedly, religion in 
the postures of the media, Oyovbaire (2001:35) argued that:
The Nigerian media is not complex, nor is it pluralistic. It is a locational 
and institutional monopoly. The monopolistic complex of the media 
is rooted and derived from its historical origins, advantage of market 
forces and patronage in advertisement, professed hold of the industry 
and the cultivation of a deep-rooted mindset or world-view of South 
West.
In this conception, the dominant section of the media locat-
ed in South-West Nigeria, are viewed as principally reflecting the 
views of political actors and the perspectives of the majority of 
citizens from that part of the country. Some go so far as to sug-
gest that what passes as national newspapers are no more than 
regional publications, which reflect the views and perspectives of 
the people from that region. Regarding ethno-religious conflicts, 
it is predictable from the above perspective, that the editorial slant 
and coverage of these conflicts will be, in a broad sense, from a 
Christian and somewhat secular perspective. It should be pointed 
out, however, that location in the Ibadan-Lagos area, does not co-
incide with ownership, considering that the Niger-Delta area has 
emerged as the dominant proprietors of major media institutions. 
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Table 1: Ownership and Location of Major Media Institutions
Name of Media Location Proprietor and State of Origin
The Guardian Lagos Alex (later Maiden) Ibru (Delta)
ThisDay Lagos Nduka Obaigbena (Delta)
Vanguard Lagos Sam Amuka (Delta)
The Punch Lagos Ogunsola/Aboderin (Oyo)
Daily Trust Abuja Kabiru Yusuf (Kano)
The Nation Lagos Bola Tinubu (Lagos)
African Independent Television Lagos Raymond Dokpesi (Edo)
Channels Television Lagos John Momoh (Edo)
Sun Lagos Orji Kalu (Abia)
Leadership Abuja Sam Nda Isiah (Niger)
Source: Research note
Obviously, from a Southern Nigerian perspective, the table 
above bears out the dominance of media owners from that part 
of the country although, this is not the same thing as saying that 
Yorubas are the dominant proprietors as suggested by Oyovbaire 
and others. Evidence that politicians of Northern extraction are 
sensitive to this lopsided distribution of media in favor of the 
South, was provided by Dr. Adbullahi Adamu, former governor of 
Nasarawa State. Adamu argued in a lecture delivered to the Arewa 
Media Group, entitled “Where is the Northern Press?” :
Is there something, I wonder that makes it impossible for newspaper to 
survive in this part of the country? Perhaps, the answer lies in the stub-
born refusal to appreciate the role news media play in the development 
of societies and in the contest for power, particularly in a democracy. 
The balance of power or the balance of terror is a stabilizing factor in 
every society. I do not argue for a press war, I argue for freedom from 
other people’s mass media in order that we may be heard. (Media Re-
view, July 2005, p26)
Adamu’s remarks, it should be noted, were made against the 
backdrop of the comatose state of the New Nigerian, the dominant 
newspaper from Northern Nigeria, which however, did not go off 
the streets until February 2012. It should be noted that since the 
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advent of the Fourth Republic in 1999, a number of newspapers 
based in Abuja, with northern proprietors have emerged. These 
include: Leadership, Daily Trust, People’s Daily and Abuja Inquirer. 
These are complemented by private television stations based in 
the North, such as, Desnims in Kaduna as well as Gotel Television, 
which is owned by the former Vice President, Abubakar Atiku and 
based in Yola. The bounce back of the Northern media is not sub-
stantial enough to cancel out the advantage enjoyed by media 
located in the south, especially the Southwest.
Table 2: Major online News Publications 
Name of Publication Founder/ Proprietor  Ethnicity
The Cable Simon Kolawole Yoruba
Premium Times Dapo Olorunyomi Yoruba 
Linda Ikeji Blog Linda Ikeji Igbo 
Sahara Reporters Omoyele Sowore Yoruba
The Eagle Online Dotun Oladipo Yoruba 
Freedom Online Gabriel Akinadewo Yoruba 
Gbamji.com Dr. Ismaila Iro Hausa 
Real News Maureen Chigbo Igbo
Source: Research note
As table two shows, the arena of digital media, as reflected in 
online news media increasingly replicates the preponderance of 
southern Nigeria proprietors. To the extent, therefore, that we can 
speak of a southern Nigeria perspective, it reflects a more or less 
Christian view point, influenced by advantages enjoyed in modern 
and amenities relative to the North. It should be mentioned that 
when ethno-religious crises break out, protesters often do not dis-
criminate between various publications located in the south. As 
the former editor, and later managing director of the ANN plc, 
publishers of Nigerian Tribune Mr. Segun Olatunji, told us in the 
course of researching this paper, when the Miss World Beauty 
pageant crisis occurred in 2002: 
Every Southern newspaper was taken to be This Day in the North. Our 
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vehicles could not move freely and our members of staff were afraid for 
their lives, we lost millions of Naira. We were careful not to pour fuel on 
an already combustible station… so that we could to do business in the 
north. (Interview with Segun Olatunji, August 3, 2017).
In other words, several southern newspapers suffer whenev-
er the anger of protesters in northern Nigeria is directed at any 
one of them. Of course, there are cleavages within what we have 
identified as southern Nigeria, but these cleavages tend to pale 
into insignificant or relative insignificance in the contexts of North 
versus South ethno-religious conflicts. Evidence of divergent per-
spectives between the north and the south is offered in the tone 
and tenor of editorial coverage of the Shari’a crisis by southern 
newspapers. To take an example, the Guardian, which on Sunday 
publishes a center spread, devoted to Christian religious issues, 
employed such headlines as ‘Shari’a monster resurrects in Kano’, 
and such expressions  as ‘the Nigerian Taliban’. These were mark-
edly different from the pro-shari’a articles published by the Kadu-
na-based New Nigerian. 
In ending this section, it is important to remark that other 
cleavages such as political, criss-cross the north-south divide in 
the coverage of ethno-religious crisis. In other words, a nuanced 
analysis will take note of factors such as professionalism, shifting 
arithmetic in political coalitions and the emergence, through glo-
balization of ideas that are broadly subversive of narrow and pro-
vincial worldviews. Agbaje (1992, 20) alluded to these criss-cross-
ing tendencies when he argued that: 
The press has found it difficult to rise above the personal, political and 
cleavage acrimonies of the colonial and post-colonial state and so-
ciety. Second, the press itself has been bifurcated along the lines of 
the fissures delineated in these inter-personal, interparty, intra- party, 
cross-cleavage and intra-cleavage schisms-
Hence, a southern perspective of media coverage, as previ-
ously argued, is not the same thing as the much talked about 
Ibadan-Lagos press. But with respect to the northern media, it is 
indistinguishable from newspapers located outside the South-
West. Hence, for example, Mahmud Jega, former editor of the 
New Nigerian evokes this generic description when he writes that: 
Ayo Olukotun & Margaret Ayansola Jesuminure
300
Watchdogs or Captured Media? . . . 
As far as I can see, among the biggest national newspapers, such as 
the Guardian, Punch and Vanguard (all Lagos-based) regional slant is 
most consigned to letters, columns and editorials. However, in troubled 
times, it bursts out to front pages and is easily seen in news selection 
and the drowning out of other news (Jega 2003, p.18)
This reinforces the tendency already identified, to view south-
ern newspapers as maintaining more or less the same perspective, 
with respect to their perception and reportage of ethno-religious 
conflicts, many of which have their origins in northern Nigeria. 
As will be shown, in the next section of this paper, there are dif-
ferential reports corresponding to the north-south divide as to 
the causes of ethno-religious crisis. To give an example, the clash 
between the Oodua People’s Congress, a Yoruba security outfit 
and Hausa immigrants in Idi-Araba in 2002, featured differences 
between southern newspapers, such as the Punch and the Comet, 
and Daily Trust located in the north. Specifically, the Comet, re-
ported on its front page on February 5, 2002, that the crisis was 
triggered by the refusal of a young Hausa man to pay for the use 
of a public toilet in the area. On February 7, a front page story by 
the Comet reinforced the trope of Hausas as aggressors, when it 
wrote that: 
Already some rich-resident-settlers in the Idi-Araba have been accused 
of giving out arms to create more havoc in the area. One Alhaji Gulolo 
who owns one of the beautiful houses in the area was said to have 
given guns to some of the resident settlers. Equally, Alhaji Mohammed 
who owns a popular house around Ifagbenro Street was said to have 
given bows and arrows to the youth in the area. But several Yoruba who 
fled the scene of horror said that the resident settlers always planned 
for and relish communal violence.
A contrasting perspective was offered by Daily Trust which 
painted the picture of the slaughter of Hausas by OPC members. 
For example, it reported on February 4, that “when Daily Trust vis-
ited the area yesterday, many of the wounded northerners were 
seen being taken to the Lagos General Hospital by Red Cross offi-
cials”. The story made no reference to wounded Yorubas. On Feb-
ruary 5, Daily Trust sought to mobilize northern politicians such 
as Senator Idris Kuta, who screamed “Do not push us to the wall”. 
This northern frame was reinforced by an Op-ed article in the Dai-
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ly Trust of February 12 entitled “OPC: The limits of tolerance”. The 
article said in part:
The latest massacre of the Hausas and other people of northern ori-
gin  by the supposedly outlawed Oodua People’s Congress (OPC) in 
Idi-Araba and other parts of Lagos have indeed brought many of us to 
the deepest limits of tolerance.
 Obviously, therefore, what is at work here are divergent re-
portorial frames with respect to the media located in the south 
and those located in the north. In the next section of this paper, 
we elaborate more, through a case study of these divergent ap-
proaches. 
SECTION FOUR
Narrating Ethno-religious Conflicts: Two case studies
As mentioned, in an earlier section of this paper, there is inter-
twining of ethnic and religious conflicts in Nigeria, to the extent 
that the country is in a sense divided, geographically into a largely 
Muslim north, and a predominantly Christian south. This division 
is accentuated by unequal development featuring a south, whose 
antecedents are located in early contact with European civiliza-
tion, through missionary influence, and a north that is in a sense 
a replica of the Muslim-dominated countries of North Africa and 
the Maghreb. Obviously, this sets the stage for a Huttingtonian 
clash of culture, and indeed, of civilization. As Salawu (2009, 90) 
puts it:
In Nigeria, due to its configuration as a nation, the strand of religion 
is intertwined with that of ethnicity. The ethnicization of religion is re-
flected in the fact that whenever there is a religious uprising, people 
from different parts of the country are always at each other’s neck. The 
Igbos, for the fact that they are mostly Christians, are usually the object 
of attack of Northern Muslims. 
 In view of this combustible combination of the competition 
for resources including grazing land for Fulani nomads  in a polit-
ical context, the memory of past injuries, and  the manipulation of 
ethnic and religious identities by politicians , the Fourth Republic, 
has witnessed scores of  clashes between Christians and Muslims, 
most of them pitching ethnic groups against each other. Table 
three below, far from exhaustive, as  it only covers the period be-
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tween 1999 and 2012, is indicative of the widespread nature of 
these conflicts.
Table three: Selected cases of ethno-religious violence in Nige-
ria 1999-2012 
No Date State (s) Nature Remarks  







The crisis originated from the 
killing of a Hausa woman by the 
Oro Masqueraders for violating 
traditional rites.
2 22 July 1999 Kano Reprisal to the 
Sagamu crisis 
above
The casualty figure was not re-
ported.






14 churches in 
Ilorin
Properties worth several millions 




Kaduna Riots over the 
introduction of 
Shari’a
An estimated 3000 people died
5 12 Oct.2001 Kano Religious riot in 
Kano
In protests against US invasion of 
Afghanistan over Osama bin Lad-
en. Over 150 persons were killed.
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The riot broke out when the Is-
lamic Brigade attacked a Christian 
woman who attempted to cross 
a public high-way barricaded by 
Muslim worshippers on Friday. 
Over 300 people were killed.
7 16 Nov. 
2002
Kaduna The Miss 





The crisis was triggered by an ar-
ticle authored by Isioma Daniel, in 
ThisDay newspaper, alleging that 
Prophet Muhammed would have 
loved to have the girls contesting. 
Over 250 people were killed and 
churches were destroyed
8 22 Mar. 
2007






The pupils claimed that their 
teacher desecrated the Qur’an 
while attempting to stop students 
from cheating in an examination 
hall.
9 21 Feb. 
2009
Bauchi Ethno-religious 
conflict at the 
Makama New 
Extension.
Over 11 people were killed, more 














Over 700 persons killed, 3 500 
persons internally displaced, 1264 
children orphaned, over 392 wom-
en widowed, and several proper-
ties destroyed.
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11 17-20. 
Jan.2009
Plateau Resurgence of 
religious crisis 
in Jos
Police announced at least 320 
killed, but aid workers and local 
leaders place death toll at over 
550. Over 40,000 persons dis-
placed.
12 7 Mar. 2010 Plateau Attacks by Fu-




wa, Shen and 
Fan in Jos.
Over 500 people, mainly women 
and children, were killed.
13 22 May 
2010
Plateau Attack on some 
Christians who 
were returning 




Reprisal attack by the Muslim over 
the killing of 3 Fulani Muslims. At 
least 1 person died while many 
were injured.





at Rukuba road 
and Farin Gada 
in Jos during 
the Ramadan 
prayers. 
No less than 20 persons were 
killed, 50 injured, over 50 motor 
vehicles and 100 motorcycles were 
torched.











23 persons (11 UN personnel were 
killed and 12 non-UN personnel 
were killed)
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More than 90 persons were 
reportedly killed, several churches 
and police stations torched.








ering of Igbo 
Christians and 
shot sporadical-
ly, killing over 










in the North to 
leave.
22 persons were reportedly killed; 
a dozen others were injured.
Source: Adapted from Sampson 2012:112
To take the specific example of the violence that broke out in 
November 2002, over the Miss World beauty competition, our 
reading of media coverage of the event is that no newspaper, 
either in the north or in the south, played an overtly instigating 
role with respect to the outbreak of the crisis. Once it broke out, 
however, coverage of the event followed a predictable pattern of 
north-south division, as well as Christian-Muslim dichotomy.
The crisis was inadvertently provoked by an article written by 
Miss Isioma Daniel containing a sentence considered to have been 
blasphemous of Prophet Muhammad. The “offending article” pub-
lished in the ThisDay edition of November 16, 2002 (pg. 50) had 
Daniel say, “The Muslims thought it was immoral to bring ninety 
two women to Nigeria and ask them to revel in vanity. What would 
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Mohammed think? In all honesty, he would probably have chosen 
a wife from one of them.” There is no evidence that the state-
ment, tucked deep in the inside pages of ThisDay was calculated 
to cause disaffection, let alone to spark off a deadly riot. It remains 
unclear as the various editors interviewed in the course of writing 
this chapter stated, whether the wave of destruction was a direct 
consequence of the publication which would have been read by 
only a few educated readers, or whether other factors, including 
northern sensitivities to a “Christian” southern presidency, were 
at stake. The outbreak of the conflict suggests, however, just how 
tender the fabric of social and political life can be in a society at 
the time, polarized by religion and ethnicity. Mahmud Jega who 
edited the New Nigerian advanced six underlying causes of the 
crisis:
Possible cause number one is genuine Muslim anger at a blasphemous 
statement directed at the Holy Prophet of Islam. Second, is the pent-up 
frustration of unemployed young men, failed WAECists, NECOists and 
JAMBites, as well as successful holders of these certificates who could 
secure neither jobs nor high school admission. Third, there were thieves 
who were looking out for opportunity to loot. Fourth, there were plain 
anarchists who were looking for the chance to burn, to maim and to 
kill. Fifth, there were local city thugs who had one or two old scores to 
settle with landlords, assorted creditors, former employers, and people 
‘who do not assist other people’, a common allegation among the city’s 
marginalized. And the sixth, there were political activists looking for an 
opportunity to reduce the incumbent governor’s roller-coaster edge in 
the race and prevent his cruising to victory, as it looks. (Interview with 
Mahmud Jega, August 03, 2017)
A similar opinion that the publication for which ThisDay pub-
lished several profuse apologies was only tangentially responsible 
for the crisis was expressed by Mr Lasisi Olagunju, editor of the 
Tribune on Saturday who said: 
I remember my initial reaction to reports of the crisis was disbelief un-
til our correspondent filed in a report confirming it. I believe the vi-
olence was an obvious over reaction by those who turned whatever 
they found disagreeable in the report to an opportunity to kill, maim 
and raze property of innocent people. The crisis, as I said before, was 
just an excuse to commit unimaginable crimes by some people. Again, 
it was easy to get foot soldiers for the mayhem because of the Alma-
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jiri system in the north which was/is also fallout of the acute illiteracy 
among youths in that part of Nigeria. (Interview with Lasisi Olagunju, 
August 03, 2017).
In keeping with that trend, the newspapers in the north and 
the south adopted a positive tone to the reportage of the im-
pending beauty contest. For example, the Nigerian Tribune in its 
edition of November 9, 2002 published a featured piece entitled 
“we are ready to host the world”. The article quoted one of the 
organizers of the beauty pageant, Mr. Ben Bruce, who informed 
the readers about the preparedness of the hosting company and 
the provision of adequate security for visitors. ThisDay adopted a 
similar, reassuring tone notwithstanding the Isioma’s article which, 
as mentioned before, could not have been calculated to offend. It 
is broadly the same thing for the New Nigerian, except that close 
reading of its coverage in the days leading up to the crisis sug-
gested a subtle undercurrent of opposition. This “opposition” was, 
however, confined to letters to the editor, rather than to the pa-
per’s opinion and news pages. For example, reflecting the tenden-
cy to criticize the event on religious grounds, the New Nigerian in 
its edition of November 13, page 8, published a letter with the title 
“Mrs. Obasanjo, stop this Beauty Contest.” Addressed to the pres-
ident’s wife, the letter read in part “…exposing nakedness in the 
name of parading women for beauty pageant is ungodly. Look at 
it this way, would you in fairness to your conscience model in such 
an event?” The point being made here is that there was no overt 
indication of looming crisis in the papers in the prelude to the 
crisis, save for the subtle hints of the New Nigerian. In this respect, 
it should be recalled that newspapers are businesses which have 
a stake in the preservation of the social order, and consequently 
suffer severe destructions in times of conflicts.
On the reporting of the crisis itself, all the papers, especially the 
ones located in the south maintained a stabilizing tenor. This pac-
ifying posture was predictably led by ThisDay which almost daily 
published apologies and sorrowful regrets on its first pages. For 
example, in its edition of November 25, 2002 it published what it 
called a further letter of apology from ThisDay chairman. It read 
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in part “The last one week has been a nightmare for all of us at 
ThisDay as we try to find answers to how all these have happened 
… When we founded ThisDay in 1995, it was to promote peace, 
order and good governance; it was to seek a better life for all the 
people of the Federal Republic of Nigeria. Our ethos was not to be 
offensive to any religion or to denigrate the cultural and religious 
values of our people”. 
ThisDay’s posture should be contextualized by reference to the 
fact that its offices in Kaduna were burnt while a report in one of 
the papers had it that by the 24th of November, 200 people were 
reported dead and 4500 were displaced. As the riot escalated, 
state security arrested the editor of ThisDay, Mr. Simon Kolawole.
In general, the New Nigerian located in the north, the area cov-
ered by the riot, maintained a stabilizing tenor as evidenced by a 
front page story of Saturday, 23th November, 2002 entitled “Ka-
duna now calm after anti ThisDay protest”. However, it continued 
not only to blame Thisday, but also convey the resentment and 
reactions of its northern readers. This pattern can be illustrated 
by its front page story of November 26, 2002 entitled “Zamfara 
declares Fatwa on Isioma Daniel.”
The story quoted the Zamfara state deputy governor, Mamud 
Shinkafi as saying that: “Like Salman Rushdie, the blood of the 
ThisDay writer can be shed. It is binding on all Muslims wherever 
they are to consider the killing of the writer an important religious 
duty”. Considering that editors use front page positioning to set 
agenda, the prominence of the story and its wordings could not 
have been accidental.
Similarly, its editorial opinion of November 28, 2002 entitled 
“A Case of many wrongs” went so far as to say that Isioma Daniel, 
who studied in Britain should have heard of the author Salman 
Rushdie and the worldwide furor generated by his blasphem-
ing the holy prophet in his infamous book “Satanic Verses.” Such 
words were certainly not calculated to de-escalate, especially as 
there were fears that the crisis may spread to other northern cities 
such as Kano, having already spread to Abuja. Similarly, Weekly 
Trust in its edition of November 22-28 reported the crisis in the 
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following words:
Ever since the idea of hosting the Miss World pageant in the country 
was made public by its promoters, there have been indications that the 
controversial beauty show may turn out to be an ill wind that would 
blow the nation no good. Even before the staging of its grand finale, 
which has now been shifted to December 7, a seemingly sponsored 
publication on the licentious beauty parade has sparked off a violent 
protest in the country.
The tenor of the report was one which appeared to justify the 
unleashing of violence rather than regret it. Another example from 
the Weekly Trust is that it lent its front and back pages of Novem-
ber 22-28 edition to news reportage, which instead of de-escalat-
ing would appear to be fueling the crisis. The front page story was 
entitled “Kaduna on the Brink”, thus, more or less spreading the 
message that further violence may be expected.
Our finding in this case study is broadly in line with other re-
searchers conducted by scholars looking at other cases of eth-
no-religious violence. For example, in their study of media re-
portage of the Jos crisis of November 2008, Musa and Ferguson 
2013:17 conclude that “the sample of reports by ThisDay and Dai-
ly Trust analyzed here differed principally, due to the fact that the 
newspapers belong to two geo-political extremes in the country. 
And this plays a major role in determining their choice of news 
values and presentation. 
The scholars, went on to argue that while there is no causal 
relationship between media report and the outbreak of violence,
The reportage of the two newspapers differ due to their region-
al and religious affiliations; they used polarizing terms to make 
the crisis a thing of ‘us’ and ‘them’; enemy images and stereotypes 
were employed demonize the others; the audience were aware of 
the such images to influence their impression on the other; ‘oth-
erness’ is a major feature of cultural and political differences be-
tween the two divides, North and South, or Islam and Christianity.
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Table 4: Timeline of Herdsmen and Farmers’ clashes 2012-2016 
No Date State (s) Nature Remarks  
1 July, 2012 Plateau Violent clashes 
between farmers 
and herdsmen
Senator Gyang Dantong and 
the Majority Leader of the Pla-
teau State House of Assembly, 
Mr. Gyang Fulani died in the 
stampede that ensued while 
attending the mass burial of 
about 50 victims of attack by 
Fulani herdsmen at Maseh 
village in Riyom LGA.
2 April 23, 
2013
Benue Violent clash 
between farmers 
and herdsmen
10 farmers killed in an attack in 
Mbasenge community, Guma 
L.G.A by suspected herdsmen.
3 May 7, 
2013
Benue Violent clash 
between farmers 
and herdsmen
47 mourners gunned down by 
suspected herdsmen in Agatu 
while burying two policemen.
4 May 14, 
2013
 Benue Violent clash 
between farmers 
and herdsmen
Over 200 herdsmen surround 
Ekwo-Okpanchenyi, Agatu LGA 
killing 40 locals.
5 July 5, 2013 Benue Violent clash 
between farmers 
and herdsmen
20 people were killed in a 
conflict between Tiv farmers 
& herdsmen at Nzorov, Guma 
LGA.
6 July 28, 
2013
Benue Violent clash 
between farmers 
and herdsmen
In retaliation to the alleged 
killing of 112 cows, herdsmen 




Edo Violent clash 
between farmers 
and herdsmen
Attackers strike at Ikpele & 
Okpopolo communities killing 





Benue Violent clash 
between farmers 
and herdsmen
36 locals killed, 7 villages over-
run in an outbreak of fighting 
between herdsmen and locals 
in Agatu L.G.A.
9 June 2015: Kwara Violent clash 
between farmers 
and herdsmen
Fulani herdsmen attacked 
Motokun village, Patigi Local 
Government Area, Kwara State.  
The Oro-Ago community in 
Ifelodun Local Government 
Area of the state was also 
attacked. Fulani herdsmen at-
tacked Ninji and Ropp villages 
in Plateau State and killed 27 
persons. Also, the same group 
reportedly murdered about 70 
Christians.
10 July 16, 
2015
Plateau Violent clash 
between farmers 
and herdsmen
Fulani Herdsmen attack and 
killed farmers in Plateau.
11 September 
2015
Delta Violent clash 
between farmers 
and herdsmen
an attack by some Fulani 
herdsmen on the community 
of Onitsha Ukwuani in Ndokwa 
West local government area 
of Delta State left about three 
persons dead. A middle-aged 
woman was raped and subse-
quently killed by three Fulani 
herdsmen in Edo state.
12 October 2, 
2015
Ogun Violent clash 
between farmers 
and herdsmen
Fulani Herdsmen raped, killed 
Ogun Residents and Farmers.
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13 November 
2015
Kogi Violent clash 
between farmers 
and herdsmen
Herdsmen invaded Ulaja and 
Ojeh communities in Dekina 
Local Government Area of Kogi 




Delta  Violent clash 
between farmers 
and herdsmen
Fulani Herdsmen kill a man 
in Ofagbe community, Isoko 
North council area of Delta.





Nigerian police DPO, 29 others 




Plateau Violent clash 
between farmers 
and herdsmen
Fulani herdsmen reportedly 
killed About 10 persons in 
Tom-Anyiin, Tom-Ataan, Mbaya 
and Tombu in the Buruku Local 
Government Area of the state.
17 February 8, 
2016:
Plateau Violent clash 
between farmers 
and herdsmen
10 killed, Over 300 displaced 
in clash between herdsmen 
and farmers at Tom-Anyiin, 
Tom-Ataan in Buruku LGA.
18 February 
11, 2016
Enugu Violent clash 
between farmers 
and herdsmen
Herdsmen attacked Abbi 
community in Uzo-Uwani LGA, 




Benue Violent clash 
between farmers 
and herdsmen
Over 500 locals killed and 7000 
displaced in an attack in Agatu 
LGA by fulani herdsmen.
20 March 9, 
2016:
Benue Violent clash 
between farmers 
and herdsmen
8 residents killed during herds-
men attacks in Ngorukgan, Tse 
Chia, Deghkia and Nhumbe, 
Logo LGA.
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21 April 5, 
2016
Benue Violent clash 
between farmers 
and herdsmen
APC youth leader, Mr. Aon-
dohemba Kasa and 3 others 
killed in fresh Fulani herdsmen, 
farmers’ clash in Benue.
22 April 8, 
2016
Ondo Violent clash 
between farmers 
and herdsmen
Fulani herdsmen kidnapped 
and killed Falae’s security 
guard at his Ondo state farm.
23 April 9, 
2016
Edo Violent clash 
between farmers 
and herdsmen
Fulani camp was razed follow-
ing the killing of a 64-year old 
farmer, identified as Alex in 
Edo.
24 April 12, 
2016:
Taraba Violent clash 
between farmers 
and herdsmen
Fulani herdsmen attack Dori 
and Mesuma villages in Taraba, 
killing at least 15.
25 April 19, 
2016
Oyo Violent clash 
between farmers 
and herdsmen
A member of about 18 sus-
pected herdsmen that invaded 
farms in Lagun village, Lagelu 
local council Oyo state, shot 
Mr. Jimmy Aido.
26 April 25, 
2016
Enugu Violent clash 
between farmers 
and herdsmen
48 killed, 60 injured by Fulani 
herdsmen in Ukpabi Nimbo 
community, Enugu state.
Source: The Guardian, April 29, 2016.
Interestingly, one of the issues that has generated animated 
discussion as well as deepened ethno-religious polarities between 
North and South on the one hand, as well as between Christians 
and Muslims on the other, is the growing conflict between Fulani 
nomads or herdsmen and farming communities in parts of South-
ern Nigeria and the Middle Belt. Table 4 illuminates the scale, in-
tensity and fatalities involved in these frequent clashes. In the en-
suing discourse, the media have been implicated to the extent 
that they are sometimes accused of taking sides in the reportage 
and analytical discussion of the events. For example, Odunlami 
(2017) in an investigation of the editorial postures of two South-
ern-based newspapers, namely, the Punch and the Nation, came 
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off with the conclusion that there was little or no sensationalism 
or slanted coverage of the clashes by the two newspapers. Indeed, 
following a content analysis, Odunlami (2017, 189) argued that: 
Most of the publication on the Fulani herdsmen stories were displayed 
in the inside pages of the newspapers. Only in very few cases were 
the stories made front page items. The reason(s) for this may not be 
unconnected to the fact of the recurrent nature of the crisis and its 
reportage appears to have become routine and seemingly intractable 
tragedies for which government has not been able to control.
Odunlami’s conclusion appears to have been based on overre-
liance on the counting of quantitative techniques of content anal-
ysis, which are obviously inadequate to capture the entire gamut 
of the impact of media reportage. For example, it is obvious from 
the increasingly heated discourse on the subject that journalists 
and intellectuals of northern extraction are more and more sen-
sitive to and irritated by what they regard as southern newspa-
pers demonization of the Fulani and allegedly biased coverage of 
the issues. For example, a journalist of northern extraction, Is’haq 
Modibbo Kawu argues that southern media are guilty of hate 
speech, stereotyping and sensationalism over their coverage of 
herdsmen/farmers conflict. According to him, “In recent years, the 
FulBe (another word for Fulani) people in general and Fulbe no-
mads in particularly have been regularly profiled within a pattern 
of hate speech that endangers national cohesion in our country.” 
(Is’haq Modibbo Kawu, “Media Narratives and the FulBe Normad”, 
Vanguard, May 5, 2016).
Kawu argues that Southern media reportage of these conflicts 
are influenced by their predominantly non-Muslim identities, as 
well as their backgrounds of having been born in sedentary ag-
ricultural communities, which have been on the receiving end of 
the frequent clashes. He maintains that the Punch, the Sun, the 
Nation and Vanguard, all based in Southwest Nigeria are the prin-
cipal culprits in these slanted narratives. Illustratively, he says that 
“Even when the media reported the killing of 20 FulBe nomads 
and over 80 cattle in Nassarawa state this week, the killers did not 
have their ethnicity reported, they were only gunmen.” (Vanguard, 
May 5, 2016).
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Obviously, Kawu’s position is characteristic of the postures of 
northern, especially Fulani journalists, reacting to what they see 
as biased reportage on the part of the Southern media. In earlier 
years, in the wake of the crisis in Northern Nigeria over the Shari’a 
controversy several northern journalists came down on the south-
ern media reportage of the crisis.
For example, referring to the provocative characterization of 
the Shari’a by the southern- dominated media in the aftermath of 
the crisis of 2000, a senior northern journalist, Muhammed Haruna 
went on record as saying: 
I have never seen anything like the days since February 21 when vi-
olence broke out in Kaduna. Almost to the last, the media have por-
trayed Muslims and Islam as the sole and total villain of the piece. In 
one particular edition of the Hallmark newspaper, Sharia was carica-
tured on three different pages as a vulture, a viper and a rampaging 
demon (Olukotun, 2011, p.133). 
Obviously, this is an issue that will continue to resonate in Ni-
geria’s political and cultural history, necessitating, as we argued in 
the concluding section, intensive and focused training of journal-
ists in balanced, fair and conflict-sensitive reporting.
SECTION FIVE
Conclusion
As previously discussed, our case study and others referred to, 
do not suggest that the media on both sides of the fence, direct-
ly incited violence. Media, we argued earlier, are enterprises, and 
the larger they are, the more stakes they have in the preservation 
of political order, and the kind of predictability and stability that 
will assure the smooth running of their businesses. However, as 
soon as rioting and mayhem broke out, they adopted positions 
and postures which suggest that they perceive the other side in 
antagonistic terms. It is this aspect that Aliyu and Ferguson (2013) 
referred to as enemy framing of issues.
It should also be noted that not only do the media and their 
output affect the outcome of crises; they are also affected in their 
journalist practice by contingencies arising from those crises. For 
example, as Mahmud Jega told us “Editors had to be careful about 
the way and manner they report the crisis in order not to become 
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victims of an aroused populace (Interview August 3, 2017). In gen-
eral, the sensitivity and vulnerability of Nigeria to ethno-religious 
violence which assumed dramatic proportions in the Boko Haram 
insurgency (the sect actually carried arson attacks on some news-
paper houses they believed were hostile to them), suggest that 
media personnel should be extremely careful in their report and 
choice of words.
In this respect, training in diversity reporting, the avoidance 
of stereotypes, sensational and inflammatory language, can be 
of help here. That apart, enhancement of professional standards, 
through training in objective reporting, as opposed to opinion-
ated journalism can assist the search for less fractious journalis-
tic frames. For example, Oso (2011) has lamented the shortage in 
the Nigerian media, of factual and objective reporting and a slide 
towards opinionated output. This can only make more daunting 
the challenges of conflict reporting, in multicultural settings like 
Nigeria.
It is often pointed out, and with good reason that there are 
several meeting points between what good journalism seeks to 
achieve, and the tool kits of conflict mediators. Obviously, by pro-
viding truthful and objective information about the protagonist 
in a conflict, the journalist helps to establish a channel of com-
munication between combatants and to narrow differences be-
tween them. In this respect, journalists need to be trained to frame 
and define conflict situations, in ways that create common meet-
ing points between opposing sides. This is to say that journalists 
should not passively reflect their immediate environments, but 
should come to terms with a journalism of nation building, which 
avoids playing to the agenda of either side in conflict situations.
References
Abiola, Doyin (1990) Press under military 1966-1976. A paper presented 
to the seminar - 30 years of Journalism in Nigeria, organized by NUJ, 
Lagos, November 26-30.
317
Aboaba, Doyin (1979) The Nigerian Press under Military rule, Ph.D. dis-
sertation,  state University of New York at Buffalo.
Adebanwi, Wale (2002) The Nation as Grand Narrative: The Nigerian 
press and the politics of Meaning. Unpublished doctoral dissertation 
submitted to the Department of Political Science, university of Ibadan.
Agbaje Adigun (1992) The Nigerian Press, Hegemony and the Social Con-
struction of Legitimacy 1960-1983 New York: Edwin Mellen press.
Bamigbetan, Kehinde (2000) “ The Press and Diversity: Case Studies” in 
Covering Diversity: A Resource and Training Manual for African Jour-
nalists New York: Centre foe War, Peace and the News Media.
Chandler, Daniel and Munday, Rod (2011) Oxford Dictionary of Media 
and Communication. Oxford: University Press.
Craig, Dylan and Nurmalanga Michize (2006) “Vocal Killers, Silent Killers, 
Popular Media, Genocide and the call for Benevolent Censorship in 
Rwanda” in Michael Drewelt and Martin Gloonon (eds) Popular cen-
sorship in Africa Aldershot: Ashgate.
Jega, Mahmud (2003) “All the News that fits to Slant” Zongo-Giwa Vol. 
1, pp.56-73.
Keliner, Douglas (1995) Media Culture: Cultural Studies, identity and Pol-
itics between Modern And Post-modern London: Routledge.
Musa, Aliyu and Ferguson, Neil (2013) “Enemy framing and the poli-
tics of reporting religious Conflicts in the Nigerian press” Media, War 
&Conflicts vol.6 n1 pp7-21.
Olukotun, Ayo (2011) “Reporting Identity Conflicts and Journalsim Edu-
cation in Africa. African Journal of International Affairs and Develop-
ment vol.15, no1, pp.125-140 Odunlami, Dele (2017) ‘Sleeping on the 
Feet with Open Eyes! Newspaper Coverage of the Herdsmen/Farm-
ers’ Conflict in Nigeria’ in Umaru Pate and Lai Oso Multiculturalism, 
Diversity and Reporting Conflict in Nigeria, Ibadan: Evans Publishers, 
p. 180-204.
Oso, Lai (2011) Press under the Military: the IBB years. In L. Oso and U. 
Pate (Eds.), Mass Media and Society in Nigeria (pp.121-140). Lagos : 
Malthouse press.
Oyovbaire, Sam (2011) “The Media and The Democratic Process in Ni-
geria in Nigeria” Text of a Lecture Delivered to Participants of Senior 
Executive Course No 23 of NIPSS, Kuru, August 7.
Salawu, Abiodun (2009) “Media Narrative Construction of Ethno-reli-
gious Conflicts in Nigeria” Estudos em Comunicaҫȃo n 5, 75-93
Sampson, Isaac (2012) “Religious violence in Nigeria: Causal diagnoses 
and strategic recommendations to the state and religious communi-
ties” African Journals online. Retrieved from http://www.ajol.info
Ayo Olukotun & Margaret Ayansola Jesuminure
318
Watchdogs or Captured Media? . . . 
319
OF RATTLE SNAKES AND GRAPES OF 
WRATH: Rise, Fall, and Rise of Indepen-
dent Media in Kenya
By Peter Kimani
Introduction
The Kenyan media are intricately woven in the narrative of the 
nation’s political evolution. Through the years of single-party 
autocracy, the media acquitted themselves well in safeguarding 
the nation’s democratic space. As one observer summed it up 
succinctly, the Kenyan media helped influence “the pace of polit-
ical change and political liberalisation, in turn, facilitating media 
growth, pluralism and relative independence.” 
This article reflects on that historical epoch, and how the so-
called “dividends of democracy” from the 1990s have problema-
tized the practice of journalism in recent times, with specific atten-
tion to the eventful 2007 General Election that inadvertently led to 
self-censorship, with far reaching consequences. In recent years, 
10
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technological disruptions, falling circulation and dwindling ad-
vertising revenues have dealt the media with severe body blows. 
Deft manipulations from the government dangling advertising 
carrot have only served to undermine the media, but this may 
only prove a temporary setback as a critical mass of phone-wield-
ing citizens are democratising society in ways both complex and 
compelling.  
Without a doubt, 1991 was an eventful year for Kenya, Africa 
and the world. Multiparty politics was re-introduced in Kenya— 
after nearly 30 years of single-party autocracy under Kenya Afri-
can National Union (KANU); Namibia hosted a watershed UNESCO 
conference, the Windhoek Declaration— affirming free media as 
a key plank in the construction of democratic and free societies. 
And months earlier, in November 1989, the Wall of Berlin fell, ef-
fectively ending the Cold War to provoke a re-alignment of global 
politics, with immediate ramifications in Africa.
While the confluence of these events suggest change was in-
evitable for Kenya and the rest of the world, there is consensus, as 
Odhiambo (2002) argues persuasively, the Kenyan media helped 
influence “the pace of political change and political liberalisation, 
in turn, facilitating media growth, pluralism and relative indepen-
dence.” 
Ogola (2010) contests this view, arguing the relationship be-
tween the media and the state in Kenya has always been “largely 
convivial and symbiotic,” due to the media’s reliance on advertis-
ing revenues from the government, and the resultant efforts to 
control the media, resulting in a complex power play that has en-
abled and constrained media development.  
According to a 2012 survey by the quasi-government agency, 
Media Council of Kenya, Kenya enjoys a vibrant media environ-
ment with six major daily newspapers, 11 weekly magazines, 20 
monthly magazines, 301 radio stations and 83 TV channels2. But 
2 This number may have changed since, as new stations have been registered 
and old ones shut down. For instance, in 2017, the Nation Media Group suspended its 
Swahili broadcasting services, QTV and QFM. The Group also closed its tabloid, the 
Nairobi News, in 2014, same year that the Standard launched its own tabloid, the Nai-
robian,that continues to thrive. The Standard also ceased publication of its bi-weekly 
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as the Media Council report revealed, and Ogola reinforces in his 
article, cross-media ownership vests these media outlets in a few 
hands—most of these connected to powerful business and polit-
ical elites. Ogola’s conclusion, however, is problematic, given the 
efforts made by the media to resist overtures from the state over 
the past 40 years. 
This article pays particular attention to several phases of state 
consolidation of media control that the media successfully resist-
ed in 1991— when multipartyism was restored in Kenya— and in 
2002, when the largely private media orchestrated another epoch 
by helping route KANU  out of power, after an interrupted 40-year 
reign. This change of guard, media historians’ record, fortified me-
dia freedoms in unprecedented ways. 
Two of the dominant media players in Kenya are the private-
ly-owned Nation Media Group, referred to hereafter as the Nation, 
which has multimedia interests in Uganda, Tanzania and Rwanda, 
and The Standard Media Group, referred to hereafter as the Stan-
dard, that owns print, broadcast and online platforms. 
Unsurprisingly, Kenyans ushered the 21st Century in a euphoric 
mood. Nzioka (2003) says a Gallup International Survey in January 
2003 polled Kenyans the most optimistic people on earth.  But this 
euphoria was short-lived. In March 2006, after a period of relative 
stability and growth for the sector, the Standard was raided by 
hooded State agents who carted away equipment and razed down 
the following day’s paper. They also switched off transmission sig-
nal for the group’s TV station, KTN. Government agents alleged 
the media group had intended to publish “embarrassing” reports 
about then President Kibaki’s family, with Internal Security minis-
ter John Michuki making his infamous statement: “if you rattle a 
snake, you must be prepared to bebitten by it.”3
The media fraternity pushed back to defend their hard-won 
freedom. But over the next decade, government machinations did 
County Weekly. The closure of all the outlets at both The Nation and The Standard was 
blamed on lack of advertising revenues and a tough business environment.
3  The event was widely reported across the world, and condemned by Kenya’s 
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not bear the violence meted out on the Standard in 2006; rather, 
the media have been dismantled with surgical precision through, 
to use the inventive expression by the former editor of the Guard-
ian, Rusbridger (2016) “fiscing”— which is an abbreviation for “fi-
nancially-induced self-censorship.” 
If this sounds sophisticated, that’s because it truly is, as jour-
nalists are emasculated without any laws being violated. The 
sacking of one of Africa’s prominent cartoonists, Godfrey “Gado” 
Mwampembwa from the Nation— the leading newspaper in East 
and Central Africa—was perhaps the best indicator that media 
houses were willing to sacrifice anyone or anything that threat-
ened their bacon.
Gado, a Tanzanian who had plied his trade in Nairobi for more 
than 20 years, aroused the ire of Tanzanian authorities after car-
icaturing then President JakayaKikwete being fed with grapes by 
a bevy of beauties, appropriately named “Cronyism,” “Incompe-
tence” and “Corruption,” among others—alluding to the ills that 
beset the Kikwete administration—massaged and manicured the 
near-naked king.
Other prominent editors, Chaacha Mwita and Denis Galava, 
were eased out of the Nation and the Standard in 2014 and 2016, 
respectively, for allegedly penning articles that did not go down 
well with the Nairobi administration. Chaacha Mwita was sacked 
from the Standard for sanctioning an article that imputed the 
Uhuru Kenyatta administration was speaking out of the two sides 
of its mouth—by advocating austerity measures while indulging 
in opulence in a cabinet retreat in a posh hotel, while Galava’s 
hard-hitting New Year editorial urging Kenyatta: “Mr President Get 
Your Act Together this Year,” rattled the Nation to the core. We 
shall deal with these claims at some length later.
Disruptions driven by technology have dealt the Kenyan media 
with a body blow that prolongs the pain.
This paper assesses the tempestuous relationship between 
Kenyan media and the government, and its implications on the 
nation’s nascent democracy over the past 25 years. Given that the 
Kenyan media are intricately woven in the nation’s political evolu-
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tion, we shall use election cycles to map out how that relationship 
has evolved, for better and for worse, and its future implications 
on media freedoms in Kenya. 
This paper is structured in four main parts. The first two are 
devoted to contemporary history of Kenyan media and the wa-
tershed 1992 General Election, when the media instigated great 
social change. The third and fourth parts are devoted to the 2007 
and 2013 General Elections, when the media capitulated under 
pressure from inside and outside. The fourth segment also pro-
vides a conclusion projecting into the future.
For the purposes of this paper, our description of the Kenyan 
media is restricted to print media which, since the beginning in 
1902, have largely been privately owned. There is need, however, 
to underline that in the pre and post-independence decades the 
state broadcaster, the Kenya Broadcasting Corporation (KBC), and 
its precursor, Voice of Kenya, was the dominant player that large-
ly served the interest of the state and the ruling Kenya African 
National Union (Kanu) and its propagation of what Ogola calls, 
“nation-building” project.
Until 2002, when Kanu was routed out of power, broadcast me-
dia was a near monopoly of KBC. This means news bulletins almost 
always dominated by news revolving around the then President 
Daniel arap Moi and his coterie. 
Kadhi and Rutten (2001) illustrate this absurdity by reminding 
that in 1994, as the entire world waited with bated breath for the 
prison doors to creak open to set free the world’s most famous 
political prisoner, Nelson Mandela—after 27 years behind bars—
KBC’s bulletin still started with the news of Moi’s church appear-
ance! 
They explain that even the oldest private TV station in Kenya, 
KTN, which was established in 1990, remained in the grip of the 
Kanu power clique through its ownership. And journalists who ap-
peared to forget were constantly reminded of that fact, as was 
Rose Lukhalo, the day editor who was sacked on Christmas Day 
in 1991 for breaking the news of the formation of the opposition 
Democratic Party. Other KTN editors, Vitalis Musebe and Isaya 
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Kabira were suspended in July 1990 for reporting anti-govern-
ment protests.
Right from the start, Kenyan journalism was intricately woven 
with the politics of the day. At independence in 1963, Kenya inher-
ited a press that had been weaned on British colonial journalistic 
tradition and a segregated readership. Obonyo (2002) says there 
existed “a three-tier system with the European press at the top, 
Indian in the middle, and African at the bottom.” Farringer (1991) 
says although the oldest mass circulating newspaper, the East Af-
rican Standard, was founded in 1902 in Mombasa by a Parsee mi-
grant, A. M. Jeevanjee, its shift to identify with the African cause 
was painstakingly slow, as was its Africanisation programme. For 
Abuoga and Mutere (1988) this racial undertone in the Standard 
was expressly manifest as “a typical European people’s paper con-
cerned with the happenings in Britain and urging subservience 
to the settlers,” a theme that Farringer observes persisted after 
independence.
This was the market gap that Kadhi and Rutten (ibid) say His 
Highness Prince Karim Aga Khan, leader of the Shia ImamiIsmaili 
Muslims in 25 countries— a fair number of them in East Africa— 
sought to fill when he bought a tiny Kiswahili weekly, Taifa, from 
Charles Hayes and his partner, Althea Tebbutt, and re-launched as 
an English weekend paper in March 1960, the Sunday Nation. The 
daily edition, Daily Nation, was launched in October of that year. 
Ideologically, the Nation was diametrically opposite of the Stan-
dard as it outlined its desire to propagate the Africans’ viewpoint 
and push for political independence for the colonised. Barely a 
decade after its launch, the Nation overhauled its older rival in 
circulation. Its success soon attracted politicians and their cronies, 
who sought to wrest its control.
Loughran (2010) narrates those contestations in The Birth of A 
Nation: The Story of a Newspaper in Kenya. He spent 12 years as 
a senior editor on the newspaper, and records a most intriguing 
battle that took shape in 1976. The setting was Nairobi, where the 
Aga Khan was opening a $3 million Serena Hotel, presided over by 
Kenya’s founding President, MzeeJomo Kenyatta. 
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Loughran recounts, “Kenyatta addressed the Aga Khan directly: 
‘This is my nephew, Mr (Ngengi) Muigai. He has just come back 
from America and I was wondering if it was possible to find a po-
sition for him in your newspapers…” A rather startled Aga Khan 
reportedly promised to look into the matter, but only after mak-
ing inquiries. Loughran also notes Muigai was accompanied by 
Kenyatta’s son-in-law, Udi Gecaga, then chairman of Lonrho East 
Africa Ltd, owners of the Standard and the Nation’s chief rival. 
Over the next few weeks, Loughran narrates, “it soon became 
clear that the position he (Muigai) had in mind was the top one, 
chairman of the holding company and publishers.” The Nation 
managers were justifiably alarmed what Muigai’s chairmanship 
would mean for the newspaper. “They (Nation editors) were even 
more concerned about the political implications. The two (Muigai 
and Gecaga) had close ties to the ‘royal court’ at Kenyatta’s Gatun-
du home, the Kikuyu power centre which appeared to wield more 
power than Kenya’s elected cabinet; they were also members of 
the Head of State’s own family…”
A unanimous decision was then made to reject Muigai’s chair-
manship of the Nation, but how would that be conveyed to the 
President without hurting his feelings, especially after the Aga 
Khan had made, in the words of one Nation executive, a “vague 
promise,” to look into the matter? Then chairman, Albert Ekira-
pa, is quoted in Loughran’s book explaining that the newspaper’s 
board and senior management met with the Aga Khan in Paris and 
drew up a list of potential backlashes, and how to counter each. 
This included offering the newspaper for sale to the government.
This response was crafted as a communique from the Aga 
Khan, in which he delicately informed Kenyatta that he regretted 
Muigai’s chairmanship was untenable. He outlined, among oth-
ers, readers’ backlash—and so potential losses to shareholders—
should it become public that the Nation and the Standard were 
effectively “under the control of one group of individuals with a 
consequent monolithic outlook…” 
Loughran says the Aga Khan reiterated this message with a pri-
vate call on the President weeks later, when he offered to sell the 
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newspaper if the Government was keen on it. Kenyatta reportedly 
declined to buy the newspaper and conceded that the Aga Khan 
had a point in seeking to keep the Nation free of government con-
trol. The crisis was over, after a six-month tense period.
Loughran writes that it soon became apparent how the Nation 
would have been used to serve political interests when, in Sep-
tember 1976, the Standard headlined with a report from the Pres-
ident’s Gatundu clique that sought to circumvent constitutional 
order from taking root. In the event of the President’s death, the 
Gecaga-controlled Standard championed that the Constitution 
should be changed to vest power in the House Speaker, not Vice 
President Daniel arap Moi, who had deputised the elderly states-
man for 12 years.
In the event, Moi succeeded Kenyatta in 1978 and as he sought 
to consolidate his power, he orchestrated a systematic crackdown 
on writers and intellectuals. The Kenyan novelist NgugiwaThiong’o 
was detained in December 1977 (by Kenyatta) and his release in 
late 1978 (by Moi) was only fast-tracked when Amnesty Interna-
tional adopted him as a prisoner of conscience. He later went into 
exile.
An attempted military coup in 1982 unleashed a state of para-
noia, claiming more academics and journalists, including the Stan-
dard’s Otieno Mak’Anyengo and Wahome Mutahi, who served as 
Arts editor at the Nation. Mutahi chronicles his prison experience 
in a novel, Three Days on the Cross, that captures the psycholog-
ical and physical torture that detainees endured in the dungeons 
of Nyayo House—a government building in downtown Nairobi.
The torture chambers of Nyayo House were opened to the pub-
lic in February 2003, after Kanu’s ouster, as old detainees trickled 
in to recall their stories of pain and suffering. Most survivors re-
called the severe beatings at the hands of police officers, and the 
endless hours in water-logged cells, naked, without food or water, 
often surviving on their own waste. 
Albert Ekirapa was at the helm of the Nation through this period 
of turbulence: “All editors had stomach ulcers4,” he chuckled, add-
4 One on one interview with the author, December 13, 2016, in Nairobi.
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ing that some editors, like George Mbugguss, had early sign-offs 
to avoid the predictable calls from the Nairobi State House, seat 
of the President. Ngotho’s (2017), recent recollections of the tricks 
employed by Kenyan Nation editors to escape state harassment, 
which often started with a call from the Big Man himself (former 
President Daniel arap Moi) border on hilarity. Some left office ear-
ly and dictated headlines from public payphones (to avoid  the 
office), locked themselves in and waited for things to cool down, 
or simply went into hiding, as their juniors concocted cock-and-
bull stories to give to authorities.
But things would get worse before they got better. Through 
the years of single-party rule, those expelled from Kanu could not 
practice politics, but so many had been expelled to form a criti-
cal mass that demanded inclusion in national politics, key among 
them former minister Kenneth Matiba, and former Nairobi Mayor 
Charles Rubia. The two were arrested on July 4, 1990 to pre-empt 
their planned rally. But fellow politicians organised another rally 
on July 7, 1990 to protest the arrests. 
Internationally, as Galloway (1992) recounts in Kenya Report, 
that was broadcast on the British Channel 4 in 1992, Western do-
nors had suspended $800m aid to pressurise Moi to re-introduce 
multi-party politics and call for elections—confirming that the fall 
of the Wall of Berlin in November 1989 had led to a reset of world 
politics. Despotic rulers in Africa and the rest of the world who had 
enjoyed backing by West powers due to their strategic position 
during the Cold War, were suddenly left adrift. These external and 
internal pressures were made to bear on the local media. 
Ekirapa recalls the pressure that he faced through this period as 
the country roiled through public protests that crystallized in the 
riots of July 7, 1990, now christened the SabaSaba riots, memo-
rialising the month and date they unfurled, leaving 20 dead, fol-
lowing clashes between police and protestors demanding change. 
Ekirapa says while the Nation had been denied government 
advertisement for years, its commercial success was buoyed by 
its growing circulation and reputation for independent reporting, 
so they were not under financial pressure to toe the government 
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line. “There was no compromise,” Ekirapa maintains. “We were an 
independent, private company and would report the events ob-
jectively.”
Ekirapa adds spies had infiltrated the newsroom to work as 
drivers, some of whom lingered by the copier long after everyone 
had left the newsroom to report what stories would be running 
the following day. Those were hazards they could live with. It was 
during this climate of fear, in December 1991, that multi-party 
politics was re-introduced and a General Election called the fol-
lowing year 1992. 
Quoting the Kenya Human Rights Commission report, Kadhi 
(2001) estimates some “20 publications stood officially banned” 
before the return to multi-party politics in 1991—including Be-
yond, a National Council of Churches of Kenya publication, that 
was banned for exposing electoral fraud in the 1988 elections, and 
the Financial Review that was banned in 1989 after exposing fraud 
in government departments, among others.
Out of their ashes sprung Society magazine in January 1992 ed-
ited by Pius Nyamora, which saw multi-party politics as a harbin-
ger to more freedoms to expose government corruption and hu-
man rights violations by police. While the big media newspapers 
like the Nation or the Standard could escape direct government 
censure, smaller entities like Society were not as lucky. Nyamora 
was routinely harassed and his printer’s premises vandalised by 
state agents. In 1992 alone, Nyamora was charged with 11 counts 
of sedition and 30,000 copies of his magazine impounded. In an 
interview with the British Channel 4 that year, Nyamora said he 
thought the harassment was intended to drive him out of busi-
ness, which the government ultimately did as he went into exile in 
the United States.
Ironically, Nyamora (2007) says his publication and others un-
der the rubric of “alternative press,” such as Finance and the Nai-
robi Law Monthly, helped fortify Press freedom for the mainstream 
press that waited for smaller presses to break the news to gauge 
government reaction, before they could act. For instance, Nyamo-
ra writes, when the doyen of opposition politics, JaramogiOginga 
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Odinga announced he would form a new opposition party, Na-
tional Development Party in 1992, the Nation and the Standard 
snubbed the news, but started covering the news after Society had 
ran the story.5
Nyamora, who previously worked as a reporter on the Nation 
says he was emboldened by the protection accorded from very 
unlikely quarters: the US ambassador Smith Hempstone in Nairo-
bi, among others. Hempstone, a former journalist himself, gained 
notoriety as the nyamachoma (roast meat) diplomat because he’d 
go out of diplomatic circuits to meet ordinary Kenyans for an oc-
casional bite. Hempstone insisted he was not supporting the Ken-
yan opposition but instead “supported democracy,” and routinely 
addressed the Press in Nairobi to condemn the arrest of journal-
ists and remind the Moi regime that the wind of change was blow-
ing. Gachuhi (2010) writes that Hemptone often reminded that 
Washington’s economic support would only flow to nations that 
“nourished democratic institutions, defended human rights and 
practised multiparty politics.” Hempstone chronicles his experi-
ences in a memoir, The Rogue Ambassador.  
Kadhi and Rutten (ibid) note one of the important publications 
to emerge from that period was The People, a weekly tabloid that 
first appeared on February 14, 1993 and was first owned by Op-
position politician Kenneth Matiba, who claimed the mainstream 
press was prejudiced against him as it was foreign-owned6. 
Matiba’s statement raises interesting questions about the inter-
sect of politics and democracy, which speaks to Ogola’s argument 
above. This was probably the legacy of KANU, the independent 
party that acquired the Nairobi Times in 1977 Kadhi and Rutten 
(ibid) and used it to propagate party ideology. Ironically, Matiba 
hardly used The People as a campaign tool as he did not run in 
1997. The paper’s forte was penetrating investigative journalism, 
but it lost its lustre when it started publishing daily. 
5 For full details, see The Role of Alternative Press in Mobilisation for Political 
Change in Kenya 1982-1992: Society as a Case Study by Pius MosetiNyamora.
6  At that stage, the Nation’s man shareholder was, and still remains, His High-
ness the Aga Khan, while the Standard was owned by Lonrho. Today, the Moi family 
has a controlling stake at the Standard. 
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Its fortunes dwindled further as Matiba’s fortunes declined.  The 
People is now owned and published as a free newspaper by Media 
Max, a firm indirectly associated with the Kenyatta family, accord-
ing to Committee to Protect Journalists. Media Max also owns K24 
TV and several FM radio stations.
Nanjom (2012) notes the mainstream media in Kenya is domi-
nated by about a dozen individuals— some of them politicians— 
lured into the business by “potential commercial returns or likely 
political harvest.” We shall see shortly what sort of “harvest” has 
been possible in the past decade.
2007—Dividends of Democracy
The 2007 General Election provided a unique challenge for 
Kenya. The Kibaki years had been defined by steady economic 
growth, but the so-called “dividends of democracy,” characterised 
by a mushrooming of electronic media, had been whittled by the 
March 2006 attack on the Standard. In the preceding year, 2005, 
the Nation had the rare of honour of an important, if uninvited 
guest – the First Lady Lucy Kibaki— when she called at the Nation 
Centre late one night to complain about the alleged bad press 
that her family was receiving. Ironically, the First Lady waved a 
copy of the Standard in her hand as she protested, implying she 
may have gone to the wrong address.
Nationally, the 2005 constitutional referendum—an election 
pledge that Kibaki was determined to keep—had left Kenya seri-
ously fractured. This followed fissures in the cabinet, with senior 
politician Raila Odinga breaking ranks with Kibaki to lead a bri-
gade that decisively defeated the referendum.
Kibaki responded by firing half his cabinet. The renegades co-
alesced in the opposition Orange Democratic Movement and 
promised to use the referendum as a “rehearsal” for electoral 
victory in the forthcoming General Election, two years away. The 
country was on the edge and individual media houses braced for 
the hard task ahead of reporting the elections fairly. Inside the 
Nation Centre, its management set up a tallying centre to monitor 
the poll independently.
But nobody appeared ready for the troubles that followed that 
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Christmas weekend in 2007. Claims of rigging by both government 
and the opposition had dominated the campaign period, but vot-
ing was largely peaceful. Things started falling apart at vote tal-
lying. A restive nation waited for results. The politicos assembled 
at the national tallying centre in Nairobi and started expressing 
their frustrations on live TV. When live transmission was banned 
and journalists kicked out of the tallying centre, the tension hit 
fever-pitch.
Soon after, the electoral commission chairman Samuel Kivui-
tu appeared on television to announce the incumbent had been 
re-elected. President Kibaki was subsequently sworn in a hastily 
convened ceremony at Nairobi’s State House. Violence ruptured 
in city slums, before spreading to other parts of the land as pro-
tests against the election outcome evolved into a vortex of vio-
lence targeting those perceived as “outsiders” in parts of Nairobi 
and the Rift Valley. In the end, some 1,100 were killed, including 30 
women and children murdered in a church where they had sought 
refuge. A further half a million were displaced.
Inside the newsrooms, media outlets were faced with a crisis of 
their own. As Nation’s former editorial director Wangethi Mwangi 
explains in A Newsroom Divided: Kenya, the Election Crisis, and the 
Nation Media Group, a Case Study developed by Aga Khan Uni-
versity’s Graduate School of Media and Communications and Co-
lumbia University’s Journalism department, he noticed journalists 
in the newsroom openly supported parties associated with their 
ethnic communities. 
There were two camps in the newsroom: one supporting Pres-
ident Kibaki, an ethnic Kikuyu, while the other supported opposi-
tion chief, Raila Odinga, an ethnic Luo. And each group of jour-
nalists would cheer if tallies on different TV screens showed their 
candidates were on the lead, or despaired when they were on a 
losing streak.
When the Nation’s internal tallying centre collapsed, some jour-
nalists grumbled it was sabotage, insinuating editor Mwangi was 
sympathetic to President Kibaki because they were both Kikuyu. 
Mwangi’s deputy, Group Managing Editor Joseph Odindo, was 
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presumed to be supporting Odinga because he was a Luo.
The Case Study documents the hard choices that the manage-
ment was faced with, not just in saving its own reputation as a 
credible news source, but also salvage its business from capitu-
lation; and crucially, restoring relations that appeared eroded be-
yond repair. 
The three challenges were entwined as editors could not edit 
stories or videos from reporters they suspected were likely to 
frame stories to favour their ethnic kingpins, or leave out aspects 
that would weaken their community positioning – in disregard of 
the laid-down editorial guidelines.
Odindo is quoted in the Case Study conceding newsroom op-
erations were nearly crippled by this animus. “The circumstances 
made it difficult for editors even to assign stories,” he said. “For 
instance, political rallies were sometimes held in the vernacular. 
That meant sending a reporter who spoke Kikuyu to a rally for 
Kibaki’s Party of National Unity (PNU).  But then by definition, it 
meant that they were likely to be politically aligned to support the 
PNU…”  
As a consequence, the Case Study continues, the Nation editors 
were unable to tell if a reporter’s story slant was selected for its 
news worth or to protect community/party interests. In some in-
stances, Odindo says he resorted to comparing the Daily Nation’s 
coverage with the stories in their competition, although that was 
problematic as “he wasn’t sure if he could trust the work of their 
reporters any more than his own.”
A few important developments followed, and somewhat cur-
tailed media freedom in an interesting way. On January 3, as the 
country teetered towards civil war, the three national newspa-
pers—the Nation, the Standard and the Star joined hands and 
published same story on the front-page: “Save our beloved coun-
try.” The report also appeared on the groups’ TV affiliates. 
“Our beloved country, the Republic of Kenya, is a burnt-out 
smouldering ruin,” started the punchy Op-Ed in the Nation. “The 
economy is at a virtual standstill and the armies of destruction are 
on the march in the Rift Valley and elsewhere. In the midst of this, 
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leaders—who are the direct cause of this catastrophe—are issuing 
half-hearted calls for peace from their hotels and walled homes, 
whence they are conveyed in bullet-proof limousines…”
This Fanonian image of elite that tele-directs violence among 
peasants was re-enacted by Kenya’s foremost author, Ngugiwa-
Thiong’o in a BBC report. “Frantz Fanon, the intellectual visionary 
of the Third World, had long ago warned us of the dangers of 
the ideology of regionalism preached by elite whose money can 
buy them safe residence in any part of a country,” Ngugi (2008) 
cautioned, concluding that no less entity than the United Nations 
should investigate the violence in Kenya. This would come to pass, 
as we shall see shortly.
The more immediate challenge, however, was how to continue 
fair coverage of the tragic events without fanning the flames of 
violence. “One of the questions we asked ourselves as the pictures 
began rolling on television, you see  people  wielding  machetes 
and  wooden  clubs  and  stuff,” Mwangi is quoted in the Case 
Study, “was  how   do   you   identify   these   groups?”  He de-
cided ethnic identities of those involved in the conflict would not 
be named. This position was contested by some editors, the Case 
Study reveals, who felt the decision “took the Nation outside the 
realm of journalism and into diplomacy7.”
The Nation was not alone in this quandary. The Standard had 
seen its circulation dip in Central Province (the region is predom-
inantly Kikuyu) in the years preceding the 2007 General Election, 
as it was seen as “an opposition newspaper.” This assertion was 
not helped by the resignation in September 2007 by the Standard 
managing editor ChaachaMwita to run for a parliamentary seat on 
Orange Democratic Movement ticket8.
The Commission of Inquiry into The Post-Election Violence, 
headed by retired South African judge Johan Kriegler, which ex-
amined how the 2007 General Election was mishandled, exonerat-
7 The Case Study identifies Charles Onyango-Obbo, then executive editor of 
AfricaReview.com, a Nation Media Group affiliate, among those who protested this 
brand of journalism.
8 ChaachaMwita’s candidacy was quashed after it emerged another candidate 
had presented a similar certificate from the Orange Democratic Movement.
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ed the mainstream media, but concluded “vernacular FM stations 
contributed to a climate of hate, negative ethnicity and may have 
incited violence.” 
Mbeke, Ugangu and Orlale (2010) argue that the liberalisation 
of the broadcast scene in Kenya was mismanaged as no regula-
tory framework was put in place when the sector expanded af-
ter 2002. As a consequence, many radio presenters lacked formal 
training and programming was skewed towards entertainment. 
This is a double-edged sword: Kimutai (2011) estimates 115 radio 
stations reach 93 per cent of Kenyans, according to an IpsosSyn-
ovate survey, but this strength may not necessarily translate into 
an enlightened public due to training deficiencies afflicting those 
running the show.
Radio journalist Joshua arap Sang, who plied his trade at Kass 
FM, a Nairobi-based outlet transmitting in Kalenjin, which is 
spoken widely in Kenya’s Rift Valley, was hauled before the In-
ternational Criminal Court (ICC) alongside five others, including 
(current) President Uhuru Kenyatta and his deputy, William Ruto, 
to face criminal charges at The Hague. Sang was accused as an 
indirect co-perpetrator in the commission of crimes against hu-
manity, murder, deportation or forcible transfer of population. He 
reportedly used his popular breakfast show, Leen Nee Emet (what 
does the nation say) to sow seeds of discord. These charges were 
confirmed in January 2012 but terminated in April 2016—as did all 
the other five cases.  Maina (2017) writes that the ICC Prosecutor 
FatouBensouda blamed the collapse of the cases on lack of State 
cooperation, witness intimidation and disappearances.
Sang was not the only journalist consumed by post-election 
violence; Nation insiders confirmed a senior editor was suspended 
for making a midnight visit to the newsroom, with a politician in 
tow, to alter a headline. An internal inquiry centred on who tipped 
off the politician about the impending publication of an adverse 
report, prompting his active efforts to have the headline amend-
ed. 9The editor was reprimanded for these transgressions but not 
9  The report in question appeared on July 12, 2009 edition of the Sunday Na-
tion, “Annan betrayed us.”
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sacked. 
The Nation and Standard were forced to recall journalists from 
bureaux that were seen as hostile. Among those recalled by the 
Standard was Cyrus Kinyungu, who served as the newspaper’s bu-
reau chief in Kakamega in Western Kenya—which was seen as an 
opposition bastion and dominated by ethnic Luhya. Kinyungu, an 
ethnic Kikuyu, said his work there became untenable as he faced 
pressure from both inside and outside the newsroom.
“In the streets, we heard crowds swearing to harm members of 
my own community10,” he recalled. “There were many stories we 
could not cover because who do you verify with? With the same 
people who were vowing to harm you?” he posed, adding even 
his own colleagues were not helpful. “One of them said ‘this is a 
revolution and sacrifices have to be made,’ implying I would be 
sacrificed.”
Amos Kareithi, a Standard reporter in Mombasa was also re-
called. In the Nation Case Study, Mwangi recalls a journalist broke 
down on the phone and wept that he feared he would be killed 
because he was not a Luo. He had been posted to work in Kisumu, 
the Luo homeland.
International news organisations like the BBC encourage hir-
ing of local correspondents to serve in their countries of origin 
where they have extensive news contacts and deep knowledge; 
wire agencies like Associated Press and Reuters, on the other 
hand, prefer posting correspondents away from their own bases 
to ensure impartiality. In the aftermath of Kenya’s 2007 General 
Election, it became anathema to dispatch a reporter to a bureau 
away from their place of origin. The messenger had become being 
distrusted to deliver the message. Or neither the message, nor the 
messenger could be trusted.
But things were not any better on the national news desks, 
where certain news beats, especially politics, became “person-
alised.” Top politicians would confide in their own kinsmen in the 
newsroom. When other reporters were assigned those beats, the 
politicos declined to make any substantive statements; news with 
10  One on one interview, Nairobi, June 25, 2017.
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gravitas was still delivered to their preferred kinsmen away from 
the Press conferences11. Ethnicity had become entrenched as a 
news factor, and the 2013 General Election would be shaped by 
the legacy of ICC, placing civil society, the media and the political 
class on a warpath.
2013: History Repeating Itself
In his foreword to Nicholas Githuku’sMau Mau Crucible of War: 
Statehood, National Identity, and Politics of Postcolonial Kenya, 
Londsdale (2016) sees 2007 post-poll violence as a mirror of the 
nation’s bloody past, when it revolved against the British: “Kenya 
was a turbulent colony, a conquest state that sixty years after its 
creation ended more bloodily than it began, with its conquerors’ 
brutal suppression of popular violence…” 
Ironically, Kenya’s political elite looked back on the nation’s vi-
olent history, and the convulsions of 2007, not as an indictment 
of its failure to entrench the rule of law, but as a renewal in the 
nation’s quest for sovereignty, more so after the Commission of 
Inquiry on Post-Election Violence (CIPEV) led by Kenyan judge, 
Philip Waki, forwarded names of the six suspects to face trial at 
the ICC.
The most eloquent exposition of this narrative condemning the 
ICC as an “imperialist” machination came from Uhuru Kenyatta—
son of the founding President Jomo Kenyatta— who alleged that 
his prosecution at The Hague for 2007 electoral violence echoed 
his father’s own trial 50 years earlier, coining the catchy line: “From 
Kapenguria Six to Ocampo Six. Luis Moreno-Ocampo was the ICC 
prosecutor who initiated the process.
That may sound sacrilegious, considering that the freedom 
icons known as “Kapenguria Six,” named for the remote location 
in Northern Kenya where BildadKaggia, Paul Ngei, OchiengAneko, 
Kung’uKarumba, Fred Kubai and Kenyatta, were jailed for agitat-
ing freedom, is a revered signpost in Kenya’s political and social 
11 Such was the experience of this author during his tenure as Head of News 
at The Standard between September 2008 and August 2011. A politician would call a 
press conference but fail to state anything substantive if their preferred reporters were 
not present. They would phone them instead, so it ultimately became counterproduc-
tive to send them to cover sources that chose whom to trust.
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history. The “Ocampo Six,” on the other hand, comprising Kenyat-
ta’s son and five other suspects, were accused of undermining the 
survival of the Kenya State by committing crimes against human-
ity, among others. 
Kimani (2008) argues such a position is fallacious, considering 
that Kenya’s independent leaders were complicit in accepting un-
favourable terms that retained the stolen lands in the hands of 
British colonial settlers. Landlessness was identified by the Waki 
commission as one of the triggers of the post-polls violence in 
2007.
Yet it’s easy to comprehend how some politicians were able to 
harness the ICC cases into political capital: anti-imperialist rhetoric 
has always found traction with the masses. As the Moi dictatorship 
crumbled in the early 1990s and intellectuals and dissidents who 
had fled to Europe and North America started streaming back 
home to agitate for change, the idea that they and civil society 
were serving their “foreign masters” became embedded in local 
political lexicon.
Come 2008, the idea that the civil society was serving self-same 
foreign masters resurged, more so after the Kofi Annan-led ne-
gotiations that brokered power-sharing agreement between Ki-
baki and Odinga resolved that perpetrators of post-poll violence 
would be handed over to the ICC, if no credible local mechanism 
was established. As Obbo and Mwiti (2011) argue, the confluence 
of the ICC trials in The Hague and the Mau Mau reparations quest 
for colonial-era atrocities in a London court, provided a perfect 
convergence of history and the present, reshaping the future.
In the event, the opening of the ICC trials in mid-December 2010 
against the so-called Ocampo Six was a culmination of months-
long posturing by politicians who chorused, “Don’t Be Vague, Let’s 
Go to Hague,” resoundingly defeating a parliamentary push for 
a Special Tribunal to try the cases locally. But the song changed 
swiftly when it emerged that the ICC trials had been built around 
evidence gathered by quasi-government agency, the Kenya Na-
tional Commission on Human Rights. The commission was alleged 
to have been working at the behest of western powers, mainly the 
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United States that was alleged to be pushing for regime change 
by locking out some politicians from contesting.
Lough (2013) says the now-famous quip, “choices have con-
sequences,” by senior US diplomat Johnnie Carson, “hammering 
home the same point at least five times during a 40-minute con-
ference call,” became a rallying point for Kenyatta and his running 
mate, fellow ICC indictee William Ruto under the Jubilee Alliance. 
They had dramatically turned the ICC and Kenya’s sovereignty into 
a campaign issue, and canvassed successfully in the people’s court 
to narrowly win the presidency.
The Jubilee administration has been a paradox. It aggressively 
projected itself as a “digital” (young, modern and savvy) govern-
ment to contrast the opposition that was presented as “analogue” 
(old)—appropriating the lingo of the season as it coincided with 
the 2013 TV transmission migration deadline, from analogue to 
digital. Yet Jubilee tapped age-old politics of patronage and em-
barked on rolling back media freedoms that Maina (2017) explains 
were “modelled on originals from Sani Abacha’s military dictator-
ship in Nigeria.”
The laws in question relate to the November 2013 Kenya Infor-
mation and Communications (Amendment) Bill that was passed 
in a record 30 minutes by 40 Members of Parliament, imposing 
punitive fines of up to $200,000 for media houses and $10,000 for 
individual journalists for breaching a government-imposed code 
of conduct. Moreover, the Bill established the Communications 
and Multimedia Appeals Tribunal, Shiundu (2013) that had been 
“given sweeping powers to even attach property of journalists and 
media houses to recover the hefty fines.” Worse still, the tribunal 
was granted the powers to recommend the suspension and/or 
de-registration of journalists, a function that is only performed by 
professional associations.” Shiundu added.
That wasn’t all: The Bill went further to regulate how media 
houses would make money by placing a curb on foreign adver-
tising in local media. Predictably, the action greeted with uproar, 
Shiundu (ibid) with the chairman of Media Council of Kenya, Jo-
seph Odindo lamenting: “They (MPs) are retrogressive, dictatorial 
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and they take this country back to the political Stone Age. We ne-
gotiated with these MPs and they have shown singular bad faith. 
We will carry this battle to the next stage and fight every attempt 
to deny the media of this country freedom.”
And sure enough, journalists paraded in the streets, with the 
Standard running a series under the rubric, “Democracy under at-
tack,” illustrated by dramatic images of scribes and photographers 
with their mouths and camera lenses muzzled. The Kenyan oppo-
sition and freedom lobbies condemned the Bill as well, with former 
Vice President Kalonzo Musyoka quoted as saying Nzau and Nzia 
(2013) the draconian media Bills would soil Kenya’s image abroad. 
Press freedom lobbies feared the move would set a bad precedent 
for the region as Kenya was considered as a bastion of free press 
within the continent. “The laws also set a dangerous precedent 
for other East African countries which take their cue from Kenya, 
traditionally a regional leader in the industry,” said Committee to 
Protect Journalists (CPJ) East Africa Representative Tom Rhodes.
Media freedom lobby, Article 19, further reported that new se-
curity laws allowed the “banning of publications, the arrest of ven-
dors, and the arrest and detention of journalists on the grounds 
of “compromising public safety, public order, morality or internal 
defence, besides thefinancial and penal punishments … powers to 
search media establishments, and seize equipment.”
Ngetich (2016) notes the media enjoyed some reprieve in 2016 
when the courts declared the security laws unconstitutional, but 
upheld the punitive law that imposes hefty fines on individual 
journalists and media houses for breaching the government-sanc-
tioned code of conduct. 
But the government wasn’t done. It further introduced a cen-
tralised advertising agency that would determine where to place 
advertisement, which Mathiu (2015) thought was “the biggest an-
ti-press freedom project since 1902.” Government advertisement 
accounts for about 25 per cent of Kenyan media’s total advertising 
revenue.
The government’s advertising agency, Namunane (2017), was 
inaugurated in February 2017, and was expected to publish all 
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government jobs and tenders on the online portal, My.Gov, which 
would then re-run  the info as an insert in newspapers of govern-
ment’s choosing. 
But the government was not paying promptly even for ad-
vertisement consumed before the directive. The Nation’s Edi-
tor-in-Chief Tom Mshindi told Rusbridger the delay was “putting 
a huge amount of stress on our bottom lines, our operational, our 
cash flows, everything.” 
Unsurprisingly, job insecurity is so prevalent, virtually all media 
houses in Kenya—the Nation which publishes the Daily Nation, 
the Sunday Nation, The EastAfrican and NTV, among other media 
outlets in Eastern Africa; The Standard Group, owners of the Stan-
dard, KTN, among others; Radio Africa Group that publishes the 
Star; Royal Media Services that own Citizen TV, have all retrenched 
staff several times in as many years. As a consequence, understaff-
ing is rampant and those who survived the purge are overworked. 
This has impacted on the quality of journalism, particularly in in-
vestigations that are fewer and far between across all media.
As the executive director of the Media Institute David Makali, 
told the Nairobi Law Monthly: “There are moments when you see 
that the government pulls certain levers to obtain its desires – to 
frustrate certain reporting so that it can portray a positive image 
of itself… You can see some level of deftness in media manipula-
tion; they’re sophisticated.”
Rusbridger (2016) observes sophistication as one of the hall-
marks of “fiscing”—financially-induced censorship—the sort that 
the Jubilee administration has perfected, as the following exam-
ples illustrate. Only months after taking charge, President Kenyat-
ta organised a retreat for his cabinet at a swanky resort on the foot 
of Mt Kenya. Ironically, the theme of the retreat was austerity in 
public spending. Leading by example, the president and his depu-
ty announced they would take pay cuts to keep down the bloated 
public wage bill.
The March 14, 2014 Standard headline: “Austerity: How Govern-
ment spent millions on luxury hotel,” therefore, was a public-in-
terest analysis. The Standard reported that about $1m may have 
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been sunk to host the 100-strong delegation for four days, this 
being the cost of airfare, food and other expenses. To work out the 
math, the Standard was guided by the amounts spent by its own 
crew at the establishment.
Further, the report indicated the costs were inflated by a two-
day extension—the initial plan was to shift the cabinet talks to the 
nearby Sagana State lodge that would have cost virtually nothing, 
since a budget is provided every year by Treasury. 
“Investigations by The Standard unveiled a picture of a Cabi-
net that talks about inevitability of belt-tightening but seemingly 
oblivious or negligent to ways public expenditure could be low-
ered much more easily,” the report concluded. The government 
spokesman declined to comment, while the Finance minister 
scoffed at the reporter in a text message: “Where did you get this 
crazy figure from? Check with the accounting officer in the Office 
of the President for correct expenditure.” 
What followed this public-interest, fairly argued and balanced 
story was, to use the minister’s word, “crazy.”  As the Committee 
to Protect Journalists recounts in its July 2015 issue, Broken Prom-
ises, insiders at the Standard reported that the State House had 
called to remind that a $700,000 advertising deal was in jeopardy 
if the newspaper maintained its strident tenor. ChaachaMwita, the 
editorial director, offered to publish the government’s side of the 
story.  The government demanded an unreserved apology, which 
was granted the following day. 
But even that was not enough. On March 16, the newspaper 
ran a Page 1 apology signed by none other than the group’s chief 
executive Sam Shollei. We shall reproduce in its entirety because 
it’s unprecedented in the paper’s 115-year history:
“In the Standard newspaper of Friday 14th March 2014, 
headlined “Austerity: How Govt spent millions on luxury retreat”, the 
Standard published the story that the government could 
have spent more than Sh100 ($1m) million on a four-day retreat 
by the President and his cabinet at the exclusive Mt. Kenya Safari 
Club.
“After establishing the truth from State House, we agree the 
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story had errors and inaccuracies. The truth that was published in 
the Saturday Standard of March 15, 2014 is that the government 
spent only Sh8.4 million. This low level of expenditure affirms the 
President’s and his government’s commitment to cut down on 
wasteful expenditure.
“The Board, management and staff of the Standard Group offer 
[an] unreserved apology to the President, his deputy and cabinet 
for [the] embarrassment and grief that this story caused them. We 
at The Standard support the President and his cabinet’s resolve 
to cut down on wastage, eliminate corruption and cut down on 
government expenditure especially the huge wage bill that has the 
potential to cripple the economic development of our country. We 
made a mistake that embarrassed the President and his cabinet 
and we apologise unreservedly to him and to the people of Kenya.”
The story has been withdrawn from all online editions.  (Signed 
- Sam Shollei - Group CEO, Standard Group).
The following day, March 16, 2014, Mwita and reporter Mark 
Kapchanga, who filed the story, were fired and escorted out the 
Standard Group Centre in Nairobi’s industrial district. Mwita has 
sued the Standard for $670,000 damages.
In this climate of fear, a satirical column filed by this writer in 
September 2014 was suspended. A note from the newspaper’s Re-
vise Editor, conveyed the hysteria at the Standard: “While the sat-
ire is appreciated, the feeling among the five editors consulted 
is that the general atmosphere we operate under is not yet free 
enough to allow such a piece to go through (sic). It borders on 
the dangerous at a time when the media is struggling to maintain 
its right to express itself freely. That is the fact of the times we are 
currently living in. Perhaps in another place or time…12”
12  Email from ‘Standard’editor Ruth Lubembe, September 25, 2014. The column 
in question “Government assures laptop project is still on, elevated to Vision 2030 
project, satirised government’s broken promise to deliver free laptops for school-chil-
dren within its first 100 days in office. The project was scaled down to tablets, instead 
of laptops, and delivered four years later.  The satirical column, “Seriously Speaking,” 
ran in the Standard from June 2008 to September, 2015. The last (unpublished) col-
umn was filed on October 2, 2015. The Standard’s Chief Sub-Editor phoned this author 
to say the last column would be discontinued because editors were “uncomfortable” 
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Around the same time, in January 2015, on the other side of 
town, at Nation Centre, the Nation Media Group’s The EastAfrican 
was temporarily banned from circulation in Tanzania, following the 
publication of the now infamous caricature by Gado of President 
JakayaKikwete.
 The authorities immediately banned The EastAfrican from 
circulation. The official explanation was that the weekly had not 
complied with Tanzania’s regulatory requirements, despite being 
in operation for over 20 years. In Nairobi, Gado, who had plied his 
trade at the Nation for over 20 years, was suspended.
“I told Gado,” ‘this guy is literally asking for your head, right?’” 
Rusbridger quotes Nation’s CEO Linus Gitahi as saying. “What we 
do is we give him your head, in the sense that we give you a study 
leave. If there was ever a time you wanted to write a book, this is 
it.”
A week after Gado’s “sabbatical,” Rusbridger goes on, The Eas-
tAfrican published a grovelling apology for depicting the Tanzani-
an president in “a bad light...” The note concluded that the draw-
ing “should not have been published except for a rare lapse in our 
otherwise rigorous gate keeping process.”
Before the end of the sabbatical, Gado returned to work but he 
had no job to return to. His contract was not renewed. 
Another “gate keeping” lapse was blamed on a blistering edito-
rial published in the Saturday Nation on January 2, 2016, which led 
to the sacking of Nation’s managing editor for Investigations and 
Special Projects, Denis Galava. Titled, “Mr President, get your act 
together,” the editorial was a blunt assessment of the failures un-
der the Jubilee administration, overseeing a corrupt regime where 
insecurity and unemployment roiled the citizens.
Stewart (2016) says Galava conceded: “…Once the article started 
trending online, I knew automatically that the political and busi-
ness class would be upset.” His fears were confirmed soon after 
with its critical tone. A request to write a farewell to readers was rejected. The satirical 
column was a carry-over from “Monday Mix”, another satirical column inaugurated in 
the Daily Nation by this author in 2005. In the column’s 10-year run, which included 
the entire Kibaki presidency, those two were the only instances when the column was 
censored, and ultimately discontinued.  
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when an official from the Nairobi State House phoned, demand-
ing: “Why is the Nation declaring war against the President on the 
first day of the year?”
Galava got an answer the following week. He was suspended 
and later fired for allegedly not submitting his piece to internal 
vetting mechanisms. He is challenging the dismissal in court. In 
an affidavit filed before the Labour and Employment Relations 
Court in Nairobi in mid-March 2016, Galava states he had filed 476 
editorials and two page-one comments over the years, following 
“the standard format in these cases and in the present case [and] 
not once had questions of procedure been raised.”
The Sunday Nation’s Investigations Editor Andrew Teyie, who 
was declared redundant in mid-2016, is also challenging his sack-
ing, claiming he was edged out for his diligent probing of scandals 
at the National Youth Service, where some $18m was swindled by 
State officials, and Eurobond, a sovereign bond that Kenya’s Audi-
tor General claimed some $1b remained unaccounted for.
The story is the same at KTN, where investigative journalist 
John-Allan Namu left in 2015 to protest shrinking freedom. Ac-
cording to Mahugu (2017), Namu felt “over these five years, the 
government has been very thin-skinned on stories that affect it.” 
Consequently, he and other investigative reporters were faced 
with “consistent pressure,” at times taking an ethnic bent. 
“We would stick out our necks, go and do a good story, but the 
criticism, condemnation, much of it unwarranted, discouraged us. 
We would be told that we were anti-government, hated Jubilee, 
hated Kikuyus etc.”
One of Namu’s stories that elicited the government’s ire was 
his March 2014 Inside Story re-assessing the 2013 General Elec-
tion and the systemic failures and deliberate machinations that 
appeared to suggest the elections were anything but free and fair. 
Cheeseman, Lynch and Willis (2014) say such narratives are unpop-
ular because they gesture away from an entrenched phenomenon 
that the Kenyan historian, AtienoOdhiambo, calls the “ideology of 
order.” Questioning election outcomes is discouraged, especially 
if they are peaceful, to avoid triggering social conflagration. This 
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was the legacy of “peace journalism” that media executives inau-
gurated in January 2008.
Namu and his associates now run Africa Uncensored, an online 
news portal whose mission is “to investigate, expose and empow-
er,” away the strictures of corporate-driven journalism in Kenya.
This could be the future of journalism in Kenya. With its invest-
ments in undersea fibre optic cable, internet is fairly cheap and 
speed high. A recent BBC report says Kenyans enjoy faster mo-
bile internet speeds than Americans. According to The Economist, 
Kenya’s exports of technology-related services grew exponentially 
from $16 million to $360 million between 2002 and 2010.
If there is any evidence for such optimism, it came in August 
2016 when, Mutiga (2016) says the CNN dispatched its executive 
to apologise for the news cable’s claim that Kenya was “a hot-
bed of terror,” insinuating that President Barack Obama was at risk 
when he visited his father’s land in July 2016.
Afro-pessimism is entrenched in western narratives of Africa, 
probably predating the days of slavery and colonialism. That the 
news cable beat such a hasty retreat and offered a grovelling apol-
ogy intimates a shift in the balance of power: a critical mass of 
millions of Kenyans armed with mobile phones had mobilized suf-
ficient leverage to challenge a major western news organisation, 
and secure a rare retraction.
This means start-ups like Namu’s Africa Uncensored, transmit-
ting content on phones, could be on equal footing with other me-
dia in Kenya and beyond, in the battle for the hearts and minds of 
an evolving audience. The government censor may have to re-cal-
ibrate where and how to place their monitors.
Conclusion
Kenya’s democracy has evolved over the past 25 years, for bet-
ter and for worse, and the nation’s robust media have acquitted 
themselves quite well. This was true in the 1990s, when journalists 
contributed to the campaign for the restoration of democracy and 
multiparty politics. In the early years of this century, the Kenyan 
media showed a measure of complacence, before their guard was 
forced back up by the violent raid on The Standard in March 2006.
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The Kenyatta administration, which succeeded Kibaki’s, has 
been decidedly sophisticated in its “silent” though effective emas-
culation of the media. It is arguable that the media may have been 
complicit in extending its hands for shackling through well-inten-
tioned but problematic overtures in maintaining peace without 
addressing the underlying issues that triggered the violence in the 
first place in late 2007 and early 2008.
Kenya’s investments in the technology sector, however, have 
led to an empowered citizenry and reorganised ways in which in-
formation is gathered and disseminated, especially using mobile 
telephony. This, it is safe to predict, is the next news frontier, and 
start-ups and other fringe news portals are likely to problematize 
power relations between media barons and the State, and pro-
voke a reassessment in the way censorship is/will be exercised in 
the near future. 
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The media’s watchdog role in Ghana since independence in 1957 
has been tenuous as a result of the country’s checkered political 
experience dominated as it were by a variety of anti-democratic or 
authoritarian, governments exemplified by one-party, “no-party” 
and military regimes. It was a political experience characterized 
by an inherently congenital aversion to citizen expression of inde-
pendent or dissenting voices. The ensuing suppression of critical 
or differing voices was highlighted by the banning of independent 
press, harassment and imprisonment of unyielding editors, pub-
lishers and journalists. These led to a situation popularly designat-
ed as a “culture of silence” in which the subordinated press and 
broadcasting attracted metaphors such as “lap dogs” or “guard 
dogs” of the regimes. 
Africa-wide popular strivings for democratic reforms of the late 
11
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1980s-1990s, produced in Ghana, as elsewhere on the continent, 
new conditions for plural political participation and expression of 
multiple voices. In Ghana, two of the most enduring outcomes of 
the restoration of constitutional governance since 1992 are: mul-
tiparty political contestation for state power on one hand and, 
on the other, a vibrant landscape of unbridled media. Unfettered 
private commercial, community and quasi-public state-owned 
outlets make up a mix of hundreds of print, broadcast and online 
mass media. 
The far-reaching nature of freedoms guaranteed in the 1992 
Fourth Republican Constitution has enabled a dynamic environ-
ment of citizen speech and expression and a nominal plurality of 
media and practitioners. It is an atmosphere in which nothing sec-
ular or temporal appears sacred to the media, and in which media 
voices appear to have no limits or any restraint by any power or 
authority. The exuberance of media, however, has quite often at-
tracted public complaints of excesses. All told, the media under 
the Fourth Republic have made significant contributions to pro-
tecting citizens’ rights and consolidating and strengthening dem-
ocratic governance and culture in the country, through a gener-
ally outspoken watchdog role performance. However, on balance, 
proprietorial influences or interference, political and or economic 
patronage, “brown envelop” (unethical) journalism, and limita-
tions of technical professional and institutional capacity threaten 
to encumber legitimate and an even more effective watchdog role 
performance. 
In this paper we examine the watchdog functions of the Ghana 
media against the background of national and international ac-
clamation of the country’s press freedom credentials. Under these 
widely acknowledged conditions of freedom, the media would be 
expected to establish their relevance and legitimacy by function-
ing as guardians of the public interest and citizens’ rights. As Cur-
ran (2011) noted, to pursue relevant social justice reform agenda, 
media ought to be imbued with a high sense of commitment, a 
“disciplined moral passion, hard work and intelligence …”…a “ro-
bust independence.” Do the Ghana media exhibit these qualities 
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in their watchdog functions? Who do they watch? What do they 
watch and for whom? For whose interests? Do the watchdogs 
have a master or masters? Who is it or who are they? What does 
the master have that must be watched and protected? 
This paper seeks to find answers to these issues within the con-
text of the general environment that shape the nature and func-
tions of the media. Thus, the paper will explore the historical, legal, 
political, economic, cultural (i.e. media practice) contexts in which 
the media operate. It is important, for example, to find out about 
the ownership system of the media and how independent or oth-
erwise they are from the state, political structures and centres of 
social and political authority and influence. It will make a broad 
overview of media practice and performance and examine how 
they exercise the watchdog functions in promoting and protect-
ing democratic governance. It will conclude by assessing selected 
case studies of specific social justice watchdog campaigns initi-
ated by particular media organizations as they represent differ-
ent media ownership types; state-owned, private commercial and 
community. This will include interviews with media leaders from 
these backgrounds to ascertain their articulation of the watchdog 
functions they engage their media in. 
The study focuses on the watchdog activities of newspapers, ra-
dio and television stations. It did not look at such functions of new 
media, that is, internet and social media outlets for news and pub-
lic information. In Ghana, the internet and social media constitute 
significant sources of news and information for growing numbers 
of citizens. In studies cited below they surpass newspapers as the 
preferred sources of news and information after radio and televi-
sion. As news sources there are two categories of online (internet 
web-based) news and information channels. The first consists of 
the internet or online editions of broadcast and newspaper or-
ganizations. The second comprise independent online news pub-
lications. They were not included in the study because the first 
group only published online what they put out in newspapers or 
broadcast on radio and television. In the second case, none of the 
independent online publications has engaged in any noteworthy 
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watchdog functions beyond publication of news – a lot of time 
including stories picked from the traditional media channels – and 
readers’ comments and opinions. 
The objects of watchdog functions
In a democracy, the media’s watchdog role functions define 
their essential relevance to society. These activities constitute the 
processes by which the media give meaning and significance to 
their fundamental responsibilities of promoting or protecting the 
public interest. In young or so-called emerging democracies, in-
stitutions of governance are generally weak, the culture of demo-
cratic life is only in the process of maturation, and the capacity of 
civil society as a bulwark against threats to democratic governance 
tends to be tenuous. It is in this condition of general vulnerability 
that the media’s professed critical role as an indispensable insti-
tution for democratic consolidation becomes most wanted. Thus, 
it is by engaging in watchdog functions that the media play best 
their roles as protector of the weak, defender of social justice and 
democratic institutions, and promoter of the public interest and 
national development aspirations. 
Media watchdog functions targeting social justice concerns 
must invariably and inexorably lead the media to take a stand in 
thedefense of one or other section of society. Yet, for their inter-
ventions to merit the attributes of watchdog role functions, the 
media activities as such must be devoid of partisan political mo-
tives or some self-serving sectarian pursuits. 
And the watchdog role function is always an act of exposure 
of issues of public interest. As such it is relevant if these activities 
include and involve advocacy for redress or change. It must call for 
action. To be effective, therefore, media watchdog role activities 
are distinguishable by the sustained – but not one-off – continual 
broadcast or publication over a period of time of the issues of 
contention.
As Tettey (2008) has reiterated, there is a temptation to limit the 
focus of media watchdog role to “state officials and government 
institutions to the neglect of other actors and centers of activity 
whose actions have significant implications for good governance, 
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democratic accountability and sustainability of democratic institu-
tions and practices.” It would be a severe curtailing of the media’s 
societal responsibilities if their watchdog functions were restricted 
to monitoring government and its agencies only, to the neglect 
of all those other institutions and agencies – non-state and tra-
ditional – that function in the public sphere and whose existence, 
operations and activities impact on or affect, one way or the other, 
the daily lives, well-being and welfare of citizens or the public. 
As (Tettey, 2008) notes the resultant destructive impacts on the 
lives of citizens occasioned by “the extensive opacity of govern-
ment transactions in Africa ….” rightly deserves the media’s con-
stant and unrelenting attention and exposure of government pol-
icies and programs and how they are implemented. Even then, 
it would still be inadequate to limit interpretation of the media’s 
watchdog role as only concerning “corruption” and abuse of pow-
er by government officials and agencies, but not as surveillance 
of any sources of threats against the existential socio-economic 
interests, needs and rights of the marginalized, poor and weak.
Media watchdog functions that do not address broad social jus-
tice reform issues are incomplete. 
The Ghanaian media professionals interviewed for this paper 
not only concur that the media have a responsibility to exercise 
watchdog role functions; they all see their roles as an obligation 
sanctioned by Article 162 (5) of the 1992 Constitution, which 
states: “All agencies of the mass media shall, at all times, be free 
to uphold the responsibility and accountability of the Government 
to the people of Ghana.”
However, even as the Constitution obliges the Ghanaian media 
to exact accountability from the government, the media profes-
sionals do not consider government as the focus of their watch-
dog monitoring. The leading investigative journalist, Manasseh 
Azure Awuni (2017), summed up the general perspective: 
“I understand my role basically as holding the government ac-
countable to the governed. But it doesn’t also end there. There 
are also public or civil servants who hold positions in trust of the 
people. Sometimes, even the private sector; we have to see to it 
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that they perform their functions well in a way that does not short-
change the fortunes of our republic. So, that is what I understand 
by the watchdog role of the media.”
For Ashigbey (2017), Managing Director of the largest newspa-
per group, Graphic Communications GAROUP Limited, it means 
also that, 
“In the media we need to give the voiceless in society a voice. 
In our current context, we find that issues of poverty, of squalor, 
disease, corruption are all things that plague us. And if we the 
media only report on them and do not do anything, then we really 
will not be part of the solution. The media is a vehicle for develop-
ment, and we need to be seen to be relevant by saying the things 
that the people want you to champion for them.” 
Historical context
The newspaper was first introduced into Ghana (then called the 
Gold Coast) in 1822.  Radio was introduced one century later in 
1935, and television in 1965, after independence. But it is only in 
the last 25 years – that is during the Fourth Republic –  that the 
media have functioned without interruption in an atmosphere of 
freedom from legal or political repression by the state. As with 
post-colonial political governance generally, this is also the pe-
riod in which the media have experienced the most stability and 
growth. In other words, media development, freedom and inde-
pendence have been casualties of the checkered political history 
of post-colonial Ghana.
The socialist, one party regime of the First Republican govern-
ment of the Convention People’s Party of President Kwame Nk-
rumah imposed state monopoly ownership and control on the 
media. The situation was maintained and enforced by the author-
itarian military regimes that dominated political power from 1966 
until the Fourth Republic in 1992. The short-lived attempts at con-
stitutional governance, the so-called second and third republics 
(1969-71 and 1979-81 respectively) that interspersed the military 
juntas, represented very brief honeymoons for independent pri-
vate press resurgence.
The period of state monopoly and control of media represented 
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what in the 1980s was popularly described as a “culture of silence”. 
When direct censorship was not imposed, self-censorship was the 
norm and editors saw themselves as part of the government ma-
chinery. Dissent or subjects contrary to or different from govern-
ment perspectives, and generally forbidden in the society at large, 
were anathema to the media. State-owned media were used as 
vanguard arms in the arsenal of authoritarian rule. The only media 
tolerated (press, since there was only state broadcasting)  were the 
“lap dogs” doing government bidding; guard dogs providing es-
pionage about presumed subversives; and attack dogs condemn-
ing, discrediting, and doing vile propaganda against the political 
opposition and critics.
The generalized suffocation of speech and expression over the 
years, therefore, made the clamour for freedom of speech and 
media one of the most urgent demands of the popular movement 
for democracy in the 1980s leading to the constitutional reforms 
of the Fourth Republic.
The media landscape today
As in most African countries the media landscape in Ghana to-
day is characterized by a proliferation of media outlets represent-
ing a plurality of ownership. The print industry is made up of scores 
of newspapers (National Media Commission, 2016) Unlike Nigeria; 
however, in Ghana there are no news magazines worth the de-
scription. For reasons that have not been investigated, historically 
news magazines have never thrived in the country. Similarly, there 
are no newspapers published in any Ghanaian language. Histori-
cally too, apart from the church-sponsored newspapers from the 
late 19th to mid-20th centuries, some state-sponsored experiments 
in the 1950s-early 1960s, and a few scattered unsustained local ini-
tiatives here and there, Ghanaian language press has not been part 
of the country’s mainstream media development traditions. There 
certainly have never been noteworthy initiatives for commercial 
or political press publication in any Ghanaian language. This obvi-
ously has implications for the scientific and cultural development 
of the languages and for the active and educated participation 
of the mass of the population in public affairs discourses. It does 
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not also help to enhance enforcing downward accountability – as 
envisaged in Ghana’s local government law on decentralization of 
governance.
The broadcast sector is categorized by the regulator National 
Communications Authority (NCA) into Public (state-owned), For-
eign Public, Commercial, Community and Campus. Currently there 
are 354 radio stations altogether in operation, out of a total au-
thorized number of 481. There are 51 television stations in opera-
tion out of 93 authorized applications (National Communications 
Authority, 2016).
Radio remains the most important source for news and infor-
mation for the majority of the people in Ghana. Internet use is 
growing so fast that it comes after only radio and television as the 
next important channel for news and information for most people, 
relegating the newspaper to insignificance. A nationwide survey 
conducted by the National Commission on Civic Education (NCCE) 
(2014) found that 62.92%of people regarded radio as their prima-
ry source of news and information, followed by 25% for television 
and 6.4% for the internet and social media. The newspaper rep-
resented a “Negligible percentage of 1.5%” followed by “Family 
and friends” in order of importance as a preferred source of news 
and information. These findings are corroborated by other surveys 
conducted by other reputable non-governmental institutions. The 
Institute of Economic Affairs (2016) confirms the same trend in 
preferred sources of news and information by citizens. 
A noteworthy point about the multiplicity of media outlets in 
the country is that, though the capital, Accra, and the second city 
of Kumasi have high concentrations of mostly commercial broad-
cast stations, there are radio stations in each of the 216 adminis-
trative districts of the country. There are television stations broad-
casting from cities other than the capital as was before 2005 when 
the first private television station started transmitting. Accessibility 
to broadcast media is further enhanced by the fact that, because 
of the geographical spread of radio stations, nearly every indige-
nous language or dialect can be heard on air. Until 1986, when the 
state-owned Ghana Broadcasting Corporation (GBC) established 
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a regional station in the then Upper Region and introduced five 
of the area’s local languages for programming, only four Ghana-
ian languages (Akan, Ewe, Ga and Nzema) and Hausa were used 
in broadcasting. This language diversity engenders wider popular 
participation in media use for involvement in public affairs and for 
enforcing public accountability and watchdog mandates.
Legal constitutional framework of media freedom
The much celebrated press/media freedom in Ghana derives 
from the guarantees provided by the 1992 Constitution and some 
legal reforms. But these have been achieved and sustained also by 
active civil society engagement, particularly in the 1990s. Progres-
sively over the post-independence period, “The 1992 Constitution 
contains by far the most elaborate articulation of provisions de-
signed to ensure the freedom and independence of the media.” 
(Kotey, in Karikari & Kumado, 2000, p.35)
Chapter 12 of the Constitution, Articles 162 to 173, is devoted 
to “Freedom and Independence of the Press”. It guarantees the 
rights of journalists and media to function without state or other 
external interference, with the provision that no media profession-
al shall “be penalized or harassed for their editorial opinions and 
views, or the content of their publications.” Among many other 
provisions, the Constitution abolishes censorship and establish-
es an independent oversight agency, the National Media Com-
mission (NMC), with the mandate to promote and protect press 
freedom, to “insulate the state-owned media from governmental 
control” and, through a complaints settlement mechanism, pro-
tect citizens from media abuse. Elsewhere Articles 21 (1) (a) (b) 
and (f) of the Constitution enhance further the media’s freedom 
in provisions guaranteeing and protecting freedom of speech and 
expression, of thought and the right to information.
The Constitution imposes obligations on the state media spe-
cifically to give political parties access to present their viewpoints 
to the public, and to give to all presidential candidates the “same 
amount of time and space” to present their programmes to the 
public. For the particular purposes of this paper, the Constitution, 
as stated above, unequivocally obliges all media, without discrim-
Kwame Karikari
360
Watchdogs or Captured Media? . . . 
ination, to play a watchdog role over government. 
The Constitution’s “elaborate provisions” notwithstanding, 
there have virtually been no reforms of the extant legislation that 
over the years have been used to repress media freedoms. The 
only exception is the fact that the Fourth Republic has rejected 
and made unconstitutional the newspaper licensing law that had 
been used since independence by the various authoritarian re-
gimes to prevent the publication of independent periodical print 
media. And the state, under the National Democratic Congress 
(NDC) government of Flight Lt. Jerry John Rawlings, continued ap-
plying some of these laws to repress the media’s newfound free-
dom in the early 1990s.
A major boost for media freedom, however, came in 2001 when 
the New Patriotic Party (NPP) government of President Agyekum 
Kuffuor repealed the Criminal Libel and Seditious Libel provisions 
of the Criminal Code, 1960 (Act 29). The repeal of these laws, which 
had been some of the pernicious instruments of suppressing press 
freedom since colonial times, followed agitation for media law re-
form by a civil society coalition led by the Ghana Journalists As-
sociation. The issue was forced onto the 2000 election campaign 
issues. The then opposition NPP adopted the issue and made it a 
campaign promise. When it won the election it fulfilled the prom-
ise by getting the laws repealed, eight months into its first year in 
office.
All the legal and constitutional regimes have ensured that, since 
2001, no journalist has been arrested and or detained arbitrarily 
and no radio station or newspaper has been closed down for what 
they have published. However, precisely because there has been 
no media law reform, media run the risk of falling foul with the 
many pieces of legislation that still remain on the books. In this 
period, the one legal instrument that has been invoked to limit 
media expression is the law on contempt of court. The Supreme 
Court, as well as courts of lower jurisdiction, have used it in ways 
that have attracted public outcry and demand for its abolition or 
reform.
The two most celebrated contempt cases slapped on the media 
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by the Supreme Court related to journalists’ comments on elec-
tion-related cases before the highest court. The first was in 2013. 
The most recent (Supreme Court, 2016) resulted from highly opin-
ionated comments, imputing the court’s bias, by three panelists 
on a talk show programme discussing election-related cases be-
fore the Supreme Court. The three were staff of a radio station 
(Montie FM) owned by leaders of the then ruling NDC. 
The panelists’ verbal attacks on the court’s judges hearing the 
case included threats of violence. The perceived unprofessional 
acts of the radio panelists attracted widespread public condem-
nation. They received prison sentences for the criminal charge of 
contempt of court. The three men were activists of the NDC cam-
paigning for the reelection of the president, their party’s candi-
date, in the impending general elections. The candidate, urged 
on by party leaders, therefore, used his constitutional powers as 
president of the country, to give the three party propagandists a 
reprieve from the court-ordered custodial sentences.
The Ghana media, meanwhile, have not been completely im-
mune from reflexive harassment from errant state security oper-
atives of the lower ranks. The Media Foundation for West Africa’s 
monitoring of media rights violations has consistently indicted 
operatives of the Ghana police and other security agencies of 
abuses by way of physical obstruction of journalists’ work, seizure 
of equipment, assault and arrests.
In many democratic societies nowadays, an important instru-
ment that enhances the rights of citizens and media to exact ac-
countability from state officials and agencies is the law on the right 
to information (widely known as Freedom of Information act). The 
“right to information” is among the fundamental freedoms en-
shrined in the Constitution (Article 21 (1) (f)). But ignoring 18 years 
of popular civil society campaigns, governments of different par-
ties and their parliaments have all refused to pass into law a Right 
to Information bill first drafted in 2003.Equally, the various parlia-
ments have been oblivious to nearly two decades of civil society 
campaign for the passage of a broadcasting law, the bill of which 
was also drafted in 2006. It is not farfetched to suggest that the bill 
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on broadcasting has not been passed, and may never be passed 
for a long time, because the commercial owners and politician 
owners, would rather there were no regulation in the industry. 
OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE
State-owned media
The state continues to own the largest circulating newspaper, 
the Daily Graphic, and other print publications belonging to the 
stables of two state companies: the Graphic Communications 
Group Ltd. and the New Times Corporation. The state also owns 
the Ghana Broadcasting Corporation which operates a network of 
regional (i.e. administrative provinces) radio stations and the old-
est television station, the Ghana Television, which transmits across 
the entire territory of Ghana and is thus virtually accessible every-
where in the country. Although the state is the sole shareholder 
in these media organizations, by the Constitution they are “insu-
lated” from state control of editorial decision-making and profes-
sional output. To affirm their independence from state intrusions, 
the independent constitutional oversight body, the National Me-
dia Commission, and not government, appoints the management 
boards and the chief executive officers of the state-owned media 
organizations. 
Community initiatives
Officially the NCA counts some 89 radio stations as community. 
But according to the Ghana Community Radio Network (GCRN), 
the association of the non-profit radio stations established and 
managed by communities of rural, mostly socio-economically 
marginalized populations, their actual members number 30. The 
GCRN states that in the absence of statutory criteria some com-
mercial interests are given frequencies under the guise of setting 
up community stations but instead operate them as commercial 
outfits. (Graphic Communications Group Ltd., 2015)
The commercial sector
In the highly competitive market of this multiplicity of media 
outlets, the state-owned establishments hardly dominate audi-
ence shares. The ownership dynamics of the hundreds of media 
operations in the private sector show a pattern towards a “con-
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vergence of business, politics and media” (Public Agenda, 2015). 
Less than a dozen companies own the most influential private 
commercial media – measured by numbers of outlets or networks 
owned, geographical location, easy access to high state officials 
and other segments of authority, and agenda-setting content 
production. Among this are three categories of owners. The first 
group is made up of investors solely set up for media business. An 
example is the Multimedia Group, owners of the respected JOY 
FM radio and TV and their other networks in and outside Accra.
The second comprises big businesses that have branched out 
with investments in media. Examples include the Despite Group of 
Companies and its network of radio and a television station. What 
makes this company’s media significant, influential and with the 
potential to command the largest shares of the audience is that 
the networks broadcast in Twi, a language of the majority Akan 
nationality (ethnic group?), which is also the most widely spoken 
lingua franca across the country. Indeed the company’s UTV is 
the first television station that uses exclusively an indigenous lan-
guage, Twi.
Tobinco Pharmaceuticals Ltd., a leading pharmaceutical mar-
keting and distribution company, owned by businessman Samuel 
Tobin, is the latest entrant into the media industry in this second 
category starting with Atinka FM and Atinka TV in Accra. Tobin 
also owns Abii National Savings and Loans and Priority Insurance. 
The third category is made up of media established by big busi-
nesses owned by persons with relations to the two dominant po-
litical parties. An example of this is the Excellence In Broadcasting 
(EIB)  Company, a recent entrant into the media market but ex-
panding rapidly by setting up new establishments or by acquiring 
existing ones. The flagship radio station in the company’s stable 
of over a dozen broadcast outlets across the country is STARR FM 
in Accra. The owner is Dr. Kwabena Duffuor, former Minister of 
Finance (2009—2012) and, prior to that, Governor of the Bank of 
Ghana under the NDC government of President J. E. Attah-Mills. 
Dr. Duffuor’s primary business interests are some 15 companies 
in insurance (Star Assurance), banking (Unibank), real estate and 
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agribusiness.
TV 3, the first private commercial television station, is owned 
by Media General. The company also owns radio stations in Accra, 
Kumase and Takoradi. The company is the media subsidiary of the 
First Group Company, which is owned by leading members of the 
NDC (in opposition since losing the elections of December, 2016). 
Although Dr. Duffuor is no more active in competitive party 
politics for national office, he and Dr. Paa Kwesi Nduom represent 
very well the nexus of business, politics and media. Dr. Nduom, a 
former Minister of state (2001—2008), is founder and twice (20012 
and 2016) the presidential candidate of the opposition Progres-
sive People’s Party (PPP). His media empire consists of about sev-
en FM radio stations and three television channels. Though these 
businessmen are politically well connected, the apparent orienta-
tion of their media organizations, so far, appears to be more for 
commercial objects than for partisan political objectives.
Another politician with extensive investment in media is Kenne-
dy Agyapong, a Member of Parliament and an outspoken financier 
of the NPP. His business interests include about 14 companies, 
and his network of media establishments comprise about half a 
dozen radio stations and a television station. His radio outlets, 
Oman FM in Accra and Ash FM in Kumase, openly do publicity for 
the NPP. The other influential media in this category is the highly 
respected Citi FM in Accra. The station is owned by a businessman 
who is a key supporter of the NPP.
Edward Boateng, owner of the Global Media Alliance, which 
owns over half a dozen radio stations, a TV station and cinema 
exhibition outlets, is a key member of the now ruling NPP. He was 
appointed ambassador to China in March, 2017, after his party 
took office as victor in the December, 2016, general elections.
Media General, owners of TV3 and allied radio stations, forms 
part of this nexus.
A common feature of the last two categories of media investors 
is the extra-commercial uses they make of their media organiza-
tions. They ensure that advertisements from their business entities 
are carried exclusively on their media networks. As their principal 
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businesses grow, not only does the media industry provide yet 
another opportunity for further expansion of their capital, invest-
ments in the media yield the additional value of advertising reve-
nue, facilitate farther reaches into the consumer market and thus 
expansion of the consumer base of the goods and services offered 
by their business interests.
Although the advertising industry in Ghana has expanded con-
siderably in recent years, access to advertising and sponsorship 
revenue is far from fairly distributed. The state-owned media and 
the dominant commercial ones cited above receive the lion’s 
share of that resource. This is an important factor that makes it 
difficult for the media to exercise public interest watch over big 
business. For example, despite incessant public complaints, some-
times through newspaper letters to the editor and radio phone 
call-ins, the media refrain from editorially criticizing poor service 
quality provided by the telecommunications companies. Some 
telecom companies have variously withdrawn advertising from 
media in retaliation against perceived adverse news coverage. In 
addition, many individual journalists are beholden to political or 
commercial interests as paymasters. Besides, with so many of the 
big players allied, through ownership, with political parties, the 
media’s independent watchdog role functions would be essential-
ly compromised, weakened or limited at best.
The party media
It would indeed be a curious, even strange, development if, in 
this hectic atmosphere of political partisanship and media mul-
tiplicity, there were no media set up purposely for political party 
propaganda. The party press has, since the anti-colonial period, 
been an important feature of the private media. In the post-colo-
nial period, whenever there was an opening for multi-party polit-
ical contests during transitions from military rule, the party press 
was a major instrument in the public discourses over the direction 
of national affairs. In the Fourth Republic, since 1992, however, the 
party press – as that formally owned, operated and managed by 
a political party – has ceased to exist. Today, the party’s publici-
ty is conducted by newspapers and radio and television stations 
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owned privately by individual wealthy party members and leaders, 
including members of parliament. Thus, the partisan media are 
those set up or owned by individual entrepreneurs but placed in 
the service of their parties for directly partisan propaganda and 
voter mobilization. Party members and supporters form their prin-
cipal audiences. The most notable and influential of these openly 
partisan media are owned by leading members of the ruling New 
Patriotic Party (in power 2001-2008 and since January 7, 2017), 
and the opposition (since January 7, 2017) National Democratic 
Congress (in power 1992-2000 and 2009-2016).
Small commercial stations in ‘rural’ districts
A good majority of the commercial radio stations, in cities or 
in the district capitals, invariably also the provincial commercial 
centres, are owned either by individual entrepreneurs of big or 
medium-sized businesses or politicians. District towns with two 
or more radio stations are not uncommon. Yet, though the pro-
liferation of radio stations across the country is an index of the 
country’s macro-economic growth and the growth of the middle 
classes in recent years, the long term financial sustainability of 
most of the mushrooming media owned by individual entrepre-
neurs is questionable. Advertising business and revenue sources 
are concentrated in Accra and Kumasi. The smaller media organi-
zations have limited access to advertising income. Interviews with 
a number of such stations in 2015 paint a picture of a distressed 
sector.10 In the medium to long-term, the vicissitudes of competi-
tion and limited revenue resources render many of these stations 
vulnerable to closure or as fodder for acquisition by the emerging 
magnates. Already, as is to be expected in a hectic competitive 
market environment, some established radio or television stations 
are selling off shares or entire establishments to non-media busi-
nesses. At the same time bigger media firms are swallowing up 
some smaller outfits. 
These dynamics show a tendency toward concentration in the 
industry. Apart from such acquisitions, the bigger entities smother 
the smaller establishments, especially those in the provinces, in 
two other ways. The first is by “poaching” promising journalists 
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and presenters/disc jockeys by enticing them with high salaries 
and other lucrative inducements. The other is through free fran-
chising of news and popular current affairs programmes to the 
smaller stations – in what is described as “affiliation”. These affili-
ate or partnership arrangements expand the audience base of the 
principal stations and, by extension, their advertising revenue. The 
“affiliated” stations, on the other, are attracted to this arrange-
ment because it provides them ‘national’ news and current affairs 
Talk Shows and panel discussions – from and about the capital 
and central government, as well as other important public affairs 
programmes – which the “affiliate” or junior partner stations could 
otherwise not be able to produce on their own.
The dominance of a small number of broadcast organizations 
in the market betrays the appearance of pluralism of outlets and 
of choices as projected by the official numbers. As at December 
2016, ten commercial radio stations, eight of them based in Accra, 
two in Kumasi, and including the two most popular partisan sta-
tions (Radio Gold for the NDC, Oman FM for the NPP), command-
ed 54.5% of the total audience in the country (Geo Poll Media, 
2017). About five companies own these ten most listened-to sta-
tions. The same stations also have the highest ratings during peak 
hours. The dominance in ratings is obviously enhanced by the sys-
tem of affiliation with smaller stations in the regions and districts.
Through cross-ownership, some of the same companies that 
dominate the radio sector also own most of the ten television sta-
tions which attract over 90% of the television audience in Ghana. 
While the radio stations of the state-owned GBC do not feature 
among the top pullers of listeners, its Ghana Television ranks fifth 
in attracting viewers to its screen (8.5%). 
These ownership structures reflect the political-economy dy-
namics that support or disable the normative watchdog functions. 
For, elites and elements within the corridors of political, econom-
ic and social power tend to trump the objective determinants of 
news and programme contents.
Tendencies toward control of media 
According to Curran (2011), in a formally democratic context 
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an important object of control of the media, in the absence of re-
pressive legislation and or use of violent attacks, is to monopolise 
the airwaves, drown out alternative ideas and opinion and sources 
of information and news. The dominant political forces, organized 
in their parties, have exhibited strong tendencies toward monop-
oly of the broadcast media through the control of the regulatory 
system of spectrum governance. The governing board of the Na-
tional Communications Authority (NCA), the body that manages 
the frequency spectrum for all communications, is appointed by 
the president. Its activities have attracted public criticism and sus-
picion that it is used to farm out broadcast frequencies dispro-
portionately to politicians of a ruling party, their allies and cronies 
to aid the particular party’s monopoly of the airwaves for their 
political purposes. The parceling out of frequencies among party 
cronies appears to have been largely pronounced under the gov-
ernment of the NDC especially during its 2009-2016 tenure.
A prominent media and human rights lawyer, Akoto Ampaw, 
observed that, “… as and when this party [NDC] came into office, 
it tended to allocate frequencies, through an opaque process of 
licensing, to its cronies. The result has been a situation where pol-
iticians, either directly or through surrogates, own broadcast sta-
tions, which they then employ in a parochial and sectarian fashion 
to champion their political ambitions.” (Graphic Communications 
Group Ltd., 2015)
In 2012, public concern about an absence of transparency in the 
functions of the NCA led some rights advocacy civil society groups 
to form the Coalition for Transparency of the Airwaves (CoTA).12Co-
alition members proposed a link between “the opaqueness of the 
frequency allocation process” and problems of unprofessionalism, 
especially widespread sectarian partisan “venom and vitriol”, on 
the airwaves that had attracted widespread public disapproval. 
The coalition’s six-point objectives aimed at: 
“a) promoting genuine pluralism of voices in Ghana’s airwaves
b) ensuring equity and transparency in the allocation and man-
agement of broadcast frequencies
c) advocating for the expeditious allocation of broadcast fre-
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quencies to genuine community radio applicants
d) helping to ensure the insulation of all broadcast media from 
governmental control and interference
e) advocating for the passage of , and adherence to, a Broad-
casting Law in keeping with international best practice
f) promoting an enabling legislative and regulatory environ-
ment  for the above.” (Graphic Communications Group Ltd., 2015)
The key implications resulting from the lack of transparency in 
frequency allocation are that the ruling party tends to control dis-
proportionate sections of radio/television outlets, thereby tend-
ing to drown out opposing or independent voices. By denying 
access to applicants whose loyalties are uncertain, the ruling par-
ty minimizes the number of outlets with the potential to engage 
in independent watchdog activities. Another critical effect is that 
community radio operators are squeezed out, thus weakening 
pluralism and the voices of mainly rural citizens.
Media performance and watchdog implications
The pattern of ownership has shown a significant tendency by 
the political elite to vie for control of the media to further their 
political interests. However, the strictly commercial interest has 
tended to dominate ownership and with it dominance of audience 
attention and influence through content outputs. What emerges is 
an appreciable autonomy of the non-partisan private commercial 
and independent community media to perform watchdog roles by 
probing issues of critical public interest and concern regardless of 
the attitudes and preferences of local or national state authority 
or non-state corporate or traditional interests. The partisan media 
have only raised questions and played watchdog when they are in 
opposition, and in relation to issues unfavourable to the rival rul-
ing party. They must probe the ruling party for obvious reasons of 
boosting their parties’ popularity and electoral interests. The par-
tisan media are, as is to be expected, usually vociferous defenders 
of their parties against all critics. 
The autonomy of the non-partisan commercial and community 
media to perform watchdog functions derives primarily from the 
certainty of uninhibited civil society voices to make use of and 
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protect the constitutional guarantees of freedom of expression. 
The prevalence of opposition parties exercising their freedom to 
voice “opposition”, including mobilization of supporters for open 
protest demonstrations, adds an important buffer for the media 
to assert their autonomy. Moreover, the political elite share a 
common interest in protecting the media’s freedom and indepen-
dence. For, when in opposition, the parties utilize their partisan 
media supporters to promote their causes, and can also depend 
on the non-partisan commercial media for reliable and fair cover-
age of their activities and as platform for their viewpoints.
This is the environment by which the media’s performance 
may be assessed. One of the important outcomes of the gen-
eralized public protection of the freedom and independence of 
the media is that, despite the changes in government resulting 
from elections, there has been no initiative to promote legislation 
threatening the status quo. The media have, thus, the enabling 
environment that enhances their potential to perform their social 
responsibility of watchdog over all matters of interest to the citi-
zens and their public.
In addition, the open space in which the media thrive, with its 
attendant competition for audiences and relevance, encourages 
improved professional standards and content quality. It also en-
hances innovative approaches to content format development. 
Thus, progressively broadcast stations generally, but more espe-
cially the big non-partisan commercial houses, have improved 
standards and introduced new content formats through all of 
which they perform various aspects of their “monitorial role”, in-
cluding “adopting an active watchdog stance”. (Christians, et al, 
2009)
The more popular and widespread programming feature of the 
new broadcast culture involves public participation, enhanced by 
the new communications technologies of mobile telephony, inter-
net and social media. From News, special interviews, Talk Shows to 
documentary features, nearly no programme on TV or radio ends 
without a phone call-in, text messaging, queries or comments by 
email and social media from the public. This highly subscribed 
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form of listener/viewer participation amounts to what Selormey 
(2012) proposes is “a new form of voice mechanism…through the 
radio phone-in programmes”, which contributes to citizen en-
gagement in promoting public accountability and strengthening 
of democratic culture. 
Tettey (2011) adds that “talk radio”, enhanced by the public’s 
use of the new technologies, most especially by the phone-in 
mechanism, “has led to a fundamental shift in the demography of 
contributors to political discourse”. The engagement of wider sec-
tions of society in public affairs discourse through broadcast me-
dia is even more critically important, according to Tettey (2008), 
because much of the time it represents “counter-discourses that 
challenge the hegemonic viewpoint of the state … within the vir-
tual architecture of this reconfigured public sphere” of the new 
communications technologies. 
But which sections of the lower social classes have now found 
their voices in public affairs discourses through the media could 
be a useful enquiry to undertake. In Ghana there is a radio sta-
tion everywhere and nearly every language and dialect is used 
on the airwaves. Mobile phone usage penetration is significantly 
high too.  So, Tettey’s (2008) proposal, nearly a decade ago, that 
the majority of media in Africa are located in urban areas and use 
mostly European languages, and therefore the voices of “Rural 
dwellers who constitute the majority …do not get articulated in 
the mediated public sphere” is worth further investigation, at least 
in Ghana. 
Be that as it may, there is a mutually reinforcing relationship be-
tween, on one hand citizens’ freedom of voice, and on the other, 
the media’s freedom and responsibility to serve the public interest. 
When citizens are assured of unrestrained access to the media to 
amplify their voices, by utilizing that right, they tend to impose on 
the media responsibility to satisfy their information needs, serve 
as whistle-blowers against acts of injustice, as channels of exact-
ing accountability from public authorities, and encourage them to 
expand their platforms for the expression of more diverse voices. 
Free, fair and transparent elections are one of the major pil-
Kwame Karikari
372
Watchdogs or Captured Media? . . . 
lars of constitutional representative democracy. In Ghana, no oth-
er process excites the public’s demands on the media to func-
tion with responsibility more than during the quadrennial general 
(presidential and parliamentary) elections. Over the years, their 
performance in providing public education, monitoring the in-
tegrity, transparency and peaceful conduct of elections marks the 
Ghana media’s highest point in their commitment to their watch-
dog role in safeguarding democratic governance.
Of the new content formats emerging with the opening up of 
the media space, none has made more dramatic impact in the 
media’s watchdog roles of fighting corruption and abuse of pow-
er than investigative journalism as a specialized discipline in the 
profession. It started cautiously and timidly among some of the 
resurgent private press of the late 1980s, such as The Ghanaian 
Chronicle, but has grown to be a sturdy presence on a number of 
the leading commercial broadcast outfits. Astute investigative re-
porters have hounded every government by ferreting out of their 
hiding places the dark dealings of ministers, top public officials, 
public agencies and criminal deals in the private sector. 
Radio documentaries, a very new format that has gained popu-
lar appeal on radio and television stations, are used to expose se-
rious social problems concerning anything from prison conditions, 
environmental degradation, human rights abuses and corporate 
malfeasance. The dramatic effect of documentaries have usually 
had the impact of arousing near instant public reaction and de-
mands for rectification.
Public perceptions of media performance
Public complaints about media impropriety have become in-
creasingly widespread. Much of that has expressed concerns 
about the incessant invective, intemperate and insulting manner 
of speech that characterises political discussion on air. The lan-
guage of political discussion on radio, dominated by NDC-NPP 
diatribe, is especially polarizing during election campaigns. It fuels 
an atmosphere of tension and arouses fear of political violence 
among the population.
One way by which the two dominant political parties, particu-
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larly, have sought to control the airways is by ensuring their pres-
ence on discussion and Talk Show programmes. The parties too 
have been aided in this by the managers of radio and television 
stations who have made it a routine of inviting representatives of 
political parties to discussion programmes, interviews or any other 
programmes, regardless of the subject matter of discussion. 
More importantly, the parties have devised a discretely inno-
vative and effective strategy of dominating or controlling pub-
lic voice in political discourse on air, thereby tending to “drown 
out” independent non-partisan voices. It is the strategy of “serial 
calling”. The parties’ communications (propaganda) departments 
mobilize cadre from their ranks whose principal daily function is to 
use the mobile phone to call or send text messages to intervene 
in radio or television programmes, most of the time, to attack op-
ponents more than to elucidate on their parties’ programmes and 
or policy ideas. The intervention of the “serial callers” is one ma-
jor source of the improprieties on air that elicit most public com-
plaints.
The partisan media have particularly attracted remarkable pub-
lic opprobrium. The partisan newspapers received the unenviable 
appellation of “rented press” from Martin Amidu, a former Attor-
ney General and Minister of Justice, whose campaigns against cor-
ruption had earned him popular appreciation by the public giving 
him the title “one man vigilante”. This followed a scurrilous cam-
paign of personal attacks by newspapers of supporters of the NDC 
government, the minister’s former employers, who had become 
the target of his anti-corruption crusade. 
The “rented press”, according to Amidu (2017) is a “press which 
has no ideology, editorial visions, nor any editorial independence. 
It is press that is put at the service of anyone who can hire it. These 
are newspapers who (that) do the bidding of anyone who can pay. 
They have no vision, no ethics – just cash. Nothing moral; just the 
editor’s stomach. It is stomach journalism. They will sell their con-
science for anything.”
Possibly influenced by the prevalent partisanship that domi-
nates current affairs discussions, significant sections of the public 
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are skeptical  of the media’s credibility. In 2014 the IEA’s national 
“Survey on Key Socio-Economic and Governance Issues in Ghana” 
reported that 56% of respondents “believed that the news media 
abused their freedom by printing or saying things they knew were 
not true”. For unexplained reasons the figure fell to about 46% in 
2016, but the proportion of those surveyed that doubted the me-
dia’s credibility was still disturbing.
Thus, by the political parties capturing the Talk programmes and 
call-in times, the parties blur the vision and focus of the media as 
watchdog of the public interest – acting, instead, as megaphones 
of the parties. In this case, the media are seen not as being on the 
side of the public but as lackeys and lapdogs of their owners or 
political god fathers.
Media as watchdog: case studies
Various media organizations, irrespective of their ownership 
backgrounds, have initiated and carried out different campaigns 
on a variety of issues of public accountability, social justice, human 
rights and environmental safety and protection. These activities, 
examples of watchdog interventions, affirm the potential of the 
freedom of the media in Ghana to promote issues of critical public 
interest.  They also give indications of the media’s autonomy in 
confronting the state and non-state centers of social, econom-
ic and political influence on their responsibilities to the citizens 
and the public. The sample of interventions analysed here as case 
studies affirms also the capacity of the media, in conditions of 
freedom, to set the kind of agenda that has the potential of pro-
voking public engagement for social justice reforms. These ex-
amples of media watchdog role performance affirm the effects of 
media enhancing citizen “mediated voice” expression and partici-
pation (Selormey, 2012).
In some of these watchdog activities, the media organizations 
have gone beyond simply publishing or broadcasting their watch-
dog investigations or features on critical social justice or rights 
issues. They have, instead, gone on to engage in direct action ad-
vocacy, sometimes in coalition or partnerships with other media 
or rights advocacy civil society organizations, for redress of the 
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issues.
They have undertaken advocacy actions by, as Opuni-Frimpong 
(2015) has proposed, “pleading the cause of another, siding with, 
vindicating, pleading and making recommendations on behalf of 
others. … Advocacy is an action by an individual or group of indi-
viduals which aims to influence public policy and resource alloca-
tion decisions within political, economic and social systems and 
institutions. Advocacy may include many activities that a person 
or organization undertakes, including media campaigns, public 
speaking, commissioning and publishing of research polls, the fil-
ing of an amicus brief, peaceful demonstrations, etc.” 
The examples below are selected because they are among 
those media watchdog cases that evoked or attracted most public 
resonance, locally or nationally.
1. The media campaign against mining and envi-
ronmental destruction (‘galamsey’)
In March, 2017, the newspapers of the state-owned Graphic 
Communications Group Limited and the commercial CitiFM joint-
ly launched a campaign to stop “illegal” small-scale gold mining 
in the country because of the devastation it had been wreaking 
on the environment. (The illegal small-scale mining of gold was 
called “galamsey”, a corruption of the pidgin expression “gather 
and sell”.) For over a decade, environmentalists and media raised 
alarm about the ecological destruction resulting from widespread 
unregulated gold mining taking place in nearly every district of 
the country. The effects were widespread destruction of virgin rain 
forest reserves, farmlands, and most alarming of all the pollution 
and extinction of major water bodies including streams, rivers, 
ponds, small lakes and marshes. The “gold rush” had attracted 
miners from neighbouring countries and places as far away as In-
dia and China.
Media exposure of this disastrous informal economic activity 
included anything from news reports, features and radio and tele-
vision documentaries on these mining activities and some acts of 
community resistance. The public reaction included local and na-
tionwide civil society coalitions demanding effective regulation of 
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mining to protect the ecology and the livelihoods of affected rural 
communities.
The campaign initiated by the two media organizations, starting 
with editorials and radio discussion programmes, attracted oth-
er media organizations and dozens of civil society organizations, 
big and small, including labour unions, faith-based organizations, 
rights advocacy groups and think tanks.  The campaign’s message 
resonated around the country. And by all indications it portend-
ed to be the most impact-making media advocacy campaign in 
recent years, considering its effects on mobilizing public opinion 
and catalysing public response for action around the whole coun-
try. The immediate impact was attracting government attention. 
The Minister of Mines and Natural Resources toured the worst 
affected places and decreed a six-month moratorium on mining, 
with orders to the police to arrest violators of the ban. Public fo-
rums sponsored by the media houses and broadcast live raised 
questions and issues that tended to provoke demands for funda-
mental reforms in legislation and regulation affecting all mining 
activities in the country.
The campaign was an example of media advocacy that leads 
to general national awareness of an issue of national existential 
import, and thus a matter of critical public interest. It was the out-
come of years of media alerts on mining-induced environmental 
degradation, sometimes following tip-offs from community activ-
ists, reports from environmental researchers, and sometimes as 
outcomes from covering community struggles against the effects 
of mining operations on livelihoods.
2. The crusaders against corruption 
Investigative journalism has come of age in Ghana and it has 
become one of the journalistic activities that effectively monitor 
accountability of government to the people. And the Accra-based 
commercial Joy FM, one of the top ten radio stations, has in recent 
years excelled in broadcasting exposes that make government 
and other high public officials tremble through its revelations on 
corruption scandals. In 2013 and 2014 the station’s celebrated 
award-winning investigative journalist, Manasseh Azure Awuni 
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shook the government and stunned the population, with reve-
lations of graft and other criminal acts concerning two major so-
cio-economic development programmes. 
The first case, filed in a series of reports, was broadcast between 
February-April, 2013. It concerned massive corruption that, in the 
end, collapsed a much-publicized  Ghana Youth Employment and 
Entrepreneurial Development Agency (GYEEDA), a programme 
ostensibly set up to reduce youth unemployment by providing 
thousands of jobs through training schemes. The Joy FM investi-
gation revealed an intricate network of collusion between officials 
of GYEEDA and some businessmen “who were siphoning benefi-
ciary funds with the connivance of bank officials”. (Azure, 2016)
The media exposure led to a government investigation which 
went nowhere. The key culprits accused in the media report, top-
most among whom included the Minister of Youth and Sports, 
were never punished even as their crimes “deprived thousands of 
miserable youth their source of livelihood while officials of GYEE-
DA and some ‘successful’ businessmen built empires out of their 
sweat.” (Azure, 2016)
The second investigation was about how corruption under-
mined implementation of a programme designed to uplift three 
regions of the savanna zone of the country out of poverty. The 
Northern, Upper East and West Regions are three regions that 
occupy the savannah ecological zone of the north of the coun-
try. Colonial policy, dry climactic conditions and other factors had 
rendered that part of the country socio-economically the poorest, 
and lagging behind the rest of the country in every index of so-
cial and economic progress. The Savana Accelerated Development 
Agency (SADA) was established by law passed by Parliament on 
30 July, 2010. The principal object of SADA was to provide special 
funds and mechanisms for the speedy development of the savan-
na north; it was an initiative designed to bridge the development 
gap between the third northern savannah sector and the forest 
and coastal southern part of the country.
Within two years of its inauguration SADA started tottering. Joy 
FM investigations revealed massive misappropriation of millions 
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of dollars of funds. Key agricultural projects funded under the pro-
gramme were never executed and afforestation projects, among 
other schemes, poorly or improperly implemented and managed 
because the funds were largely diverted into private pockets of 
officials put in charge of the scheme. 
As with other investigative reports by the radio station – and 
others – the “Sad SADA saga” provoked public displeasure as oth-
er radio stations and media picked up the issue in discussion pro-
grammes.
Following Joy FM broadcasts, aired in April 2014, the govern-
ment of President John D. Mahama dissolved the board under 
whose watch SADA derailed and reconstituted it and appointed 
a new chief executive officer. But nobody was punished for caus-
ing the financial losses and incapacitating a national programme 
meant to reverse decades-old underdevelopment of a third part 
of the country. 
3. Radio documentaries and rights issues: JOY FM 
and prison conditions
In March, 2015, Joy FM, one of the stations to introduce and 
popularize the radio documentary format, broadcast a two-part 
series of documentary stories entitled “Locked and forgotten”. 
The programme investigated how scores of persons accused of 
various crimes were remanded in prison custody to await trial by 
the courts but were never brought to trial for months and some-
times years. The ordeals of these citizens whose rights to justice 
had been so violated rankled many sections of the society and 
provoked calls for redress by the Ministry of Justice. Public outcry 
compelled the President and the Chief Justice to visit a number of 
prisons. The government and the judiciary set up a programme 
under which several numbers of such victims of injustice were re-
leased from prison.
4. State-owned media asserting some indepen-
dence
Despite the constitutional guarantees of their independence 
in editorial decision-making, the state-owned media have been 
remarkably silent in giving voice to those critical issues that gen-
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erally make government and state institutions uncomfortable or 
even angry at their exposure. This attitude of playing safe must be 
one important factor why none of the radio stations of the state 
broadcaster, GBC, appeared among the ten top most-listened-to 
stations.
The Daily Graphic in recent times, however, appears to be striv-
ing to break out of that mould and to find a voice to be relevant.
The newspaper published in 2015 two investigative reports that 
exposed examples of serious misconduct of public officials. 
The first was an investigation into widespread graft by top offi-
cials of the National Service Secretariat, the office that administers 
the national service programme of graduates of tertiary education-
al institutions. The paper discovered a scheme by which, over some 
years, the top managers of the organization inflated the number 
of graduates registered for the national service programme. They 
then skimmed off huge amounts of money purported to be al-
lowances for the non-existing “ghost” national service personnel. 
The government reportedly investigated the matter and promised 
prosecution of the culprits, including a deputy minister of state. 
Nothing came out of it.
The second investigative report by the Daily Graphic was a case 
of abuse of office by the chairperson of the independent consti-
tutional Commission on Human Rights and Administrative Justice 
(CHRAJ). The head of the Commission misconducted herself by 
incurring for the organization unapproved financial liabilities. She 
ordered unauthorized innovations on her residence and took resi-
dence for months in a hotel at the CHRAJ’S expense. An inquiry by 
the Chief Justice’s office led to her dismissal.
What makes the state-owned newspaper’s watchdog reports 
significant is that, for the first time since the Fourth Republic, the 
paper sought to investigate an issue of public interest that test-
ed the government’s commitment to accountability of persons in 
high public office. 
5. Community radio initiatives in rural districts
Some examples of the watchdog advocacy work of two of the 
29 members of the Ghana Community Radio Network (GCRN) 
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were selected for this study. 
The Radio for Development (RADFORD) is located in Tumu, a 
town in the Upper West region of northern Ghana close to the 
border with Burkina Faso.  Radio Ada, the very first community 
radio in the country, is located in Ada, a coastal town some 50 
kilometres east of the capital Accra. 
(a) RADFORD’s campaigns
This community radio’s watchdog broadcast activities were 
around three key subjects of concern to the mainly peasant farm-
ing population of the Sissala ethnic community covered by the 
station’s transmission signals and programmes. They comprise: 
(i) Security from armed criminal groups.The Sissala East 
and West Districts were among a number of rural communities in 
the country that had come under attacks from gangs of armed 
robbers in recent years. RADFORD’s campaigns, in response to 
community reports to the station, included dedicated reporting 
of incidents and setting up an early warning system of receiving 
and broadcasting alerts of attacks from victims or witnesses. These 
broadcasts resulted in increased police presence and patrols, more 
effective community prevention of attacks, more arrests and gen-
eral reduction in armed robbery incidents.
(ii) Protection against environmental destruction. The Sis-
sala districts are in the dry savannah ecological zone bordering on 
the sahel. Its grasslands with very short rainfall seasons have sparse 
trees and are easily vulnerable to degradation and desertification. 
Meanwhile it is rich with the rare rose wood, a species of hard wood 
treasured for its beauty and use for luxury furnishing. Unregulat-
ed exploitation leads to extinction. In 2015 hordes of smugglers 
entered the forest reserves in the area to illegally exploit the trea-
sured forest product. RADFORD’s investigative broadcasts led to 
the mobilization of youth watch groups who, in collaboration with 
forestry officials and police, eventually drove out the smugglers.   
(iii) Protecting young girls against backward cultural prac-
tices. Forced marriage to young girls, including elopement, is an 
old practice prevalent among some ethnic groups, including the 
Sissala people. The station’s campaigns have involved education to 
change attitudes and encouragement to families to rescue young 
girls given away to early marriages, most often by their fathers or 
uncles. In 2006 six girls were rescued by villagers who reported 
their actions to the station. 
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(b) Radio Ada
The most outstanding watchdog role function this commu-
nity radio station engaged in since it was set up some 15 years 
ago concerned defending the economic rights of women in 
the Ada community. For centuries, the area has been one of 
the richest salt mining centres in Ghana. Traditionally, women 
have been the principal social force in an informal system of 
small-scale self-employed salt winning (mining) and trading. 
But in recent years, the Ada salt industry became a new fron-
tier of encroachment by big capital. And the women of Ada 
went on the frontline fighting to protect their livelihoods and 
sources of subsistence. They also resisted new mining practic-
es, introduced by the big capitalintruders, which threatened 
the ecology of the lagoons that produce the salt. 
The work of Radio Ada involved dedicated broadcast cam-
paigns that gave voice to the women for their self-organiza-
tion, mobilization and advocacy to protect their economic and 
social interests against an alliance of external big capital inter-
ests, local middle men and traditional (mainly male) authorities 
(chiefs). This struggle was ongoing (at the time of this study) 
and was not likely to be resolved soon. But Radio Ada and the 
women it supported did not appear ready to relent yet.
Some common features of the media activities
The examples of watchdog interventions by the media are cited 
because they were some of the more outstanding role functions in 
recent years. They are cited also because  they represent an insig-
nificant proportion of the hundreds of media organisations in the 
country that have taken up critical and significant public interest 
causes beyond mere reportage or commentary, and without par-
tisan political motives.
The cases cited also share some common features that give 
these media activities the attributes of watchdog role functions. 
The first is that all the media took the side of social justice, nation-
al developmental or public interest causes, be they on citizens’ 
rights, environmental protection or public accountability issues. 
Secondly the activities involved sustained publication or broadcast 
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of the issues over periods of time. Further, the advocacy activities 
in these matters always attracted considerable public resonance 
and supportive response.The media, in most cases, also involved 
themselves in active mobilization of the aggrieved social sectors, 
groups or communities beyond the routine act of reportage or ed-
itorial commentary. In addition, the targets of advocacy were not 
always only government or state institutions. They included non-
state actors, such as private economic interests or perpetrators of 
illegality or criminal behavior threatening the collective security of 
communities. In some cases too, the media have cooperated with 
public authority to address the issues raised.
Public responses to media’s watchdog broadcasts
New communications technologies, especially the mobile 
phone and internet, have made instantaneous public interaction 
with mass media publications a major development in promoting 
free speech and citizen participation in governance and public af-
fairs discourse. In all the watchdog cases studied – indeed as they 
regularly do with most news bulletins and discussion programmes 
– radio stations invited and involved listener comments, opinions 
and perspectives. Most cases attracted condemnation and de-
mands for justice or resolution of the problem from majority of 
the public interventions as the case may be.
In some cases sections of the public volunteered support and 
assistance. In the case of the campaign against illegal small-scale 
mining, civil groups volunteered participation in the coalition and 
demanded review of existing legislation and regulation of mining 
generally. 
Reactions to those cases of corruption involving government 
agencies and or officials introduced partisan biases from the pub-
lic interventions. Generally, the corruption cases were also round-
ly condemned by the majority of public commentators. Howev-
er, party loyalists often called in or sent messages to rubbish the 
media exposes as “opposition propaganda” or labelled the media 
houses concerned as tools for the opposition. 
The usually lengthy panel discussions that took up the media 
exposures were often polarized along political party lines. This sit-
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uation arose principally because radio stations made it a practice 
of inviting party activists and representatives to compose the dis-
cussion panels. That, therefore, set the tone and directed the tenor 
of public contributions through the phone calls, text messages, 
emails, twitter, facebook or other social media.
Conclusion
In this paper, we have attempted to show that the conditions 
prevail in Ghana for the media to exercise the independence and 
freedom required for vigorous and consistent watchdog role 
functions. But their general performance of this fundamental role 
in a democracy is far short from what is possible and necessary. 
Among practitioners themselves, there is a sense that more could 
be done. Of the five leading professionals interviewed, only one 
considered that the generality of the Ghanaian media were doing 
very well but that “some of the imperfections are more as a result 
of lack of education and lack of resources on the part of the me-
dia.”(Attah Mensah, 2017) 
The other four agree that the media’s watchdog role perfor-
mance “is below average. I say this because we are all reactive 
rather than being proactive. We tend to allow the politicians and 
others to set the agenda and we follow. We are not able to initiate 
the fight. Also a lot of us are corrupt. Sometimes you do a story 
and some media people fight and defend the wrongdoers. Some-
times you find out later that they are in bed with some of these 
wrongdoers. If you look at the kind of freedom we have and the 
amount of space we occupy – in terms of radio stations going to 
400, in all the regions and all the districts – if we were really do-
ing our work well, there wouldn’t be so much rot in our system. I 
am really not impressed with how we utilise our freedom.” (Azure, 
2017)
“I don’t think they [the media] have done well. Maybe some 
pockets do a good job. With the coming into being of the Con-
stitution of the Fourth Republic and the liberalization of the me-
dia, you would think that when quantity improved quality would 
follow. … But what you find is that most of our journalists are fol-
lowing the ministers, the district chief executives. Our newspapers 
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are filled with a lot of ‘he said’ ‘they said’ stories. Our newspapers 
are filled with a lot of PR stories. Even business, when business 
is doing something it is the PR side of the business story that 
is followed. Who is asking the businesses the critical questions?” 
(Ashigbey, 2017)
The general verdict is that much, much more could be done 
by the media. And that seems to suggest that, in spite of the fa-
vourable environment, the generality of the Ghanaian media lack 
the “disciplined moral passion, hard work and intelligence” and 
the “robust independence” Curran (2011) prescribed as a primary 
predisposition for committed and relevant watchdog role func-
tioning.  As one of the interviewees has pronounced, one of the 
important factors hampering the media’s commitment to this fun-
damental of roles in a democracy, is corruption among the me-
dia professionals. This widespread phenomenon ranges from the 
petty cases of reporters collecting small amounts of cash from 
subjects they cover before filing their stories, to reported cases of 
editors and publishers or radio managers burying or ignoring big 
stories of scandal in exchange for big cash bribes.
Active leading figures of the two dominant political parties form 
the single largest proportion of any group of identifiable persons 
who own radio stations around the country. This reality, coupled 
with the partisan political influences on, and biases that hold sway 
over so many among the media professionals, render large sections 
of the media morally incapable of mounting watchdog activities. 
For the partisan media, they raise critical questions of government 
when their parties are in opposition. Similarly, when they raise crit-
ical issues about the activities of some business or some non-state 
entity for public scrutiny, the subject being questioned would al-
most certainly have something to do with the rival political par-
ty or grouping opposed by that media’s favoured party. Serving 
the party in state power or loyalty to a political party comes with 
rapid access to material benefits never realisable through diligent 
commitment to independent professional journalism. It may take 
the form of immediate material rewards or appointment to one 
or another high political office with attractive perks and access 
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to material benefits. It is one of the principal attractions for many 
young persons who enter media work. And with that motivation 
any concerns for watchdog role performance for public interest 
purposes is anathema to the seeming aspiring journalist.
These questions aside, there are objective factors of weak or 
poor professional technical capacity of most of the media, es-
pecially the radio and television stations in the rural and district 
towns, to undertake activities that demand more than basic skills 
of journalistic work. The media industry has grown faster than the 
development of the requisite human resource to meet its pro-
fessional and technical needs.The low capacity of personnel is 
further compounded by lack of resources to engage in activities 
that would often involve preparation of material and campaigns 
of advocacy that would usually require considerable time and fi-
nancial resources, assets hardly available to the numerous outlets 
of community radio or commercial stations owned by small and 
medium-sized entrepreneurs. 
These limitations on the Ghana media’s watchdog role func-
tions may become even more constraining over time as the busi-
ness-political nexus of media ownership gets more consolidated 
and expansive with the dialectical processes of concentration. 
These trends may be slowed down or reversed if a broadcasting 
legislation is passed with provisions for effective regulation that 
are responsive to these fundamental and critical questions for the 
promotion of unencumbered media independence and transpar-
ent pluralism. And it may be questionable if the media ownership 
cabal of an alliance of political and business elites would encour-
age enforcement of rules and regulations that threaten their hold 
on these vital instruments of political, economic and cultural-ideo-
logical dominance.
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THE MEDIA AND ELECTIONS: The Nige-
rian and South African Experience 
Abiodun Salawu and Kayode Eesuola
Introduction
One thing that the media do, be it in its print, broadcast and 
digital forms, is utilize an array of devices to communicate with a 
large, diversified audience.Democracy being a system that cen-
ters on the masses of a people shares certain significant symbi-
otic relationships with it (Rickert 2011). This explains why a large 
chunk of the social science scholarship, especially in the fields of 
Communications and Political Science; and  in the sub areas  of 
Political Communication, Political Behavior and Psephology,  has 
established the link between  the media and many  institutions 
of democracy: elections, political party, pressure groups, judiciary, 
legislature  and so on; and how all of them influence and affect 
one another for  effective functioning of a political system (Müller 
12
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2014, Coronel 2015). 
Election is, however, the main focus of this chapter, vis-à-vis the 
relationship it has with the media. Nigeria and South Africa are put 
in comparative perspective. Attempt is made to historicize, and 
thereafter locate the similarities and differences of media opera-
tions during general elections in the two countries, with specific 
focus on South Africa’s 2014 and Nigeria’ 2015 general elections. 
The basis for comparison is clear: Nigeria and South Africa are the 
biggest economies as well as biggest democracy in Africa, and 
their general elections hold in a period of one year interval, mak-
ing issues and discussions highly comparable on the basis of time. 
The paper generally assesses the role of the media in politics and 
democracy before narrowing down to elections, and of course 
placing emphasis on the new media. 
The problematic is that many scholarly efforts have been invest-
ed on the media watchdog functions on democracy, but neither 
election as the soul of democracy, nor the form of the media that 
is more active towards it has received ample attention. So, this 
chapter will among other things determine the extent to which 
the media plays its watchdog role by informing and educating 
people on elections, and which, between the digital media and the 
traditional mass media, has more potency on the people when it 
comes to influencing elections in contemporary times. While do-
ing this, we shall also address   how the media has contributed 
to successful conducts of elections and the overall development 
of democracy in the two countries taken for comparison. After 
that we give recommendations on which the new media in the 
two countries can positively influence each other not only for the 
purpose of election on which the paper focuses, but also on the 
political development of the two countries in general.  
The chapter then intends to respond to the questions of  wheth-
er  South Africans, more than Nigerians, relied  on the media more 
than other institutions for political knowledge   and information 
in their 2015 and 2014 general elections; whether South Africans, 
more than Nigerians, used  the new media for political knowledge 
and information in 2015 and 2014 and, on the last note, whether 
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peoples’  use of the media for political knowledge   and informa-
tion in 2015 and 2014,   increased  electoral participation in South 
Africa more that in Nigeria. 
In what follows, therefore, there is, at first, a political history 
of both Nigeria and South Africa which is followed by a broad, 
generic exploration of scholarly positions on the relationship be-
tween the media and politics, then democracy. This narrows down 
to the particular case of elections, both in the generic sense and 
in the two countries. 
The Political History of South Africa and Nigeria
The political history of South Africa, particularly within the con-
text of elections, will most accurately be traced back to 31st May 
1910 when the Union of South Africa was created. That was byvir-
tue of the Imperial Parliament’s South Africa Act of 1909. At this 
time, the lower house of the newly created Parliament of South 
Africa, that is, the House of Assembly,together with the provincial 
councilswas elected by first-past-the-post voting in single-mem-
ber electoral divisions. Taole (2005) observes that initially in this 
election, there were different qualifications in different provinces 
as the franchise was the same as that for the lower houses in the 
four colonies that had formed the Union.
This was followed by the enfranchisement of the poor whites 
and the white women in 1930 when the National Party govern-
ment of J. B. M. Hertzog passed the Women’s Enfranchisement 
Act,that extended to all white women over the age of 21, the right 
to vote and be voted for.  This development contagiously led to 
the Franchise Laws Amendment Act that lifted the property and 
literacy requirements for white male voters in the Cape and Natal, 
just a year after, and with this development all white citizens of 
South Africa who had become 21 years at least became enfran-
chised. According to Taole (2005:17), “as the exclusion of women 
and the literacy and property qualifications continued to apply to 
non-white voters, these acts had the effect of diluting their elec-
toral power by more than doubling the number of white voters.” 
This was going to create a landmark political history in which   the 
first female Member of Parliament, Leila Reitz,was elected in the 
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general elections of 1933 as representative of Parktownfor the 
South African Party.
Between 1936 and 1948, the segregationist elections were 
held. In 1936, there was segregation of black voters as the Hert-
zog government enacted the Representation of Natives Act that 
eliminated the black voters from the common voters’ rolls, placing 
them separately on what was called the “native voters’ rolls”. This 
was, however, repealed in 1959 following series of agitations in 
which the press played very significant roles. In 1948, the National 
Party engaged in a policy of removing colored voters in a similar 
manner to black voters, and the Parliament in 1951 passed the 
Separate Representation of Voters Act, removing four members of 
parliaments. 
A whites-only kind of referendum was held in 1960 to decide 
the possibility and modality of   South Africa becoming a republic. 
This was popularly known as the Republic Referendum, and the 
republic eventually   emerged in 1961, removing the remaining 
black representation. The political alignments and realignments 
that followed gave birth to the Tricameral Parliament in 1983. A 
referendum had been held on constitutional reform leading to the 
formation of the Tricameral Parliament, which consisted of three 
separate houses to represent the whites, the colored and the Indi-
an South Africans. 
The Interim Constitution was enacted as negotiations con-
tinued for the eradication of apartheid. The interim constitution 
introduced the   non-racial universal suffrage, and adopted the 
party-list proportional representation in place of the first-past-
the-post voting system, which is that in which voters indicate on 
a ballot the candidate of their choice, and the candidate who re-
ceives most votes wins election. This made it possible for all races 
in South Africa to take part in the elections of 1994, the first   fully 
democraticand multi-party exercise which became the founding 
principles of the 1996 Constitution of South Africa. The new con-
stitution guarantees the right of all citizens to vote as contained 
in the Bill of Rights and it has guided the conduct of elections and 
politics till 2014. 
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For Nigeria, one can moderately trace electioneering politics 
back to 1959 as struggles became intense on which party or parties 
would control political power in the immediate post colonial peri-
od. The keen competition led to a situation in which major political 
parties controlled majority of seats in their different regions with 
none of them having enough votes to constitute government at 
the national level. With this, the Northern People’s Congress (NPC) 
and National Convention of Nigerian Citizens (NCNC) formed a 
coalition government which provided a measure of north-south 
consensus that could have been difficult if the Action Group had 
been second to NPC.  With this arrangement the NCNC’s Nnamdi 
Azikiwe became the Governor General and the NPC’s Abubakar 
Tafawa Balewa, Prime Minister.  
Then came the 1964 general elections which had to be conduct-
ed independent of the Britons.  It was a competition between the 
Nigerian National Alliance that was formed by the NPC and NNDC, 
and the   United Progressive Grand Alliance (UPGA) made up of 
the NCNC, the AG, and their allies. The 1979 general elections ush-
ered in the Second Republic which produced Alhaji Shehu Shagari 
as the first executive president of Nigeria. This was followed by 
the 1983 elections which reproduced Alhaji Shehu Shagari before 
General Muhammadu Buhari-led military coup returned Nigeria 
to square one. The military ruled till 1993 when another general 
(presidential) election took place but was annulled. It wasnot until 
1999 that other elections were held to return Nigeria to civil rule. 
This was followed by the 2003 elections. 
The 2007 general elections produced Umaru Musa Yar’Adua 
and Jonathan Goodluck as President and vice–president respec-
tively. Held between April 14 and 21,2007, it became significant 
for witnessing handover of power from one elected civilian gov-
ernment to another.  Akinwalere (2012) says the 2007 elections, 
perhaps, illustrated the crudest manifestations of all that has ever 
been wrong with elections in Nigeria, in terms of the extent and 
magnitude of poor, fraudulent conduct and conflict-ridden na-
ture of electoral politics. From ballot box snatching and stuffing, 
manipulation of the party nomination process and imposition of 
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candidates; down to incumbent executive interference in all as-
pects of the electoral process, electoral fraud aided and abetted 
by high echelons of the election management body, use of secu-
rity agencies by incumbents to intimidate opponents and ensure/
assure electoral ‘victory’, and use of thugs to interfere with the 
electoral process. The impunity with which these dastardly acts 
were committed was overwhelming, and Nigerians and friends 
of Nigeria in the international community were so disgusted with 
what happened that, virtually in unison, they demanded for re-
forms to bring about free, fair and credible elections. 
It was generally established that the electoral commission in 
Nigeria identified significant lessons learnt from the past elections 
and factored them into the preparations for the conduct of anoth-
er one which came in April 2011. The elections of 2015 followed, 
and this changed leadership of Nigeria from the Peoples Demo-
cratic Party to the newly formed All Progressives Congress which 
is in charge of the country till date.  
The basis for comparison between Nigeria and South Africa is 
clear. Both are the biggest economies as well as two of the biggest 
democracies in Africa.Their general elections which have evolved 
from the period of colonialism till the present, incidentally hold in 
a period of one year interval, making issues and discussions highly 
comparable on the basis of theme and time.  
Politics, Democracy and the Media 
It is well established in literature that the media play a key role 
in democracy. The media perform the role of a ‘watchdog’ through 
provision of information to the democratic society, and, to anoth-
er extent, they stand as a forum representing views and opinions 
of citizens. Today, all over the world, people rely almost solely on 
newspapers, television, the internet and the radio as their main 
sources of information and knowledge. Such information they 
need in sports, education, business, health and especially poli-
tics- which connects everyone directly and indirectly is obtained 
primarily from the media (Miller 2014). It is, therefore, difficult, if 
not impossible to operate without the media in the modern world, 
whether in a democratic society or otherwise. Neustadt (2008) 
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holds that in the age of modernity, it is not possible to hold any 
intelligent discussion on democracy if the roles played by print 
and electronic media are ignored, especially, in terms of dissemi-
nating concrete and important information to the political public. 
Whenever there is any innovation in the media, the public eval-
uates its potentiality towards improving democratic politics, and 
media professionals   are often judged based on their disposition 
to democratic values.  Of worthy note is that gladiatorial  politi-
cians, campaigners  and political activists reach their large target 
audiences thorough the media, so, the absolutist position of the 
indispensability of the media in democracy cannot but gain a cer-
tain degree of understanding. This suggests why it is stated that 
“following the creation of electronic media in the twentieth cen-
tury, the connections between democracy, political campaigns, 
public opinion, and journalistic practices have become the focus 
of great attention and anxiety among communication scholars” 
(Encyclopedia .com). 
This is also why, since the 17th century, philosophers  and rulers 
alike have given due recognition to the media  as what Colonel 
(2015) calls the  “Fourth Estate”  that creates  forum for debates 
and discussions of issues that affect the public.  This notion sig-
nificantly endures all over the world in spite of the porosity, sen-
sationalism and superficiality introduced by the social media,  and 
the notion that the media serve as the watchdog, “guardian of the 
public interest, and  a conduit between governors and the gov-
erned remains deeply ingrained” (Colonel 2015, p.2). 
Indeed, the linkage of democracy to the media is as old as   the 
beginning of the use of liberal democratic theory in Europe, at 
least as an intellectual exercise.  In the era of the 17th century, John 
Milton’s Aeropagitica advanced an argument towards the need for 
encouragement of free discussion as a panacea to rejecting false-
hood and illogical opinions, and, subsequently towards building 
knowledge based on truth.   In the United States of America, the 
idea of media importance was enshrined in the Bill of Rights and 
attracted impacts when the First Amendment to the constitution 
was made. Today, the duo of media and democracy continue to 
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attract serious discourse, and, in the words of  Edelman (1988, 27), 
this is, “...in part because of frustration with the early Federalists 
which made  Thomas Jefferson and other anti-Federalists some 
passionate defenders of the free press in the early days of the 
American republic”. Similarly, English philosopher John Stuart Mill 
advanced a very convincing argument in support of free speech 
and a free press in democratic politics, asserting that when people 
are silenced, truth is suppressed and errors are expressed in the 
political system.   
In not up to two centuries has the modern media been able to 
disseminate up-to-date political information to the public, and this 
is largely due to the technological advancements witnessed glob-
ally to affect both print and the electronic media. Then, as Jürgen 
Habermas (1962) reveals, the increase in the political awareness of 
the public in America and Europe has a fundamental connection 
to the development of the media. In these societies, not only did 
people accept news reported by newspapers, for example, their 
opinions were shaped by them. 
However, as newspapers continued to depend on commercial 
advertising for their survival, the proverbial saying of he who pays 
the piper dictates the tune began to apply, and newspaper edi-
torial policies and journalistic practices began to get increasingly 
tainted by the yearnings and aspirations of those who control the 
greatest financial resources. Habermas concludes that this makes 
“wealthy individuals or those who control wealth have more influ-
ence over public opinion and, ultimately, over what policies are 
changed than do members of the lower and middle classes” (1962, 
11). This created a pool of scholars who have expressed some 
worries about the fact that the heavy reliance on the modern me-
dia on governmental sources of information might lead in some 
cases to less scrutiny and criticism of governmental policies;   in 
addition to the economic forces that might distort public debate. 
Indeed, as scholars continue to theorize about  the link  between 
democracy and the media  throughout the twentieth century, high 
emphasis  has been placed on  the extent of media effects, espe-
cially in response to the speed and manner in which  governments 
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of nations produced propaganda during the first and the second 
world wars.
Nonetheless, there is hardly any of the foregoing opinions that 
will not agree that the media represent an information tool and 
forum for discussion of issues, assertion of positions and even 
ventilation of anger. There is no doubt that a  truly democratic 
society requires citizens’ participation, and that a diligent media 
has the capacity of keeping  citizens engaged in the business of 
governance,  prompt them to take action--the entire virtue upon 
which democracy is built-- and when, for instance, the media pro-
vide the public with some information in making informed choices 
such as who to vote for and which policies should be supported or 
opposed, the media can then be said to be playing a  a watchdog 
role.
In addition, there is, at least a role of the media that can be 
considered most obvious and common. The media report news 
and give information on politics, sports, war and peace to all of us 
in the general public. One will consider this as the most important 
role of the media, especially in a democratic setting where every 
activity seems to, at least theoretically, focus on the citizens who 
are expected to play critical political roles and take crucial and 
informed decisions through the information available to them. 
It is expected, therefore, under this circumstance, that the media 
are   professional and impartial when giving out information to the 
general public on political events and activities of the government 
within the political system.  
Elections are critical in this regard. From the beginning of poli-
ticking to the declaration of interest down to the real contests and 
declaration of winners, the media are expected to maintain neu-
trality, professionalism and objectivity while educating the public. 
Indeed,  “media coverage should be unbiased rather than favoring 
any one candidate or point of view in order for the voters to make 
informed decisions” (Dennis, 2009). In fact, Dennis asserts “polit-
ical journalists can be especially helpful in this role. Many cover 
candidates and the elections as a full-time assignment but can 
provide both positive and negative glimpses into the candidate’s 
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life” (2009, 102). 
When the media serve as watchdog they protect the general-
public from incompetent political aspirants and mediocre officials 
by exposing their details through the press.  Elchahabi (2015) ex-
emplifies how this has worked: 
Think for a moment about the Benghazi, Libya, attacks and ensuing 
investigation. In September of 2012, U.S. diplomatic offices were at-
tacked, leaving four Americans dead. The coverage regarding what 
Secretary of State Hillary Clinton knew and when she knew it continual-
ly overshadowed her possible presidential candidacy. This is an exam-
ple of watchdog media (2015, 8). 
Even when exposures have nothing to do with corruption and 
some evil doings, the media still protect the public by  providing 
information on the successes, strengths and weaknesses of  elec-
tion candidates, their political parties, election officials  and their 
practices. This watchdog function educates the public on the past 
performances of political personalities and officials in politics, and 
it obviously helps in holding politicians and their political parties 
accountable to the political public. 
As earlier indicated, the media provide a platform for register-
ing people’s voices by allowing candidates and their political par-
ties   to communicate their electoral promises and campaigns to 
the general public.   This is often done through provision of debate 
forums where candidates are invited to present their manifestoes 
to the public. With this the media impact our political views and 
color our opinions, and they directly or indirectly shape our elec-
toral and general political behavior through the information that 
their different platforms provide.  
While the media do this on the part of gladiatorial politics, they 
also simultaneously provide a platform for the public to convey 
their political thoughts and feelings towards the candidates who 
have used the media forums to reach them. Strong writers, colum-
nists and opinion leaders used to do this. At present, however, it 
is done mostly in the social media. Whichever way it is done, and 
through whatever means, the media also promote the voice of the 
people by giving them some open forums for debate, discussion, 
analysis, criticism and appraisals. This is what strikes the balance. 
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An example of such situation is provided by Castalls (2012):
During an election for example, a popular television station can hold 
presidential debates to present the thoughts and programs of can-
didates to the public. After that, it can encourage viewers to submit 
comments, questions and topics on issues they want the candidates to 
address but that did not occur due to the reason of time during the live 
broadcast. Such comments, questions and topics could be submitted 
using the email, the Facebook or the twitter. Through a practice of this 
nature, “the public can communicate opinions and concerns with one 
another and even with the candidates and the government. In this way, 
the media provide an interactive experience for the voters. The audi-
ence can be participants rather than simply viewers... 
However, in spite of the foregoing plethora of roles and func-
tions that the media play in developing political system, especially 
a democracy, a great deal of controversy exists amongst scholars 
on whether the mass media actually promote or destroy democ-
racy.  This is where the idea of media malaise theory originat-
ed from, and advocates of the  theory claim that “because mass 
media in established democracies mostly operate according to 
market principles, they disregard their democratic duties, there-
by inflicting serious repercussions on democracy;  causing apathy, 
cynicism and ignorance with regard to politics among citizens” 
(Curra, and Cohen et al 2014, p.4). 
Propounded in 1976 by Robinson, and expectedly attracting 
many amendments as it tested the intellectual grounds, the media 
malaise theory has most of the researches conducted on it in the 
United States, giving room for different schools within it.  There 
are theorists within the media malaise tradition who  completely 
blame the television for the malaise (Becker, Whitney, Patterson) 
for instance,  while others  subscribe more to the  generic view 
rather than  blame one aspect of the media (Bennet, Rhine and 
Newton).  
Irrespective of the different traditions discussed in the fore-
going, the Malaise Theory essentially presupposes that the way 
media covers news or disseminates information to the public is 
antithetical to the interest of the general public and the society as 
a whole.  In doing so, the Media Malaise theory emphasizes the 
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political realm, claiming that the media have been rendered as an 
instrument for declining public trust, creating political skepticism, 
cynicism as well as apathy etc. Evidence can be traced to the pre-
dominant interest of the press today on sensational issues such 
as scandal, conflict, deaths, fatal errors and dramatic situations to 
attract their audience’s attention: the scenario of “Only Bad News 
is News”. This is increasingly so in today’s vast world where news-
makers have to compete to survive in a capitalist society. Media 
Malaise will assert that the media do not give a fair coverage to 
the existing stories as a fresh and bigger story is searched. Specifi-
cally, when the world wide news is covered, it instantly generates a 
breakthrough where only constant points are put forward without 
adequate explanation of the details. This often creates a pool of 
confusion in the society (Curran et al. 2014).   
It is difficult to ignore the negative impact of this scenario on 
politicians and the politics they play.  As demonstrated in the case 
of the United States general elections of 2016, politicians often 
attack their opponents and do negative things rather than act-
ing positively in order to have more publicity. This underplays the 
positive aspects of their politics and the good work they do often 
go untold. From the point of view of the Media malaise theory, 
this situation creates a constant ambience of mistrust and cyni-
cism; along with such a negative vibe that disrupts, if not destroy 
the political environment.  A study conducted in the United King-
dom found that the period before the elections is often full of 
such political news and reports that stress the populace and cre-
ate tension in the polity. People then usually tend to avoid such 
news and reports by temporarily avoiding newspapers and some 
television stations. As this scenario tends to make the politicians 
less accountable to the public, it also, on the other hand, has dam-
aging effect on political participation which is the foundation of 
democracy. Inevitably also, it affects the quality of public life and 
stability of the political system. 
However, in contrast to the Media Malaise Theory there is the 
Mobilization Perspectives to the Media, with both theoretical ori-
entations making attempts to assess the role of the media in dual 
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contrast manner.  Adherents of the ‘mobilisation’ perspective in-
sist that the Media Malaise theorists are quite unrealistic in their 
expectation of the media. Though they appear to be in minority 
compared to the Media Malaiseisits, the Mobilizationists feel that 
the society does not contain such thing as objectivity, but is con-
stantly responding to what is wanted and needed; after all, it is 
only the news that people love to read or hear that should ordi-
narily be sent to them. That, on its own, the Mobilizationists will 
argue, is what makes the media democratic and responsive to the 
needs of the people.  What they, mobilization theorists, perceive 
to be more realistic is that people should assess the media based 
on the ample information they provide to the public and leave the 
rest for the ability of the public to sieve. In other words, what the 
mobilization theorists will conclude is that media coverage of pol-
itics and electoral campaigns does not have significant influence 
on behaviours of the public; it is the other way round (Strömbäck 
and Shehata 2010).
But if media coverage of political issues and dissemination of 
political information have little or no influence on the attitudes and 
behaviors of the citizens, one can assume that people should be 
less worried about the quality and authenticity of news as well as 
attention that people pay to the media. To test the reverse, if me-
dia coverage of politics and political campaigns has a moderately 
potent influence on the attitudes and behaviors of the general 
public, it requires a very meticulous review to protect democracy 
and the rule of law, and, if possible, the regulation of the media 
by the governments of nations. What is historical, and which must 
be  stated at this juncture, is that scholars, at one period of history 
or the other, have maintained the position that  the effect that the 
media has on their political audiences are quite indirect and insig-
nificant; or that, on the other hand, the media exerts a potent, and 
highly significant influence on their audiences. While the debate 
continues and is unlikely to end at any time soon, the vast majority 
of contemporary scholarship will not deny the fact that the media 
will continue to have some form of influence on the general public 
and their political behavior. 
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But, again one must ask, does the quality of the media and its 
information actually affect the quality of democracy? This is an-
other one million dollar question that has generated debate and 
responses over the years, and it is best answered by the findings 
that here follow. As it happens, countries with a higher degree 
of media performance show higher levels of political participa-
tion and less corruption. They also tend to have a more lively civil 
society, and elected representatives seem to reflect the prefer-
ences of citizens more adequately. These findings illustrate that 
media performance is clearly related to at least some aspects of 
the functioning of a democratic regime. Therefore, given its rele-
vance to democracy, it can be concluded that the discussion over 
whether the media fall short of, or fulfil the normative demands 
imposed on them is highly significant. This questions the general 
and sweeping assumptions that both the ‘media malaise’ and the 
‘mobilization theories’ make about the state of media and democ-
racy. Ultimately, both perspectives could benefit from considering 
comparative empirical evidence that distinguishes between differ-
ent aspects of media performance and their influence on different 
elements of democracy (Castells, 2007). 
Media in Nigeria and South Africa
The media have developed in Nigeria and South Africa right 
from the periods of colonialism, and have played critical roles in 
the political development of the two countries. In South Africa, 
media partnered with the people to fight segregationist policies 
and prepare grounds for democratization (Kasoma, 1988). As this 
was done in South Africa and indeed the entire South, especial-
ly in Zambia (Kasoma, 1986), same was going on in West Africa 
as the press vehemently battled against military dictatorship that 
overtook most of the countries. Whilst tracing the development 
of media activities in the politics of Nigeria since the colonial pe-
riod till the military era, Seng and Hunt (2006) conclude that for 
Nigeria, political development was more of war of the press than 
of protests and social movements. Thus, as far as South Africa and 
Nigeria are concern, the media in the two countries have not been 
found wanting in their watchdog roles. 
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Shelly (2010, 16) however declares that “The advent of digital 
media has turned the media landscape upside down. The news 
cycle moves at lightning speed, thanks to live tweeting, blogging 
and citizen journalism, all unknown just a few years ago”.   In a bid 
to stay relevant, Shelly further asserts, practitioners are fast adapt-
ing to the ways and methods of the new media, especially that 
aspect which allows interactiveness and feedback mechanism. 
This has been more critical in Africa where the task of the media 
rests in the bulk of    institutionalization and deepening of democ-
racy. Since the media, both conventional and new, play a critical 
role in social equilibrium, peoples all over the world rely on the 
media for credible information that can in turn provoke informed 
and civil debates that will ultimately transform their societies. This 
was and has been the role of the media in Nigeria and South Af-
rica. 
A Note on the New Media 
The phrase ‘new media’, can trace its popularity to a 2005  con-
ference which drew  attention  to the conversation surrounding 
the future of e-government and the role that social media, new 
media and online communication would play. It is a drastic and 
dramatic movement from the print and electronic media to the 
use of the internet which Tambini (1999) calls “the third sphere”, 
and where communication now goes away from the control of the 
state; where it  is free from the bound of commerce and has be-
come a platform where free public deliberations occur. 
The following interaction of Thomas Keenan presents an inter-
esting way of establishing the concept of the new media.  Cited 
in Chun and Keenan (2006), it presents a simplistic and interactive 
way of understanding the phenomenon:  
When I explore the web, I follow the cursor, a tangible sign of presence 
implying movement. This motion structures a sense of liveliness, of im-
mediacy, of the now. I open up my “personalized” site at MSNBC: via 
“instant” traffic maps (which, the copy tells me, “agree within a minute 
or two” to real time), synopses of “current” weather conditions, and 
individualized news bits, the Web site repeatedly foregrounds its cur-
rency, its timeliness, its relevance to me. A frequently changing ticker-
tape scroll bar updates both headlines and stock quotes, and a flashing 
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target floats on my desktop, signaling “breaking news” whenever my 
PC’s on, whether or not a Web browser is open. The numerous polls 
or surveys that dot MSNBC’s electronic landscape (they’re called “live 
votes”) promise that I can impact news in an instant; I get the results 
right away, no need to wait for the 10 p.m. broadcast. Just click. Imme-
diate gratification. (Chun and Keenan, 2006, p.201)
The invention of the internet has over the years given a new 
dimension to the operation of the media. The internet provides 
some form of unparalleled avenue to the generality of people 
trained and untrained, to disseminate information quickly and 
cheaply across the world. Some scholars describe the availabili-
ty of the new media as a way of compensating the people with 
alternative means of democratizing their opinion, having for de-
cades suffered from media monopolies orchestrated by the own-
ership of traditional media forms by very few commerce oriented, 
large companies which have frustrated the diversity of opinions 
that are expressed in established media in order to aid democracy 
(Muller 2014).  The free use of the web for information dissemina-
tion, however, implies that news read therein cannot be deemed 
reliable as they may be posted by ill-informed, untrained persons 
and sometimes robots.  Muller adds that “while some political ob-
servers have discussed the potential of internet voting and cam-
paign material distribution to rejuvenate interest in voting and in 
political activism, others have argued that the tendency of internet 
websites to engage in shallow political humor and parody is more 
likely to foster cynicism than to combat it” (2014, 17). Indeed, the 
rapid development of the Internet and its proliferation of use all 
over the world is a big concern. 
But  the use of the  social media via websites  platforms has 
expanded the frontier of political knowledge and  information dis-
semination and, according to Bokor (2014), has led to a major par-
adigm shift from the old to the new media with almost unimag-
inable  changes in both the way information  content is received 
as opposed to sent (cited in  Pavlik and McIntosh  2011, p.68). 
Bokor (2014, 11) adds that “The old media provided a unidirec-
tional model of flow of information, a sort of one-way communi-
cation that is largely centralized and devoid of   facilities by which 
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the audience interact with one another on the information they 
receive”. This is what the newspapers, the magazines, the televi-
sion, the radio, telegraphy, telephony, photography and all sorts 
do. However, with social media instruments such as the Facebook, 
the Twitter and the Pinterest through which users are able to de-
sire and share with both selected and general audience,  the   new 
media “radically break the connection between physical place and 
social place, making physical location much less significant for our 
social relationships” (Croteau and Hoynes 2003, p.311).
Internet and Social Media Use in Nigeria and South Africa
All over the world, more and more people are making use of 
the internet, both in and outside of the work settings; and this 
activity is growing at geometric progression. As at November 
2016, the figure of global Internet active users was 3,495,349,351 
(Berners-Lee, 2016). Statista (2017) reported that as at April 2017, 
the global figure of Internet active users was 3.81 billion, while 
2.91 billion were social media users and still counting. This means 
global Internet active users are now over the 3 billion mark equal-
ing 51% global population (Statista, 2017). Berners-Lee (2016) and 
Kemp (2016) contended that number of internet users equaled 
46% global population.
By 2016, total users of the Internet in Nigeria were over 86 mil-
lion (86,219,965) while in South Africa, they were over 28 million 
(28,580,290) – more than half the population in both countries. 
In another account, Internetworldstats (2017) recorded that by 
March 2017, total users of the Internet in Nigeria were over 93 
million (93,591,174) while in South Africa, they were over 28 mil-
lion (28,580,290). Also, global statistics show that more than half 
of planet earth now owns a mobile phone, with Internet and so-
cial media access exceeding 3.6 billion (Kemp, 2014). Mobile social 
media use is also on the rise with 2.31 billion social media users, 
delivering 31% global population (Kemp, 2016) and with 77% of 
all social networking users now accessing via mobile devices (Ber-
ners-Lee, 2016). In South Africa alone, over a quarter of all South 
Africans - 13 million people - now use Facebook (Statista, 2016).
Since the inception of the Internet and integration of email 
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technology into personal and work lives, ways of communicating 
began to change. However, it was not until the creation of social 
media interfaces like Facebook, Twitter, Instagram, Whatsapp, Ba-
doo, Snapchat, MySpace, LinkedIn, YouTube and other similar ap-
plications that we started seeing such a massive harnessing of the 
potential of the now-pervasive online connectivity in our everyday 
lives.
Media and Elections 
There is little need repeating the role of elections in democracy. 
In fact, election is so much of a pillar of democracy that a scholar-
has equated the two (Bidson, 2004). Elections are a major demo-
cratic exercise in which the media can contribute positively or oth-
erwise. In a way, the influence of traditional patrons, parties and 
institutions (like churches) on the electoral process is fast dimin-
ishing as the society becomes increasingly modern and the media 
becomes ever more pervasive. Gladiatorial politicians and political 
parties do their campaigns and advocacy through the mediaand 
this has some economic implications as electioneering campaigns 
are increasingly getting expensive in many countries.  The cost of 
television and newspaper advertisement is colossal, and it often 
accounts for the largest budget of elections. This is because can-
didates that are well-funded often stand a good chance of being 
elected because, in the words of Coronel (2015), “they can buy 
air time and newspaper space, and, in some countries...also bribe 
journalists and editors who endorse their candidacies in various 
ways using various strategies”. 
As one strong pillar of democracy, the media play an imperative 
role in influencing political discourse in the period of elections. In 
a participatory democracy, almost all citizens get their news and 
information from the media. The media colours people’s obser-
vation and subsequently process their political information about 
coverage of elections. The traditional media (print and broadcast), 
for instance can foster transparency and balance dissemination 
of important electoral information. The new media, on the oth-
er hand, provides additional means and possibilities for citizens 
to participate, acquire information and share knowledge. That is 
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what one sees in the functions of such internet sources as social 
media sites, blogs, email and other new platforms. Combined, the 
traditional and new media play the all important roles of watch-
dog and platform for campaign and avenue for public debates 
during elections (Elchahabi, Samer, 2015).    
Media Performance in Different Countries 
Performance of the media differs from one country to the other, 
especially when measured through the yardsticks of information 
dissemination, being a watchdog, and education of the public that 
have been exhaustively discussed above (Norris, 2000). Not very 
many social scientists, especially political scientists and sociolo-
gists will be surprised with this because of their taken for granted 
knowledge that the character of every state or society will inev-
itably color the behavior of institutions and structures found in 
it (Kari, 2013).  Suffice to say that the nature and character of a 
state determine the performance or otherwise of the media in that 
state. These nature and character in question have to do with the 
emergence of the state. 
Alfan (2013) asserts that the mass media provide a structure of 
the dominant class in every society. It is used to disseminate their 
values to the entire society through hegemonic means, and that 
is why the character of the dominant class would necessarily color 
that of the media. Muller (2014) did a comparison of democratic 
media performance in about forty five countries which reveals a 
considerable variation with different patterns identified.  Muller 
observes that “Although some countries may be ascribed a higher 
overall degree of media performance than others...It seems that 
optimizing both media functions at the same time is only feasi-
ble up to a certain point. Countries perform badly or moderately 
on both functions, or outstandingly on just one of the functions” 
(2014, 5).
In a nutshell, the  younger  democratic states  within the sample 
generally lag behind (especially the Eastern European, Asian and 
Latin American cases, but also some Southern European countries), 
while  different patterns of media performance can be observed 
with respect to the more mature democracies. Muller adds that 
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theextent of  political information provided by the media, what he 
calls “the vertical function”,  appears  to be well entrenched among 
Anglo-Saxon,  Scandinavian countries and then Japan, while the 
Anglo Saxon countries, the United States of America notably, are 
generally rated the worst  when it comes to media performance. 
On the contrary, however,  the ability of the media to represent 
the public sphere at all times appears to be better entrenched in 
Austria, Germany, Switzerland  and a host of other central-western 
European countries. In the final analysis, Muller’s patterns, which 
are premised upon content and structural consideration as well 
as  the structural and the content levels, expressly reveal that “a 
country’s performance on the structural level has an impact on 
its performance on the content level, thereby suggesting that the 
two levels are not independent of each other. The systemic condi-
tions that media outlets operate in also appear to influence their 
news coverage” Muller (2014, 5-6).
Analysis of How South Africans and Nigerians used the Me-
dia in the 2014 and 2015 General Elections
As earlier declared, this chapter focuses on the extent to which 
the media play their watchdog role by informing and educating 
people on  elections. It also tries to address which,  between the 
digital media and the traditional mass media, has more influen-
ceon the people when it comes to elections in contemporary times. 
It also addresses how the media have contributed to successful 
conduct of elections and the overall development of democracy 
in Nigeria and South Africa based on the two general elections of 
the two countries. Put differently, effort is targeted towards es-
tablishing the extent to which the media performed the watchdog 
roles during these elections, and which form of the media did the 
subject matter of media as watchdog during elections through 
primary gathered from respondents. The actual work done in the 
data gathering was an exploration of the disposition of Nigerians 
and South Africans towards the media and during the elections of 
2014 in South Africa and 2016 in Nigeria.  
Limitations
Time was a major constraint in this study, considering what 
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is required to compare the scenarios of the two large countries 
involved. This limitation made the researchers restrict the study 
to Lagos, Nigeria and Mafikeng, South Africa. Sampling carried 
out in the two locations was augmented with an in-depth analy-
sis of literature in the foregoingbefore arriving at conclusions. In 
other words, the quantitative part of the study was conducted in 
the University of Lagos, Nigeria, and the North West University, 
Mafikeng, South Africa. The research investigated the relationship 
and experience that people had with the old and new media in the 
general elections of their countries. In this, reading of newspaper 
and using tweeters, Facebook and other online sources are active-
ly involved. This inevitably restricts the audience to the educated 
ones, and explains the choice of universities as location. 
Sampling Procedure and Size 
The researchers adopted probability method, and used the sys-
tematic sampling procedure in which every tenth person within 
the stream of people available on the two campuses were inter-
vIewed through the questionnaires. This enabled the researchers 
to attract respondents that cut across categories of the educated 
people. Two hundred questionnaire copies were separately dis-
tributed in Nigeria and South Africa. Nigeria had a higher return of 
167 while South Africa was 156. Perhaps due to the simple nature 
of the questionnaire, and the fact that the researchers persuaded 
respondents to fill in the questionnaireon the spot, all instruments 
filled in and submitted were valid.
TABLE 1.1. BIOGRAPHIC PROFILE OF PARTICIPANTS









Nigeria 104 93 160 7 29 138 142 25
South 
Africa 
97 59 117 39 40 116 111 45
From responses generated from the questionnaire, all respon-
dents used the media for their political knowledge and informa-
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tion, both in Nigeria and in South Africa. They relied on media in-
formation on such issues as profiles of the contesting candidates 
and their political parties, date of elections at different levels, why 
participating in the elections is necessary, and giving their own 
opinions on an array of issues regarding the elections. As a result 
of this, the researchers take absolutevalue because the number 
of the questionnaire copies validly returned differed in the two 
countries. 
A total of 81 respondents from Nigeria received and relied on 
elections information from the new media sources such as the 
Facebook, Twitter and WhatsApp while the rest 86 relied more 
on the conventional media: newspapers, radio and television.  In 
South Africa, 134 respondents got and relied on elections infor-
mation through the new media such as the Facebook, Twitter and 
WhatsApp while the rest 22 relied more on the conventional me-
dia: newspapers, radio and television.   
Media Use in Nigeria 
Use of the media for political knowledge   and information in 
2015 and 2014, increased electoral participation in South Africa 
more that in Nigeria. 
160 out of the 167 respondents in Nigeria agreed that the use 
of the new media increased their participation in the 2015 elec-
tions, while in South Africa, only 88 out of the 156 so agree. Extra 
comments added under the questionnaire reveal a high degree of 
disillusionment on the part of South Africans towards the attitudes 
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of politicians who contested during the elections. This disagrees 
with the line of argument that “Peoples’ use of the media for po-
litical knowledge   and information in 2015 and 2014 increased 
electoral participation in South Africa more than in Nigeria.
Participation in Elections of 2014 and 2016 due to 
Media Use
Discussion of Findings
As earlier stated, discussions from the foregoing findings will 
be supplemented by analysis of literature to arrive at conclusions. 
The above responses to questionnaires indicate that 
1. Nigerians and South Africans use, as well as partner with the 
media as watchdog in democracy and the entire polity. This was 
also true during the last general elections of 2015 and 2014. 
2. While both Nigerians and South Africans rely more on the 
new media for political information during elections, South Afri-
cans rely more on the new media than Nigerians. This might not 
be unconnected to better availability of electricity and internet 
technology in South Africa compared to Nigeria, and it provides 
another area that demands research inquiry. 
3. That while generally the use of the media increased political 
participation among Nigerians and South Africans alike, as far as 
the 2014 elections are concerned in South Africa, a high level of 
disillusionment and seeming apathy greeted the participation of 
Abiodun Salawu & Kayode Eesuola
410
Watchdogs or Captured Media? . . . 
the people. High number of South Africans got information and 
monitored processes of the 2014 elections through the media but 
this did not manifest in high participation in the elections. What 
this implies is that using the media for political purposes does 
not on its own contribute to increased political participation; other 
dominant issues at stake in the polity appear to be more potent. In 
Nigeria, for instance, the issues of insecurity, economic depression 
and corruption provoked high level of participation among the 
people, irrespective of the lower use of the new media due to the 
problem of electricity. What was at stake in South Africa in 2014 
was totally different, and even with the higher use of the new and 
the old media compared to Nigeria, a lower participation in the 
election was recorded. 
4. While the above is true, it does not necessarily mean a signif-
icant improvement in the political development of the two coun-
tries under study. The idea insinuated by this, that   politicians, 
once elected into the office, hardly ever follow the programs and 
promises upon which they are elected, is virtually manifested in 
the two countries today under Presidents Buhari and Jacob Zuma. 
This is subject to debatethough. 
To discuss the above in line with literature,  it is noteworthy that 
many scholars: Bennett and Entman (2001), Coleman and Blumler 
(2009), Hindman (2009), Norris (2001), Shane (2004), and Wilhelm 
(2000),  have earlier studied the  connection between politics and 
the new media, as against the conventional or the analogue me-
dia. Of them all, Coleman and Blumler (2009) attempted to high-
light the pros and cons of the Internet vis a vis how it will influ-
ence the future relationship between general citizens and political 
gladiators, and between the two and the entire political system. 
That being stated, almost all of the foregoing scholars have some 
optimistic  assurance that the new media and the Internet  would 
foster a deeper  relationship between citizens and politicians; 
without stating the exact dimension of the relationship though; 
but the optimism changed as most of these researchers observe 
that with the new media, the result is  states’ loss of control over 
information dissemination, and general reduction of interests in 
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general politics, as well as  how unequal  access to the Internet 
would imply unequal access to political information. 
From the forgoing one can expressly deduce that the new me-
dia now occupy a conspicuous and strategic space in the realm of 
politics, especially by significantly altering how the general pub-
lic receive and consume information. Of all spheres of politics in 
which the new media may have effect, elections as one of the most 
important structures of democracy remains outstanding, and this 
is what this chapter has focused on. The question can then be put: 
How did political parties in South Africa use the new media in the 
2014 national election, starting from campaign to declaration of 
winners? 
Swanson and Mancini (1996) observe that of all periodic activi-
ties in a democracy, election periods remain the most critical and 
fundamental, as far as democracy is concerned. This is the period 
when stakeholders and political parties present the best of their 
strategies and programs to the public as a prelude to the latter’s 
vote for or against the party in what  determines selection of  deci-
sion makers, shapes policies and re-allocates power and resources 
within the political system. 
The new media make a great impact on voters and what they 
expect from parties they vote or do not vote for. In the past, all 
information needed about parties and their candidates were ob-
tained at political rallies, party advocates, radio, televisions and 
newspapers.With the new media now, however, there is a remark-
able increase in the use of the Internet as an information source, 
upon which majority of the people now regularly rely as source 
of information that is often needed to take informed political de-
cisions. During electioneering campaigns, the new media play a 
very important role in creating public awareness over the position, 
history and integrity level of   candidates; as well as their campaign 
strategies, plans and positions. Apart from that, the media give 
clues to the general public about the ideological orientations - if 
any- of  political parties and their candidates, after all, as  declared 
Funkhouser (1973, 12), “the average person takes the media’s 
word for what the ‘issues’ are, whether or not he personally has 
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any involvement or interest in them”. In their study, Williams and 
Gulati (2008) analyzed the impact of new media on electoral out-
come and summarize that online campaign activity is an import-
ant additional indicator of candidate viability that is independent 
of traditional measures like expenditures, media coverage and 
organizing activities.  As further analyzed by Williams and Gulati 
(2008), the aspect of online campaign is another important aspect 
of the new media; that if a candidate has a well  integrated and 
clear  packaging, through online campaigning  he or she is likely 
to generate a huge positive response.
This study has indeed established the potency of the media as a 
watchdog in democracy. It has also shown that the new media are 
fast overtaking the traditional one in playing the role of watchdog. 
From the two countries studied, the watchdog function of the me-
dia, when performed, has the potency of increasing political par-
ticipation of the people, as is expected of any democracy, but this 
does not place the people in the control of their governments 
because politicians in the two countries still find a way to deviate 
significantly from political promises and programmes once they 
get to the office. Based on this issue, it is high time that the media 
extend the watchdog role to very proactive levels where they can 
hold politicians accountable for their election promises without 
necessarily waiting for periodic elections. Exactly how this will be 
dome is unknown yet and can form a basis of new research in the 
media, but somehow it has to be done in order to add significant 
value to the role of the media as watchdog in a democracy. 
Ultimately, evidences from the study throw up the conclusion 
that the media in both countries under study are indeed watch-
dogs, not captured.  This is without prejudice to the issues of rela-
tivity and grades as the level of advancement of media use differs 
between Nigeria and South Africa. In spite of the difference in 
levels, peoples of the two countries partner with the media on 
political knowledge and political information, and they are quite 
proactive in giving feedbacks and acting politically based on the 
information they receive from and send to the media. 
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CONCLUSION: Glancing Backwards, 
Looking Forward
Ayo Olukotun
The issues in focus
This chapter recapitulates by backward glances at the contribu-
tions of the scholars and  brings together some of the issues that 
have been raised and analyzed within the context of the problem-
atic alluded to by the title of the book, as to whether the Nigeri-
an media have remained alert watchdogs of power or its lapdogs 
and captive praise singers. It then goes on by way of synthesis to 
broach scenarios as well as policy prescriptions to make what is 
undoubtedly, a far from healthy watchdog into a more robust and 
vigilant one.
It is no news but a staple, even cliché of our generation that ours 
is preeminently the age of the media. Illustratively, we can under-
line the statement by drawing attention to the growing, almost 
pervasive use of personal computers, rapid internet penetration in 
Nigeria and many African countries, spaces, which Castels (1997) 
once described as switch-off from the Information Superhigh-
13
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way; the spreading use of smartphones, as well as digital forms 
of communication. In the United States, President Donald Trump 
has mainstreamed the deployment of social media, in particular, 
Twitter, to create a bully pulpit, as well as steer up controversies 
nationally and globally. Television is often described as the fifth 
Estate of the Realm while social media is seen by some as the sixth. 
Indeed the Italian sociologist, Castel, has argued in a seminar tril-
ogy that the information technology revolution has introduced a 
new mode of production, which has bearing for wealth generation 
and importantly, for the distribution and exercise of power within 
nations and in the global community (Castels, 2000). 
Obviously, this innovative development and media pervasive-
ness have differential impacts in the developed world and the de-
veloping nations of Africa. What the contributors to this book have 
sought to document and analyze is the way and manner in which 
the accelerating developments in media and communication are 
affecting as well being affected by political transitional changes in 
Nigeria’s semi democracy. In particular and considering the excit-
ing role of the media in bringing about democratic transitions in 
most African countries, including Nigeria, the book grapples with 
the question of how much the media in Nigeria–for comparative 
guidance, we also deal with Kenya, Ghana and South Africa – have 
contributed to the enlargement of the democratic space and civic 
discourse by holding elected leaders to minimum standards of 
accountability.
Revisiting the performance debate
The title of the book poses the issue, somewhat sharply, by 
raising the poser and question of whether the media have enabled 
our emerging democracy through  their watchdog role or whether 
they have descended into a captive institution, the ventriloquist 
of the establishment, barking feebly but unable to bite. It should 
be noted that in Nigeria, the 1999 constitution, which compared 
to Ghana’s 1992 constitution, is a bit too reticent on media free-
dom, nonetheless, mandates the media in Section 22 to monitor 
governance and to hold elected officials accountable to the elec-
torate. The question, around which the book is organized, there-
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fore, is not arbitrary, but one that derives from the constitutional 
responsibility of the media to play the role of an active watchdog 
of democracy. Anecdotally, one can illuminate the issues in focus 
by recalling that in a television program aired on Channels Televi-
sion on 13th January, 2018, political economist scholar and public 
intellectual, Professor Pat Utomi alluded to a discussion on the 
role of the media by mentioning that that once vibrant institution 
has virtually gone to sleep. Utomi went on to rehash the view of 
a discussant who said that “Once I pick up a Nigerian newspaper, 
one of the main questions I am asking is who has paid for the sto-
ries that are published in it”. This, of course, may be an exagger-
ation, but in the absence of opinion polls to determine just much 
the media has cascaded downwards in public esteem, it remains 
a rough and ready gauge of what some concerned intellectuals 
think about the media. In this respect, and as Lanre Idowu points 
out in his chapter, the media cannot afford to capsize to economic 
challenges to such an extent of becoming the butt of widespread 
cynicism and sardonic jokes about its performance.
To be sure, corruption of media is not peculiar to Nigeria or 
Africa; it is a global problem, which as a recent publication which 
looks at the issue in eighteen countries makes clear, is related to 
“government, unscrupulous politicians, overweening powers of 
corporations regularly brought to bear on newsrooms” (White, 
2015:1). The issue, however, is whether corruption is pervasive 
enough in the Nigerian media to have rendered it a totally cap-
tive institution. As some chapters in the book suggest, the media 
in an age of recession have become individually and collectively 
vulnerable to seductive gratification. Nonetheless, it is possible to 
discern counter narratives to the story of unmitigated corruption 
especially in the quality press, which have been known to sack 
senior editorial personnel over allegations of corruption. The case 
referred to occurred at the Punch when the former Chairman, Mr 
Ajibola Ogunsola fired a senior editorial personnel. As Ogunsola 
told the story (Ikiebe 2015; 334):
He was the chairman of the editorial board. We were at the meeting 
of the Nigerian Proprietor’s Association (NPAN) in Vanguard which 
Ayo Olukotun
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hadn’t even started. We were having preliminary discussions in Uncle 
Sam Amuka’s room. That was where I heard that there was this thing 
at Babangida’s place and that the editors went including the editor of 
Punch. And I said it’s not possible. And then I found out. The chairman, 
Editorial Board…
Obviously, therefore, and as the audacity and the integrity of 
the independently-owned Channels TV illustrates, the media and 
their performance cannot be fixed into one ugly strait-jacket of 
a corrupt and auctionable media. As the book demonstrates, the 
Nigerian media are increasingly keeping abreast of technologi-
cal changes, as well as development in New Media with the rapid 
growth of the Online Media as well as the fact that virtually every 
newspaper and broadcast station has an online section which at-
tempts to globalise their content to varying degrees. It can hard-
ly be otherwise, considering that the presidency and the legisla-
ture these days not only appoint personnel for Social Media, but 
actively employ Facebook and Twitter to communicate with the 
citizenry. Hopefully, these developments will be all the more ac-
celerated with the completion of the transition of the broadcast 
media in Nigeria from analogue to digital. The transition as well 
from a media in jaws of an authoritarian hangover vulnerable to 
the abuse of power by political authorities – as documented in 
the chapter by Prof. Ogbondah, to a freer and unfettered media 
needs to be completed. Nigeria continues to rank low on several 
human rights and press freedom charts and for virtually all the 
years between 1999 and 2016 is rated as partially free, while Gha-
na, for most of those years is rated free by the United States-based 
Freedom House. 
In this regard, the passing of the Freedom of Information Act 
by the National Assembly in 2011, as documented by the chapter 
by Edaetan Ojo, created a momentum in this direction, although 
the indications are that journalists and civil society activists are not 
taking advantage of these potential, while most Nigerian political 
and public institution are yet to embrace the culture of openness, 
which the FOI canvasses.  Nonetheless, the media in Nigeria are 
unlikely to succumb to the kind of censorship alluded to by Dr. 
Kimani in the chapter on Kenya. It is also interesting to note that 
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the competition in Nigeria for power and resources among large 
ethnic groups thus creates a balance of terror, which has prevent-
ed the emergence of one man or one party dictatorship and con-
sequently, of overt clamping down on the media.
Talking about ethnic competition, the two chapters in the book 
that take up these important issues suggest that all too often the 
framing of ethno-religious conflicts by media in different geo-
graphical regions tend to stoke the fires of such conflicts rather 
than douse them. A watchdog media properly so called will be less 
susceptible to manipulation by politicians and partisan groups 
which seek to control the media narratives in periods of ethno-re-
ligious conflicts. Nigeria, as an unsteady federation, where the na-
tional question is often raised, has a long way to go in training 
journalists to do conflict-sensitive reporting, avoid the publication 
of hate speeches as well as counter the challenge of fake news, 
which has tended to increase with the proliferation of social me-
dia outlets. Obviously, associations such as the Nigeria Union of 
Journalists, the Nigerian Guild of Editors and the Newspaper Pro-
prietors Association and the Broadcasting Organisations of  Ni-
geria have prominent roles to play in capacity building directed 
at media vulnerability to manipulation in times of ethno-religious 
conflicts and elections. In this connection, the statement made by 
former president, General Olusegun Obasanjo in August 2016 is 
of note: “Nigeria is increasingly polarised and divided along ethnic 
lines with the press fanning embers of division and separation.” 
Considering that that the survival of the media is intertwined with 
the survival of the Nigerian nation state, the media themselves 
should create monitors, which can expose and limit the damage 
that can be done by inflammatory reporting and the promotion of 
sectarian and sectional interests by the media.
In other words, taking into account that the Nigeria 1999 Con-
stitution explicitly mandates a national outlook and federal char-
acter by spelling out consociational remedies, the media while 
not submitting to self-censorship should consciously cultivate 
and promote trans-ethnic and inclusive mindsets and approaches 
that mainstream diversity reporting. As I have pointed out else-
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where, the media, their constraints notwithstanding can act as the 
bell-whether of democracy and improved governance by drawing 
attention to issues of accountability, pushing government towards 
greater respect for human rights, including those of minorities 
and marginalized groups, exposing corruption and rent-seeking 
behaviors and by setting the agenda for public discourse in such 
way that captures these fundamental issues (Olukotun, 2000).
Before getting to policy recommendations, it is pertinent to 
mention that, as argued in the chapter on economic and tech-
nological issues the biting recession of the last couple of years 
has thrown the media, state and private, into more distress with 
the consequent mortality of media institutions as well as degen-
eration in the working condition of journalists. The media will not 
be taken seriously as long as they are reduced to a Begging-bowl 
syndrome in which they supplicate, either as individuals or as in-
stitutions for bailouts from the high and mighty. The increasing 
practice of putting journalists on the payroll of government and 
corporation for the purpose of media management can only re-
sult in a further deepening of the incorporation of journalists into 
national frameworks of spoils-sharing and distribution of the so-
called national cake.
Policy prescriptions and recommendations
As mentioned in the introductory chapter, the idea of the me-
dia as a healthy and robust watchdog connotes such activities as 
a scaling up of investigative journalism, exposures of scandals in 
high places, muckraking, as well as the maintenance of a vigil of 
sort over the activities of elected officials, undoubtedly, the quality 
press and sections of independent television have risen to the ad-
vocacy and watchdog billings of the media in the current period of 
democracy. Although these activities and orientation fall short of 
the magnificent anti-military role that the media once played, the 
flames of daring and investigative journalism continue to flicker 
now and again. Ready examples that come to mind include the 
united opposition of the press to General Obasanjo’s Third Agen-
da which sought to elongate his rule illegally, the exposure of the 
derelict character of the Nigerian Police College, Ikeja, by Chan-
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nels Television under the Jonathan Administration, the opposition 
to profligacy and squander mania of President Goodluck Jonathan 
years, as well as the insistence of a section of the media that the 
former Secretary to Government of the Federation, Mr. David Ba-
chir Lawal must step aside because of his involvement in what has 
become known as the grass-cutting scandal, encapsulating the 
payment of millions of Naira for cutting grass at some of the in-
ternally displaced person camps in Borno State. Indeed, it is inter-
esting to note that under the Buhari administration, which made 
the fight against corruption a flagship project, the Nigerian media 
have been active in extending the tepid borders and outlook of 
that agenda, especially in cases where government was reluctant 
to sanction unethical behavior on the part of its appointees. It has 
done this by the publication of front page news, as well as editorial 
opinions, which have made it difficult for government to backtrack 
on its own self-appointed role as the nation’s official crusader.
Given that fact, it is difficult to uphold a verdict that the media 
have become a captured institution, though without doubt, the 
opportunities for self-actualisation within the multiplying bureau-
cracies of Nigeria’s expensive democracy, the appointment of star 
journalists as information personnel, the poor pay and low self-es-
teem of journalists, the lack of human resource organisation and 
ethos within the media accentuated by the rapid collapse of me-
dia institutions have all resulted in cooptation of critical segment 
of society, the media especially, into Nigeria’s notoriously corrupt 
governmental system. For a nation, which regularly features at the 
bottom league of Transparency International’s tables, it is hardly 
surprising that corruption has increased in the media in the period 
under study. For example, Mr. Steve Ojo, one of the founders of 
private television in Nigeria argued that: 
There are a number of television stations that retain state governments 
as clients. In other words, any information those governors have, they 
have to cover them. Galaxy will not accept that. We will not be tied to 
the apron strings of anybody, including governors, because the point 
is this, if a governor retains you to promote him, how can you criticize 
his governance when he is not doing right? We balance our news and 
make sure we do not get money from anybody simply to survive (The 
Media coverage of Ethno-religious Conflicts in Nigeria: Another Perspective
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Punch, April 30, 2005, P.A24).
However, as indicated in other sections of the book, there are 
hopeful tendencies which portend that this is not a problem with-
out solutions. Therefore, the media themselves must become 
more sensitive to corruption within their own ranks, so that they 
can be more credible when they subject other Estates of the Realm 
to critical scrutiny. The Freedom of Information Act remains  an 
important step forward in enhancing the watchdog role of the 
media. To enhance its exciting possibilities, it is suggested that the 
media should  submit  regularly requests for information to public 
institutions and private entities covered by the Act, and thereafter 
document and report on their experiences on how much relevant 
institutions satisfy the requirements of the Law. They should also 
carry out a systematic assessment of the level of compliance by 
public institutions with various actions mandated by the law and 
issue reports of their findings. 
On the subject of corruption, Lanre Idowu’s paper is replete 
with policy suggestions, which media managers and authorities 
will do well to consider. For example, he suggests the need to 
publish the infraction of journalistic codes through naming and 
shaming mechanisms. In other words, just as outstanding journal-
ists receive awards based on performance, the media should insti-
tute Halls of Shame; perhaps, along the lines of what Media Rights 
Agenda is currently doing, with a view to going public with ethical 
infractions. Obviously, no serious anti-corruption in the media can 
succeed as long as employers of journalists continue to default on 
salaries. In this regard, therefore, Idowu’s suggestion that media 
proprietors should be compelled by legal means to pay their staff, 
regularly and well enough, should be seen as an antidote to jour-
nalistic corruption. Apart from that, the famous beat association 
which has developed into infamous cartels can be broken. Idowu 
suggests that it is not just enough to train journalists well, they 
should be moved around beats periodically. That is another way of 
saying that, rather than allow reporters to entrench themselves in 
certain beats, newsroom managers should ensure that they abort 
the cartelisation of beats by redeployment of journalists across 
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beats. Of course, the debit side of this proposal is that beats will 
lack the expertise of journalists who have developed ties with news 
sources. However, this drawback is more than compensated for by 
the gains in a more sanitized newsroom environment.
Regarding the emergent digital media sector, it is important 
that the communicative and participatory emphasis of these media 
genre should be rescued from the possibilities of the kind of com-
mercialisation and emphasis on soft/human interest stories, which 
Oso and Akanni argue have rendered the conventional media less 
effective as participatory and accessible along the lines suggested 
by Jugen Habermas. That apart, the dangers of fake news, imper-
sonation, over-politicisation, and the carryover of ethnic and reli-
gious conflicts should be countermanded through campaigns and 
enforcement of existing regulations. In this connection, Oso and 
Akanni referred to the recent circulation of a fake version of Bu-
hari’s speech at the 2017 United Nations General Assembly, which 
was disseminated on some popular blogs in Nigeria. Even when 
we grant that fake news is a menace around the globe, society 
must show a healthy awareness of its dangers by treating it in the 
same way as it should deal with open corruption and the brown 
envelop syndrome in the media. In the same vein, the presidency 
dissociated itself from and condemned a fake tweet credited to 
Buhari in the wake of the mass killings in Benue State in January, 
2018, featuring justifying the attack on Benue farmers (The Nation, 
Janury 14, 2018).
Regarding television and radio, it is obvious that there is too 
much of a gap between privately-owned and state-owned broad-
casting. One dimension of this problem is in the huge amount 
paid by independent broadcasters, especially television, to the 
National Broadcasting Commission as license fees. These tend to 
make entry cost to the industry high and crippling for private sec-
tor operatives, who for now, are more credible than state-owned 
broadcasters that tend to pander to the whims and caprices of 
presidents, governors and their wives. Another way of putting this 
is to say that the evolution of state-owned broadcasting into pub-
lic broadcasting has been stalled; hence, making it easy for the 
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temporary custodian of state power to control and manipulate 
political content. A graphic illustration of this misnomer was pro-
vided when the Nigerian Television Authority, within a few days of 
the announcement of the results 2015 General Election switched 
sharply from a pro-Jonathan news approach to a pro-Buhari news 
approach. For as long as the executive hires and fires state-owned 
media personnel, so long would it continue to dictate or at least 
control the content of state broadcasting. What is required here 
is the setting up of a National Media Commission along the lines 
of the Ghanaian example, which can act as buffers between the 
states and the editorial department of state broadcasting.
Regarding the issue of diversity reporting in the context of eth-
no-religious reporting, it is important that the media, as suggested 
by Dr. Danjibo, should be encouraged to invest more in the train-
ing and retraining of journalists as well as in investigative journal-
ism, which would make them report objectively in times of crisis. 
It is also essential that newspaper proprietors be encouraged to 
include diversity factor, gender, ethnic and religious, as a way of 
enhancing the abilities of media institutions to capture maginal-
ised groups. Something like this occurred a few years ago when 
the Guardian newspapers regularly flew in from Northeast Nige-
ria, a professor of political science to its editorial board meetings. 
The idea was to enhance diversity and to ensure that a Northern 
perspective of issues was part of the discussion. The present prac-
tice where newspapers are published in two or three locations is 
capable of enhancing diverse perspectives in reportage and edi-
torial contents generally, if aligned to an editorial object of report-
ing all the sides of a story. Important too, given Nigeria’s private 
sector-led public sphere is the need to build upon the emerging 
model of journalists becoming owners of media. This is capable of 
redefining journalism, as the success of Channels television and 
a clutch of online media, such as Premium Times and the Cable, 
both founded by former senior editors, have demonstrated. Fi-
nally, it has been suggested that the partisan public sphere can 
be reduced in influence and damaging potential if media owned 
by politicians experiment with or outrightly embrace a trusteeship 
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model, which distances the media from political control. This was 
successful in the 1990s when the former publisher of the Guard-
ian, Mr. Alex Ibru, put the newspaper under trusteeship when he 
was appointed as minister by the General Sanni Abacha adminis-
tration. This safeguarded the relative independence of that news-
paper from the government of the day, thereby enabling it to con-
tinue to stay at the cutting-edge of advocacy for political reform 
and democratisation.
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APPENDIX TO CHAPTER ELEVEN 
Research Instrument 
Research Questionnaire 
This is a questionnaire designed to measure which, between the traditional 
and the new media, contributes more to your involvement in the general elec-
tions in South Africa (2014) and Nigeria (2016). Please fill in the information 
based on the country to which you are responding. It is expected that you 
respond to every question by ticking the space that appropriately represents 
your view. Where you leave the space blank, the researcher assumes that you 
are unsure of the answer to provide.
Ethically, you are assured of absolute confidentiality of the information you 
give. Please do not write your name or institutional affiliation since whatever 
response you provide shall be used solely for the purpose of this research.
We thank you as you take a few minutes of your time to complete the ques-
tionnaire. The first question is the overall summary and we advise that you re-
spond to it last based on the belief that your response to others will assist your 
summary instincts. 
Country (Please tick as appropriate)
Nigeria      South Africa 
Bio data
Please provide us with your bio data in what follows. 
Gender  
(1) Male      (2) Female     (3) Others  
Religion  
(1) Popular Religions in Africa(if Christianity or Islam) 
(2) Other Religions  
Type of Residence 
(1) Rural/Semi Urban      (2) Urban/Cosmopolitan 
Current Engagement Status 
(1) Student     (2) State Employed     (3) Private Sector Employed   
(4) Self Employed   
Lowest Educational Qualification
(1) Doctoral    (2) Masters from University      (3) First Degree 
(4) High School  
Age Bracket 
18-23    24-29    30-35    36-40    40-50    50-60    60-70    











1. From which of the 
media did you get po-
litical knowledge that 
has direct bearing on 
the political develop-
ment of your country?
2. Where did you first 
get information about 
the last general elec-
tions in your country?
3. Through which 
of these did you 
first know about the 
political parties in the 
elections?
4. Through which of 
these did you first 
know about the   candi-
dates of the political 
parties?
5. Where did you get 
the most detailed infor-
mation about programs 
of the parties?
6. Through which of 
these media did you 
get best educated on 
the need to participate 
in the election?
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7. Which of these con-
stantly reminded you 
of the voting dates and 
other updates needed 
to participate in the 
election?
8. Through which of 
these did you receive 
the highest political 
campaign?
9. Which of the/.se 
means did you use to 
put your own political 
opinion to the public?
10. Which of these 
media did you use very 
frequently and on daily 
basis?
11. Through which of 
these did you receive 
your highest knowl-
edge about elections 
and  politics generally? 
12. Which of these 
stimulated your interest 
in voting?
13. From what source 
did you get elections 
results and count it 
real?
14. Through which 
means did you know 
the winners of the 
elections? 
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